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
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CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

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AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

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worship; and almost immediately on the arrival of a minister, they took measures for his ordination and support. Afterwards, when another company of colonists came, under Governor Winthrop, their first Court of Assistants, as it was called, was held in Charlestown, at which the first thing propounded was, how their ministers should be maintained. Towns and villages were planted from time to time in other places, and in every case, as soon as a sufficient number of persons were collected for the purpose, means were provided for social worship, and public instruction in morals and religion. This they did, as they said, 'that so the name of the Lord our God being known in our dwellings, and exalted in our gates, he may still delight in us, to continue his favorable presence with us, and our unparalleled enjoyments, both temporal and spiritual, which, through the rich mercy of God in Christ, hitherto we have enjoyed; and not be provoked through our profane slightings and despising thereof, to bereave us and our posterities of such choice mercies.' The expense, thus incurred, was defrayed at first by a voluntary contribution, and this continued to be the practice in Boston; but, in the country towns, it was soon found necessary to make it a public charge, and assess and collect it like the other taxes; and a law was passed for this purpose as early as 1654. So determined was the government, that no town should be without the benefit of religious institutions, that, by another law, in 1692, the Court of Sessions in every county was authorised, in case any town neglected to provide themselves with a minister, to put one over them, fix his salary, and levy it as a tax on the inhabitants.

For a long time the right of electing and dismissing the minister was in the hands of the church members exclusively; and it was expressly declared by statute, October 1668, that the minister thus elected was minister, not to the church only, but to the whole population of the place, all of whom were required to attend on his ministry, and contribute to his support. In the beginning there was no peculiar hardship or injustice in this practice, as the first planters were, almost without exception, communicants. The law required, therefore, little more than this;—that the same persons should support a minister as inhabitants of the town, whom they had previously called to that office as members of the church. Bésides, until 1665 none but church members were freemen, or citizens, and having no voice in the choice of civil officers, or in the affairs of the town,

they could hardly expect it in the choice of a minister, or in the affairs of the parish. Citizenship, however, was now extended to freeholders who were not communicants, and, meanwhile, a second and third generation were growing up with different habits and feelings; the consequence of which was, that, toward the close of the century, the communicants, instead of comprising all the legal voters in the parish, comprised but a part, and, in some places, but a minority. Under this change of circumstances, it was regarded as manifestly inconsistent and oppressive, that a whole parish should be compelled to support a minister, whom a majority of them, perhaps, had had no voice in electing, nay, when to a majority of them he was, perhaps, personally odious. Hence arose what has been termed the Parish Controversy, which was carried on for several years with considerable heat and violence on both sides. In 1692 the parishes triumphed; for, in this year, a law was passed declaring, 'that every minister, being a person of good conversation, able, learned, and orthodox, that shall be chosen by the major part of the inhabitants in any town, at a town meeting duly warned for that purpose, (notice thereof being given to the inhabitants fifteen days before the time of such meeting), shall be minister of such town, and the whole town shall be obliged to pay towards his settlement and maintenance, each man his several proportion.' The next General Court repealed this law, it is true, because of its inapplicability, as the statute recites, 'in divers towns, wherein there are more churches than one, and inconveniences attending the same not so well before seen.' But, after having repealed the existing law, for the reasons stated, they go on to pass another, securing to the parish the right of a concurrent vote. The church, as a church, must still lead in the election, by giving the candidate a call; but this act had no force, until the parish, as a parish, had voted to concur. It was further ordained, in 1695, that if a parish should refuse, in any case, to concur with the church in the election of a minister, the church might convoke an ecclesiastical council, and the approbation of this council, regularly called and conducted, would make the election legal and valid. This strange provision grew, perhaps, out of the feverishness of the times, or out of some temporary reaction in favor of the churches, or, more probably still, out of a fear, that parishes, from an unwillingness to incur the expense, might, in some cases, persist in exercising their veto, to prevent the set-

tlement of any minister. At any rate, the intrinsic odiousness of the law, or the circumstance that it was never intended but to be held up *in terrorem*, appears to have made it a dead letter from the beginning; for we do not find that it was ever enforced, or appealed to, in a single instance.

Such was the law at the adoption of the present Constitution of the State, in 1780, which, as is well known, by the third article of the Bill of Rights, guaranties to every parish or religious society, as they are exclusively responsible for the support of the minister, the exclusive right of electing him. Respect for an ancient usage, it is true, has, until lately, induced parishes almost universally to concede to the church the privilege of leading in the choice of a minister, and voting as a separate body. The church, however, in law, has no such right, and can claim it only as a matter of courtesy; for the parish is competent to call and settle a minister, not only without the consent of the church, but against the declared wishes and solemn remonstrance of every member of it. Communicants, of course, are not excluded from voting in the choice of a minister, for they have a right to vote, and do vote, as members of the parish; but the Constitution bars their right of voting twice on the same question, first in one capacity, and then in another. By enlarging the powers of parishes, however, it was not in the contemplation of government to release them, directly or indirectly, from the obligation to support religious institutions. Long afterwards, by a law still unrepealed, 'every corporate town, parish, precinct, district, and other body politic or religious society,' is required to be 'constantly provided with a public Protestant teacher of piety, religion, and morality;' and, in case any town, parish, or religious society neglects to make such provision for three months in six, it is liable to a fine of from thirty to sixty dollars, and to a fine of from sixty to one hundred dollars for every repetition of the offence.

When the Constitution was adopted, most of the parishes in the Commonwealth consisted exclusively of persons living within certain territorial limits. But the rise and spread of various sects soon led to the rapid multiplication of Poll Parishes; by which are meant parishes composed of persons living in different parts of the same town, or of neighbouring towns, who voluntarily unite for the support of religious worship, without respect to territorial limits of any kind, and sometimes even without much respect to vicinage. Nine tenths of the parishes

in the State are now virtually of this description, though in every town or precinct the first or oldest parish is understood to include all those who live within the limits of the town or precinct, and have not formally connected themselves with any other religious society. The laws, down to the commencement of the present century, threw many obstacles in the way of those who wished to leave the parish in which they were educated, and attach themselves to another, and made it necessary for them to obtain a formal license to do it from the General Court. Since that time it seems to have been the policy of the Legislature gradually to remove these obstacles, probably from the influence of sectaries in that body, or because such a change was thought to be required by justice or liberality, or as a party expedient. Accordingly, by a law passed in January 1800, and still more clearly and decisively by the Religious Freedom Act, as it is called, of 1811, it was ordained, that any citizen, merely on filing a certificate with the parish clerk, might leave one society and join another, on the ground that he was of a different religious sect or denomination. The same things are provided for still more effectually in the statute of 1823—the present law, which enacts that any person may at will, and merely on filing a certificate of the fact with the parish clerk, separate from one religious society, and connect himself with another, either of the same, or of a different sect, persuasion, or name. It even protects the property of non-residents, by declaring that no person shall 'be liable to pay any tax for the support of public worship, or other parochial charges, to any parish, precinct, or religious society other than that of which he is a member.' The Legislature also relinquishes all control over the multiplication of new parishes or religious societies, by making it competent for any ten or more legal voters, without an act of incorporation, to form themselves into such a society, merely by complying with certain legal forms in calling the first meeting.

We are next to notice, historically, some of the principal attempts, which have been made since the first settlement of the State, to disturb and break up regular parishes, and those especially of the Congregational order.

Most writers have been lavish in abuse of our forefathers, for their severe and intolerant measures against sectaries. It is but fair, however, in condemning the persecutors, to make allowance for the provocations which they received. The zeal-

ots, who began the troubles in the New England churches, were violent and headstrong men, who were not content with peaceably holding their own opinions, nor yet with calmly and modestly avowing and defending them, but saw fit, also, rudely to assail the religious institutions of the country. It was this which roused, not only the bigots, but the experienced and sober-minded statesmen, who, whatever might be said about the doctrines of Christianity, were not willing to see its institutions broken up and destroyed. They thought, and not without reason, that religious institutions, of some kind or other, were of the utmost importance, not only in a religious, but in a moral and political point of view; and they also believed that the parishes, as by law established, were the only effectual provision for this object, that would or could be made. This conviction often hurried them into extreme measures against whatever menaced the harmony or stability of the Congregational parishes. But it suggests, at the same time, as it seems to us, the best apology of which their conduct admits, proving that they were not actuated by bigotry alone, but by what they conceived to be a sound policy. It was not merely because the existing parishes were Congregational parishes, that many of them were so eager to beat back sectaries, but because they were the only existing parishes; and if these were broken up and destroyed, there would probably be nothing to supply their place, and the religious institutions of the country would be thrown into irretrievable disorder.

The first serious disturbance which the churches suffered, was that occasioned, in their very infancy, by Mrs Hutchinson and her followers. These uneasy and disaffected zealots sent their emissaries into every society, who insinuated themselves into the confidence of well-disposed, but weak-minded people, and exerted the influence thus obtained in fomenting differences, and undermining the good opinion generally entertained of the regular ministers and their preaching. It was a knowledge of these arts, and that they were constantly intriguing to disturb and break up the regular parishes, a thousand times more than their Antinomian errors, which awoke against them the public vengeance; and they were put down. The same is also true of Gorton, and the Familists, as they were called, and also of the first Quakers; for these fanatics were banished, or otherwise punished, not for their opinions merely, but as fierce or unmanageable disorganizers. Our fathers, at an in-

credible expense of toil, and tears, and blood, had succeeded in establishing civil and religious institutions, under the influence of which the wilderness had been converted into a fruitful garden. Was it to be expected, that they would let the boar out of the wood waste it, and the wild beast of the field devour it?

Next came the Baptists, a respectable sect, it is true, and one which has always numbered among its members some of the best men in the community. Still, it cannot be denied, that their first preachers amongst us, and those especially who scoured the country as missionaries, were, many of them, extremely ignorant, endeavouring to make up in zeal and clamor what they wanted in real weight and respectability. For a long time they poured out the bitterest scorn on human learning, considered as a preparation for the ministry, and launched their fiercest denunciations against older, wiser, and better men than themselves, whom they were pleased to stigmatize as hireling preachers; and by such proceedings offended and disgusted the judicious and sober-minded, almost to a man. If they were sometimes handled roughly, it was no more than what they had defied, and courted, and in some cases, we must say, richly deserved; not indeed for their opinions, or for avowing and propagating their opinions, but as disorganizers and incendiaries.

The first coming of Whitefield, in 1740, was another occasion on which the great body of the people and ministers rallied in support of existing religious institutions. It is true, the passage of this extraordinary man through the province, was almost like a continued triumph. But, when it was found that dissensions arose wherever he came; that he openly vilified the colleges and the clergy, and proposed himself as an example and patron of every kind of ecclesiastical irregularity,—the good sense of the people threw off the delusion, and a reaction took place, which saved the Congregational churches. Calvinists and Arminians, Trinitarians and Unitarians, felt that it was high time to combine their forces against men, who, whatever might be their pretensions to sincerity and piety, were certainly acting the part of disorganizers and schismatics. Time would fail us to speak of the Episcopalians, who advanced but slowly, as if opposed by the very genius of our institutions; of the Methodists, who came in upon us like a flood; or, lastly, of the Universalists, who, though comparatively a

recent sect, are now thought by some to have, or to be rapidly gaining a political influence equal to that of any other denomination. These sects had, of course, an undoubted right, and perhaps it was their duty, to use all fair and reasonable efforts and expedients for the diffusion of their sentiments. Still, as it seems to us, every friend of order, either in church or state, must regret the issue, when these endeavours have had no other effect than to disturb and break up the religious institutions already in existence, without establishing any others in their place. Any Christian, who has the good of his fellow-creatures at heart, will find but poor consolation for the failure of his plans, in reflecting, that, at any rate, he has broken up and destroyed the regular provision which the people had previously enjoyed for instruction in morals and piety.

After all, the mortal wound inflicted on Congregational ascendancy, was inflicted, as such wounds commonly are, in the house of its friends. From time immemorial, ministers and churches of this denomination had been of different persuasions on points deemed by some fundamental. This, however, though sometimes the occasion of sharp controversies, and partial and local estrangements, had never led to anything like a dismemberment of the sect. But, in 1814 and 1815, several publications appeared, impeaching the orthodoxy of some of the Congregational clergy, and accusing them of practising dishonest concealments, and calling on the people, in the words of the apostle,—'Wherefore, come out from among them, and be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing.' From that hour the ascendancy of Congregationalists, for some time the sole, and until then the predominant sect, was at an end in this State. The house was divided against itself, and it fell.

In consequence of this passion for division and separation, a large proportion of the parishes throughout the country have been disturbed and rent. We are far from meaning to intimate that this state of things has been productive of nothing but unmixed evil. Good has resulted from it, and evil has resulted from it; and these we would weigh, one against the other, as calmly and dispassionately as we can.

In the first place, it is said that this state of things is peculiarly favorable to religious liberty. To compel a whole town, against their will, to worship together, and support the same minister, would be an infringement on their liberty; and for

this reason it ought never to be attempted by the Legislature.—But if a whole town can be convinced, notwithstanding the difference in their tastes and opinions, that it is advisable for them to unite in the support of religious institutions, and can be persuaded to do so of their own accord, this is no infringement on liberty. Nay, it is liberty itself; for, after all, it is but acting out their own pleasure. The present state of things may, therefore, be more favorable to religious liberty, than that which formerly existed in New England, when every man was compelled by law to support the established worship. But no liberal minded man wishes to see the policy of that day revived. All that he can desire is, that, in small towns, there may be a voluntary amalgamation of sects, so far as is necessary for the respectable and independent support of religious institutions. Now if this amalgamation is voluntary, of course, we repeat, it is no infringement on liberty, but only one way in which men exercise their liberty;—by doing as they think fit. Besides, it should be considered, that, though the multiplication of churches of different denominations may serve to make sects more independent on one another, it will not make individuals more independent on sects; and this, as it seems to us, is the quarter whence religious liberty has most to apprehend at the present day. The jealousies, collisions, and rivalships of these little societies, are adapted to excite and bring into intense action the sectarian principle; and where this principle is thus excited and brought into intense action, it is oftentimes as injurious to individual freedom, and in some respects still more so, than a national religion. Men are trained to think the thoughts, and say the words, and cooperate in the plans of a sect; and they do not, and they dare not, act themselves. Everybody is quick to discern and condemn this mischief in other sects, and nothing but a want of reflection or magnanimity prevents him from seeing and confessing it in his own.

Again, it is said, that the present state of things is peculiarly favorable to the discovery and dissemination of religious truth, as it affords the people an opportunity for hearing what can be said on both sides.—This, however, is a privilege, which, even if men would avail themselves of it, is not so important and necessary now, as it used to be formerly, when they had to depend almost exclusively on the pulpit for their information on religious subjects. The almost endless multiplication of tracts, and other cheap publications, has put into the hands of all class-

es the ablest expositions and defences of disputed dogmas. As the press, therefore, is supplying us so liberally with doctrinal and controversial discussions, is it not better that the people should look to that source chiefly, for their knowledge of this description? Is it not better, under these circumstances, that the pulpit should be given, for the most part, to the inculcation of those practical and devotional topics in which all can unite? Besides, is it quite certain that in consequence of thus setting up altar against altar, and pulpit against pulpit, the people will in fact be more likely to hear both sides? On the contrary, so far as this system of exclusion and separation has been carried into effect, has not the practical result been, at least in many places, to make persons less and less disposed either to hear, or read, the arguments of their opponents? Each party has become a little better drilled, perhaps, in its distinctive tenets and watchwords; but this has had the effect, as might have been expected, to obstruct, rather than promote, liberal inquiry, enlarged views, and thorough investigation. The popular religious publications, the preaching, and the conversation of religious people, evince how few and narrow are the subjects, especially in practical religion, on which the bulk of the community are at all enlightened. In this respect, society has been retrograding since the days of Doddridge and Watts.

Others rejoice in the present state of things, because, as they say, it has given a death-blow to priestcraft, and the unjust domination of the clergy.—That there is such a thing as priestcraft, and that the people should be jealous of its encroachments, is readily conceded. But priestcraft is not the only thing of which they should be jealous. Persons who have anything at stake dependent for its security on the public morals, would do well to consider, whether, at present, they have not quite as much to apprehend from the radical and disorganizing principles of those who are loudest in the hue and cry against priestcraft, as from priestcraft itself. It becomes us also, in this connexion, to distinguish between a due and an undue influence of the clergy; for that they are intended and wished to exert some influence, is manifest; else why are they appointed and paid? We are willing to confess that a contempt for the clergy, wherever it exists, is an evil which the clergy commonly bring on themselves by their scandals, or their officiousness. Still the evil, however created, is a public evil, as it must essentially impair the benefit of their public labors, especially in

regard to the young. If, therefore, which is but too apparent, it is the tendency of the present state of things to bring the clergy, as a body, into contempt, and make the whole profession a subject of disparaging insinuations and jealousies, and the butt of low and coarse jests,—if the very children are brought up to feel no respect for the sacred office, we say not whose is the fault, but we say the public suffers.—Besides, the broken and distracted state of our churches is particularly productive of that worst of pests, a managing and intriguing clergy. The ambitious and unprincipled minister studies all the arts of the politician, and avails himself of the prejudices and jealousies of a divided people, and in this way seeks and gains the personal consequence and influence, which he can no longer expect from the sanctity of his calling, or even from the purity of his life. It is a mistake to suppose that a death-blow has been given to priestcraft and clerical domination. When, since the first settlement of the country, had ministers more control over the purses of the people? When had they the wielding of more powerful combinations? When were they at the bottom of more domestic differences and popular excitements? When had they, as a body, less of the peaceful and simple-hearted scholar and pastor, or more of the man of business, the manager and the politician?

It is also said, that the present state of things secures a balance of power among the rival sects, the different religious societies acting as guards and checks on one another.—There is some weight, undoubtedly, in this suggestion. But will it call into action the best feelings on either side, to set one party to watch for the halting of the other, and to meet every manœuvre and stratagem of their opponents by a counter manœuvre and stratagem? At best it is but availing ourselves of one evil to counteract or qualify a still greater evil; and instead of attempting in this way to balance evil against evil, it certainly would be better, if it were practicable, to rid ourselves of both. This would be effected, at least in some good degree, if the people would consent to worship together, as formerly, on a more liberal and comprehensive plan. We multiply churches of different denominations to act as a check on intolerance. But is this wise, if it can be shown, as we believe it can, that this measure is quite as likely to prove only a new occasion of intolerance? What is more likely to make the inhabitants of a country town intolerant towards Unitarians, for example, than a

premature attempt to build up a Unitarian society, strongly against the wishes and interests of a great majority? We know, too, that, where, from this division and subdivision of sects, no one of them is strong enough to oppress the rest, there is nothing to prevent a combination of those sects which agree in what are termed fundamentals, to crush the common foe.

Another topic much insisted on, is, that the present state of things promotes a spirit of competition and rivalship among the different societies, in support of religious worship. More people attend church than otherwise would. Ministers exert themselves more, and their salaries are provided for, at the same time more cheerfully, and more liberally.—We admit that a favorable change of this description sometimes takes place immediately after the languor and monotony, which are apt to gather over long-established institutions, are broken in upon for the first time by schismatics. But is there no danger, that, even while the fervor lasts, strange fire will not unfrequently be burnt before the Lord, by those who worship him under circumstances of so much excitement and irritation? When the controversy was between Christianity and Paganism, Paul could rejoice in the labors of those who preached Christ, 'even of envy and strife;' but, now that the controversy is between one form of Christianity and another, it does not follow that he would regard with the same feelings those who preach up either, 'of contention and not sincerely.' Besides, what confidence can be placed either in the purity, or probable endurance, of a pretended zeal for God, which originates in no higher source than party feeling, or personal dislike, or mere vanity or pride? After the heats and differences of the day have in some measure subsided, and men have had time for cool reflection, is it likely that they will continue to meet the doubled and trebled demands for religious institutions without flinching? In a moment of passion men may neglect and spurn the calculations of self-interest; nevertheless, passion is no match for self-interest in the long run. In many of our towns three ministers are employed and supported to do what might be done as faithfully and effectually by one. Will the people, in such cases, continue willing to pay three times as much as is necessary for a public object? Even if they do, will this prevent it from being a needless waste of the public resources? Indeed, some towns already, by dividing their strength, have made themselves absolutely unable to support a single minister, without as-

sistance from abroad. Begging is resorted to; a means of supply, which, from its very nature, can hardly be counted on as permanent, and even while it lasts, is hardly consistent either with dignity or independence.

Money, however, we shall be told, is of no consequence in matters of such infinite concernment. The present state of things, some will say, has grown out of the honest convictions of the people, and scruples of conscience, which, of course, are not to be set aside by a regard to interest, convenience, or personal dignity.—That there are no instances to which this remark applies, we should be among the last to affirm. But those, who have studied the history of parish difficulties in New England, will be not a little surprised at the pretence, that they can generally be traced either to the power of conviction, or a sense of duty. In an evil hour the Congregational clergy saw fit to take strong ground on disputed questions in national politics; and this disgusted and drove off multitudes. Many also became uneasy under the pecuniary burdens, which the regular support of religious institutions necessarily imposed, and this contributed largely to the growing disaffection. Sometimes, too, it was a controversy about the location of a meeting-house, sometimes it was a personal dislike of the minister, and sometimes it was a quarrel with the parish officers, which sent people away. Meanwhile, and until very lately, the laws, by a strange oversight, made it necessary that those who left the regular parish, should join, and of course assist in building up, societies of a different denomination; and this, in a large majority of cases, will be found to have been the true origin of these societies, or at least of their rapid growth. To be sure, it is not easy to see how it follows, because the Congregational minister happens to be a dull preacher, or an uncomfortable neighbour, that therefore the Baptists are right; or because it is concluded to build the Congregational meeting-house on one side of the road, and not on the other, that therefore the Universalists are right; or because the Congregational parish committee will not abate one's taxes, that therefore the Methodists are right. With not a few, however, this seems to have been the reasoning, so far as there was any reasoning in the case, the rest being caprice, spleen, or the operation of an injudicious law.

We must deal sincerely with this topic. Of late, seceders have taken the high ground of conscience, and a real and im-

portant difference in opinion, as a reason and justification of dissent. But how exceedingly rare have been the instances in which difficulties of this sort have arisen in small and retired country parishes, except through the interference of neighbouring ministers, or the emissaries of some sectarian institution. The mass of the people, in such places, will hardly pretend that they are competent to decide those great controversies, which have agitated the christian world from the beginning. But they have chosen their leaders; they have connected themselves with different parties; they are told that they must separate, and they obey. It is with these wars in the church, as it often has been with wars between States. The people do the fighting, and defray the expense, and suffer most of the inconveniences; and this too, for questions which they do not understand, and in which they have no real interest, acting merely as instruments and tools in the hands of a few trusted men. Let it not be thought that these remarks are directed against a particular sect, or that they apply to all of any sect. We believe that the moderate and reflecting of every denomination will agree, that there are religious demagogues, as well as political demagogues; men who would lead the people to suspect that they have been duped by others, that they may make use of this suspicion in duping them themselves.

Once more; it may be contended, that whether these differences can be justified or not, they certainly exist; and so long as they do exist, it is impossible that the people should worship together in any harmony; and therefore, the sooner they separate, the better. After they have separated, wholly and entirely, there will be fewer collisions, fewer occasions of offence and disgust, fewer scenes of painful and disreputable altercation.—This suggestion may hold good in regard to cities and large towns, where there is room enough for the separate societies to exist and flourish without interfering with one another. But in the small towns and villages, if two or three societies are instituted, it immediately becomes a struggle of life and death which shall succeed, as only one can. Hence the coldness and estrangement originating in a mere difference in belief, are increased and embittered a hundred fold by an opposition of interests, by acts of open hostility, and by a thousand irritating circumstances growing out of the arts, employed on both sides, for gaining proselytes. The evils and inconveniences, too, which are now sometimes felt in worshipping and frequently

associating with Christians of other persuasions, may be traced for the most part to a want of that spirit of candor and compromise, which the general adoption of a more liberal and comprehensive plan of worship, would almost necessarily introduce. We talk about the impossibility of worshipping together in harmony—we assume it as something that must be, and in this way we create the impossibility.

Our conclusion, then, is, especially in regard to the great majority of the country towns, that in weighing the good and evil resulting from the present divided and broken state of our churches, the evil vastly preponderates. Perhaps we shall be told, that our proving this, even if we have proved it, is labor thrown away; because the evil, supposing it to be an evil, is a necessary one.—Grant it to be a necessary evil, something is done by unfolding its true character and tendency, that we may not call evil good. What is there, however, in the measure which we would propose, when separated from other questions with which it has sometimes been mixed up and confounded, that is absolutely hopeless and impracticable? Let us still have our controversies, and our parties, and, if needs be, our party names; but let us learn to take a more liberal and comprehensive view of the nature and objects of preaching and public worship, and of the principles on which they are to be conducted and supported. On all disputed points, let every man think for himself, let every man read for himself, let every man decide for himself; but what is there in this to prevent us from joining to support religious institutions, chiefly with a view to their moral and political uses? The people certainly can do it, if they please; and what reason have we to conclude, thus peremptorily, that they will not please to do it, if clear and solid arguments can be adduced to prove it to be expedient and right? We do not suppose, of course, that these arguments, or that any arguments, will convince everybody. There are those, whose tempers and talents only fit them for storms; there are those, who are conscious that they owe most of their consequence and influence to these unhappy dissensions and separations; there are those, who gain their daily bread by causing divisions and offences, and by catering for the bad passions thus excited and inflamed. It is hardly to be expected, of course, that arguments of any kind will make much impression on persons of this description. Let an angel from Heaven proclaim a general amnesty in our churches, and many

of them would probably denounce it as 'another gospel.'— But this is not the general character of the people of this country, nor of any sect or denomination amongst us. When we call to mind the manifest virtue and intelligence of the great body even of professed Exclusionists, we bear them witness, that, in their general habits and prevailing dispositions, they are sensible, practical, independent, and well-disposed. We cannot doubt, therefore, but that, as the miseries attendant on their system and its utter failure as a measure of policy are more and more exposed, they will be persuaded to reconsider the steps which they have taken, and return, as far as may be, to the liberal and comprehensive plan of worship and christian fellowship, recommended and practised by our fathers.

We would say to them, Brethren, you misunderstand us. We have deeply at heart a desire to save from decay and ruin the religious institutions of the country, because we believe them to be enjoined by God, and absolutely indispensable to public order, and the public conscience. We intreat you not to push your experiments so far as to bring into jeopardy the very existence of what used to be accounted one of the principal distinctions and privileges of New England,—her free, united and flourishing village churches. The Scriptures say, it is true, 'Can two walk together, except they be agreed?' But your own commentators will tell you that this passage means, Can two walk together, except they first agree to walk together? and this is precisely what we wish you to do, in those places, especially, where two religious societies cannot possibly exist and flourish. Again, the Scriptures say, 'A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, reject.' But your own commentators will tell you, that in the language of the New Testament 'heretic' does not mean, one who holds erroneous opinions, but one who is factious and schismatical in asserting and propagating his opinions, no matter though his opinions, in themselves considered, be not erroneous. According to the injunction of the apostle, therefore, instead of rejecting a brother for an honest difference in opinion, modestly held and maintained, you ought rather to reject the man who is factious and schismatical enough to propose the step. Of course, you do not go to church, that you may subscribe yourselves slaves, expecting to assent blindly and unconditionally to whatever a fallible man shall utter. Can it be, then, that you have not confidence enough in your own faith, to trust yourselves to

hear occasionally what can be said on the other side? 'Do you not know that he who dares not hear and inquire, lest it should make him a skeptic, is a skeptic already? If you are afraid of being thought to countenance false doctrines by being present where they are sometimes preached, make no secret of your dissent. Avow yourselves Calvinists; read your Calvinistic books; bring up your children in that faith; exert whatever influence your character or information may fairly give you, to bring over the whole society to your way of thinking;—only give us back, at least in our retired country villages, the holy and peaceful days of New England, when neighbours and friends 'took sweet counsel together, and walked to the house of God in company.'

The duties incumbent on Liberal Christians, in this exigency, are not less important, or less imperative. Where they are the majority, they will of course assert and exercise the rights of a majority, temperately and generously, but firmly. With the power in their own hands, they would, as friends of liberality, be idiots and traitors to submit to the impositions of those by whom this very liberality is denounced and spurned. Exclusionists, as a party, must show a disposition to worship with Liberal Christians on principles of a fair compromise, and to redeem the pledges given in such cases, before they can expect the latter to make any, even the smallest, concessions. Perhaps, however, they are the minority in a parish which respects neither their feelings nor their rights; they are excluded from the christian ordinances; they are not permitted to hear, even occasionally, the preachers whom they prefer; and the preachers whom they do hear, scruple not to bestow the most opprobrious epithets on their creed, and on every man of eminence who is known to hold and defend it. Under these provocations, too, if they are strong enough for the independent support of religious worship, they have a right, nay, it is their duty, to proceed immediately to establish a church of their own. But, in small towns and villages, this measure should be forborne until they have been driven to the utmost possible limit of christian endurance. It often happens that individuals of the greatest influence in an Exclusive parish are Unitarians, and are known to be so without suffering at all in the public estimation; and this influence they can exert, as opportunities offer, and in various ways, in recommending liberal principles and measures. But let them undertake permanently to build up in the town a

Unitarian society, and they will be immediately marked and shunned by many of their former friends; an opposition of interests, as well as of opinions, will arise; they will be hated, because they are feared, and every effort will be made to break down their influence, not only in religion, but in everything else. It is, moreover, desirable, in many respects, that a reform in religion should be silent and gradual, affecting communities as whole masses. This can take place, only where the leading and influential members of society continue mixed up with the rest, and retain their hold on the public sympathies in the great religious movements of the day.

We are no advocates for concealment, or for indefinite views; and we are not afraid, or ashamed, of the name which properly designates our views. Still, we should remember that our object is not to convert men to our party, but to our principles; and to our principles, not because they are ours, but because they are the truth. Unitarians have done more, and are doing more for the cause of truth, by promoting a real though gradual change for the better in the opinions of other sects, than by building up their own denomination. Their expositions of Calvinism, for example, have contributed, even among Calvinists themselves, to the avowed abandonment of many, and the virtual abandonment of still more, of the most offensive dogmas of the Genevan school. We do not measure the progress of Unitarianism, therefore, nor the good it is doing, by the number of Unitarian churches. Nay, a church which does not prosper, is a dead weight on the party to which it belongs,—a monument of its failure, and not of its success, bringing the cause into sharp collision with other interests, and discouraging all from connecting themselves in any way with a feeble, obnoxious, and discomfited opposition.

Some may think, perhaps, that if Unitarians continue to listen to Calvinistic preaching, they, or at least their families, will probably be won over to the prevailing errors. But is that preaching, which could not keep them in Calvinism, likely to convert them back to it? If a large and respectable minority of Unitarians have grown up under Calvinistic preaching, what reason have we for supposing, that they may not, in good time, and under the same preaching, become the majority? So circumstanced, they will, of course, feel more disposed than others to avail themselves of the instruction and encouragement to be derived from Unitarian publications, and take care to circulate

these publications among their neighbours; and in this way the bad tendencies of the preaching will be in some measure counteracted, and its defects supplied. It may also allay our fears on this subject to remember, that more persons, at least in this country, have been made Unitarians by Calvinistic, than by Unitarian preaching; and, indeed, to strong and discriminating minds, what better refutation of Calvinism can there be, than a full and fair exposition of all that it inculcates and implies? Besides, what is the preaching of the pulpit, where people think for themselves, to the preaching of the Bible, and the preaching of nature, and the preaching of common sense? Let the minority pursue the course which we have pointed out, and the simple fact of their moderation and liberality will preach, and powerfully recommend, their views to the intelligent, dispassionate, and well-disposed. Admit, however, that under the circumstances which we are considering, the mass of the people may, in some cases, retain a little longer their old names and old associations, still we protest, as has been hinted before, against the assumption, that none are Unitarians but those who call themselves so, and join the Unitarian party. It should be known that there are Unitarians everywhere, of all denominations, and in all connexions. The distinctness with which party lines are sometimes drawn, makes their passage so much the more a terror to the weak and timid, so much the more an innovation to the prejudiced and opinionated, and so much the more a risk to the time-serving and worldly-minded. Paradoxical as it may seem, we cannot help believing, that, but for the existence of a Unitarian sect, there could be no obstacle among a free, intelligent, and inquisitive people like ours, to the rapid, and universal prevalence of Unitarianism itself.

We are aware how much we expect from Unitarian minorities in small towns, when we conjure them, wronged and insulted as they have been, not to separate. They may say, and say with truth, that it is a misery to hear doctrines preached, Sunday after Sunday, which they can neither believe as true, nor respect for the ingenuity with which they are defended, and which sometimes outrage their best feelings. They may also insist on the bad moral tendency of hearing such preaching, as it must lead them insensibly to regard the whole subject of religion with less respect. They may further urge, that they have always shown a willingness to compromise existing

difficulties, but that they have no notion of a compromise, in which one party concedes everything, and the other nothing. Finally, they can say, that they have been literally driven off, and throw back the whole responsibility for the present state of things, and the evils that follow from it, on the authors and abettors of the Exclusive System.—All this is true; but it does not prevent the distraction and ruin of our churches from being a great public calamity, an evil of incalculable amount and extent, which, by a noble sacrifice of private feelings and private interests, they can do much to avert. Let it not be said, that the community cannot reap any advantage from religious institutions, so long as they are used as the instruments of error and intolerance. It is a perilous problem to solve, how far religion must be corrupted, before it ceases to be a public blessing. Bad as some systems appear, and are in theory, we still believe that there is no form of Christianity, as actually understood and held among us, which is not greatly to be preferred for its influence on the public morals, to a general skepticism and indifference. We repeat, moreover, again and again, that if the course which has been recommended be adopted and persisted in by Liberal Christians, it will, in the end, approve itself as politic, even in a sectarian point of view, as it is generous and public-spirited. This is not a community to be blinded and shackled forever. Sooner or later a re-action will take place in favor of the friends of peace and order, and the churches which they have saved by their moderation, will be given them by an over-ruling Providence, as the reward of their forbearance and magnanimity.

ART. II. *Professor Stuart's Remarks on an Article in the Christian Examiner, concerning the Meaning of the Expressions, 'Everlasting Punishment,' and 'Life Eternal,' in Matthew* xxv. 46.—A Letter from the Writer of that Article.

I HAVE read, with much interest, Professor Stuart's Dissertation in the 'Spirit of the Pilgrims' for August 1829, on the meaning of עולם in Hebrew, and αιων and αιωνιος, in scrip-

tural Greek. It is an interesting publication, and treats upon a subject of immense importance. It is not, however, my present object, to enter into a discussion of the whole subject, as presented in that dissertation. But, as Professor Stuart, at the close of his work, makes some observations on an article in the Christian Examiner for December, 1828, which, you are aware, was mine, I will state my thoughts concerning what he there says, confining myself to his remarks on that article.

At this distance of time, both the article itself, and Mr Stuart's remarks upon it, are very like to have been forgotten by many, if not all, who have ever seen them. Nevertheless, I will take liberty to recall the subject to your mind, and trust your patience to give a hearing to what may now be said. And, as I am simply expressing my own mind, and not speaking in the name of any body of men, sect, or party, I make no apology for using the epistolary mode of writing, or for employing the personal pronoun in the first person singular.

The remarks of Mr Stuart, on the article in the Examiner, are few and brief; probably as many, and as extensive, as he thought the subject required, or the object deserved—perhaps more so. But, while I acknowledge his civility in saying that the writer seems to be 'seriously inquiring after scriptural truth,' regard to truth requires me reluctantly to add, that I do not think he has treated the article itself, or the argument contained in it, with the high-minded fairness which might have been expected from him.

He begins by affirming, that I propose 'to render αιωνιος, *spiritual*;' and declares my reason for so doing to be, 'that Æons (Αιωνες) were counted as incorporeal, i. e. spiritual beings, and therefore αιωνιος may mean *Æonic*, i. e. *spiritual*.'

This is an unfair statement of the case. To be sure, mention is made, in the article, of the ancient philosophic doctrine of the Æons, as showing good reason to believe, that the sense of Æonic, or *spiritual*, was probably a very ancient, if not the original meaning of αιωνιος; i. e. in classical Greek; presuming it would be so understood, by those acquainted with the distinction between that and scriptural Greek. But, I nowhere attempt to prove, that αιωνιος signifies *spiritual*, in the New Testament, *because* it was derived from αιων, signifying an incorporeal or *spiritual* being. This derivation of the word is named in the article, as little other than an incidental circumstance, throwing some light on the question in discussion; and,

so far from being made the foundation of the argument, as Mr Stuart asserts it to be, it has so little connexion with it, that all which is said concerning the Æons might be stricken out, without affecting, at all, the true reasoning on the subject in hand.

My whole argument to prove that one meaning of αιωνιος, in the New Testament, is *spiritual*, is founded on this; namely, that there are some passages in the New Testament, in which, from the connexion and circumstances, it is evident that the meaning of this word, in the mind of the inspired writer, is *spiritual*; and some texts, in which it cannot well be understood to mean anything else.

In order to prove this position, several texts are quoted, in which αιωνιος cannot well be understood to signify anything else than *spiritual*; as 1 John, v. 11, 12; 1 John, iii. 15, &c. together with some other texts, in which this word does, most probably, mean *spiritual*, although the connexion does not so positively require it, as in those produced as above named.

All this, which is the only true argument, Mr Stuart leaves untouched. He does not attempt to show, that αιωνιος, in these texts, does not contain the meaning assigned it in the article; i. e. *spiritual*. He nakedly affirms, that my reason for thus translating it, is, that 'Æons (Αιωνες) were counted as incorporeal, i. e. spiritual, beings; and therefore αιωνιος, may mean *Æonic*, i. e. *spiritual*.' And he affirms it in such a manner, that his readers would infer this to be my only reason. This is exceedingly unfair; and seems much like evading the true point at issue. It is a mode of dealing, which was not to have been expected, from one so well provided as Professor Stuart, to meet a matter of this kind face to face.

In regard to the texts themselves, quoted in support of the position assumed, he perhaps thought it sufficient, that, in his previous dissertation, he had arranged them under what he judged their proper heads, and had there translated them, as he thought, correctly. With this he had a right to be satisfied, if he chose. But he had no right to represent me as founding my interpretation on a different ground from that on which I did found it; unless, which is not improbable, my modes of expression were so unfortunate, as to have left him to mistake my meaning.

He, subsequently, arranges his reasons for rejecting the 'exegesis proffered,' under three heads; on each of which I will now offer you my remarks.

'His *first* reason for rejecting the meaning of *spiritual*, as belonging to αιωνιος, is, that it is greatly to be doubted, 'whether the Gnostic system, (the one from which the imagination of Æons sprung), had an existence, or, at any rate, was known in the western part of Asia, before the propagation of the gospel, or even at that period.' He also remarks, that, according to the Gnostics, the Æons 'were regarded as *secondary* or *derived divinities*, θεοι δευτεροι. There were spiritual beings above them, and below them. Why then,' he inquires, 'should *Æonic* be chosen to designate *spiritual*, any more than an adjective borrowed from the God above them, or the sub-divinities below them?'

I willingly admit the propriety of his doubt, so far as it relates to the Gnostic system's being known in the western parts of Asia, as one regularly organized, at the period above named. But, it cannot be doubted, that ideas of *spiritual existences*, similar to those which the Gnostics subsequently arranged into a definite system, existed, and were well known in every portion of the philosophic world, for some centuries before the Christian era. The Gnostic *system* is much more like to have originated from pre-existent notions of spiritual existences, than the imagination of those existences to have originated in the Gnostic system.

Neither can it easily be doubted, that *words*, expressing the then existing notions of spiritual beings, were widely current among the nations then existing; nor that, in the course of time, those words must have formed a part of the common language of the people; as almost all words, originating with philosophers, fall, at length, into common use.

In passing from philosophic to vulgar use, those words, in the common order of things, must have lost much of their precise philosophic signification, as expressing special distinctions, or specific kinds or orders of spiritual beings. In the minds of the mass of people, such words must, naturally, have come to signify *spiritual existences in general*, or things relating to spiritual beings; without implying the same precise distinctions of rank or condition among them, as they did in the minds of those philosophers who first fabricated those terms, or applied them to these particular objects, in some strictly definite sense.

Although, therefore, the term, *Æons*, was used by the original philosophers, or by the particular sect of the Gnostics, to signify *secondary gods;* having higher gods above them, and

inferior gods beneath them, as Mr Stuart remarks, yet, in the use of the *common people*, it is hardly conceivable, that the word should have retained its precise technical meaning. Still less is it conceivable, that this word, in travelling into the western part of Asia, unaccompanied by the peculiarities of the Gnostic system, should have retained this precise meaning among the common people, in those places where the Greek language was in use.

Like the English word *divinity*, it must have signified merely *an existence, of a nature superior to man* in a general sense—*a spiritual being;* without specifying whether it were a spiritual being, or divinity of the second, the third, or the hundredth class.

I argue this from the known principles of human nature, from the well-known operation of this very thing among all nations, and from the known fact among us, that words, which, in philosophic use, retain a precise technical meaning, are employed by the common people in a most extensive latitude of signification, only retaining some general allusion to the original philosophic meaning. On this principle, it has become strictly true, that the 'learned philologist,' may

> '——————— chase
> A panting syllable, through time and space;
> Start it at home, and hunt it in the dark,
> To Gaul, or Greece, or into Noah's ark,'

and yet be profoundly ignorant of its import in the mind of some particular writer, especially if that writer happen to be an unlearned man, and not a philosopher.

Now, it is hardly to be suspected, that the apostles were very expert philologists. Their peculiar province was *religion*, the religion of the heart and life, which their great Master had taught and exemplified, and which had been confirmed unto them by the inward 'demonstration of the spirit, and of power.' In pursuit of this high and holy object, they cared but little for 'the *letter* which killeth,' provided only they could maintain and extend 'the *spirit*, which maketh alive.' They, therefore, used language as they found it; and they used such language as was common among the people to whom they were addressing themselves.

On religious subjects particularly, it is most probable, if not absolutely certain, that the language of the Septuagint was much employed among the Jews 'scattered abroad' out of Judea.

The words of that version were reckoned true scripture by the Hellenist Jews, as much as the words of the received English version are by us. The terms and phraseology of the Septuagint would, of course, be very frequently made use of, for expressing religious ideas, and, doubtless, were so employed by the apostles in their preaching and writings, as terms familiar to the people. They expressed themselves, on religion, in the style and language to which the people were accustomed, without troubling themselves to give precise definitions of the words they employed, without stopping to explain the different senses in which different sects of philosophers used those words, without describing the derivation of them, and probably without thinking of it. The terms, as commonly employed among the people, conveyed their ideas, as nearly as any words could do it. This was the most they could expect of human language, which, at best, is but an imperfect channel for the conveyance of thoughts and affections, the 'things of the spirit.'

This course, I conceive, they followed in regard to the word αιωνιος. They did not employ it to express things spiritual, *because* they knew it to have been derived from αιων, which signified a spiritual being. It may be even doubted whether they knew that it was so derived. Much less did they coin it for the occasion, as Professor Stuart would have me make them do. But they used the word in this sense, because they found it already, in common use, expressing what they wished to express, as nearly as any Greek word could express it.

Αιωνιος had been previously employed by the Seventy, as a proper translation of the Hebrew עולם, understood as an adjective. I think this Greek word was chosen as the representative of עולם, by particular design on the part of the Seventy. Αιωνιος is a word of sparing occurrence among ancient classical Greek writers; nor is it, by any means, the common term employed by them to signify *eternal*. On the contrary, they much more frequently make use of αιδιος, αει ων, or some similar mode of speech, for this purpose. Αιωνιος is not to be found in Homer, Hesiod, or Euripides, unless I have overlooked it in a very careful inquiry; but αει ων appears in these writers very often, in the sense of *always existing*. The adverb αει, *always*, occurs also very frequently in ancient Greek, in the same sense with the old English adverb *aye*, which is probably

descended from it. Αιων is sometimes employed, by the authors above named, to represent the *principle of life*, the *breath*, or the *spirit*, but never to signify *eternity*. A sense of spirituality, as well as of *period*, *state of being*, or *duration*, is attached to this word in the more ancient Greek; and it is but reasonable to believe, that it was used in the Septuagint in a kindred sense. To me it appears that the Seventy, by choosing αιωνιος to represent עולם, testify, that they did not understand the Hebrew word to signify strictly *eternal*. Had they so understood it, they would certainly have translated it by some more decisive word; some term, which, like αιδιος, is more commonly employed in Greek to signify 'that which has neither beginning nor end.' But I cannot find that either αιδιος, or αει ων, or any similar terms are ever used in the Septuagint for translating the Hebrew term in question. It is almost uniformly done by αιων or αιωνιος. The translators had doubts as to its meaning, whether it signified *spiritual*, or *enduring*, and therefore translated it by the Greek αιωνιος, which may signify either or both.

But the Septuagint was the received Greek scripture in the days of the apostles. They, of course, employed Greek words, for expressing religious ideas, in the same sense in which they found those words used in this received scripture. The Septuagint modes of expression must have become familiar, in the ordinary religious language of those believers in the Old Testament who spoke the Greek tongue; even as the peculiar modes of speech in the received English translation are, in modern days, very often used by those who speak the English language, for expressing *their* ideas on religion. They are fond of quoting English scripture, and like to express their own religious ideas in the peculiar phraseology of the English Bible. Hence scriptural terms become familiar as 'household words,' and often, it must be confessed, bear a signification, in a religious sense, very different from their ordinary meaning in common conversation. Without doubt, the Hellenist Jews were similarly attached to the peculiar phraseology of their Greek scripture. But, in that Greek scripture, αιωνιος represented that, which, in Hebrew, was expressed by the adjective עולם. This Greek word had become familiar among the Hellenist Jews, in the same signification with the Hebrew word. They made use of it to represent the same ideas which the Hebrew word represented. The apostles, there-

fore, employed αιωνιος as a thing of course, in their writings on religion, to express the same thing. That which they understood by it, and intended to express, was, I believe, *spirituality* of nature, more frequently than *duration*. But it is no part of my present purpose to enter into an argument to prove it. I therefore merely state the opinion, and pass on.

I do not imagine, however, that this word, αιωνιος, in vulgar Greek, or even in philosophic Greek, if I may use these expressions, signified, precisely, what the apostles wished to express, or what they intended their readers should understand by it. Their own language, it is well known, was the later Hebrew, or Aramean, called also by several other names; and their Greek is but a translation. Of course, there must be many terms, in their native tongue, to which there are none precisely corresponding in the Greek. Such seems to be the case in regard to the *ancient* Hebrew terms translated by αιων and αιωνιος in the Septuagint. Such, I believe to have been the case, in regard to the later Hebrew terms, which the apostles would have used, had they been writing in their vernacular tongue, but for which they make use of Αιων and αιωνιος in the Greek.

The original terms in the ancient Hebrew, (and in the later Hebrew they are probably the same, or similar,) signify something *hidden*, *mysterious*, *unsearchable*, *unknown*; something which the eye cannot see, nor the ear hear, nor the hand touch, nor human powers measure; terms, therefore, well calculated to express that which is of an immaterial, intellectual, or *spiritual* nature.

In order to express, in Greek, what these words signify in Hebrew, the apostles seem to have chosen the Greek word, which approached the nearest to their Hebrew meaning, and that is αιωνιος. They chose this word, not because they knew it to have been derived from αιων, but simply because the Seventy had done so before them; and because, in common use, it expressed what they wished to exhibit, more nearly than any other term, although not exactly so.

If, with this thought in your mind, you will turn to the article in the Examiner, p. 6, you will find that no pretence is there made, that the term αιωνιος, in the New Testament, signifies *spiritual*, because αιων, among philosophers, signified a spiritual being. It is merely remarked, that 'there is good

reason to believe that such was a very ancient, if not the original meaning of the word;' and the reason assigned for this opinion is, that an ancient meaning of αἰων is *a being having a spiritual nature.* But it is not pretended to make use of this *derivation* of the word, to prove that it had this meaning in the mind of the writers of the New Testament. The sense, which *they* attached to the word, is to be sought, not from etymology, but from the connexions and relations in which they themselves use it.

In inquiring after their meaning on this principle, some passages are quoted, in which the labor of 'exegesis' must be hard to affix to the term αἰωνιος, any other signification than that which I call *spiritual,* for want of a more specifically descriptive term.

These passages Mr Stuart has left unnoticed, in the part of his work particularly directed to this article. He has given them a passing notice elsewhere, and has, authoritatively, assigned them such significations as he thought right, without, in any case, offering a reason for assigning those meanings. He treads, for the most part, the beaten track of lexicographers and critics; and, in the present case, by turning aside from the question, and raising a dust about Æons and Gnostics, evades the true point at issue. Let him show, that, in such a passage as 1 John iii. 15, 'No murderer hath eternal life [ζωην αἰωνιον] abiding in him,' and other passages of a kindred nature,—the phrase, *eternal life,* does not mean *a present state of spiritual goodness and felicity,* or *harmony of the soul with God,* and then I will admit that αἰωνιος does not, in any case, mean *spiritual.* This he has not attempted to do; and by this 'expressive silence' on the real question, leaves it, so far as relates to myself, exactly where he found it.

Under this first head, Professor Stuart introduces a rather whimsical argument to show, that if the term αἰωνιος meant *spiritual,* it would mean so in a bad sense; because, as he says, 'the majority of the Æons were *apostate* ones. *Æonic,* then, would be about the same as *diabolic,* in regard to its meaning.'

On this, it may be observed, that it is most vehemently to be doubted, whether the majority of the Æons were apostate ones, as Professor Stuart here asserts. But, granting the fact; still, their apostasy does not alter their nature, it affects only their *character.* They are *spiritual* beings as to their nature, still; as truly so, as those who kept 'their first estate;' and both the joys of the good and the miseries of the wicked, among them all, are wholly of a *spiritual* kind. So long as there re-

mained some good ones, the term, *Æonic*, would still signify simply *spiritual in nature*, without expressing, in itself, either the goodness or the wickedness, the happiness or the misery of the beings represented.

This argument of Mr Stuart's is much the same as if one should say, 'the greater part of the human race are wicked; therefore, the word *human* means *wicked*;'—a most 'lame and impotent conclusion.' It is reasoning from the *minor* to the *major*, which has always been accounted miserable logic. In order, also, to make the argument consistent, even according to his own statement, it would be further requisite for him to show, that there are some few *good devils* in existence; a sufficient number at least to constitute a tolerable *minority*—a task which he would be scarcely willing to undertake.

His *second* reason for rejecting my interpretation, is what he calls, 'another conclusive argument' against it, stated in the following words; namely, 'that the exegesis proposed would make *spiritual misery* or *happiness* to begin only *after* the general judgment. Matt. xxv. 31—46 represents, (as the critic in question concedes), the judgment of the *future world*. Is it then true, that *spiritual* happiness commences with the righteous only after that period; or, that *spiritual* misery then first begins with the wicked? Neither the one nor the other.'

This would be a 'conclusive argument,' did the statement made in it exhibit a true view of the doctrine maintained in the article. Scarcely any reader of this sentence from Mr Stuart would think otherwise, than that I maintain, that Matt. xxv. 31—46 represents the judgment of the *future* world, and *that only*, according to the concession which, he says, I make.

This is a most incorrect exhibition of the subject. I had thought to have been sufficiently clear in asserting, that our Lord, in Matt. xxv. 31—46, 'describes the judgment of the soul;' that 'all judgment of souls is of a *spiritual*, or inward nature;' that 'this inward judgment takes place in the individual person, *whenever* God is revealed to that soul in his true character, and when his searching presence is really perceived by the spirit of the man; *as truly, though not to the same extent, in this world as in the world to come;*'—that, 'as our states of mind are, either good or evil, godly or ungodly, so do we experience either the peace of penitence, the conscious remission of sins, and the heartfelt satisfaction of unity with God; or, contrariwise, painful disquietude, anguish of mind, remorse, and horror, and fear that cometh like deso-

lation. In one or the other of these states, we have, to a greater or less degree, an experience, on the one hand, of that "eternal life" which visits the soul, that, by patient continuance in well doing, "seeks for glory, and honor, and immortality;" on the other, the "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish," which rack the heart of "the contentious and disobedient," the lover and follower of unrighteousness, the soul which "striveth with his Maker." '—'This spiritual judgment takes place in a measure, and perhaps very often, in human hearts, *in the present world.*'—'This spiritual judgment takes place, in the fulness of its power and efficiency, when the human being passes away from all material connexions, and goes forth a simple spirit, naked, unshielded, and exposed.' With these words written and laid before him, I can hardly conceive how Mr Stuart could have understood me to concede, that Matt. xxv. 31—46, represents the judgment of the *future* world, any more than those judgments of the soul which take place in the *present* world.

As, however, he has misunderstood me, possibly you may, also. I will therefore here observe, that in the article in the Examiner, no allusion is intended to be made to any *general* judgment whatever. I do not believe there ever will be any. The 'assembled universe,' so often spoken of as gathered at once before the throne of God, to be reciprocally spectators of each others' trial and judgment, is, I believe, a mere 'coinage of' the human 'brain.' Certainly the scriptures assert no such thing.

Every man, I believe, is judged in himself, and in himself alone, by the spiritual manifestation of God within him. Whenever he is so judged, he experiences *spiritual* happiness or misery immediately, according as he is acquitted or condemned in that judgment which he then endures. And, inasmuch as such a judgment of God, in and upon man, takes place in the *present*, as truly as in the *future* world, although not so extensively—insomuch *spiritual happiness* takes place in the good, and *spiritual misery* in the wicked, as truly, although not so extensively, in this world, as in that to come; that is, *whenever* judgment takes place by reason of the individual's consciousness of the presence and power of the Highest.

Mr Stuart seems to have been led into the mistake, by his belief in that part of the Orthodox system, which maintains one particular day, in the *future* world, appointed for the judgment

of all human souls at one time, and reckons this to be the only judgment to which the scriptures refer. Believing this himself, he seems to think that every allusion, made by any one, to the judgment of *souls*, must refer of course to such a day; as if every one must, necessarily, believe as he does concerning it. But he has no right to make such a conclusion of his own in another's behalf, and is in fairness bound, if he take them into consideration and make remarks upon them at all, to accept and exhibit a writer's thoughts as that writer has described them.

Nor yet, in truth, do I think, that Professor Stuart, or any other Orthodox man, believes that the human soul enjoys *spiritual happiness*, or suffers *spiritual misery*, in the true sense of these words, until after something in the nature of a judgment has been had upon his case, and manifested in his mind by the divine influence.

In all cases of turning from sin to holiness, whether in a first experience of religion, or in any subsequent relinquishment of any particular sin, or acceptance of any new particular of holiness; in all such cases, conviction must precede conversion, although it must be confessed, that conversion does not always follow conviction. 'In all our spiritual maladies, conviction must begin the cure.'

That conviction—I use the word in the well-known technical sense—must precede conversion, is a rule so well established, that, notwithstanding there may be some exceptions, it will doubtless be admitted as a general rule.

Now, what is conviction, but the judgment of God manifested in the secret soul of the individual subject, revealing to the man his own state of general sinfulness, or the particular sinfulness of some of his particular habits of thought, feeling, or action, and revealing with equal clearness the excellency and glory of the opposite state of holiness or virtue? It is God himself, present in 'spirit and power,' convincing the man 'of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment;' and for this very particular, because the '*prince of this world* is judged.'* '*Now* is the judgment of this world,'† said our grear Master; and, in my simplicity of mind, I cannot help thinking it means, that a judgment of God, particularly in and through Christ, was then commencing its operation in and upon human souls; that, once com-

* John, xvi. 11. † John, xii. 31.

menced, it has been continuing its operation ever since, and is still, and ever will be taking place in them, whether they be existing in the present or another state of being; a *spiritual* judgment in which sin is condemned to the conscience of the subject, and holiness acknowledged and honored. 'The hour is coming, and NOW IS, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God.'* He is 'ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead;'† of souls in this, and souls in other worlds. Wherein man, in such a judgment, is conscious of condemnation, therein he experiences *spiritual suffering;* wherein he is conscious of acquittal, or of 'the remission of sins,' therein he experiences *spiritual happiness.* This takes place in the present world; and, until some such judgment is endured, the soul has no true experience of *spiritual felicity* or *wretchedness.* I have no great fear that Mr Stuart will be disposed to think this a very incorrect statement of the case.

Neither have I any doubt, that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews intended to represent this inward experience of judgment, as one of the essential preliminaries to a person's becoming a cordial Christian, when he named 'eternal judgment [κριματος αιωνιου]'‡ '*spiritual* judgment,' as one of 'the principles' or first 'beginnings' of religion; 'the word of the beginning of Christ.'

Mr Stuart has seen fit to number this expression, [κριματος αιωνιου] 'eternal judgment,' among the texts in which αιωνιος is used in relation to *future punishment.* He explains it to mean 'eternal condemnation, or punishment.' I have been, however, in the habit of thinking that the word κριμα signifies *judgment* merely. It may as well be applied to a judgment in which one is acquitted, as to a judgment in which one is condemned. Such is the true meaning of the word, if we may believe the general testimony of lexicographers. With how much propriety, therefore, Professor Stuart arbitrarily interprets it to signify 'eternal punishment,' we must judge for ourselves.

I conceive also, from the nature of the case, that judgment

* John, v. 25. † Acts, x. 42.

‡ Heb. vi. 2. Professor Stuart quotes this text, αιωνιου κρισεως. Griesbach gives the reading κριματος, without any hint of its being a doubtful reading. The received text also reads the same. I therefore take this to be the true reading. It makes no difference in the sense; but it seems well to have the exact word. Dr Knapp, perhaps, gives κρισεως; but I must use one word or the other in commenting on the text, and, for the reasons above named, I adopt κριματος.

in the future world is the same in kind as in the present world, although more intense in degree. It is still the judgment of the *soul*, a *spiritual* being, in that world as well as in this, and is spoken of in the Scriptures, frequently, as what is effected by a manifestation of the divine presence and power, in any state of being. Every consideration, therefore, leads to a belief that judgment is the same, in kind, in both worlds.

For the same reasons I conclude that the *spiritual felicity*, or *spiritual misery*, consequent upon judgment, is the same in kind in the future, as in the present world, although either be more intense in that world than in this. Both the judgment and its consequences, taking effect upon a spiritual being, the *soul*, are of a spiritual *nature*, accompanied by no necessary outward form or circumstance in either case;—as it is written, in regard to the happiness of the servants of God, 'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him; but God hath *revealed* them unto us by his *spirit;* for the *spirit* searcheth all things, yea, even the deep things of God.'* Without doubt, the opposite is true, in regard to the sufferings of the wicked. And so, by an inward, spiritual discernment and experience, man is often a partaker of the felicity of heaven, or the misery of hell, as truly, although not so extensively in the present as in the future world. The Christian has an '*earnest*' of the heavenly inheritance, and the sinner condemned, an earnest of the infernal lot; and an earnest must necessarily be the same in *nature* as the thing itself; otherwise it is no earnest at all.

The judgment, described in Matt. xxv. 31—46, is, I believe, the judgment of the soul *in general*, whether in the present or the future world. It takes place, whenever God is manifested to man in Jesus Christ; or, what is the same thing, whenever 'the Son of Man cometh,' and is seen by the individual soul 'in the glory of his Father and the holy angels,' sitting on the *spiritual* 'throne of his' *spiritual* 'glory,' whether in the present or the future state. In either state, the consequences of that judgment are immediately experienced by that soul, in spiritual felicity or spiritual misery. And, that 'the coming of the Son of Man,' in judgment, does signify something which takes place in the present, as well as in the future life,

* 1 Cor. ii. 9, 10.

bear witness his own words, Matt. xvi. 27, 28. 'The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels; and then shall he reward every man according to his works. Verily, I say unto you, there be some standing here, which shall not taste of death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom.'—Surely, then, his *coming* takes place among human beings, before some of them 'taste of death;' and it is a spiritual coming in the spirit and power of his religion, or by a personal revelation of Christ in the soul. His glory is a spiritual glory, his judgment is a spiritual judgment, his reward is a spiritual reward, and his kingdom is a spiritual kingdom, [Βασιλεια αιωνιος]—Compare Mark viii. 38, and ix. 1,—Luke ix. 26, 27.

Until, therefore, Mr Stuart can prove, which I do not believe he can, that Matt. xxv. 31—46, refers *exclusively* to the judgment of the *future* world, and has no allusion to the manifestation of God in Christ Jesus in the present state; or, until he can prove, that there is no divine judgment, in the scriptural sense, had upon, or manifested in human souls in this world, before they experience *spiritual* happiness or misery; or that the revelation of the Deity in man does not produce such happiness or misery,—until then, his 'conclusive argument' utterly fails.

The *third* reason assigned by Professor Stuart for rejecting the 'exegesis proposed,' is this; namely—'If the meaning *spiritual* is to be given to αιωνιος as a general one in the New Testament, then cases would arise of the most revolting nature in regard to the application of it.'—Granted willingly; especially, if the same English word *spiritual* is to be *always* employed in translating αιωνιος. But the meaning *spiritual* is not proposed as the *uniform*, nor even the *general* meaning of this word. I have only asserted this to be *one* of its significations; and the argument used in support of it, is, that there are passages in the New Testament in which it evidently has this meaning, and some in which it cannot well signify anything else.

It would not affect this position at all, if Mr Stuart should find a thousand instances in which the word cannot be so translated, provided *some* could be produced, in which the plain meaning is what I have asserted to be *one* among its many meanings. If, for instance, in the mind of the apostle John, the phrase ζωη αιωνιος signified *spiritual* life, as when he wrote,

'God *hath given* us eternal life, and that life is in his Son;'* or if, in the mind of our Lord, it signified the same, as when he said, 'This *is* life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent;'† then it ought to be so translated in such cases, even if in every other part of the New Testament it had a different signification.

Here I trust you will allow me to explain. I use the word *spiritual* for want of a more precisely significant term. But it does not exactly express what I understand by the word αιωνιος, when applied to things of the soul. There is no English word which does. I confess myself at a loss to find, or frame a phrase, that will precisely convey the idea.

When Shakspeare makes his ghost say concerning things of the spiritual world—

> '—— this *eternal* blazon must not be,
> To ears of flesh and blood,'

he makes him assert what every writer on things relating to the soul has often experienced; and, in truth, he makes use of the English word *eternal*, in this place, in a sense very similar to that, which, I believe, was intended to be conveyed by the Greek αιωνιος, in many places in the New Testament. The term that would convey the meaning of αιωνιος, in the New Testament, when used with respect to things relating to the soul, should, like the Hebrew עולם, contain within itself the sense of *something secret, inscrutable, immaterial, intellectual,* and of *indefinite* or *unknown duration.* The English word *spiritual* approximates more nearly to this than any other, and therefore I employ it in this sense, but would not be confined to this one word, when the propriety of language, or the special connexion of αιωνιος requires a different one.

With this explanation, we will now look at the passages which Mr Stuart quotes, as cases in which *spiritual* would be revolting as a translation of αιωνιος.

1 Tim. vi. 16, ['to God] be κρατος αιωνιον,' *power everlasting*, in the received translation. On this he inquires, 'Shall we render, *spiritual power?*' Truly, I know no great evil nor anything very 'revolting,' if the term should be so translated. The word *everlasting* expresses only one attribute of the divine

* 1 John v. 11. † John xvii. 3.

power, but the word *spiritual* expresses its very nature. And it seems by no means unreasonable to believe, that the apostle had in his mind something more than the mere *duration* of the power, which he here ascribes to the Omnipotent. All true *power* is essentially of a *spiritual* nature. Power has been well defined to be, 'that which originates motion;' and, in whatever respect we contemplate motion as existing, we always think of that which originates it as being, ultimately, something *spiritual*.

We observe motion in the heavenly bodies, as they 'wheel, unshaken, through the void immense,' and 'absolve their stated rounds of time;' and, without hesitation, we refer the origin, and even the continuance of the motion, to a spiritual source. 'The heavens declare the glory of the Lord,' the Spiritual Divinity. The whole material universe, with all its beauty, harmony, majesty, and motion, is but an outward expression of mind and will, existing in the secret, unsearchable, *spiritual* Deity.

We notice the movements of truth or falsehood, holiness or wickedness, exhibited in the conduct and conversation of men, and feel, at once, that the true source of each and either is *spirit*, either descending 'from above,' or springing up 'from beneath.'

We witness any effect produced to our perceptions; and when we seek after its *cause*, we may, indeed, go through a long series of intermediate causes, but, ultimately, we always arrive at a *spiritual* one. Every effect must be, ultimately, attributed to the self-deciding will of some intelligent agent; i. e. a *spiritual* agent.

All *power*, therefore, considered in the essence, is spiritual. And, inasmuch as God is the all-pervading and all-animating spirit, and yet is a God, who 'hideth' himself, it therefore seems exceedingly appropriate, in an ascription of praise, to ascribe unto him power associated with the attribute of secrecy, unsearchableness, and general spirituality. It is acknowledging him as the true but secret source of all existence, motion, peace, and consolation. Certainly, this is quite as appropriate, as to ascribe unto him power associated with the solitary attribute of eternal duration. It would seem, also, that the Seventy had not lost sight of some meaning of this kind in the Hebrew עלם; for twice, at least, they have translated a form

of that word, by δυναμις, *power*. Job xi. 6. 'O, that he would show thee the *power* [*secret* or *wonderful energy*] of wisdom; for it is double of what is with thee'—Job xxviii. 11. 'He exhibiteth his *power* [*secret* or *wonderful energy*] in light.' —Possibly, also, an idea not very different is conveyed under a different form of words, in Wisd. vii. 24. 'Wisdom is more moving than any motion,' [or 'more active than action.'] And it may not be aside from the purpose, to remark, that δυναμις, commonly translated *power*, is often used to represent 'miracles'—'mighty works'—'wonderful works,' all of which lead the mind to contemplate a secret, mysterious, *spiritual* agency in producing them.

The expression *spiritual power*, therefore, might not be so 'revolting,' in this place, as Professor Stuart would have us think. But if the term *spiritual* seem too poor for the connexion, in which αιωνιος here appears, then take any other term, more expressive of the mysterious nature of power, or even the term 'everlasting,' if you see cause—it will have no effect at all on the truth of the proposition, that one meaning of αιωνιος, in the Scriptures, is *spiritual*, which is all I have affirmed; although it is exceedingly probable, that the comprehensive sense of *spirituality*, rather than the more narrow sense of mere perpetual duration, was in the mind of the apostle, when he composed this ascription of praise;—or, if you like it better, adopt Professor Stuart's own translation of κρατος,* in this passage, and read *spiritual* '*praise*;' which would be but little different from another name for 'worship in *spirit* and in truth.'

If the word *spiritual* seem poor, it is only because we do not, in our minds, assign it the exceedingly comprehensive sense which, in reality, belongs to it. Spirituality is, in truth, the immense region of intellectual thought, moral affection, and self-deciding volition; an immaterial realm, boundless, vast, unsearchable, and incomprehensible to the finite mind. In its whole extent, it is known only to the Infinite One, who fathoms the abyss of mind, measures the extent of affection, and estimates the force of volition; 'the High and Lofty One, who inhabiteth SPIRITUALITY.' Finite beings are partakers of this mysterious state, only so far as they are 'spiritually minded.' God alone, in the strict sense of the term, is SPIRIT itself.

* Spirit of the Pilgrims for Aug. 1829, p. 432.

The word *eternity*, therefore, expresses only a solitary attribute of the Supreme Divinity; *spirituality* expresses his nature; and, it is nothing but want of use, which makes the term *spiritual* seem inappropriate, in many cases, in which we have been in the habit of reading *eternal*, or *everlasting*.

It is even much to be doubted, whether many simple hearted readers of the Bible do not annex a meaning of this *spiritual* kind to the English words *eternal*, and *everlasting*, when they read them in many scriptural passages; and think more of the secret, unsearchable, or *spiritual* nature of the subject spoken of, than of its perpetual duration. As when they read such passages as this;—'His ways are everlasting;'* or, 'Lead me in the way everlasting;'† and others of a similar kind, abounding in the scriptures.

Another passage, quoted by Mr Stuart, as an instance, in which the term *spiritual* as a translation of αιωνιος, would be 'revolting,' is Heb. ix. 14. 'Who [Christ] by an *eternal spirit*, δια πνευματος αιωνιου, offered up himself,' &c. He asks, 'Shall we say, *by a spiritual spirit?*' Certainly not. The word *spirit*, in this text, is evidently a proper name. It is the proper name, either of a third person, or '*distinction*' in the Godhead; or of the Divine Energy personified. The word *spiritual*, as expressing the nature of such a person, or distinction, or energy personified, is far from inappropriate. It is, on the contrary, exceedingly appropriate. Nevertheless, I would not use it, in translating this passage into the English language, because the proper name of the subject, in that language, is *spirit;* and the union of an adjective and noun, of the same name, would, from the custom of this language, make an unseemly appearance, and give an unpleasant sound. But the impropriety exists only in the appearance and sound of the English words.

There is no impropriety in applying the term *spiritual* to the subject spoken of in this text; i. e. the person, the distinction, or the personified energy, here called a *spirit*. But, for the sake of the appearance, and sound, and habit of our language, I would employ a different English word, either for the subject or the attribute, if I could find one which contained enough of the sense of the original to justify its use; and, if I could not find such a word, I would submit to the evil, and call it a spiritual spirit; even as if I were a Hebrew, who would

* Hab. iii. 6. † Ps. cxxxix. 24.

make no scruple at all in saying *a spiritual spirit*, or an *eternal eternity*.

If you choose, then, change the English name of the subject here spoken of, and say, a spiritual divine energy; or change the English name of the attribute, and say, an *unsearchable* spirit; or, if you prefer, retain the present translation 'Eternal Spirit.' You will, even in this latter case, leave my main principle unharmed. For, I do not contend for *spiritual*, as the meaning of αιωνιος, in all cases; but only as one among others. And yet it seems most probable, that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews intended to express the vast, and to us unsearchable, nature of the power, through which Christ 'offered himself, without spot, unto God,' rather than its *mere* perpetual duration.

The only difficulty, in this place, results from the necessity, if it be one, of using the English word *spiritual*, as the nearest which the language affords, to express the meaning of αιωνιος, but still, from common habit, not precisely corresponding to it. In the Greek, the difficulty disappears; and in the Hebrew, you well know, it is no uncommon thing for the noun and adjective to be, not merely similar in sound and appearance, but the very same words.

Professor Stuart next quotes, as an instance in which the application of *spiritual*, as a translation of αιωνιος, would be 'revolting,'—'Philemon 15—for he [Onesimus] was absent a little while, that thou mightest have him αιωνιον,—*spiritually?*'

And wherefore, I ask, should it not be so? Onesimus was Philemon's slave. The only relation, hitherto existing between them, had been the external, coarse, and earthly relation of master and slave; a relation, which, on the part of Onesimus, had been most reluctantly endured; for he had absconded from his master, and fled to the city of Rome. There the apostle found him; and, by the divine blessing, converted him to Christianity. He seems to have been a most cordial Christian; so completely a new man in Christ Jesus, that St Paul calls him his 'son,' and his 'own bowels;' whom he 'would have retained with' himself, to have ministered unto him 'in the bonds of the gospel.' But, as in duty bound, he sent him home to his master, entreating Philemon to receive him in his new *spiritual* relation; 'not now as a slave, but above a slave, a brother beloved, especially to me, but how much more unto thee, both in the flesh and in the *Lord*.' The remark of the

apostle is, in such a case, exceedingly appropriate;—'Perhaps, he therefore departed from thee for a season, that thou shouldest receive him *spiritually;*' i. e. in the new, cordial, and enduring relation, in which he was now returning. This, to my apprehension, affords a much more enlarged and delightful view of the apostle's mind, and, I think, a more correct one, than when we consider him as referring to the mere perpetuity of the new relation which Onesimus was now sustaining to Philemon.

It may not be amiss, also, to remark, that αιωνιον, in this place, might, without violence to the Greek, be translated *a spiritual one.* In which case, we should, at least, avoid the necessity of converting an adjective into an adverb; and should lose nothing but the supposed antithesis between προς ωραν and αιωνιον. If we believe such an antithesis to have existed in the mind of the apostle, when composing this epistle, we ought to retain it in the translation; but, if not, we lose little, and gain much, by exchanging it. Let each inquirer be 'fully persuaded in his own mind.'

As other instances, in which *spiritual* would be 'revolting' as a translation of αιωνιος, Professor Stuart next quotes in these words—'Rom. xvi. 25, the revelation of the mystery, which was kept in silence χρονοις αιωνιοις—*in the spiritual ages?*'

Also, in these words—'2 Tim. i. 9, the grace given us .... προ χρονων αιωνιων—*before the spiritual ages?*'

The former of these texts I had introduced into the article in question, as an example of those cases, in which the words αιων and αιωνιος refer to *ancient things.* The latter text, he might have readily supposed, I should have interpreted in the same manner. I can see no reason why he should have introduced these texts, in this inquiring way, unless it be to show, that αιωνιος sometimes signifies *ancient*, and, thereby, lead his readers to believe, that it never can mean *spiritual.* I believe, however, that Professor Stuart himself would be hardly willing to translate αιωνιος, in these two last texts, by the word *eternal*, ready as he seems to be to translate it so, wherever he can. They are instances of a use of the word, which is uncommon in other parts of the New Testament, and equally uncommon in the Septuagint, like ετη αιωνια ['years of ancient times.'] Ps. lxxvii. 5. Mr Stuart considers them so himself, and assigns them, together with Tit. i. 2, a separate place, as the three only cases in which the word sustains this unusual

meaning in the New Testament. They ought not, therefore, in fairness, to be introduced as testimonies for its ordinary signification, nor as evidences against any other sense of αιωνιος. Professor Stuart seems here to have been greatly in want of instances, when, after having virtually set these texts aside, as incompetent witnesses in the case, he calls them to the stand, to bear testimony against another. He is welcome to all the advantage, which such quotations as the two last, produced in this manner, can afford him; equally so, to the influence he may exert over the minds of his readers by such means; and I have no desire to deprive him of his responsibility for the effects which may be thereby produced, upon their views of the nature and character of the spiritual religion of God in Christ.

He might have found a few more cases, and only a few, in which αιωνιος, possibly, refers to some outward state, or condition of being; he might have found others, in which it refers, simply, to *duration;* and some, in which it is used in other senses still; and, in so doing, he would have done nothing more than what is not only admitted, but affirmed, in the article on which he is animadverting. He would still have fallen far short of showing, that αιωνιος has not the sense contended for, in a great multitude of texts; far many more, than those in which it certainly refers to duration, or to material or temporary existences of any kind, or to anything necessarily associated with material existence; like *time, age, institution, &c.*

Nor yet, admitting *spiritual* to be one meaning of αιωνιος, is great difficulty to be apprehended, in ascertaining the particular meaning to be affixed to the word, in either of the different places in which it occurs in the scriptures. The evident object of the speaker or writer in his discourse; his own peculiar habits of employing language; the known state of things relating to the speaker or writer, or to his hearers or readers; the *usus loquendi*, or the *exigentia loci*, most commonly afford a competent guide,—as in regard to the terms *the kingdom of heaven, darkness, light*, &c.—With the ordinary means we possess, for ascertaining the import of words as used by different persons, or in different connexions, we need no more be mistaken in the meaning of this word, when we meet it, than we need be in that of many other words and forms of speech, confessedly made use of in different senses in different parts of the scriptures. The connexion, the subject, and the circumstances of the case, enable us to understand the particular im-

port, in the particular text, with an ordinary share of information and common sense, and a competent measure of wisdom from above.

At the conclusion of his remarks, Professor Stuart asserts, that 'I must know, in my own conscience, that grounds of reasoning *a priori*, have inclined me to embrace the doctrine which rejects the *eternity* of future punishment; and not the language of the Bible.' I am not very fond of detailing, before the world, personal experiences. But the fact is not at all as he has affirmed it. I once believed the doctrine of eternal misery to those who die impenitent, with as much sincerity as any one. My faith in it was first startled, in consequence of an attempt I made, to lay before my people the *scriptural* argument in its favor. In searching for the meaning of the Greek terms, which are thought to express it, I was astonished to perceive, that I could not find positive *eternity* in them; and, I must confess, I was disappointed; for I had expected these words to give a most powerful support to the doctrine.

After this, there were left no particular scriptural terms, excepting the English words *eternal* and *everlasting*, by which to enforce the doctrine upon a congregation. But, conscious that the original did not, with certainty, contain this meaning, I despised the thought of exhibiting, to a confiding people, as expressions of divine truth, English words which expressed more than the originals. And I despise it now.

Nevertheless, the doctrine itself still hung upon me, by the influence of old association; and, perchance, 'like a baby, sick to death, it was dearer for its weakness;' until, having sought, with painful anxiety, a support for it in the scriptures, and sought in vain,—I was compelled to relinquish it; so far, at least, as to believe, that if there be eternal misery, it must be only as a consequence of eternal sin, voluntarily continued in.

Subsequent inquiries have convinced me, that neither our Lord nor his apostles intended to assert the positive eternity either of sin or misery. In my view, they simply contemplate man, with respect to his soul, as an immortal existent, and the partaker of a *spiritual* nature. They reveal the joyous consequences of holiness, and the wretched consequences of sin, in that spiritual nature, region, realm, or kingdom—by whatever name you call it—which consequences each must experience, according to his character and state, when God is manifest

within him; whether in the present world, or any world to come. They state the immutable rules, by which spiritual happiness and spiritual misery are severally dispensed to individuals; and, that these rules are everlasting. But I cannot find, that they specify any positive *period*, either in this life, at death, or in a distant moment of general resurrection, at which the eternal decree of the Almighty so positively establishes the state of the soul, that there shall certainly be no subsequent change;—I mean, when they speak of the spiritual condition in its *nature*, as common to both good and evil. They have sufficiently taught us that the good shall continue good, and be eternally happy in spirituality; but have not taught us that the wicked may not change and turn to God, and goodness, and felicity.

I should not have said so much concerning my personal experience, had not Professor Stuart undertaken to judge between me and my conscience; with which I cannot but hope, although aware of liability to self-deception, that I am somewhat better acquainted than he. 'Judge not, that ye be not judged.'

He, also, calls upon me to show, 'that a day of grace, a preached gospel, an offered Mediator, a sanctifying Spirit, and pardoning mercy, are proclaimed in the Scriptures, as proffered to sinners in another world, who have rejected them all in this; and then,' he says, 'we may lend him a listening ear.' In other words, he would have me prove what I have not asserted, and then he will give attention to what I do maintain. Let him show, first, that I have anywhere affirmed, that sinners will repent in another world; and then I will either do my best to prove it, or acknowledge my error. He will not be able to do this, so long as my words are these;—'we do not read any explicit promise, that such conversions shall take place in the world to come.'

I think, however, it would be difficult for Mr Stuart, or any one else, to prove, that the *same* means of grace, which he delineates as essential to salvation, are *not* proffered to sinners in the world to come;—at least to those, who have not rejected them in this world; if not to those who have.

It would be more difficult for him to show, that other, and more powerful means are not used upon them, in that world; or whether any means at all are necessary, in a state, where the divine presence is blazing in everlasting light, and the spirit of the Highest is searching all things.

Of this one thing there can be no doubt; that if any soul, in any world, be in a fitting condition to receive it, neither 'pardoning mercy,' 'a sanctifying spirit,' nor a medium of communion with God, will be withheld.

There are, doubtless, many sinners transferred to the world of souls, to whom the means of salvation have never been proffered in this world. Are they, therefore, excluded from 'a day of grace,' and from all opportunity of being saved? It is not merely the Athenian, at whose ignorance 'God winked;' nor merely the heathen, who has never heard the name of Christ, who is in this predicament. There are those, in christian lands, whose birthright is penury, labor, and exclusion from all opportunities of learning the truth as it is in Jesus; many, whose condition is so near akin to that of the 'beast which perisheth,' that they have it not in their power to embrace the Messiah, and become the citizens of the kingdom of God in Christ. If they have no opportunity for being saved in the world to come, they are dealt with most inequitably. Orthodoxy itself could scarce find, in its heart or its Bible, to deny unto these, an opportunity for salvation in the future world. And if it may be so with them, it may be equally so with others. Admit the principle, that an opportunity for salvation is offered to any in the future world, and you open the door of possibility for all who have not plunged into sin so deep as to be past repentance.

Again,—What is that, which *saves* a soul? Is it not, more especially in the Orthodox creed, mere *grace?* Grace, which seeks, enlightens, convinces, and converts that soul, and *saves* it 'by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost,' * through the instrumentality of such means, as God, in the gospel of his Son, has provided? It is, ultimately, the free grace of the Divine Being, which saves a soul; and means are of service, only as they lay open a channel through which saving grace enters the heart.

This is no *argumentum ad hominem* in regard to an Orthodox man. I believe it myself, with all fulness of faith; and, therefore, am the more free to exhibit it, in the present view of the subject. 'All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ.' † All '*spiritual* life is the gift of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord.' ‡ It is God, himself

* Tit. iii. 5. † 2 Cor. v. 18. ‡ Rom. vi. 23.

alone, who, 'in Christ' is 'reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.' *

What we call *the means of salvation* are, I believe, nothing more than provisions made in the present world, by the Supreme Divinity, for opening a way for himself to the soul of man,—that secret, invisible inhabitant of a blinding and deafening house of flesh. And, until the human soul becomes conscious of the divine presence, and submits willingly to the operations of divine power, no spiritual birth unto God takes place, and no true salvation is effected in that soul; 'as many as are *led* by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God.' †

In this intention, of preparing 'the way of the Lord' to the soul, the means of salvation, in the present world, are of immense importance; and it often pleases the Most High, through their instrumentality, 'to save them that believe.' But, in the world to come, it is exceedingly to be doubted, whether the same means employed on earth, or any other means, are requisite, for making the same preparation. In a state, where the light of the Eternal's countenance shall forever shine, and man, a spirit, denuded of the garment of flesh, shall see as he is seen, and know as he is known, it may be, that judgments, convictions, and conversions may take place, without the intervention of such means of salvation, as are operating in this world; possibly, by the direct influence of the Supreme Being alone. But I will not attempt to prove that it certainly is so; because I do not see it so asserted in the record of divine revelation.

I will only say, that we can neither expect, nor fear, that God will change his parental character, or alter his parental principles of government over us, because we change our state of being. He will be found the same, through all states, and all conditions of existence, whereunto we may ever be transferred; 'The Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.' ‡ His wisdom may be confidently trusted, to bring to pass whatever his love may dictate. And what neither infinite benevolence shall prompt, nor infinite wisdom devise, we may be well content should not take place. But, I doubt not, that, in the world to come, mercy, love, grace, and wisdom, will be unfolded to our perceptions, in ways of divine providence, and laws of the divine government, which are, now, too deep

* 2 Cor. v. 19. † Rom. viii. 14. ‡ James i. 17.

for us to fathom; over which clouds and thick darkness hover; and which, to many of our minds, exhibit, in the present, anything but mercy. Be all this as it may, we have the certain assurance of spiritual felicity, so long as we continue in unity with God; and the mere wish to be happy in alienation from our Maker, is, in itself, a sin.

In this letter, I have purposely confined myself to that part of Professor Stuart's dissertation, in which he remarks on the article in the Christian Examiner above named, setting aside the general substance of his entire work. I will trust your goodness to endure whatever burden I may have laid upon your patience, in calling your attention to these observations.

Yours respectfully,

E. S. G.

Sandwich, Aug. 9, 1830.

ART. III.—*Paul Clifford.* By the AUTHOR of 'Pelham,' 'The Disowned,' and 'Devereaux.' New York. J. & J. Harper. 1830. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 215, 216.

No one, we think, can read the work before us, without reprobation and disgust; no one, we mean, who is properly impressed with the importance of moral duty and religious obligation, or who feels sensible that the regulations of society, in regard to property, industry, and personal security, are entitled to any respect.

The tendency, if not the design of the work, is to remove the restraints which the laws and institutions of society impose on the bad passions of depraved and dissolute men, by portraying, in brilliant colors, their manners, habits, and modes of life—giving the charm of energy, courage, and heroism, to the conduct of thieves and highwaymen; and, by throwing into the shade whatever penalty remorse might inflict, or the contempt and detestation of society impose on them, to present, in strong relief, the appearance of a real and satisfying happiness, which needs but little aid from integrity, and suffers comparatively nothing by any compunction of conscience. It is in fact to inculcate, by the most vivid examples, that moral distinctions are quite unessential to personal happiness, and that, in the

most contemptuous and habitual disregard of them, there is found about as much genuine satisfaction, and as strong a claim to admiration and esteem, as in their exact observance.

Nor is this all. These distinctions themselves are scouted at and derided, as mere human inventions. All laws are represented as iniquitous and unjust; the institutions by which they are protected, are treated with sarcastic or open indignity, and the men by whom they are administered, presented, not only as base, corrupt, and infamous, but as made so by the operation of those principles or arrangements of society, on which hitherto we have been taught materially to depend for our security and happiness. In fact, if our author is to be trusted, religion and morals, honor, fidelity, and truth have no natural existence; the institutions, which profess to teach or preserve them, are mere contrivances of chicanery and fraud; the men who administer government, in whatever departments they are found, are most eminently absolved from all regard to any interests but their own, and solely occupied in imposing weights on the subdued spirits of the subject, which it should be with him a point of honor, as well as duty, to throw off; so that, as we are tempted to believe, the most respectable members of the community are felons, of whom, by our author's graduated scale, pickpockets are in the lowest, and highwaymen in the highest rank. There is a charm, a beauty, a nobleness infused into their mode of life, which should draw to it all the choice spirits, the gay, daring, reckless and pleasure-loving members of the community! This is something beyond that satanic school of poetry, of which Byron is the principal master; it is a step or two further in that course of delusive sophistry, which, at its commencement, startled the sober sense of mankind, and prevailed only by the extraordinary genius with which its paradoxes were pursued and defended.

Paul Clifford is a robber, the captain of a band of highwaymen. His associates and companions, when he is moving in the sphere to which he properly belongs, are thieves and robbers; and when he gains admission, as the author extravagantly supposes him to do, into honest society, it is by hypocrisy and deception, by means of an artful concealment,—which is all the while a practical falsehood,—of his real character and course of life. All this would be disgusting enough, if it were detailed with accuracy or plausibility; but it is the design of the author to excite a strong and deep interest for his hero, and of course the low

and profligate scenes of daily life, in which such characters are engaged, are to be raised and refined; the coarse conversation of vulgar, uneducated companions, is to be polished and purified; and although this is done to an extent that is unnatural and absurd, there is yet a vulgarity and indecency in the dialogue, which is little adapted to gratify intellectual readers. The principal character is to be rescued from the detestation which is naturally felt at his conduct, by endowing him with a romantic and captivating chivalry, a generosity in his rapaciousness, and a gentlemanlike manner in his outrages; giving him a sort of *petit maître* mode of committing a larceny, that, because of the fashion of the manner, we may be willing to forgive, ah, even to admire the action itself!

All this is done, too, by design,—on a plan and a system. The novice actually studies his profession. He reads the memoirs of *the great Turpin*, a hanged highwayman, whom he adopts for his model, as the young soldier warms his imagination over the memoirs of Marlborough and Turenne. But, notwithstanding all this, the old prejudices of society would induce us to consider him as in fact only a thief; and a thief, we are accustomed to think, is the lowest, meanest, basest of mankind. To overcome these antiquated notions, the author has kindly contrived to lay all the blame on the laws and institutions of society. He never omits a sarcasm on the establishments of justice or the forms of civil government, and never fails to introduce such incidents as may bring them into contempt. Indeed, the character of the hero, seems, in the judgment of our author, to be the natural offspring of the existing constitution of society; and although it is not very obvious whether, according to his theory of morals, larceny be a crime, yet if indeed it be one, the blame of it is transferred from the thief, who is little more than a passive instrument of destiny, to the laws and the magistrates and the forms of society which influence him. Certainly, in the picture he has given us, the highwayman is quite as respectable as the judge; and the code by which the former is governed, is not a whit less reasonable and praiseworthy, than that system, which, under the name of law, he would represent to be the real creator of what we should call wickedness and guilt.

In pursuance of this design, the character of Sir William Brandon is an important part of the work. This personage, the father of the hero by a clandestine marriage, is an eminent

lawyer and judge, with a fair prospect of promotion to the highest honors of his profession, while at the same time he is as entirely free from all the restraints which morality imposes, as the vilest criminal whom he sentences to death, and is in fact indirectly the cause of that course of iniquitous life, which, that it may not too much degrade the hero, the author has contrived to impute to this eminent jurist.

We object to this work, that it presents entirely false views of individual character, and that its tendency is thereby to *make* such persons as it *feigns*. We do not mean that there may not be unjust magistrates; but we venture to say, that, except by the especial favoritism of absolute power, certainly not existing in the country where these scenes are laid, men of such character do not, by the mere force of their depravity, make their way to the bench. We do not mean to say, that there are not unwise laws; but we believe that no intelligent man will pretend that the main tendency of all jurisprudence is to make candidates for the gallows. The principal character of the novel is in our opinion wholly and extravagantly fictitious. A noble-minded, generous highwayman, a kind-hearted, benevolent thief, a pure and sentimental debauchee, an intellectual, accomplished, elegant and fashionable companion of uneducated, vulgar, depraved, and dissolute votaries of profligacy and intemperance, is an inconsistent and visionary being, which has no existence in real life, and is here produced with as little good taste as truth, from a desire to offer to a diseased and prurient appetite, something that may gratify its irregular cravings.

We cannot present this objection more strongly than by a plain statement of it. Virtue and vice are, to be sure, singularly blended in the human character; but if there be none perfect, so truly none are utterly and irremediably depraved. There may be, in the worst individuals of the worst class, a redeeming quality, that may vindicate their claims to humanity. But settled, premeditated, intentional disregard to all human and divine laws, wherever such laws would impose a restraint on the passions or interests of an individual, is totally inconsistent with any qualities which can command respect or esteem. The conduct, in such case, whatever it might be, would be directed by caprice, interest or passion; and occasional acts, which might seem the indications of a better mind, would no more be entitled to the appellation of virtue, than the momentary pauses of the storm would be considered as the termina-

tion of its fury. The predominant habits and manners of life form the character; and it is as difficult to combine the repulsive and contradictory elements of the moral, as of the physical world. The individual, who is stern and ferocious enough to pursue his objects of personal acquisition to the ruin of his fellow beings, by an invasion of their rights, either of security or property, or who foregoes the labors of honest industry, and levies the expenses of his profligacy on such persons as chance places within his power, whether it be by the little arts of petty fraud, or the boldness of open violence, is, and must be, thoroughly depraved and detestable; and the art and genius of the poet, or of the romance writer, are wasted and debased in attempts to conceal the deformity of his vices, by connecting it with the brightness of virtues, which must necessarily be fictitious.

But the effort to make vice less detestable by ingenious palliations and strong contrasts; by opening, as it were, a sort of account current, in which heinous and habitual and weighty offences are to be balanced by imaginary and irreconcileable virtues, is dangerous wherever it is successful, and blamable wherever it is attempted. It may be charity, indeed, to find a palliation for actual transgression, by adverting to other and better qualities in the agent, because, when this is the actual exercise of a candid spirit, it will find the apology it seeks for in nothing but truth. It will never attempt to encircle the penitent it would pardon, with rays of glory, which it is impossible should ever have adorned him.

The writer of a novel has no restriction. He draws from imagination, and he addresses the heart. When the object or the tendency of his work is to make vice fashionable, or lessen the disgust which ought to prevail at every open and unblushing proclamation of it, by throwing round it a charm that can by no possibility exist in reality, and by accompanying it with pretended sentiments and feelings, which, if true, would be some alleviation, but which he knows not to be true in real life, and introduces only that they may disguise the poison he infuses,—we can have no respect for his honesty, and must add his name to the long list of those whose interests have made them base enough to corrupt the morals of mankind. Even the talent with which it is done, fails to command the admiration which genius inspires; for we despise the poor and pitiful spirit which condescends to be the caterer of evil, either from low ambition or the meaner desire of personal profit.

We do not, as we think, attribute too much to the influence of fictitious narratives upon the character of a community. If books which inculcate good principles and correct conduct, are worth the employment of the best men's time in preparation, circulation, and study, it is only because their effect is supposed to be important in the general concerns of society; and we know no reason why the result may not be as great, when the machine is of an opposite character and in different hands. Probably, as in the case before us, it is greater, because the readers are more numerous. They are of a class, too, more susceptible of impressions; and the impressions made upon them are more permanent. The work comes stereotyped from the press, and by this means copies without number may be scattered through the country. It is the popular topic of the day. The drawing-room and the boudoir, stages and steam-boats, every place, indeed, where a book is to be found, contains a copy of it. Its style, its language, its incidents, are calculated to excite curiosity and protract it. It falls in with a taste, not indeed peculiar to this country, but which is too common here not to be regretted, and can never be indulged, we think, to any advantage.

The taste we refer to, is a perverted appetite for the extravagant and the horrible; for strange adventure, terrible accident, or monstrous crime. The manufactory of such tales for the daily press, has satirically been supposed to be the employment of a particular class of laborers, who live on the credulity which takes such extravagance for truths. To gather them from the records of criminal courts is a sure means of newspaper patronage; and the more outrageous the act, and the more minute the account of it, the better is the popular feeling satisfied, and the more is the reporter praised. A murder most foul and unnatural, or an execution the most revolting and painful, is therefore the highest treat that can be prepared for this insatiable thirst; and the life of a man whose every-day course led to the commission of nefarious crimes, and whose end might be expected on the gibbet, meets the wants of this strange curiosity. We do not think this state of the public mind is very creditable to the public taste or the public morals; or that to provide for its gratification is a very honorable or useful employment. We do not find that it makes men wiser or better. We see something of its effects in the awful tragedy of a public execution. The crowd that gathers its immense masses at the scaffold, is led

there to see, what it had before only read of; to partake in reality of those feelings, which had been excited in imagination by horrible tales of crime and depravity; to be agitated by strong impressions; to be excited by the endurance of agony, and become familiar with death. Who believes these scenes humanize the heart? Who does not feel, at every account of them, that they carry back the age to the days of a barbarism from which it ought to have emerged?

Something not dissimilar is the natural effect of the story, told with an art that interests the feelings, of the progress of vice in the person of a bold and presumptuous offender. But this effect is stronger and more permanent. The grosser part of the community assemble at the ultimate scene of the great tragedy of justice; but the more susceptible and intellectual and enlightened, are affected by the artful recital of its preparatory scenes. They only, whom the most awful of earthly exhibitions can interest, are the witnesses of the last infliction of the laws; but the young, the inexperienced, the tender, whom a less powerful prescription would move in a similar way, take a no less injurious impression from the account of it. The scene, too, that is thus awfully exhibited, is finished by a single display, and no similar one for a long time returns; but the account of iniquity, under all the alluring aspects in which ingenuity can describe it, is ready to seduce every unoccupied moment, and enforce by repetition what it may want in intensity.

Providence, in its kindness, has connected suffering with crime; not only remotely and feebly, but directly and acutely. We do not always see this in real life; but whenever the heart is displayed to us, we find it to be so, without one solitary exception. First begins the painful admonition of conscience at the violation of duty; and when, by successive efforts, its precepts are disregarded, and crime, by familiarity, loses its terrors, justice wakes and threatens the criminal with impending ruin. Fear is a base passion; and the highwayman, however boldly he conducts himself on the field, is always haunted by its apparition. The mean subterfuges to which the fraudulent constantly submit, the pitiful shifts to which they resort for concealment, and the uselessness of all their gains for any purpose of enjoyment, except indeed the lowest indulgences of mere sensuality,—overwhelm, with immensely disproportionate anxiety and alarm, all the moments, which folly had whispered to them might, by a course of iniquity, be appropriated to

pleasure. Such is the disclosure which reflection would convince us must be made, could we have revealed to us the history of the felon's life. And we know it so to be by the melancholy story, which remorse has again and again drawn in agony from his lips. The punishments which society inflicts, severe and terrible as they are, fade in comparison with the goadings of conscience, the jealousy of associates, the fear of discovery, the painful watchings and concealments and burthensome slavery of crime. This necessary and inseparable connexion of suffering and sin, is that guard which preserves the innocence of mankind; and this guard, the author of Paul Clifford, and such caterers to foul passions, designedly remove. In the scenes, which his fancy draws as an accurate picture of the robber's life, there is a gallantry that is above fear; a gaiety that is scarce shaded by apprehension; a light and buoyant spirit which soars above the ordinary anxieties of daily life,—we had almost said, a satisfaction and delight which we had thought were only to be gained by honest labor or honorable talent. Confidence and fidelity, too, which, in despite of the proverb, never dwell among thieves, are represented as flourishing in a congenial soil; as if it were possible that these sacred affections could be sustained in the minds of depravity and vice. This false and dangerous separation of what Providence has united, is the delusion that misleads the thoughtless and the rash. This representation of perfect freedom from all laws, human or divine, with a careful concealment of the price which is paid for it, breaks down the security which has been erected in the constitution of the human mind for the preservation of virtue.

We do not mean to have it inferred from anything we have said, that Paul Clifford, the highwayman, will make highwaymen in this country as the character of Charles de Moor made the young men of Germany robbers, or as our author's Pelham made fops in the United States.

But it is no fault of his, if this result does not follow. He has done what he could to unsettle the faith, and pervert the reason, and warm the imagination of all that class of men, of whom the Paul Cliffords of any country are composed. As yet, however, our communities are not forward enough in iniquity to give either encouragement to such a life, or means for any tolerably safe mode of conducting it. Our population is as yet too sparse, and the business of individuals is too well known

in society, to allow of the intermixture of rogues with honest men, without suspicion and probable detection. But the principles, or the want of them, which turn men loose to prowl upon the defenceless or the simple; the charm that makes a life of occasional danger and constant iniquity more alluring than the steady, and it may be dull, occupations of honest industry; the allurement of great gains by momentary hazards, which balances the chance of severe suffering against the prospect of impunity; and, above all, that ingenious sophistry which strives to reconcile the mind to any infractions of law, by persuading it that the law itself is a system of injustice and oppression,—will have their effect here as elsewhere; and the author, when he has reaped his gains, may feel whatever satisfaction he can at this payment for the blood of innocence, this reward for the sacrifice of souls.

It is because we believe the tendency of the work is peculiarly dangerous in our community, that we have thought it our duty to notice it. We are aware, indeed, that any attention that is directed to it may increase the evil it will probably accomplish; but it has gone abroad too widely to be treated with neglect, and we do our duty in contributing what we can to diminish its popularity.

We remark, then, that mistaken views of the political liberty, or personal equality, secured by our constitutions of government to all classes of citizens, have an injurious effect on the moral character and happiness of the people. This liberty, it is almost too obvious to repeat, can consist only in the due observance of proper restraints upon the unlawful desires of the unprincipled; and this equality, while it secures the perfect right of every individual to his just possessions, can never preserve an equality of possessions to all. Rational liberty consists quite as much in having the power of preserving to one's self the fruits of industry, as it does in the means of honest acquisition. The true liberty of no individual can be protected, unless a restraint is imposed on all others not to molest him; and while their liberty is necessarily curtailed by this limitation on their wills, they still possess the utmost freedom which civil society can admit, when such curtailment is made only on principles that conduce to the general welfare of the community.

So far as restriction is put on acts of outrage and force, none, probably, are bold enough to desire it to be lessened.

But there are various and almost innumerable modes of very dubitable honesty, which, although their practice would lead to direct personal emolument, are prohibited by the good sense of society, to the greater or less displeasure of those who might profit by their toleration. A class of men is thus raised up against the salutary operation of the laws; or rather, divers classes are united, who possess no inconsiderable part of that power to which we give the name of public opinion, and whose efforts are perseveringly directed to evade or break down the force that controls them. The most common and popular mode in which their exertions are made manifest, is by giving to the laws and institutions of society an odious and disreputable character, by imputing to them harsh and oppressive principles and evil designs; by inculcating the opinion that they are intended to foster and support the rich and educated and distinguished, at the expense of the laboring and middling classes of the community; by spreading the doctrine that all the arrangements of society are calculated to make the depravity that they punish, and that they therefore ought to be considered odious in the view of free citizens and liberal-minded men, and treated as varieties of the general despotism, which it is praiseworthy to evade or destroy!

This is a mode most familiar to the classes, numerous, and, because of their numbers, very powerful, who have too much pride or property, to make it very safe to brave the terrors of a criminal prosecution, and feel themselves vastly above the ordinary transgressors of the law,—but who, nevertheless, are mainly occupied in such a course of conduct as is within the spirit of its prohibitions, and are not prevented by moral considerations from a more determined infraction of its authority. To such men our author has furnished all the plausibility of sophistry, and encouraged them by all the art of his ingenuity and talent. He has given them new motives and additional strength, and taught them an easier mode of reconciling their course of life with that pretension to respectability, which they have pride, if not honesty enough, to value.

The class of men to whom we refer, are already too numerous in our country for the entire claim we might wish to make to as much eminence of character, as of political privileges. It would give us just cause for uneasiness, if, on due examination, we should find they were increasing; and especially if there be anything in our institutions which tends to multiply

their numbers. But it would answer no good purpose to conceal the truth, or to shrink from its examination.

Under institutions calculated, with the entire force of human ingenuity, to accelerate the civil and religious advancement of mankind, we might expect an indefinite improvement, even to the perfection of our species, if we did not find, that, in every arrangement of man's device, there is something to retard as well as to propel, and that, as in physics so in morals, an increase of the moving power does not always produce a proportionate progress in the body to be moved.

To the animated pursuit of wealth, neither the genius of our system, nor the condition of individuals offers any restraint. Probably here, more than under any other form of society, wealth itself has the most allurements, and promises the largest rewards. Political power or talents, besides that they are necessarily the distinction of a few only, though they cannot be purchased and do not depend for their existence upon the accident of affluence, are of comparatively small advantage without it. All the faculties of active and busy men are devoted to this object; and there is not here, as elsewhere, any superior or even balancing power. In wisely abandoning the distinctions, which, in European society, have some control over the universal passion for accumulating property, we lose also the checks they impose upon it. We restrain it, to be sure, by the force of moral principles and the energy of good laws; but where the inducement is so vast and constant, these will be evaded or opposed with more or less success, in proportion to the solidity or weakness with which proper defences are erected in the public mind. But it is hardly possible these defences should be sufficient; and the consequence is, that in the general eagerness to advance, means are resorted to that cannot be tolerated with safety or respectability; and classes of men arise, who, not daring to avow any direct assault on the good order of the State, will yet, by artful and ingenious devices, strive to press forward their own fortunes, whatever may be the consequences to the public.

The passions and vices of men, quite as much as their honest requisitions, afford means for the accumulation of property; and the hazard which is incurred by those who minister to their gratification, is often repaid with large profits, which are too strong temptations for ill-regulated minds.

Another evil is found to be connected with one of the best principles of our institutions. The system of universal education too often carries men beyond the sphere in which their exertions might be useful to themselves, or the public. Accommodate as we will, the condition of society to the general desires of those who compose it, there will always be, as there ever has been, an inequality of wealth, dignity, and enjoyment. It is inevitable that there should be poor men as well as rich, working men as well as idle, men of little consideration or esteem as well as those who may fill the distinguished stations of society. And it seems, also, just as certain a decree of Providence, that the least enviable classes should be the most numerous. But to the highest positions of society every man here has an equal claim; and though the actual summit may be beyond his view, each, by a natural and laudable ambition, strives to pass his original condition. But the majority of these aspiring minds are destined, by the immutable laws of human existence, to severe and hopeless disappointment. The advanced stages of society are filled to overflowing. The employments which are assigned to genius and talents, and high faculties of mind, are seized on and exhausted; and still an unsatisfied multitude remain behind, unable to labor, and ashamed of their poverty. The useful, though, as they are sometimes considered, the humbler occupations of life are neglected, in the hope of engaging in loftier and more honorable duties. But fame cannot satisfy her votaries; power is limited in its means; distinction, from its very nature, can be conferred only on a few. The ability of living without manual labor may indeed be possessed by some, but obviously not by all; and disappointment, wherever it falls, is rarely borne with equanimity. It adds nothing to the quiet of the scene, that success is not always in proportion to merit, and that he who apparently most deserves encouragement, meets oftentimes with the most cruel neglect.

The tendency of this state of things, is, to crowd those professions and employments which are considered easiest or most respectable, and to gather, out of the great majority who have been altogether or partially disappointed, a band of malecontents, complaining of the laws, the institutions, and the general arrangements of society. It is not merely the danger to political establishments growing out of this state of things, that it is our present purpose to consider. Such establishments

may resist, a long while, whatever open force may be brought against them. It is the more speedy and certain evil of wrong principles, which will produce wrong conduct; want of regular employment, that will be succeeded by a dangerous activity, and find in dishonest and disreputable means, the gains that had been expected in a different pursuit. It is the course of immoral life, openly going to the very line of the law, and secretly passing it, that cannot to any extent be indulged, under free institutions, without inevitably undermining their foundations, and sooner or later tumbling them to the ground.

We do not know whether the classes of men to whom we refer, are more numerous in our Commonwealth, than might be expected anywhere with an equal population; but that there are such classes, and that already they exert an influence on our laws and manners and public men, is too obvious, we think, to be doubted. To all these, Paul Clifford will be a text book. They will form themselves by his model, if not in action to the extent which he is represented as going, yet in kind, and habit, and taste, and effect, with like disregard to principle, and like encouragement for depravity, and with the same conviction that the laws of society are not their friends; that the code of morality is the mere contrivance of self-interested individuals; that the one may be evaded without compunction, and the other set at nought whenever it can be done with impunity.

ART. V.—*The Evil Consequences of an Injudicious Use of the Old Testament.* For the Christian Examiner.

AN apostle said of the Jews, that when Moses was read, a veil was upon their heart. For this, perhaps, they were not answerable. Their prejudices were sufficiently natural. But their condemnation was, that they obstinately resisted every endeavour that was made to remove them. It would seem as if the moment the fact was stated to them, that the Hebrew religion was only a preparation for another, they must have felt that it was true. It was evidently adapted to a single people and to an ignorant age. It was full of safeguards against idol-

atry, which was the prevailing temptation of an unenlightened people. It abounded in ceremonial observances, such as are suited to a people who resemble children in their simplicity, and were more likely to regard a trifling visible form than an important religious truth. If this were not enough, the fact that all the Hebrews were required to present themselves three times a year in the temple, made it evident that the religion was meant for a country of narrow bounds. To suppose that it was meant to be perpetual, is the same as supposing that man was intended to keep himself forever an infant in understanding, and to resist improvement as a matter of duty; for the Hebrew law is plainly and exactly calculated for an infant state of the world.

All this is now so evident to any reader of the Old Testament, that it seems almost impossible that it should not have forced itself upon the convictions of the Jews. It is true their religion was their great distinction above the rest of the nations; and it is natural that they should have resisted everything which went to diminish its value in their eyes. But there must have been those among the wiser men of their country, who felt a secret consciousness that the system was not likely to endure. Why not, then, come forward, when they heard Jesus Christ saying, that the purpose of that law had been fulfilled by his coming—why not come forward and receive the living spirit instead of the dead letter? It must be remembered that a large proportion of them did receive his instructions, and avow themselves Christians. And those who did not, were undoubtedly kindled to fiercer wrath by a consciousness deep within the breast, that the days of their faith were numbered. Such is human nature; and but for this irritating consciousness it would have been almost impossible for the Pharisees to overcome the personal popularity of Jesus Christ. Seeing to what point their efforts were directed, he repeated to them that it was not his object to destroy, but fulfil; that not an iota should pass away from the law, till all was fulfilled. They felt the foundations of their national pride sinking beneath them, and were wrought up to madness, instead of being subdued to sorrow and despair.—We may trace the operation of this singular feeling among religious partisans of the present day. Instead of yielding with the best possible grace to the force of truth, they resent argument as a personal affront, the moment it grows too hard for them to answer, and never cling to their faith with a grasp so inflexible as

at the moment when their last poor sophism in defence of it, is overthrown.

We should have but little concern with this piece of history at present, however, if the same prejudice were not found among many who bear the name of Christians. We do not hesitate to say, that many professed Christians have nothing but the Hebrew religion. Because the Old Testament holds the foremost place in their Bibles, they give it the same place in their reverence and affections. Not merely the ignorant, but those who might know better, regard those writings as equally important with the gospel. They read the Old Testament, and neglect the New. They get their ideas of God and duty from the Old Testament. If they want instruction, encouragement, or consolation, they go to the Old Testament. They are in the constant habit of drinking from that broken and moss-grown cistern, though the living water is flowing at their feet. If this were the case only with those who use the Bible as a talisman to guard the household, or read it as an incantation, believing in its magical power to purify and calm the soul, we should not say a word. But those who have the power, and whose duty it is, to correct such impressions, feel as if it were their interest to sustain them; and to this do we ascribe much of the narrowness of feeling, the servility of devotion, which dishonors the religious spirit of the present day, and gives occasion to the enemies of Christianity to say, that, by drawing their faith and feeling from such a fountain, Christians are become no better than Jews, in understanding, character, and heart.

We believe that this is a great evil, and therefore state it strongly. Doubtless we shall be asked, in no good temper, whether we would not have the Old Testament read. Certainly we would have it read; but read as the word of God addressed to an unenlightened people, and no more suited to Christians than infant instruction to the manhood of the mind. The difficulty is, that men read it with a veil upon their hearts; without in the least regarding what people and what times it was meant for. We would have it read, as containing the record of the Hebrew, not the Christian faith, and fix the reverence of men as strongly as possible upon the Gospels, as the great treasury of our religion.

We will now attempt to point out one or two of those results which follow from this misuse of the Hebrew scriptures.

Men borrow from them incorrect impressions of the nature of

God. In his nature he is everywhere present, and therefore is familiar with all that passes in the universe—near or distant, in the dead of midnight or the blaze of noon. Christianity labors to impress this truth; to make its disciples feel that we never can escape the searching gaze of that Eye that reads the heart. And every one who is not a perfect stranger to his own heart, must be conscious that this is one of the strongest inducements we have to be faithful—to know that we act always in the sight of God.

Now by resorting to the Old Testament as constantly as we do, we are in danger of losing the benefit of this impression. We find there grand and striking representations of the divine majesty, but all of the material kind. God appears as a king seated on a throne of glory. Hyacinth, jasper, emerald, and gold make up the splendor of his array. Little, comparatively speaking, is said of the moral perfections of his nature, which entitle and recommend him to the reverence and love of enlightened minds, because such representations were not suited to impress the hearts and imaginations of the Jews. On the contrary, everything gives the impression, that he exists in a human form—an impression which needs to be resisted. Perhaps we should except Solomon's prayer at the opening of the temple, though even in that sublime address to the Most High, it is the language, rather than the meaning, which seems superior to the common theology of that people. It is impossible to conceive of a human form as everywhere present, and it hardly needs be said, that when we cease to feel the omnipresence of the Deity, almost all the power of religion is lost.

There are few, we believe, who cannot feel in themselves the bad consequences of being more familiar with the Hebrew, than the Christian representations of God. We do not mean to say that the Old Testament *gives* these impressions;—they are the natural fancies of childhood;—but our finding them confirmed in a page so sacred, prevents the gospel from wearing them away. There are few who feel as they would wish to feel, that no change of place can remove them from the sight and presence of God—of Him who knows the thoughts, purposes, and wishes of every heart. The very language we employ sustains, as well as expresses, this error. We speak of going into the presence of God. We speak of some places as if God were present there, and absent from others. When our Saviour said, 'My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?'—the

words were not his own. They were an application to himself of the words of his ancestor. We do not get this dialect from him, nor from his disciples. They will furnish us with more worthy, just, and exalted views of God; and, unless we learn to reverence his moral perfections, we shall have no regard for his sovereignty. We cannot pay homage to sceptres, thrones, and crowns. Such pageantry can never inspire the feelings which religion demands.

Of the divine character, this practice gives us still more unjust impressions. The Old Testament reminds us, not so much of God's mercy as of his exalted power. It holds out, comparatively, but little encouragement to repentance and prayer, and, in the whole of its spirit and letter, awakens fear rather than love. The object of the Hebrew law was to intimidate and overawe, because an appeal to better feelings would have been vain. God seldom appears there as a kind and merciful Father. Tenderness would not have been understood. He is the terrible and resistless king. Clouds and darkness are round about him. The storms are his messengers, the lightnings his servants. Everything was gloomy and repelling. The registry of the law was engrossed in blood. It said of almost every transgression, 'The soul that sinneth it shall die.' We do not mean that God was not called the Father of Men, but that all such representations were overshadowed by the awful visions of his destroying power.

Notwithstanding the repeated assurances of Christianity, that 'God is love,' such impressions, borrowed from the Old Testament, prevail very generally among Christians. Can any man doubt that we perpetuate this delusion by taking our idea of God from ancient prophets, instead of later and milder interpreters of his will? The piety of too many is slavish and depressing. The strain of their devotion is weak and low. It consists in abject and insincere self-humiliation. You can measure their secret pride by the very depth of their abasement, as you know that the miser feels richest when he talks most of being poor. When their piety is not hollow, it is mistaken and unworthy—unlike as possible to the glad and grateful offering, which real religion inspires. For the same reason, not one child in a thousand has the least conception of devotion. God is represented to them without one solitary attraction; and how can they be expected to go familiarly to pour out their hearts to a being whom they dread? Nothing which they know of his

character, gives them any reason to trust that he cares for their happiness or sorrow; and, if they engage in prayer at all, it will be to them a penance in which they have no pleasure, and which they submit to only because it is a duty.

The agency of God in the work of salvation, is represented by many in a way which gives pain to every thoughtful mind, and which would not be tolerated for a moment, if our views of the divine character were taken solely from the gospel. Strong and highly colored figures are taken from the Old Testament, and applied to the revelations of Christianity, with which they have no concern. They are used for the purpose of making an impression, and whether that impression be true or not, seems but little regarded. What would a stranger to our religion think of its disclosures as he gathered them from the lips of many Christians? Assuredly he would not suspect that salvation began in the mercy of God; that Jesus gave himself willingly for us; that all was done in condescending love to men. He would hear that the Father was full of wrath, and thirsting for revenge; that the Son came forward in pity to mankind, and received the Father's vengeance on his innocent head. Nothing but the language of those scriptures which ascribe human passions to the Almighty, could give the least air of truth to such representations. The prophets ascribed passions, sometimes fierce passions, to the Deity, because no other language would have been understood. But it is time for us to know that God is a spirit, far exalted above those passions that affect the sensibility and destroy the good feelings of men.

This brings us to another of these dangers. We read in those scriptures, that God was served with sacrifices, ceremonies, and professions; and that these were meant for visible signs of feelings existing in the heart. But in many of the Jews the sign became a substitute for devotion. That which was meant to express feelings, was offered instead of feelings of grateful praise. Nothing could be more striking to the imagination than the holy solemnities of the Jews. They were gathered in the temple where they were overawed by the praises of the multitude, uttered as with the thunder's voice, or by the anthems that rolled through the long aisles like the tides of a sounding sea. It is true the prophets repeatedly told them that they were doing wrong; that benevolence was better than all this sacrifice, which never could reach Heaven without obedience and real devotion. The caution was forgotten. The form only was

regarded. And so it is with thousands of Christians. They love to offer the easy form, and keep back the service of the heart; and while they thus refuse to render active obedience to God, they shelter themselves under the Hebrew writings, the character and meaning of which they cannot, or will not, understand.

It is beyond a doubt that a great proportion of Christians have thus learned to feel as if the prayer raised in secret and unheard except On High, was of little value, though Christianity so strongly approves retired and silent devotion. Their devotion does not shun the public eye; and, instead of bearing a religious spirit with them from the temple into all the duties of life, they leave all their devotion at the threshold of its doors. The worshippers depart, feeling, like the Syrians, that God is not the God of the valley, but only of the hill. It seems as if a weight were lifted from their souls, and in any other place they were free to do many a deed which they would not think of doing in the presence of their God. Thus worship itself becomes a snare. It makes them forget that the universe is his magnificent temple, where everything around, above, and below, is bright with his perfection and eloquent with his praise,—that there is not a place in ocean, earth, or sky, where he is not present at every hour, by his power sustaining, and his mercy crowning, all.

But there is another way of serving God, which has found shelter under Old Testament examples, but cannot be too sternly condemned. David, when severely provoked by his enemy, said of him, in a moment of passion, 'Let his days be few, and another take his office; let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow: let his children be fatherless and beg their bread.' Such language, which can be excused only by the savage character of the age in which it was spoken, has been brought, with more of the same description, as a precedent for the indulgences of revenge in the cause of religion. And thus men, under the pretence, and possibly the conviction, that they were doing God service, have broken every one of his laws. Dungeons have been crowded with victims, scaffolds have run with blood, fires have consumed, floods have drowned,—almost as many as now move upon the earth have sunk at various times under the cannibal fury of persecution, and all has been justified by an appeal to language which can hardly be palliated, and not at all defended. Yet those who used such language,

were educated under a faith, which, as explained by authorised interpreters, almost insisted on vengeance for personal wrongs—an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; and Christians, to whom their Master has said, 'Love your enemies, bless them that curse you,' have gone to kings and prophets to learn a lesson more agreeable to their revengeful feelings, than the law of kindness and pardon so plainly laid down in the gospel.

Again, by taking the lessons of morality from the Old Testament, we lower our standard of duty. This standard must be set high; so high as to keep always before us the way of improvement. We need not fear lest it should be discouraging to see a vision of excellence which we may not reach; for a sense of duty never despairs, and what we cannot reach in the present life, may be made our own in another. If we lower the standard of moral excellence, our holy ambition sinks down at once. Easy attainments inspire no exertion. And it is universally understood that our Saviour came to reform the Old Testament morality. In his sermon on the mount he says that he came to correct the impressions which had been received from those of old time, and to teach a morality of a higher order. The demands of religion were abridged and abated in that day, on account of the 'hardness of their hearts,' which required a morality suited to their circumstances and character. But he came to give principles in place of directions, and to place the source of obedience in the affections, instead of the fears, of men.

How, then, can men, with any consistency, go to the Old Testament for their moral examples? Take the 'monarch minstrel' just mentioned, who, because he resisted idolatry and thus fulfilled the purpose for which the Jews were a separated people, was called a 'man after God's own heart,'—the phrase by which he is still described among Christians. Living under an imperfect light, desiring in vain to know what we know of God and duty, he left an example which is miserably defective, when judged by the christian law—an example which it would be destruction for a Christian to follow. But there is no justice in trying his character by a law which he never knew. Compared with others of his day, he was faithful; and he deserves to be protected against the injury of proposing him to Christians as a moral example. We should rather forget his transgressions in the mournfully affecting eloquence with which he deplored his infirmity and sins.

We may mention another example;—that of Job, who, in all his variety of suffering, held fast his integrity, and openly maintained, such was his confidence in the divine justice, that, should the disorder which had already consumed his skin go on to destroy his body, he believed that 'in his flesh'—while yet among the living—he should be restored to the favor of God. If we remember that life and immortality were not then brought to light; that he and his friends both believed this world to be the only place of retribution, we shall see that this confidence was devoted and sublime. How any one can believe that he was acquainted with the future state, except as an imagination, we do not know, when the single word 'immortality,' could he have spoken it, would have overthrown all the long arguments of his friends to show that he had sinned because he suffered, and would have lighted up his heart like a flame of fire. Had he known that state of retribution, the language of complaint and defiance to the Almighty which he used, would have been unpardonable. As it was, his fortitude was noble and commanding in one, who, to all appearance, was standing on the awful boundary between the living and the dead. But his endurance, great as it was, is not such as is expected and demanded in a Christian.

There is another common and pernicious error, which can be traced directly to the use of the Old Testament without regard to the design of its parts, and the times when and for which they were written. It is the doctrine that misfortunes are sent as judgments for sin; a doctrine manifestly belonging to an age when another life was unknown, or known only as a dim and imperfect reflection of the present life, and therefore one of the first errors which the light of Christianity might have been expected to dispel. The friends of Job took it for granted that whoever sinned was punished, and that no man ever suffered who was not guilty, and, knowing nothing of the future state, supposed that those judgments must be experienced now. To all their reasonings Job had nothing to return, except that he had an unshaken confidence in God, and believed that he would as certainly do justice to the innocent as the guilty. Owing to his ignorance, his hands were bound. But he would have asked no more than a single ray of the light which we enjoy, to bring his pertinacious friends to shame, and to strengthen him for his departure which seemed so near at hand.

Still, in some portions of the earth, and those not usually considered the darkest, men talk of judgments as if the present were the state of retribution. Forgetting that 'whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth,' they believe, as we have seen it expressed, that all their neighbours' misfortunes are judgments, and all their own are trials. It is in vain that our Saviour explained this very error to the Jews, telling them that the persons on whom the tower fell, and the idolaters whom Pilate slew, did not suffer, as they supposed, because they were worse than others. Such language is still used in the world, and there are many who look upon those who use it, as subjects of admiration for their piety, not as deserving pity for their unacquaintance with the character and providence of God.

This comes of reading the Hebrew scriptures with a veil upon the heart, and applying what was said of far off ages, to our own. The Jews lived under a system which made their national prosperity dependent on their fidelity to God. But now every one sees that prosperity does not follow the order of moral distinctions, though it is certain that it is our interest to be Christians in this world, even were there none beyond it. As a general rule the bad are miserable, and the just are happy. Still there are exceptions, and the knowledge of a future state is needed to explain the mysterious events of this. We know of no inflictions in the order of Providence, no sorrows sent on purpose to punish the guilty soul. The misery which is called the future punishment of sin, is a natural and inseparable consequence of sin, not a judgment sent directly down by the Almighty; and the accidents and misfortunes of life, which are sometimes so severe, are means by which the character is formed, because, like him who was made perfect through sufferings, our virtue must pass through trial and exposure, before God will pronounce it good.

We might also refer to the superstition which has been encouraged by reading the Hebrew scriptures without understanding. This may seem like a trifle. But superstition is not always harmless, like that which spreads paleness through the winter evening circle. It has done much to debase manly and powerful understandings. Witness Johnson, who would fain believe in ghosts, because he wanted more evidence of a spiritual world; as if sensible forms, visible to the eye, could be any evidence of spiritual and unseen things. The history of justice in this country, as well as in England, affords many examples

of the strange manner in which superstition has made savages of tolerably enlightened men, and taught them that the command 'thou shalt not suffer a witch to live,' was a sufficient justification for all manner of hypocrisy and falsehood in executing the sentence of blood; for we defy any one to read the registry of witchcraft in our land, without the conviction that there was unexampled knavery in those who were thought to be simply deluded, and that it was justified to their conscience by the denunciations of the Hebrew law against witches and offenders of that description. It seems certain that they imposed upon others, and it is probable that, like all deceivers, they imposed in a measure upon themselves.

We do not think that the Old Testament, read with any understanding, encourages this kind of superstition. Moses, in this provision against sorcery, knowing that such impostors were the pest of every unenlightened people, and might easily gain a dangerous influence, made the punishment severe enough to deter them from the crime. It does not appear that he believed in the reality of their powers and charms. We can infer nothing from his language, except that others believed; for the sternest infidel in New England might have approved severe statutes against witches, as persons who live by abusing the credulity and encouraging the vices of men. In the story of the resurrection of Samuel by the witch of Endor, everything bears the mark of evident imposture. The witch knew Saul by his extraordinary height, and his attendants. The ghost did not appear to Saul, except in the woman's own description; and the prophecy was made at a venture, trusting that his own desperation would make it true. While, therefore, we cannot charge the writers of the Old Testament with giving wrong impressions, it is evident that superstition has found its strong hold in the Hebrew scriptures, and can never be dislodged, till those remarkable writings, with their time and circumstance, spirit and letter, are better and more generally understood.

But we let these things pass, in order to show how entirely readers of the Old Testament lose the consolations of religion. The Hebrew faith never taught the immortality of the soul. Doubtless, there were intimations of this truth before Christianity. But the first clear, full, and convincing disclosure of a future existence, was made by him who died and rose again. Before he came, the grave was cold and dreary; no human eye could look through its caverns; no returning footprint was

ever seen in the churchyard way; no word of God revealed the destiny of man. And yet, in the day of solitude, sorrow, and bereavement, Christians turn over the pages of ancient inspiration, for that comfort which gilds every page of the gospel. When they pay the last tribute of affection, you hear them reading from that word which sums up all that was then known of the departed, in the withering sentence, 'dust to dust.' No wonder they mourn. Such language gives a double chilness to sorrow, and a deeper darkness to the tomb. If they had no other consolation, their tears would flow till time should dry them away. Happily they have. If they only lift up their eyes, they see the Sun of Righteousness rising, and his first warm radiance cast on the dark mountains on which their weary feet have trod.

Other instances might be pointed out, in which men go to the Old Testament for that instruction which it was never meant to afford them, and return without benefit, though not always without injury, from that word of truth which might have enlightened and improved them, had they read it without the veil on their hearts. But we may trace the effect of this misuse of it in the religious spirit of the present day. It is not the free and joyous reverence which should be paid to God. It is not that surrender of the heart and affections which duty and improvement require. It is a sullen devotion, a slavish submission. It is more like the studied homage offered to a king, than the pouring out of the soul in gratitude for a father's never weary love. It loves darkness rather than light. It is more at home in some melancholy tabernacle, than in the open sunshine and the broad creation. It is not the feeling inspired by a deep acknowledgement of the great perfections of God. We are impressed with the conviction, that the religion of many good Christians is but an imperfect likeness of that contained in the gospel. There, we read that devotion is a manly fervor, benevolence a noble and ever active principle; that Christianity is something more than a name and a profession, and that it absolutely and entirely disowns the livery or chain of party. And we fear that one great cause of it is, that men go to sit at the feet of kings and prophets, whilst the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than they—whilst the humblest Christian could have taught them that of their destiny, which they would have given worlds to know, had it not been revealed.

Let no one charge us with undervaluing the Old Testament,

because we say of it that it does not contain Christianity, and that men do wrong to go to it to learn the duties, feelings, and consolations of the christian religion. Deny it who can! We acknowledge the grandeur of its inspirations, the sublimity of its visions of God. We love the plaintive music of its hymns. We feel the greatness of the prophets, who sent a gleam of light down into future ages, seeing what none beside could see, hearing what others could not hear. We bow with reverence to all those mighty men, who, in their successive ages, lifted up the banner of religion and of God. Still we must say, that the Hebrew faith is not Christianity—it was only the preparation, which, when that which was perfect came, was ready to be done away.

ART. VI. 1. *Du Perfectionnement Moral, ou de l'Education de Soi-même.* Par M. DEGERANDO. Seconde Edition. Paris. 1826. 2 tom. 8vo.

2. *Self-education, or the Means and Art of Moral Progress.* Translated from the French of M. LE BARON DEGERANDO. Boston. Carter & Hendee. 1830. 8vo. pp. 456.

OUR readers may remember the opinion, expressed in a former number, that we have no ethical work of any living English writer, to be compared to the treatise, which we have now placed at the head of this article. We might, perhaps, with perfect justice, make this remark still more comprehensive, and declare our conviction that it holds a station in moral philosophy, which has not been filled by any writer in our language, either among the living or the dead. We do not mean to intimate by this, that it is superior, in all respects, to every treatise on morals which has preceded it. We would not have it understood, that we are insensible to the various merits of the great English moralists, by whose writings the habits of thought on ethical subjects, in our own country, have been principally formed. The theory of morals has certainly been discussed with uncommon ability, by some of the most acute minds in England, since the shock it received, in the age of Charles II., from the speculations of Hobbes. His writings were the signal for the commencement of an effectual study of human na-

ture; and from that time,—when, as Warburton asserts, a general panic took place, 'the press sweat with controversy, and every young churchman militant would try his strength, by thundering at the steel cap of the philosopher of Malmesbury,' —the subjects of free-will, duty, moral obligation, the nature of virtue, and the condition and destiny of man, have been favorite topics of consideration, with many enlightened and profound English scholars. We should be unjust to the memory of such men as Cudworth, More, Clarke, Butler, Price, Smith, and Stewart, did we fail to acknowledge the value of their writings, and the clearness of the light they have shed on some of the most interesting subjects of human inquiry. At the same time, we cannot forget, that there is not a little truth in the sarcasm of Voltaire, when he said, that Clarke was nothing but a 'reasoning mill;' nor that this is too appropriate an appellation for the eminent men we have named, with the exception, certainly, of Dugald Stewart, and perhaps of the amiable Platonist, Henry More.

The merit of these writers generally consists in the profound and patient thought with which they view their subjects, and in the sound and logical application of argument. But they fail in exciting the reader's interest in the results at which they arrive. They prove everything so conclusively, and yet so dryly, that we get almost tired of being convinced. They carry us on, step by step, the mind yielding as it proceeds, and eager for the full and bright revelation of truth, until we are brought to conclusions in reality the most beautiful and inspiring, but presented in a form as little adapted to produce emotion, as if they were actually wrought out by the unconscious operation of a machine. They are satisfied with demonstrating a moral truth, as they would a theorem in geometry; and having done this, they forget all its rich and affecting applications to our moral nature. The consequence is, that in perusing their writings, while the head is enlightened, the heart is impoverished. They may contribute much to the correct formation of opinion, but little to the perfect developement of the character. They are too barren of sentiment, too abstract and dry. We seem to repose with them in the shady gardens of philosophy, where every tree is set in the most proper place, the walks skilfully laid out, and all the beds and banks prepared for the fragrant rose and clustering vine, but on which the imprecation uttered against the mountains of Gilboa, that there should be no rain, neither dew upon them, has been fulfilled.

If we were called to decide upon their relative merit, we should place Butler clearly at the head of English moral philosophers. His successors have either vainly attempted, like Paley and Priestley, to establish a different theory of moral obligation, or they have done little more than repeat his arguments under different forms, without advancing a step beyond the eminence, which he attained. The few sentences in Butler's Second Dissertation contain the most important principles on the theory of virtue, which Stewart and Brown have expanded over as many lectures. But, after all, we have nothing in Butler's writings, which does full justice to the subject. In his celebrated Sermons on Human Nature, which indeed are admirable as philosophic expositions of the grounds of duty, he lectures on the constitution of man, with less apparent feeling than an ingenious artisan would show in pointing out the construction and uses of a curious machine. He throws a steady light upon the inspiring questions, which man has always put, respecting his nature, his duty, his destiny; but it is light without warmth, and it falls upon the mind with as little direct moral effect, as the clear, cold moon-beams fall upon the earth.

We have made an exception in favor of Dugald Stewart. We yield to none in our admiration of his character, or in respect for his general philosophic views. He has labored long and worthily in the honorable vocation of illustrating the truths of moral philosophy; and he has succeeded, better than most of his predecessors, in presenting them in the beautiful and attractive light, which naturally belongs to them, and by which they are recommended to the affections and feelings, as well as the intellect. Far inferior to Butler in depth and precision of thought, as well as in skill in the management of an argument, he surpassed him in his sympathy with the spirit of humanity, and his ready perception of the lovely and sublime in the character and actions of men. He evidently wished to make his moral speculations subservient to the practice of virtue, an aid to the advancement of the human race in all that is morally beautiful, pure, and true. But it cannot be denied, that sensibility, rather than power, was the prevailing characteristic of Stewart's mind. He had more taste than genius. He could plan, better than execute. His outlines of a subject are always excellent; but we are disappointed in their completion. He made magnificent promises to his own mind and to the world; but when the trial came, he failed to fulfil them. Had he ac-

complished all that he conceived, he would have done more for moral philosophy than any who preceded him; but now the very light he has given us, enables us to see and point out his deficiencies.

We suppose that few among us would name Paley or Hartley, as disproving our remarks. In our opinion, the theory of the former is so radically false, that any system built upon it, must needs be essentially defective. We estimate Paley's merits as a writer on Natural Theology, on the Evidences of Christianity, and on Practical Rules of Conduct, with some exceptions, as highly as any one; but we cannot but regard a philosopher, who resolves all virtue into expediency, and allows no higher motive to human nature than self-interest, as equally deficient with the astronomer, who, in explaining the system of the universe, should confine himself to the laws of centrifugal motion, and deny the sublime attraction, by which all the heavenly bodies are drawn towards a common centre.

Neither does Hartley's unquestionably able work meet our views, with regard to the wants of moral philosophy. We venerate the zeal, the disinterestedness, the piety of the writer, but we cannot deem his theory tenable, or his views of the formation of character either salutary or just. His practical rules, too, admirable as they are, in many respects, are stated in such formal and repulsive language, that we are not aware of their having exerted a moral influence on the general mind, which is capable of being appreciated.

We might name one among the living writers of England, with whose sentiments on the connexion between speculative and practical philosophy, we are happy to coincide, and from whose efforts, wisely applied to the moral improvement of society, we should hope for the most favorable effects. We refer to Coleridge. We are aware that it has been usual among certain classes with us, as well as in England, to speak with contempt of his speculations, as mystical and unintelligible; but, for ourselves, we consider him as in possession of a treasure of valuable truth, and capable of doing a great service in the 'formation of manly character, on the principles of a sound philosophy.' But the obscurity, which has been complained of in his thoughts, is certainly to be found in his style; and that to such a degree, as to make what he has hitherto written, inaccessible to the great majority of readers. Whether, in his moral discussions, he will ever lay aside his 'robes and

singing garlands,' and descend from the 'high regions of poetic fancy' to the earth upon which we dwell, is yet so doubtful, that he cannot be regarded as an exception to the complaint we have entered against the deficiencies of the English school of moral philosophy.

We return, then, to the position from which we started, that no ethical writer in our language, either among the living or the dead, has given us a work, which could supply the place of the treatise before us. It is not merely the cold and uninteresting manner of the English writers on moral subjects, that prevents us from assigning the highest rank to their works. We demand, in a perfect treatise of moral philosophy, more comprehensive views of human nature, than any of them appear to have taken. We would see a more profound analysis of the soul, with its boundless capacities of suffering and enjoyment, its thirst for infinite good, its deep passions, its inexpressible wants, its lofty aspirations after the unseen and eternal. Man has been regarded too much as the creature of accidental circumstances, while the primary and indestructible laws of his being have been kept out of sight. We wish to see his whole nature clearly exhibited before us, with all the mysterious powers it involves, in his varied progress from the cradle to the grave. We want a philosophy which recognises the religious and immortal relations of the human race,—those holy and spiritual relations, which alone explain the secret of our present existence, or cast any light on our future destiny,—as well as the material and sensual ties, by which we are connected with the fleeting interests of our earthly condition, and bound for a few short years to our fellow men. We would have these relations not only recognised, but felt and insisted on, in proportion to their unspeakable importance. We do not wish them to be treated as subjects of cold, logical discussion; swathed and confined by the technicalities of a system; reduced to a level with merely metaphysical and mathematical speculations; but to be held up in living colors, as everlasting realities, in which every human being has a deep and vital interest.

A perfect treatise on moral philosophy should take more enlarged and liberal views of human character, than those to which we are accustomed in the writings of English moralists. It should connect practical discussions with theoretical. It should aim, not only to convince the understanding of the rational foun-

dation of virtue, but to win the heart to its service, and form the character to perfection. We want a philosophy, which, after clearly illustrating the speculative difficulties which may arise on moral questions, takes up the progress of man, in all the various conditions of life, from infancy to old age; points out the dangers to which he is exposed, warns him of the errors he may commit, suggests to him the means of improvement, unfolds to him the mysteries of his own nature, and directs and cheers him in his endeavours to obtain perfection. A work, containing a philosophy of this character, would be much more than a series of speculations, however profound and conclusive, or a dry, lifeless compendium of ethical rules. We should not feel, in perusing it, that we were losing ourselves in abstractions, nor be tempted to question, whether, for all practical purposes, our time might not be better employed. We should perceive its immediate connexion with the most interesting objects of our being. It would touch the deepest principles of our nature. It would present the divine form of Virtue before our mental sight, not as a cold, monumental, sculptured image, but as a living and active spirit, radiant with celestial beauty.

We want a work like this, which we can ponder with delight in our studies, and read with our families at the fireside. We want it for our own use in the hours of mental misgiving and gloom, when the mystery of the universe presses heavily upon our souls, and the fountains of the great deep are broken up, and the waves and billows of a false philosophy threaten to overwhelm us, as the 'intellectual power goes on, sounding its dim and perilous way' over the troubled waters of the stormy sea. We want it for the use of our practical men, who, surrounded on every side with the objects of sense, engrossed with the competitions of business, the rivalries of public life, or the cares of professional duty, and accustomed to look at the immediate and obvious utility of everything which attracts their attention,—often acquire a distaste for all moral and religious inquiries, and, as an almost inevitable consequence, lose their interest, and often their belief, in the moral and religious faculties of their nature. We want it for the use of our young men, both of those who are engaged in the active pursuits of life, and those who are enjoying the intellectual advantages of our public literary institutions. How many on the very threshold of responsible life, by one or two unhappy mistakes, which an acquaintance with the powers and needs and dangers of their own

nature, as pointed out by a sound, religious philosophy, could have prevented,—have consigned themselves to disgrace, remorse, and all the evils which attend the train of a violated conscience! How many become the dupes of the sophist's eloquence, or the victims of the fanatic's terrors, for whom the influence of a true philosophy—a philosophy, 'baptized in the pure fountain of eternal love,' would have preserved the charm and beauty of life!

We do not say that the work of Degerando comes up, in every respect, to the standard we have described; but it certainly approaches more nearly to our idea of a perfect treatise on the application of moral philosophy to human improvement, than any one with which we are acquainted. The author does not, indeed, as we shall soon perceive, claim for it the character of a scientific exposition of moral principles. His object is more practical and popular. He designs it for the use of all. It is adapted to the improvement and instruction of all, who do not deem themselves too good to be made better, and who are not unwilling to give to an elaborate treatise on human duty and happiness, as much attention, to say the least, as they do to the ephemeral literature of the modern press. The scholar who reads it for mere speculative curiosity, as well as the idle man who takes it up to pass away a long morning, and the literary trifler who dips into all books that happen to be in the fashion, will gain little pleasure or advantage from its perusal. But, to the serious and earnest inquirer after moral truth, who knows that he was placed in the world to form his character for 'glory and virtue,' that life is not a season for thoughtless amusement or unmeaning effort, but for preparation and progress, in which are solemn duties to be performed and stern trials to be borne,—we believe, this volume will be full of interest and improvement. It is time, however, to have done with our remarks, and introduce our readers to the book itself.

The author is known to us only as a philosopher, and the profound and eloquent historian of philosophy. The private life of a great writer is generally an object of laudable curiosity; but on this point, in the present instance, we can now say nothing. The work before us was first published at Paris in 1824. It was originally destined, as the author informs us, to be known only to a small circle of friends, but the duty of making it public, was laid upon him by a voice which he considered sacred; and, as the translator suggests, probably by the voice

of the friend to whom he dedicated the work. 'Let no one,' he adds, 'expect in it a literary production, which it was not the author's intention to execute. He has aimed at nothing, but to express with simplicity, and present with good faith, a summary of observations, collected in the course of his life, to those entering the same career. Some of his readers may, perhaps, find too many trains of thought and modes of expression, which belong to speculative philosophy, and others again, too many views, with which they are already familiar. But this is the consequence of the author's plan, to reconcile the truths of philosophy with the experience of common life, and to make them confirm each other.'

The same intention is thus announced in the author's preface.

'As morality is both a science and an art, there are two distinct modes of treating it: we may give a systematic exposition of the principles of its beautiful theories; or we may collect its counsels for applying these principles to the conduct of life.

'It has been generally thought that these two modes were essentially distinct; and writers have generally confined themselves, more or less exclusively, to one of them. But the author of the following meditations has believed it possible, and desirable, to unite these two methods; that the doctrines might be tested, confirmed, and made fruitful, by practical views; and that the recommendations and precepts might receive from their connexion with doctrines, new dignity, force, and light. He has thought, that, as it is peculiar to the wise man to carry his principles into his conduct, so the teachings of wisdom may display the accordance of principles and practice: and if it is sometimes well to consider the science and the art separately, in order to preserve to each their distinctive character; it is also useful, to consider them, sometimes, in union with each other, since they have a common aim; to study their relations, since they lend each other mutual aid, and to maintain the natural alliance which unites them, in order to gather their fruits.'—p. 7.

We will now give our readers some account of the execution of this plan, by liberal quotations, availing ourselves for the most part of the language of the translator. The idea which lies at the foundation of the author's system, and which is fully developed and illustrated in the sequel of the work, is thus expressed;—*The life of man, is, in reality, but one continued education, the end of which is, to make himself perfect.* This education commences under the most sacred and benign auspi-

ces. In confiding it to the heart of a mother, Providence seems to have taken it upon itself. Many individuals have hardly any other education than the maternal; and by the influence which a virtuous mother exerts over the mind, it is prolonged over many into the years of maturity. In this early education the pupil learns the use of his senses, and how to exercise his faculties. He is taught also two things, which are necessary to initiate him into all things else. He acquires language, and he learns how to love.

Then comes the artificial or school education, which should be a continuation of the preceding, but which seldom preserves its spirit. This second period of education is profitable in proportion as it trains the pupil to act for himself, and thus favors the progressive developement of the gifts of nature.

'When tutors retire, in the eyes of the superficial, the education is finished. But the means alone are changed. To external education succeeds a purely spontaneous education, peculiarly important and useful; seconding, more or less, what has been received from without, and making it efficacious. That free activity, which ought hitherto to have cooperated with the instructions of masters, is now left to itself, to invoke and acknowledge a new guide, reflection. It is true, that the pupil in the school of life may abandon himself to circumstances and passion, and trust to the habits already formed; but then there is no career of progress left open; a boundary is prematurely presented, and in resigning the prerogatives of youth, all things will appear aberrations, because he feels himself the victim of diverging forces, whose effects he cannot discern, and whose influence he cannot regulate. Then let the voice of friendship make known to him, that he is responsible for his own happiness; that great duties are evolved from the liberty he possesses; that from the present moment his destiny is to take its coloring; or let him throw a searching glance into himself: under what a new aspect life appears! He pauses, hesitates, interrogates the universe, his destiny, himself. A thousand mysteries rise up to agitate him, and he would sound their depths. As his ideas enlarge, his problems are multiplied, and his reason feels the necessity of a support. The more honest is his heart, the more does he feel the need of being convinced of the precepts, which are to preside over his conduct and secure his happiness. In the career, upon which he eagerly enters with conscious strength, but which is involved in a cloud, he seeks what he may hope for, he inquires what use he is to make of the activity which consumes him, for what end he is placed on earth, what are the means possessed for attaining that end, what

method he must pursue to accomplish it. O then may a good parent be at his side, whose life is a book of instruction; or an experienced friend, who, without giving precepts, may awaken and receive his confidence, commune with his heart, and support his good intentions!'—pp. 2, 3.

The great purpose of life, then, according to our author, is moral progress; and this purpose is accomplished by self-education. Moral progress is a career open to all. It does not consist in producing extraordinary men. It may be found in the destiny and condition of every one, and may be adapted to the most ordinary occasions. It consists in a complete and harmonious combination of the intellectual and moral faculties; and it is not striking or surprising to a spectator, precisely because everything is conformable to order and simplicity. But we should not confine our attention to the course of this life only.

'The thought of human life as a great and continual education, acquires new grandeur, when looking upon the destiny of man in its whole extent, and, from an elevated point of view, we glance over that unlimited future, which philosophy promises, nature reveals, and religion warrants.

'The very faculty of progress, continuous and infinite, furnishes an argument as powerful as it is legitimate, in favor of a future to which it refers, and of which it is the herald. They are the two terms of a magnificent relation. Since man may always improve, there is always a higher existence that awaits him; since he has the expectation of a higher existence, he must continually improve. The virtues of old age are the germ of a second youth; like the flowers found under transient frosts, which prelude a new spring. The mysteries of our temporal existence are the evidences of life's being a preparatory state. It is a long and painful trial to most men: this trial is a pledge. Education is laborious, as it ought to be effective. If we bestow so much care upon that, the fruits of which will only last a few years, and which early death may blight, what efforts, what attention should we not bestow on the fruits that are to endure forever!'—p. 6.

The nature of self-education is thus described.

'If this art, which is the most general as well as the most important of arts, can be reduced to practical rules, they ought to be within reach of every one, being necessary for every one. They ought not merely to be adapted to the privileged few, whom nature has endowed with eminent faculties, and who have less need of directions on account of the abundance of their own

inspirations; they should be accommodated to common weakness, and enlighten the first steps (which are often the most difficult) of those, who undertake their own improvement. They should also rest essentially upon facts, which belong to universal experience; they should rest upon familiar truths, which, far from rejecting because generally known, we should rejoice to find received and approved by all. It is a noble prerogative of moral truths, that they are founded on general consent, and form, as it were, *the conscience of the human race.* Let us beware of making them less general: they would become less sublime and less useful. They ought to harmonize with a diversity of opinions; at least so far as different opinions accord with the interest of virtue. They should be as free as possible from systematic theories:—not that the beautiful and lofty speculations, which embrace both the principles of duty and the cause of moral approbation, may not be one of the most important subjects for meditation; but by uniting this order of speculations with the precepts of an entirely practical art, we run the risk of compromising the latter, in the eyes of those who may not have leisure or courage to judge of such controversies. And farther, those who have most thoroughly examined these systems, have only been confirmed in the conviction, that the councils of wisdom are inspired by rectitude of heart. The authors of these various systems, after having differed speculatively, have always arrived at the same practical results, except that the scale of virtues and motives is different. We are perhaps authorised to conclude, therefore, that the truest and best of all systems is that, which, without excluding any, acknowledges in each something useful, wisely combines them, and censures what is incomplete, defective, and exclusive in all.'—pp. 7, 8.

The following passage contains a brief exposition of the method adopted by our author.

'Self-education requires as its prelude the history of the internal man. This history manifests the subject matter of our labor, and the instruments to be used: it will consist of the inward experience, founded upon immediate intuition, more sure than the experience of the external senses, but more delicate and difficult, since it results from reflection, which is a slow faculty, and restrained in its free play by a thousand obstacles. This will constitute the first book of the present treatise.

'From this preliminary study we shall learn that the two principal springs of moral progress are Love of Excellence and Self-government. These powers make up the whole moral man: the first determining purity of motive, and resting upon disinterestedness as its essential condition; the latter rendering us capable of acting from the best motives, and taking for granted that man

not only has power but authority over himself: one directs to the end, the other furnishes the means.

'In the second book, we shall examine how, from the exercise of these two great powers, results all the good there is in us; also, how the degree of their application is the measure of the merit and demerit of human actions, and of the estimation granted them by the judgment of the wise. We shall see them act separately and by turns, as far as they can be separated; and afterwards unite and combine; and it is upon their association and perfect harmony alone, that all moral perfection depends.

'In the third and last book, we shall inquire what is the best method of cultivating these two great moral powers, to give them their highest energy and to preserve between them the harmony which is equally necessary to both.

'We shall thus be naturally led to seek some remedies for the principal moral diseases that afflict humanity, and particularly, perhaps, in this age. One disease is that selfishness, which isolates men, rendering them strangers to each other, loosening and destroying the bonds of affection, and concentrating individual exertion into a search after pleasure. Another is that weakness of character, which makes men slaves to blind imitation, or to their own inclinations. Would that we, when so many circumstances seem to be calling society to deep morality and solemn destinies, when the dignity of human nature begins to be understood,—would that we could lend a feeble aid to heighten this dignity, and keep alive the sacred flame of noble and generous affections!'—pp. 9, 10.

The first step, according to the method just stated, is to analyse the nature of man, in reference to its capacity for self-education. This is done by regarding the human being in relation to the various motives which are presented to his will. These motives are divided into five orders.

We have, first, the *sensual* nature of man. When we speak of this, we mean, that his will may be moved by pleasures and pains purely physical. But he is not confined to this sphere, as a mere animal; but to physical sensibility is joined another sensibility, connecting him with all who are similarly endowed. Hence the *social* nature, which is nourished and unfolded in social intercourse. Still further, there are motives, which descend from the understanding to move the heart. The perception of the beautiful, and the conviction of the true, acting upon the affections, model them to become the guides of the will. This is the sphere of the *intelligent* nature. Fourthly, there are duties. A law speaks to man from the depths of his

being, giving rise to a new order of relations, both with himself and his fellow beings. Hence we speak of his *moral* nature. Lastly, man is called upon to form and preserve an order of relations, which crown and regulate all others; relations with the Author of all things, and which unite his present existence with the hopes of another. Hence we say, man has a *religious* nature.

'Each of the orders of faculties above named, has equally its root in nature; for all the motives to which they correspond are in nature. Like so many seeds, when considered relatively to their first origin, they are contemporary; but they are not brought forth and developed with the same rapidity. Some require a more active cooperation on our part; some are heralds, others are designed to finish. Each higher order requires, also, that those below make proper progress, and all together, in the order in which we have arranged them, conjointly prepare, more or less immediately, for the great future, into which our whole existence is to be resolved.

'Thus, the developement and exercise of the senses may occupy the infancy of individuals and of nations; but everything goes to ruin and degenerates, when they predominate in manhood. The affections should animate youth; but they excite all the storms of passion, when they reign with too absolute a sway. The intellect sometimes absorbs all the other faculties, as in artists and learned men; and sometimes comes to predominate in society, as in a certain state of civilisation, when public morality loses its tone under the influence of the spirit of discussion and analysis. The moral nature, also, when it sacrifices the senses and affections too much, withers in a savage sternness, or is lost in mysticism. Indeed, when deprived of the aid of intellect, both the moral and religious faculties go astray, and may convert their power to bless, into baneful poisons.'—pp. 13, 14.

Under each of the separate orders of faculties, the author enlarges upon their nature and uses.

The legitimate rank of the sensual nature of man is first discussed. The true exercise of the senses, as they are the gifts of Providence, must be necessary to the perfection of the human being; but, when they predominate over more noble faculties, they debase the soul in proportion as they prevail, and produce disorder and confusion. Their function is to prepare man for the exercise of his higher powers. Their peculiar season is the infancy of the human being, when they reign almost unrivalled, but serve as a prelude to a nobler education. They

are the means of communication with the external world—the keys of that great temple of nature in which the august image of the Creator is to be revealed to human reason.

The condition of man, as he would be if his senses alone furnished the motives of his conduct, is well described, in the following passage, which furnishes a complete answer to the eloquent sophisms of Helvetius, and other writers of the same paradoxical school.

'Let us suppose a man endowed with all the intellectual faculties, but compelled to draw from perceptible impressions instead of from the faculties of the heart, his sentiments and his morality; and to seek, in the objects of the senses, the only ends of his earthly existence. He would have two spheres; one, the pains and pleasures belonging to each particular sensation; the other, the pains and pleasures derived from the degree of intensity, which any sensation whatever may acquire. In the first of these two spheres, he would remain entirely passive; in the second, he would begin to cooperate with outward impressions, by a more or less marked reaction. He would have, and there would be for him but one principle of determination—mere personal feeling. He would have but one interest—to seek these pleasures and to avoid these pains. Every other consideration would be secondary, subordinate and relative to this arbitrary interest. What then would there be for him? In the past, regret for lost pleasures, and perhaps the solace of past troubles; in the future, some possible but uncertain joys, whose sphere would contract from day to day, and inevitable pain, more or less severe and prolonged;—his hopes would have limits, but would his fears?

'The supreme beauty would be to him the pleasure which arises from surprise, and consists in the mere brilliancy of colors. In images of order, he would see a merely mechanical utility; in harmony he would feel none of the chords which enrapture us, and truth itself, in his opinion, would have a mercenary value and no other. In other men he would see what he sees in all the objects of nature—only his instruments, or the obstacles to his personal interest. But as they are endowed like him with intelligence and will, he would be obliged to make them subservient to his use, by conviction, seduction, or force. When he sees his equals happy, can he feel anything but envy? When they suffer, can he feel anything, but that he does not suffer like them—except, perhaps, that he may feel a contrast, which will render his personal pleasures more keen? What motive can prevent him from being cruel, if it were his interest to be so? What can be his regret at the sight of a victim? He will only rejoice, that there is one

who can no longer injure him. If he be resisted, or if he be importuned with his complaints, he will only be irritated. Though his equals have their eyes fixed on him, he cannot aspire to glory, for he understands neither admiration nor esteem. He may however find some aliment in the triumphs of vanity, for though applause cannot stimulate merit, it may increase his strength, and he might use it as a new power, and therefore he may endeavour to obtain it.

'Let us extend our hypothesis and admit, that he might live in the midst of men, who are endowed with those faculties of the heart, to which he is entirely a stranger. He could not understand in others, affections of which he is himself incapable; but he would judge of their effects with all the sagacity of an egotism which would profit by everything. He would study the means of obtaining affection; and not being able to find those which the heart inspires, he would seek those which his own experience suggests; he would employ cunning; he would suppose the affections might be bought. Nor must he necessarily be free from malevolence, when unable to love: inaccessible even to gratitude, there would remain the power of hating, for it is sufficient for hatred, that another man is an obstacle, though it is not sufficient for love or for gratitude, that he is a docile instrument.

'We grant to this unfortunate being all the privileges of the position, in which our hypothesis has placed him. He will experience the solitary pleasure, which a man feels in the exercise of his own activity; a pleasure which consists in a more vivid conception, or consciousness, of his existence; but we are obliged also to admit his necessity of activity, and the consuming inquietude, which arises from it, when it cannot be satisfied. His desires can have no other bounds than fatigue and impotence, and they may survive them also. What then must be the principle of this insatiable activity? Impatience for change, ambition for power, the torments of vanity and pride, for he will not even conceive of elevation. This is the region which that author * has explored with a rare talent, who would have been an estimable philosopher, if, in his paintings, he had pretended only to exhibit an example of a too frequent degradation, merely to inspire a just horror of that selfishness, which disinherits man of all generous affections; but who is an unfaithful painter, nay, a calumniator of human nature, when he pretends to give as a general law, what is only an accidental perversion; and who is a dangerous moralist, when tracing such pictures with such nonchalance, he dares not express, nay, when he does not let us suspect the indignation of his soul against these effects of egotism, of which he offers us the frightful image.

* La Rochefoucauld.

'What an existence is that of this solitary self, shut up in the gloomy dungeons of egotism, surrounded by an inanimate nature, and hearing no friendly and responsive voice! What could the code of morality be to such a man?—a difficult and vast calculation of personal interest. But would the sensual man always discover it? and when he did, would he always embrace it, and sacrifice the present, which he possesses, to a doubtful future? Would not the imagination mingle any delusion with his hopes and fears? Let us request an answer from the experience of each day. What an immense variety of objects attract and repel us on all sides! What a prodigious variety of shades in the impressions produced upon us! What confusion, what chaos in those various solicitations, which urge us in every sense! How many errors, how many mistakes we make before we gain experience! When we attain the difficult knowledge of what will contribute to personal welfare, is not life passed, and a hopeless tomb open to receive us? Let us admit still more. Let us grant to this man the notion of an Author of all things. Let us try to create in him a kind of worship, which may conform to his ideas. How will he conceive of the Supreme Being?—as a sovereign who is powerful and strong. He can do no more, he cannot even conceive of him as just. What relations will he bear with his Creator? He can conceive of pains, of pleasures, but not of the celestial emanations of his kindness, and will seize, at a venture, upon all which, in his opinion, may attract the equally capricious favor or displeasure of this terrible power. How will he imagine a future existence?—sensual as his present existence. He will desire its pleasures, but only as pleasure; he will deprecate its sufferings, but cannot rise to the idea of *punishment;* and to avoid pain and secure pleasure, he will make a mercenary calculation, wishing to buy that future, which he is incapable of deserving.

'But let us still observe him. The farther the circle of his ideas extends, the more will increase the disproportion and discord between the faculties of his mind and heart. Moreover, the faculties of his mind want a stimulus, when deprived of the energy which the sentiments of the soul lend them. The habit of passiveness, to which the servitude of sensible impressions condemns him, will plunge him inevitably into a kind of lethargy. The spur of vanity may awaken him, and he may find in a mercenary interest some spring for his thoughts, and become skilful, perhaps, in studying the surface of our universe, and applying to it the material instruments of technical operations. But whence may he draw the inspiration and light, which can introduce him into the sphere of the most fruitful

ideas? What creation in the fine arts, is possible for him who cannot admire? What knowledge of human nature can he have, who knows not how to love? To him the heaven is closed; the earth alone is open—but open as a tomb.

'This is man, such as he is when confined to the motives that address the senses, and disinherited of the patrimony to which the first order of faculties should have entitled him! If there escape from him unconsciously some generous emotion against his will, he would, if faithful to his cause, condemn it as an error; and, if he pretended to give the name of morality to this course of conduct, which he has adopted, he must condemn the act of disinterested devotion as a crime; for he would only see in it the violation of the sole legitimate end of his being. This is the sensual man! this is that desert, that gloomy night, where he vegetates and is trained! We have not imagined or exaggerated; we have hardly glanced at the frightful solitude, the savage state into which man can descend, when he puts aside the noblest faculties of his being; a state towards which he approximates, whenever he suffers his inclinations to prevail over his duties. The necessary state of the sensual man is this abyss, which we must contemplate, in order to avoid it the more entirely.'—pp. 32–7.

In the next chapter, our author pursues a similar train of thought upon the social nature of man.

'The benevolent affections are a preparative to the admiration of the truly beautiful, to the instructions of conscience, and to religious emotions. At this stage of developement, nature, through the happy instinct which regulates it, suggests to man a part of the actions, which morality will afterwards prescribe for him, and disposes him to become unconsciously good. This instinctive goodness will have little merit; but society will reap its fruits as it has watered its germs. The state of society is a state of nature. Society is the grand vocation of nature for man. Without it he would never truly become a man. It is to the faculties of his heart, what the material universe is to his senses.

'Were man reduced to act from the motives that address the inferior faculties, society would be merely a coalition of interests, which, hostile from rivalry, and egotistical in their associations, could have no bond but the rigorous calculation, which measures the exchange of services, and no end but personal advantages, which, indeed, each would find more abundant from combination of forces. But a new interest is formed under the influence of the affections; reciprocation is established without being forced; devotion to others, which cannot be bought, takes the

place of an avidity, which nothing could satisfy: this is the social interest.

'Doubtless self-love continues to exist and act in this new region; it can never be abandoned by man, since it is a condition of his nature; but it takes another and an unexpected form; it is combined and commingled with devotion to others. Man, under the influence of new motives, delights in loving and sacrificing, and places himself in the service of generosity. In his sacrifices he enjoys a recompense, which selfishness denied.

'We may observe in all communities, instituted by affection, the bond is stronger in proportion as the beings it unites have more need of one another; the affections seem to seek of themselves a theatre, where they can show themselves most generous; the sphere in which they are spread, enlarges in a progressive manner, as if to prepare the heart to love more, in proportion as it learns to love. Filling the bosom of a family as their first sanctuary, the affections begin to be exercised in obscurity, and then become capable afterwards of embracing society, of which a family is the element and image. The most entire, intimate, and perfect union is the conjugal. What a touching and beautiful symbol in our social institutions is that custom, which gives one name to two companions, thus united upon earth, as if to indicate that hereafter they are not only to have the same habitation and patrimony, but also the same sentiments, hopes, and life! Nature, which formed this noble alliance, is moved at its approach, and as she is decked with flowers and surrounded with perfumes, when she sets forth her most beautiful works, so, preparing for the most touching of festivals, she sends love in peculiar tenderness to adorn the best period of life, and to serve as a herald and precursor of sacred marriage. In this union there is the happiness, not only of loving and giving reciprocally, but of a common devotedness, and of receiving also, by means of a second bond springing from the first, which attaches a new generation to it. Reciprocal protection of husband and wife, of parents and children, of brothers and sisters,—this is the family. A series of communities are formed around the family, like so many concentric circles, in all of which there are wants, and in all, generous affections that come forth to meet wants. Family, country, the whole human race, call by turns upon individual self-sacrifice, and upon an extension of the domestic affections; as they are themselves so many successive families, under a more general form. Patriotism is an instinct before it becomes a virtue; it is called forth by public dangers; the necessity of sacrifice kindles instead of extinguishing it. In the midst of these different relations, which spread on all sides,

some more intimate alliances are formed of individual to individual, as if to keep alive the affections, and render the heart capable of supplying so many relations. The alliance we call friendship, reanimates affection continually, by concentrating its energy on individual objects. This is also instinctive, the fraternity of sympathy; but this sympathy is the effect not only of analogy, but also of contrasts. To need to be united, we must also need to render mutual aid. In this common intercourse each one is enriched by what he receives, and still more by what he gives. Thus, in the order of sentiments developed in this first school of nature, paternal love represents authority; filial love subordination; fraternal love justice, and all these various alliances, going on as it were before laws, preparé for public by private morality, and lead from one to the other. But in order that this power of natural sentiment should accomplish its destination, it must be carried out into that morality to which it leads, and of which it is the prelude. It is by unfolding itself in morality, that sensibility will be understood, and find a new energy by finding its sphere sufficiently enlarged. The sensibility of the heart needs morality, as sensation needs reflection, that its fruits may ripen.' —pp. 41–3.

But the social nature of man is by no means sufficient for his perfection.

'Let us suppose man limited to his affections alone, which can never be absolutely realized, and to which there are not so many approaches among men, as there are approaches to a life of mere sense. There is something animated in the exercise of the affections, as there is something stationary and lethargic in the sensual life: the former has then in itself a progressive tendency. The affections, besides, are so vivid a presentiment of morality, that they give it an anticipated power over us; but, for the same reason, it is also more common to see the affections usurp a larger part than belongs to them in the economy of our nature, and among estimable persons; for it is more difficult to stop ourselves seasonably in the movements of sensibility, than to condemn ourselves to perfect indifference, because they are absorbing as well as delightful, and because we excuse ourselves for this excess by the sanction that morality itself gives to the disinterestedness which is in the soul, approving most actions which result from the affectionate heart. It is in this way that the noblest feelings are sometimes those which make us commit the greatest faults. We think we are virtuous as soon as our hearts beat with sympathy and generous sentiments; we disdain and put away those positive precepts which seem cold, compared to our emo-

tions, not remembering, that an excess is possible in self-forgetfulness, or at least deciding that such an excess is excusable. The man who, in the course of his developement, could go no farther than the motives by which the affections are developed, and who is unable to rise to the region where conscience reigns, could better and more easily conceive religion than the sensual man. He would represent the Divinity to himself as mere infinite power no longer, but also as infinite beneficence; yet he could not represent to himself the Supreme Being as a legislator, a judge and a remunerator. The worship of the sensual man degenerates into a sort of *feticism*, which materializes the Supreme Intelligence; the worship of the man of mere affections degenerates into a kind of *anthropomorphism*, which, by endowing the Deity with the instinctive affections, gives him also caprices, errors, and all human passions. Eager for continued existence, struggling with terror against that which takes from him the objects of his tenderness, man ardently invokes that immortality which alone can restore them to him; but he does not seek in it that better future where truth and virtue will triumph. His religion perhaps bears some relation to the extravagant ideas of certain modern mystics, for whom religious sentiments are rather a search after exquisite enjoyment, than a rule of conduct or an aid to practice.'—pp. 44–6.

The intellectual nature is the next step in the magnificent progress, by which the human being—so noble, yet so weak—walks through trial to immortality. This order of our faculties is thus described.

'The enjoyment of truth and beauty, (or admiration), though essentially contemplative, gives a great impulse to the powers of the soul, inspiring an ardent desire to reproduce the objects of enthusiasm.

'When the mind is thus moved, we say it has intellectual life, a life which predominates in the learned, the literary, the artist; filling the hours consecrated to study, mingling with labors apparently material, with social intercourse, and with our very pleasures; a life introducing us into a region of light, and filling us beside with deep emotions, but not without agitations and pains of its own.'—p. 47.

The two great elements of this life, are the perception of the beautiful and the sentiment of the true. The perception of the beautiful cannot be resolved into any views of utility or calculations of self-love.

'Order is, as it were, the soul and essence of the beautiful,

and becomes the sublime by being associated with grandeur. Charmed with the presence of order, we attach ourselves to it ardently, and, satisfied with seeing it always, forget ourselves in contemplation. Is it possible that among philosophers there can be found men, so inattentive to the phenomena of the internal world, or so prejudiced by their theories, as to pretend that such a beauty is only the disguised transformation of utility, and that the admiration of it is merely a profound calculation of self-love? And can it be that they have gone so far as to seek that utility, from which beauty receives its value, and of which it is the instrument, in the enjoyment of the senses merely? Are not the emotions, which the appearance of the beautiful excites, more real, vivid, and pure, in proportion as the sentiment of the beautiful is more entirely disinterested? Not only sordid calculations of self-love do not mingle with this admiration, but they destroy it if they appear. The perfectly beautiful dwells in what we cannot turn to any use. It is the pleasure of selfishness to destroy, that it may use; it is the pleasure of admiration to preserve, and it respects in order to preserve. If the beautiful received its character from leading to profit, profit itself would necessarily be the most beautiful. If it received its character only from utility, value would be in proportion to utility, and the masterpieces of genius would yield to the cold treasures of avarice. We may seek beauty in the sensations which are most useful, as in taste; or in the instruments which are used to satisfy the most pressing wants of life; but we find it elsewhere, in the simple violet, in the lily of the valley, as well as in the starry heaven, and melodious concert. The young virgin is most truly beautiful to the chaste eye; and all real beauty is wrapt in a kind of virginity, which, like a consecrated veil, forbids the profanation of enjoyment. The admiration which the sight of order as an element of beauty, inspires, is an essentially generous sentiment. It is a love free from return, a special and primitive faculty of our soul, the leaning towards an end, placed in the sphere of thought, which we shall be happy to attain even by sacrifices: it is much more than a subtle and prudent calculation—it is a direct sentiment, which may penetrate and fill all the capacity of our being.'—pp. 52, 53.

The other element in our intellectual nature is the sentiment of the true.

'The possession of truth inspires man with a sense of dignity, for he feels the value of the intercourse he holds with the universe and himself;—the value of that power which he exerts over nature by means of understanding it; the value of what he gains on all sides, when, from the imperceptible point

which he occupies in time and space, he follows the course of ages that are no more, penetrates into the future, embraces the celestial spheres, and discovers the properties and relations of so many different beings; when, inconstant and transient as he is himself, he is permitted to sit near the centre of those immutable and universal laws which govern creation.

'This sense of dignity is not, however, the love of truth, and may even destroy it; for the love of truth supposes, in the treasure for which it aspires, a peculiar value and merit, independent of all personal enjoyment. This sense of dignity is very far also fiom being satisfied here below: it often gives place to a sadness and an humiliation, still more true to our nature; for what are the truths we can enjoy, compared to those which must escape us! The love of truth is constant and equal, animating the search, as well as accompanying the possession of it: and even feeding upon the sadness, which our doubts and experience of error and feeling of ignorance inspire, being pure in proportion as it is more modest and distrustful of itself.

'Truth is also the most useful: for its possessor finds in it a first-rate instrument, applicable to everything, and necessary for everything; he finds not only a personal advantage, but the most extensive means of serving other men in society, to which he brings the most certain general and lasting services, by diffusing light. The idea of its utility strengthens and rewards the love of truth; but it is not all which is contained in the sentiment. Truth is also loved for itself; for it is not only beautiful, but good, and excellent, and worthy of love, when its future application is not even suspected. The love of truth becomes associated with the generous ambition of serving society by the operations of the arts. It animates the efforts of the scholar in his long watchings and meditations, when, a stranger to the crowd, he joyfully renounces pleasure, fortune, and honors, that he may enlarge the patrimony of the human mind; it sustains the teacher of science in the midst of his perilous explorings and remote wanderings, in which he often exposes life; and it procures for him a sublime calmness, which permits him to observe, in the midst of tumults and the storms of nature, in the trouble of the elements and the agitation of the human passions, dangers which instruct more than they terrify him, on which he meditates silently, as if in the presence of his own thoughts only.'—pp. 55–7.

Something is still wanting to the perfection of man.

'The Author of all things cannot be perceived as a moral legislator by minds, whose highest motives are love of the beau-

tiful and the true. The attribute of justice, and other perfections, cannot be discovered in God, till we have conceived them ourselves; and immortality would not therefore appear as retributive, since, without a notion of duty, there could be no notion of merit. It would be an immortality of the intellect, and not of virtue. This religion would therefore have a speculative, poetical, or metaphysical character, in proportion as images of the beautiful, or as abstract speculations preside especially over it: but there would be little influence from it on the character. It would give us exquisite enjoyment, but would not be capable of rendering us better in habit and practice.'—p. 61.

The next step in the order of motives, leads us to the moral nature of man, or the sentiment of duty. Under this head, our author gives his views on the great question of the origin of moral obligation. His analysis is so simple and perspicuous, as to bring a subject that has been often darkened by words without knowledge, to a level with the plain common sense of every sincere and thoughtful inquirer, who is willing to give his patient attention to the objects of his own consciousness. He rejects, at once, all the ingenious modes, which different philosophers have invented, to explain away the reality of our moral sentiments, and to substitute for the primitive sense of duty, some foundation for virtue of an artificial character. He treats with little respect the theories, which attempt to resolve the sentiment of duty into the perception of utility or the desire of personal advantage, and maintains the more generous views which have been adopted by those, whom we deem the most elevated, as well as the most accurate philosophic thinkers, from Socrates and Plato down to Butler and Stewart.

'The great law of duty is not at first expressed in a general formula, as an abstract notion. By the wisdom of Providence, this law is first announced in particular examples and in a practical application; and this is so ordered, because, being indispensable to all men, it must be accessible to all, even the most ignorant and simple, and become the inspiration of infancy as well as the guide of maturity.

'We hear this law when we observe, either in ourselves or a fellow being, deliberate, spontaneous action, done by man as an author or cause. Whenever such an action is done before us (impartial spectators), it excites in us a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, according to its nature, effects, and the motives we suppose in the author. And this sentiment is not the result of reflection upon the personal advantages, which we may hope

from the consequences of the action; for we have supposed ourselves disinterested; and besides, the sentiment excited is direct, immediate, preceding all deliberate combination. Nor is it the consequence of our judgment concerning the advantage which the action may procure for its author; on the contrary, from the first glance, the consideration of the advantage which the author sacrifices to fulfil the duty, confirms and increases our approbation, as our observing the personal profit, which he seeks in violating duty, confirms and increases our blame of him. Our approbation and blame differ from our assent to truth, and our censure of error; they are attached to ideas of merit or demerit, which truth or error cannot call forth. Moreover, our approbation or blame is not checked, when the author of the act has been stopped in the execution of it, by an obstacle independent of his will: the intention itself is what is estimated. And if we play in the action the double part of author and spectator, our approbation or blame will be more decided and energetic, as the intention is more clearly known to us.

'But this approbation will be quite a different thing from the pleasure we have experienced before, quite different from the satisfaction born of pleasure; it will be an inward content of an entirely new kind, which will not be attached to effects, but to motives. It will be a testimony of esteem, a kind of eulogium, merited by the author within us, and discerned by him, who, as a spectator within, fills the office of judge. The blame, too, will be quite different from our regret for a false calculation, or a mistake; it will be condemnation; a particular and new kind of punishment, which we call remorse, to appease which, something more will be necessary than to put away the external effects of the action—nothing less than to disarm and destroy the motives which have inspired it: for all which surrounds us might be changed in vain, unless we may be satisfied that the will is purified.

'Now if we suppose just such actions as the above done by creatures of our own nature, we should pass the same judgment upon them, whoever does them, or wherever and whenever they are done. If we should suppose such actions as merely possible, we should still pass the same judgment, and give them a general approbation and anticipated blame; feeling that the one kind is prescribed to us, and the other is forbidden. Approbation or blame will interpose between our will and these actions, when we conceive of them, not as a necessary cause or a necessary obstacle, but as an injunction, which, while leaving us all our liberty, orders us or forbids us; not hinting that we have want of power, but saying to us, You ought to do—or, You ought to refrain.

'Thus approbation or blame comes to us with the authority of a general constant law, anterior and superior to us—a law which we have not made, but are only permitted to discover and obliged to confess—a law which is not coercive, though it commands, and which we have the power of violating, but which we are conscious of, even while we violate it, and which we are not forced, but laid under an obligation to obey. This law may be misunderstood by the inattentive, and remain obscure from the effect of a too rapid or too light consideration. But the principle itself of the law will preserve its evidence whenever it is attended to; having the same evidence as any fact which is perceived by reflection on ourselves—the same evidence as any internal phenomena of sensibility or intellect.

'It is indeed even more simple, more elementary, and more fixed; and, what is worthy of remark, the light that surrounds it, shines more abundantly, brightly and purely, in proportion as we are more free from all which commonly deceives our reason, agitates our soul, or troubles our imagination. And it shines brightest, when we have obtained the highest degree of peace and liberty of mind. Let us not embarrass these phenomena of conscience with our own subtleties. Every order of knowledge rests upon primitive phenomena given by external observation, or by consciousness, which is nothing but inward or reflective observation. There is no possible knowledge, unless we take observed facts as a foundation, even as there would be no compounds without elements, nor consequences without operative causes. There are, then, laws for moral beings—that is, for sensitive, intelligent and free beings—as there are laws for material beings, organic or inorganic. They have, in common with the latter, generality and constancy; but the laws which assign to these beings their natural destination, and which are instituted to lead them to it, differ from moral laws in an essential particular; for the laws which govern inorganic or organized matter, act unconsciously, infallibly, and determine absolutely, their modifications; but the laws which govern moral beings, addressing themselves to their intellect and to liberty, and respecting both, (because they are to lead such beings by means of this liberty and this intelligence), merely propose and prescribe, leaving them to consent and execute; they teach and show the model, and are a manifestation of the destination; but they do not carry towards it—they merely order men to tend towards their destination, the accomplishment of which has nothing of necessity about it, being imposed as a duty. By having injunctions imposed on us, our independence is revealed to us; and we are elevated to higher dignity, in proportion as their power is more sensibly felt. Material nature obeys its

laws without knowing them; human nature, morally speaking, obeys its laws because it knows them.'—pp. 62–5.

The idea that obligation is derived from enjoyment, is shown to be a fallacy, and the true relation of happiness to virtue correctly pointed out.

'The pleasures connected with the practice of virtue are so true, so deep, and so exquisite, that they have naturally been confounded with the source whence they emanate, and thence they have been considered as the definition of virtue itself. Thus a kind of interested motive has been given to virtue, a motive springing indeed from the noblest self-love, but which is put in the place of motives drawn directly from the principle of obligation. But this mistake is easily corrected. We take the effect for the cause, and the emanation for the source. We enjoy virtue because we approve it, and it must have something worthy of approval; we cannot approve virtue excepting by referring to some time which is anterior to it; our enjoying good morality does not create it—our enjoyment is the love of it; we therefore suppose it existing independently of our enjoyment. To derive obligation from enjoyment, would be absolutely the same thing as to derive light from the phenomena of vision. Good morality is not good merely because we enjoy it; we enjoy it because it is good, and it is precisely this goodness, which our enjoyment discovers and declares. It is the same with that sense of dignity, which the love and practice of virtue calls up in the heart of man. If the love and practice of virtue give so deep and true a consciousness of our own dignity, is it not because we are associated by these with what is already great and eminent of itself? To found virtue upon dignity, is wrong, if we do not suppose, that dignity, in its turn, finds in it an independent title, from which it borrows its rights; otherwise we are proud of our dignity merely; this would be taking the consequence for the operative cause. From the nobleness peculiar to virtue, and which virtue confers upon us, are derived all the ideas of nobleness, honor and glory, which must be either its emanation or its reflection, a solemn expression of its existence, or a simple emblem which derives all its real value from its fidelity to the type.

'But this mistake has no serious dangers, if, when in founding virtue upon enjoyment, we demand this enjoyment of virtue alone; the effect then will at least lead back to the cause. It would be a greater error to separate them from one another, and thus to deprive virtue of an auxiliary, the assistance of which is as natural as it is useful. For it is in the atmosphere of virtue, that pleasure and well-being take the character of happiness, and

that self-love discovers and embraces its true tendency. And happiness, if it be not virtue, at least is its herald; announcing its presence, as promise; and following it, as a worthy and faithful reward. Providence is pleased to make happiness flow from virtue, as it has given perfume to flowers, flavor to fruit, glory to light, and attracting forms to all useful objects; the indulgent and beneficent teacher of man endeavours to call his attention to the most worthy objects of study, to interest him in the pursuit of excellence which is valuable in itself, sustaining his efforts, encouraging his weakness, binding him by the gentlest ties to the severest duties, and leading him to find what is most agreeable in what is necessary. Let the good man render thanks to Providence, bless and enter into its views, accept the cup of happiness at the banquet of virtue, and not presume too much upon himself! The pleasure connected with the impressions of the senses, and confined within the limits necessary for its own economy, the different kinds of pleasure which surround the affections of the heart, the contemplation of the beautiful, and the possession of the true,—are so many progressive steps which lead to happiness, approaching nearer and nearer to it, without being happiness itself, and only making it foreseen and desired; it is thus that the pleasures granted to man are in proportion to his moral progress. But inferior orders of pleasures, when left unregulated, often exclude and contradict one another; we can only enjoy one at the expense of another, and often one of these pleasures is destroyed and poisoned by its own wanderings and excesses; but received and adopted by virtue, they harmonize with it, virtue being for them a kind of measure, giving them their proportion and full harmony. The pleasure of self-love, when gratified by the senses, is also somewhat concentrated and narrow, but agitated and fearful; being confined to self, while enjoying it, we do not perceive its ends, nor discern its utility: but when governed by virtue, our self-love discovers the end which was wanting, and becomes free from grossness and impurity, and is kept in bounds by the necessities of a wise and prudent economy. The pleasure of affection is uncertain in its object, and often cherishes without being able to esteem; but virtue, by giving esteem for its nourishment, teaches true love. The pleasures of the mind are confined to a speculative region; but virtue introduces them into the sphere of the will, that they may influence action; giving them deep reality, it makes them the property, and, as it were, the substance of our soul, converting the assent of the reason into an approbation of the conscience, and the satisfaction which contemplation had given, into an inward contentment which renders our self-intercourse delightful. Let us not separate what God has united, virtue and happiness; let us not take from virtue its crown, or dis-

inherit our nature of the blessings which it reaps from it, and of the aid which renders it accessible to the weak. And yet it would not only poison the essence of virtue, but would often compromise the accomplishment of it, to rest it here below upon the pleasures it gives, whatever may be their elevation or purity.'—pp. 68–70.

The religious nature of man is next considered. Religion, our author maintains, is natural to man, because it is necessary to him, and answers to his natural wants, and to the laws of those faculties which he has received from nature. We are not, however, to understand by this, that we possess it from our cradle, but that we have a predisposition for it, and attain it by the simple developement of our constitution. We may be convinced of this, by the constant and universal testimony of history; but still more strongly by observing the essential relation which exists between religious sentiment and the condition of humanity.

'Man alone, of all living beings, is aware of the speedy termination of his days; he sees, while yet afar off, the tomb open to receive him; and the fatal decree, incessantly resounding in his ears, contradicts the instinct of preservation, proclaimed by the voice of the senses, or gives it a mournful accent. He alone is sensible to the tender affections; but whether these affections are refused or obtained, he loves, only to see what he loves removed from him, or be himself separated; his heart expands only to be torn by despair, and he is ready to curse the blessings which have excited him. Models of truth and beauty transport and bewilder him, but he desires them more when he cannot possess them; and he sometimes discovers only detached fragments of truth and beauty, and sometimes a cloud conceals them altogether; or, perceiving them only in an imaginary world, when recalled to himself and to sad reality, he resembles a traveller thirsting and dying in the midst of a desert. The arm of a wretch or a fool, the slightest accident, may forever destroy the most magnificent work of art, or a breath of wind may destroy it. And even when virtue resolves this difficult problem of destiny, a sanction is still wanting. Placed in the presence of austere and difficult duties, we are afflicted by our own weakness, and invoke assistance. The present cannot satisfy the moral faculties, and we begin to feel the greatest need of an order which this world seems to contradict, of a future which the earth denies. It is true that virtue promises happiness and also frequently demands a sacrifice for it. But the soul she has ennobled demands a worthy communion, even admission at the gates of heaven; and will such a confidence be abused? Will man be repulsed from the threshold of

the temple where he kneels in supplication? Reason justifies the desires of virtue; and from these desires themselves comes the influence which justifies them; for, from the general analogy of the laws of the universe, we see in each want the indication of a corresponding object. All who thirst find wherewith to quench their thirst: the newly born infant is not deceived in his desires; and will the man, faithful to his vocation, be deceived by his Creator?

'The idea of the Supreme Being, conceived as a moral legislator and judge, can alone imprint upon religion its true character, and identify it with conscience. The moral sentiment finds in this alliance the means of fulfilling its mission, and religion, through the medium of morality, penetrates and seizes all the faculties of the soul. The interest of preservation is no longer an instinct, but is in union with the designs of the Creator; restless sensiblilty is reassured and finds comfort; reason obtains a solution of its doubts, seizes the link of the great chain of causes, and discovers the principle of the universal plan; while the efforts of virtue find a support, and its merits a recompense.

'We shall return afterwards to the manner in which the progress from morality to religion is effected, and to the renovation which religion causes in the whole system of the human faculties; but let us clearly determine the characteristic conditions of what we call *the religious* nature in man. There is a fundamental consideration which seems to prepare us for conceiving them. It is this: in the universe we see an ever increasing progression commencing at brute or unorganized matter. This progression apparently seems to stop at man; and yet, in several respects, he is himself a beginning, a sketch, a corner stone, and the most noble portion of him is precisely that which is not finished; the column remains without the capital; the dome does not yet crown the edifice; and the universal plan announces certain summits which remain still veiled, above what is seen. In like manner, the mountain is often enveloped, at a certain degree of elevation, by a girdle of clouds which conceal its summit; while above, the pure heaven reigns, and the rays of the sun shine unobstructed. Man in his present state seems to have relations only with beings who are his inferiors or equals: but he would be singular, if he could not commune at the same time with a region more elevated than his own; for all the other works of nature are intermediate, and, by the different properties they possess, are united at once to a system which they terminate, and to one which they commence: moreover, man alone is endowed with the power of conceiving what is more perfect than himself—alone aspires to it. This insatiable desire of rising and of growing great, meets in power and renown nothing but false and deceitful indications;

such conquests, far from satisfying what is most excellent in him, injure and corrupt him. Does not this portion of his nature, which corresponds and communicates with a more perfect order of things, and which tends to be developed by it, and which we call his religious nature, complete the system of his faculties, precisely in the same manner as religion completes the general system of the universe? Man thus becomes, through sentiment and thought, the organ of creation, in the tribute of gratitude which it offers to its Author; he becomes the delegate of supreme intelligence upon the visible scene of the world; he exercises upon earth a kind of priesthood.'—pp. 74–7.

From the extracts we have now given, our readers will perceive the elements of human nature which the author supposes to enter into the composition of a perfect human being. We presume no one will deny that the proper adjustment and natural harmony of these elements, go far to make up his idea of the highest form of excellence. What is the character to which a wise and good man constantly aspires,—the character, to obtain which, the noblest principles of our nature urge us forward,—the character of which the only complete model is that which we revere in Him, who has 'left us an example,' and to form which, the religion which he taught, in the designs of Providence, is made the most effectual instrument,—but that in which the senses are submitted to the authority of the soul, and the various faculties of the social, intellectual, moral and religious nature, expanded and exercised in harmony with each other, according to the purpose of the Creator in their original constitution? Such, it appears to us, is the true idea of the moral perfection of man. According to our author, this depends on two great moral powers, the Love of Excellence and Self-government. The nature and characteristics of these powers are illustrated at considerable length. But for his views on these topics, we must refer our readers to the volume itself.

We have thus given an exposition of the plan which the author proposes, with specimens of his style of thought and expression. Our limits do not permit us to enter, at large, upon the subsequent details of the work, though we might fill our pages with extracts of equal beauty and power with those which we have already given. Under the general divisions of the Employment and the Culture of the Moral Powers, a great variety of topics relating to the formation and progress of the human character, are discussed with a strength of argument, and a warmth and

richness of eloquence, which remind us of the severe logic of the best English moralists, clothed in the graceful forms of French composition.

We quote the following passage, at once as a favorable specimen of the taste and ability of the translator, and as an example of the author's elevated religious feeling.

'The belief in a future beyond the tomb, is doubtless founded upon powerful inferences drawn from the ordinary course of nature. For nothing perishes in the elements which compose nature; they only change their form, by passing into various combinations. Now reason and analogy equally show that the principle of individuality, in the intelligent and sensible being, is necessarily one, and cannot suffer dissolution, since it is elementary. But these inferences would still leave a thick veil over the destinies which compose the important futurity. It is reserved for moral truths to raise this veil, by showing us, on the one hand, an equitable judge in the Supreme Dispenser; and by showing us, on the other, merit or demerit in human actions. Excellence would not be excellence because it is rewarded; and evil evil because it is punished. It is just the contrary; as the terms of rewards and punishments declare. It is then necessary that virtue itself should be something real, and worthy of great price, that we may apply to it the consequences deduced from the notion of an infinite justice and of a supreme judge, associated with that of a sovereign remunerator.

'Thus virtue bears witness to immortality. And the more deeply virtue is felt, the better the hopes of this great future are understood. We find in these hopes our proper destiny, explaining our earthly condition. A spectator, placed at the foot of a vast and regular edifice, cannot embrace all the parts in one glance; but those which are presented to his eye, give him a conception of the design of the architect; he completes in his mind what he has not yet been able to perceive; he prolongs the lines, and sees the point where they must unite; he penetrates beforehand into the secret depths. Such is the inference which morality authorises us to form, about the as yet invisible portion of our destiny. Virtue upon earth is the peristyle of a great future. It is so regularly, so harmoniously and wisely concerted, it makes us foresee exactly how its plans are accomplished and consummated. The whole moral nature is a grand prelude, a magnificent promise. It is a relation whose first terms only we hold. It is a triangle whose base we occupy, and the summit of which is as yet veiled in a cloud. This new progression, of which the present and terrestrial man

occupies the first steps, seems to be exhibited, already, as an image or sketch, on the bosom of human nature, by means of the scale of moral superiorities. So far as the good man is superior to the wicked, so far he feels that there is something much superior to himself. This presentiment of a better world increases with the degree of his progress. Who has not, in certain moments of his life, obtained a foreknowledge of it? Must we then always cast our eyes downward, and never raise them towards the summits which tower above our weak nature? I have seen a family assembled in a domestic oratory; the mother offering to God those to whom she gave existence; the father blessing his children; youthful hearts rendering thanks to the Heavenly Parent, whose tutelary providence they well understood, accustomed as they were to meet it in the interpreters it has chosen here below. O how beautiful is religion, since it can heighten the loveliness of a family picture!—I have seen a confused multitude united in a temple; every soul was concentrated, every mind mingled in the same thought; and hearts were blended in song; the poor man, by the side of the rich without being jealous, had forgotten his miseries: the rich man learnt his own indigence; brotherly love, which seems to banish all social distinctions in the world, awoke free and pure: all had obtained intelligence of their destiny; all prepared for it, rejoicing together; all advanced with an equal step. How human nature is ennobled, when in this attitude! how many dark mysteries are cleared away! how much discord is hushed! The whole earth seems to pride itself in the dignity which the most noble of mortal creatures has just acquired: the whole system of the universe is explained. Of all the kinds of worship, that which has obtained the most general and lasting success among mankind, and the only one which has owed its success entirely to free and individual conviction, and which has triumphed, by the mere force of this conviction, over all the resistance of prejudice and force, is that which has the rare privilege of fully satisfying the wishes and wants of morality. It is through this character, which so eminently distinguishes it, that its first defenders made their most eloquent vindications; they well knew that by calling virtue as a witness, it would not deceive their expectations. Its first conquests, also, were either among good and simple men who had resisted the corruption of the age, or among the sages who had deeply meditated upon the eternal laws of morality, such as Justin, Theophilus, Athenagoras, and Clement of Alexandria. What a magnificent homage rendered to Christianity, that it has been able to cause desertion from the school of Plato!

'In the general system of beings, everything proceeds in a

continued gradation, as everything tends to extreme simplicity, whatever may be the wonderful complication of means. It is an immense pyramid, the regularity of which we discover more clearly, the more minutely we examine the details. At the lowest degree lie inanimate and unorganized substances: organization is successively produced and manifested, which soon receives the breath of life, feeling being as yet but a sensation, and action but simple mobility. With morality and intelligence commences a new world, which crowns the preceding; it is the atmosphere into which man enters, but it only commences with him. Would the scale be suddenly interrupted? Would the progression stop at the very point where our view grows faint? Would all that is preeminent in the whole of the system be excluded from the common law? Would the plan remain incomplete, where it became most important? Alas! it would have been better to have left it unfinished in inferior species. Nature could have dispensed with insects and reptiles; but not with higher degrees of intellect and goodness.

'Yes, man is an intermedial link in the chain of beings. As he sees what is at his feet, so he has a presentiment of what is above him. All that is most elevated in humanity, moral and intellectual perfection, is exactly what approaches most nearly to a superior nature, and what receives from it the most direct influences.

'Alas! what would mean that secret but insatiable emotion of our souls, which incessantly directs towards a higher perfection all those sighs, which constantly call for a better state, and all those glances, turned upward, which are the expectation of the accomplishment of a great mystery? What would mean that idea of infinity, which becomes the most cruel poison if it is not a just and glorious hope; that tendency to higher states; those desires which call upon all that is capable of elevating us; that inward sentiment which declares that we are the neophytes of a better life; that natural dignity and pride which is so unjustifiable, when we consider only what we really are; those purer and warm affections, which would otherwise have so transient an object; that faculty of loving, which would only find such imperfect and limited objects; and that virtue, so true in all which we can control by experience, and which would be baffled in its dearest interests in what we cannot yet verify? What would earth be, the orphan of GOD? What would be humanity, disinherited of immortal life? O does not all morality invoke and proclaim with a unanimous voice this last relation of man with his Author, of the present with the future, which alone solves all the problems of existence! Religion, doubtless, is a sigh of weakness; but it is, above all, a wish and want of vir-

tue, which alone nourishes those noble instincts which religion is to satisfy. Virtue thrills at the sight of religion, with the same joy a son feels when he flies into the arms of his mother. And what voice would be raised within men to answer to the Creator's voice, if not that of conscience? What powers would greet and receive religion, when presenting itself upon earth, and would bring to it the reverence of men, if not those moral powers by which humanity is animated, elevated, and directed? What principle could germinate religious truths, in a soul deprived of the sense of what is just and good? What intelligible language could piety address to a heart deaf to virtue? Of what use is it to seek laboriously, whether or not in some corner of the globe some ignorant colony may be found, which, sunk into stupidity by the want of the chief necessaries of life, has only confused ideas of the Supreme Benefactor, and the worship due to him? What is the importance we attach to the vague narrations of travellers? Yes, religious ideas enlarge and develope with civilisation, because they can only spring up with moral habits; and this is what proves their affinity with moral sentiment. They acquire grandeur and truth in proportion to the purity and energy of this sentiment. Of what use is it to accumulate so many wretched examples of blind or cruel superstitions, which have sullied the worship of GOD upon earth? It is true that man will carry into his worship his passions and his errors, and necessarily corrupt by adopting it. But it is no longer the worship of the divine nature: it is profanation; and nothing proves better than this, how natural a preparation are purity of heart and innocence of life, for true religious sentiment. Let us seek for facts more adapted to instruct us, in the aspirations of mankind. The experience of a good man is that which I consult, and upon which I rest. Religious sentiment in him will be, as it were, but the continuation and consequence of those sentiments which already filled his soul, taking a wider range. He will be religious, for he deserves to be so. All there is in him pure, laudable and generous, will be satisfied. He thirsted for justice, and the streams of an eternal, infinite, universal justice will flow before him, and all the wrongs of the earth will be repaired. He delights in the emotion of gratitude; he will have discovered the Author of all blessings. An idea wandered in his thoughts; he will find it realized. He placed his happiness in devotedness; he will be able to consecrate all the faculties of his being to a boundless love, and to make a tribute to GOD himself, of the good he does to other men.'—pp. 256–61.

After making such liberal extracts from the work before us, we need not repeat our testimony to its merits. Our readers

will perceive, that the author is of a different stamp from that which we have been accustomed, almost involuntarily, to associate with the speculative philosophers of the French school. And to those who remember the influence which the writings of Voltaire, Diderot, and the contributors to the *Encyclopédie* in general, have exerted on the public mind, not only on the continent of Europe, but in England and our own country, it must be no less gratifying than it is to us, to welcome a writer, inferior to none of them in depth and variety of literary attainments, and superior to most in calmness and sobriety of philosophic judgment; who appears as the dignified and enlightened advocate of religion and virtue, and the expounder of principles which recognise the true destiny of human nature. As the friends of just and enlarged views of moral philosophy, and their practical application to the formation of character, we rejoice that this work is added to the literary treasures of our own language. It is an encouraging omen, when a writer of the singular candor and impartiality of Degerando, with an evident disposition to do equal justice to all who have preceded him, however opposed to his own opinions, and possessing a familiar acquaintance with the brilliant theories they have espoused,—lends no ear to their seducing paradoxes, but, having demonstrated the insufficiency of their foundation, in point of argument, and their inadequacy to meet the wants of the intellectual or moral nature of man, in point of sentiment, returns to the acknowledgement and defence of the grand, primary truths, in which is involved all that is most dear to the human soul, and which, though frequently called in question, have remained steadfast as heaven's 'pillared firmament.' In our opinion—and we hope our wishes have not deceived us—the age of a superficial, sensual philosophy, is passing away. Its foundations were first effectually laid bare by the strong thinkers in Germany,—a source, from which has emanated more of the intellectual light on the deepest subjects of philosophic inquiry, than most writers in our language have yet been ready to acknowledge. The best minds in France are awakening to more serious and elevated views of human nature. After the melancholy aberrations of the last century, the country of Descartes, Malebranche, and Fenelon, is resuming her station in support of a spiritual and religious philosophy. We confess that we look with the deepest interest, mingled with a cheerful hope, on the progress of the eclectic school in France, of which Cousin, Royer Collard, Jeoffroy, and Degerando, are dis-

tinguished representatives. We are not prepared to defend all the speculations of the philosophers we have alluded to; but we do rejoice in their tendency, which is, to place the great truths of the existence of the Deity, the free agency of man, his immortality, and his vocation to moral progress as the chief purpose of his being, on a deep and solid foundation.

We are glad, moreover, as Christians, to welcome among us a work, like this, from the new school of French philosophy. We are weary of the thread-bare sophisms, sanctioned by the former philosophers of that country, and repeated by superficial declaimers since, which tend at once to cast contempt on the nature of man and the truths of the gospel. It is well to have their fallacy exposed by a writer, like Degerando, who, singularly free from prejudices himself, is well qualified to soften the prejudices of others. He reasons, always, like a lover of truth, never like a partisan. We have been surprised, accustomed as we are to witness the rudeness of theological controversy, at the perfect justice and good-will with which he treats opinions the very reverse of his own, and the scrupulous delicacy, with which he distinguishes between the tendency of systems, and the characters of those who hold them. A similar temper we believe to be necessary in every religious or philosophical discussion. What his peculiar *theological* sentiments are, we are not informed. We have no knowledge whether he is a Catholic or a Protestant, a Trinitarian or a Unitarian. We care not to ask. But we do know his *religious* sentiments. They are inscribed on every page of his writings. They breathe in every thought of his mind. They pervade his style, like a living light. They are incorporated with all his views of life, duty, and human destiny. They are of such a character, as to neutralize any theological errors, which may be held in connexion with them; and therefore we aver, that we care not to ask for his creed. And it is needless to add, that these sentiments are decidedly christian. They are identical with the spirit of the gospel. They do homage to its sublime revelations. They authorise us to unite his testimony with that of the learned and independent Cousin, who expressed his belief to the thronged auditories of Paris, 'that all truths are contained in Christianity.'

We ought not to close our remarks, without expressing our thanks to the translator for presenting us this work in an English dress. We cheerfully give our testimony to the good

judgment and pure taste, with which the task has been executed. It bears marks of a faithful study of the original, a sufficient knowledge of the author's language, a ready perception of his style of thought and illustration, and a deep sympathy with the beautiful and elevated spirit of his philosophy. The long sentences, in which Degerando often indulges, are divided into periods of more convenient length; and some repetitions, apparently not essential to the subject under discussion, are judiciously omitted. The style is, generally, perspicuous and elegant, the language chaste and unaffected, and the spirit of the author's reasoning happily retained.

It is very properly observed, in the translator's preface, 'that the ideas and representations of moral truth and beauty, not less than those thoughts and feelings which form the essence of poetry, are so inseparable from the precise words in which the creating mind of the author first clothed them, that a work on this subject seems to lose as much by translation, as a poem.' On this account, it is perhaps impossible for such a writer as Degerando to be duly appreciated, except in his own language. His style grows directly out of his thoughts, and the latter, when divested of their native garb, lose much of their freedom and beauty. We do not, then, regard this translation as doing full justice to the original. The reader will be apt to complain of a want of easy and flowing expression, and of obvious connexion between the thoughts. The transition from one idea to another is often so rapid, as to leave a doubt in his mind, whether he has seized the author's meaning. This is not the fault of Degerando. His style is clear as the sun; sometimes rather diffuse, but always graceful and flowing. He dwells upon a thought long enough to give the reader full possession of it, and, if necessary, holds it up in a variety of lights. We think the translation fails in this. The ideas are presented too bare. There are not words enough for the thoughts. This gives many passages an air of harshness and constraint, which renders the effort of attention irksome, and, generally, unsuccessful. It will not do to give too great condensation of thought, in a popular work, and, on this account, it would have been better had the translator followed, more closely, the free and copious diction of the original.

In some other respects, too, we think a more literal translation would have been desirable. The reasons of the translator, it is true, are given, for following an opposite course; but they do not convince us of its correctness.

The critical reader will detect some French idioms, and a few expressions which he would prefer omitted or modified. But we find no instance, in which the sense of the author is perverted; except, perhaps, in some cases, which, after all, may be mere errors of the press.

We have thought it right to point out these faults, but with no wish to detract from the merits of the translation, for we certainly think, after all the exceptions we have felt it our duty to make, it is highly creditable to the translator's taste and skill, and a valuable gift to the public.

ART. VII.—1. *Essays on the Present Crisis in the Condition of the American Indians; first published in the National Intelligencer, under the Signature of William Penn.* Boston, 1829.

2. *Memorials of the Cherokee Indians to the Congress of the United States, presented to the House of Representatives, February* 15, 1830.

3. *Memorial of a Deputation of the Creek Nation of Indians, to the Congress of the United States, presented to the House of Representatives, February* 9, 1830.

4. *Report of Mr White to the Senate of the United States, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, February* 22, 1830.

5. *Report of Mr Bell to the House of Representatives of the United States, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, February* 24, 1830.

6. *Speech of Mr Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, delivered in the Senate of the United States, April* 6, 1830, *on the Bill for an Exchange of Lands with the Indians residing in any of the States or Territories, and for their Removal West of the Mississippi.* Washington, 1830.

7. *Speech of Mr Everett, of Massachusetts, on the Bill for Removing the Indians from the East to the West Side of the Mississippi, delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, on the Nineteenth of May,* 1830. Boston, 1830.

MOST of our readers are probably in some degree acquainted with the controversy between the States of Georgia, Alabama

and Mississippi, and the Indian tribes residing within what are called the chartered limits of those States; that is, within their boundaries, as they appear upon our maps. The Essays of William Penn, the discussions in the newspapers, and the debates at the last session of Congress, have excited a great, and, as it seems to us, an increasing interest in the subject. The general voice of the nation is, as it should be, clear and decided in the sentiment, that justice should be done to both parties, and at all hazards.

It is not our intention to give an account of the various pamphlets named at the head of our article. It is, however, but justice to say, that the Essays of William Penn contain a very thorough and satisfactory examination of the whole subject, exhibiting great legal and historical research, and much clear and logical argument. No better proof is required of their worth, than the extensive circulation which they have in various ways received, and the powerful influence, which, as we believe, they have exerted in calling forth that deep and general interest which has been recently expressed by the public in the rights of the Indians.

We have no expectation that we shall be able to throw any new light on a subject which has already been so ably treated, not only in the Essays just mentioned, but in the speeches of several distinguished members of Congress. Our only object is to give such a sketch of the history and nature of the Indian controversy, as will make it more thoroughly known to some who have not read the publications to which we have referred. We have felt it an imperative duty not to be silent while a great moral question is agitating our nation, involving in its decision, not merely the character of our country for justice and humanity, but the happiness and lives of many of our fellow men.

We should be careful not to prejudge the question, or to let the sympathy, which we are ever ready to feel for the weak, lead us to disregard the rights of the strong; and on the other hand, we should be on our guard not to let any fears of a collision between the General Government and the authorities of any State, or of some unknown and uncertain evil, prevent us from attaining and declaring the decisions of right and justice.

In order to understand this controversy, it will not be necessary to describe particularly the boundaries of the Indian nations, whose rights are brought in question. It is sufficient to observe, that the Cherokees occupy a territory comprising the

northwest corner of Georgia, the northeast corner of Alabama, the southeast corner of Tennessee, and the southwest corner of North Carolina, as those States appear on the maps. The Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws occupy extensive territories in Alabama and Mississippi. Whatever may be the rights of these four Indian nations, as a matter of fact it is indisputable, that at the time the acts which we shall mention were passed, and for a long time previous, they formed distinct political communities, governed by their own rulers and their own laws, without any interference of the States within whose limits they reside.

On the nineteenth of December, 1827, a report was made by a joint committee of the Legislature of Georgia, in which they claim for the State an absolute right to the soil and jurisdiction of that part of the Cherokee territory which falls within the State limits; say that the possession of the land by the Indians is only permissive; that they are 'mere tenants at will' to Georgia, and that the State has a right to expel them by force whenever pleased to do so. Several resolutions were reported and passed, in which the same principles are distinctly asserted.

The next year, December 28, 1828, an act was passed by Georgia, to extend her laws over the Cherokee Indians. On the nineteenth of December, 1829, this State passed another act 'to add the territory lying within the chartered limits of Georgia, and now in the occupancy of the Cherokee Indians,' to the adjacent counties. The first five sections of the law enact that the territory shall become a part of the five counties of Carroll, De Kalb, Gwinnett, Hall, and Habersham. The sixth section extends all the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State, over the territory, and provides, 'that all persons whatever, residing within the same, shall, after the first day of June next [1830], be subject and liable to the operation of said laws, in the same manner as other citizens of this State.'

The seventh section provides, that, after the same date, 'all laws, ordinances, orders, and regulations, of any kind whatever, made, passed, or enacted by the Cherokee Indians, either in general council, or in any other way whatever, or by any authority whatever of said tribe, be, and the same are hereby declared to be null and void, and of no effect, as if the same had never existed; and in all cases of indictment or civil suits, it shall not be lawful for the defendant to justify under any of said laws,' &c.; 'nor shall the courts of this State permit the

same to be given in evidence on the trial of any suit whatever.'

The eighth section provides, that it shall not be lawful for any person, by virtue of any Cherokee law or custom, 'to prevent by threats, menaces or *other means*, or to *endeavour* to prevent' any Indian of that nation from emigrating or removing from said nation; or to punish any Indian of that nation for emigrating or intending to emigrate.

The ninth section declares, that any person offending against the provisions of the preceding section, shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding four years, at the discretion of the court.

The tenth section enacts, 'that it shall not be lawful for any person or body of persons, by arbitrary power, or under color of any pretended rule, ordinance, law, or custom of said nation, to prevent, or offer to prevent, or deter any Indian, head man, chief, or warrior, of said nation, residing within the chartered limits of this State, from selling or ceding to the United States, for the use of Georgia, the whole or any part of said territory, or to prevent, or offer to prevent, any Indian, head man, chief, or warrior of said nation, residing as aforesaid, from meeting in council or treaty, any commissioner or commissioners on the part of the United States, for any purpose whatever.'

The eleventh section provides, that any person offending against the provisions of the preceding section, shall be punishable by imprisonment for not less than four, nor more than six years.

The twelfth section provides, 'that it shall not be lawful for any person, or body of persons, by arbitrary force, or under color of any pretended rules,' &c. to take the life of any Indian for enlisting as an emigrant, attempting to emigrate, ceding or attempting to cede, the territory, or meeting or attempting to meet, in treaty or in council, any commissioner. The punishment for this offence is death by hanging.

The thirteenth section provides, that where any of the preceding offences is committed under color of any law of the nation, all persons acting therein, as individuals, or as pretended executive, ministerial, or judicial officers, shall be deemed principals, and punishable as such.

The fourteenth section provides for the fees of officers serving process in the territory, and, in case the service is resisted, authorises them to call out the militia to assist them.

The fifteenth section enacts, 'that no Indian or descendant of any Indian, residing within the Creek or Cherokee nations of Indians, shall be deemed a competent witness in any court of this State, to which a white person may be a party, except such white person resides within the said nation.'

It is impossible to read this law without being struck with the injustice and cruelty of its provisions;—injustice and cruelty, even if the pretensions of Georgia to jurisdiction be valid. The long imprisonments, which are to be inflicted for offences committed without violence, and which may be acts done with the firmest belief of right in the offenders, are severe in the extreme. Georgia, however, is not satisfied with punishing the Cherokees for imaginary offences. She deprives them of the protection of the government, laws, and usages to which they have been accustomed, and extends over them her own laws, of which they must be entirely ignorant. This is a degree of cruelty, which a civilised nation would refrain from exercising over a conquered foe. But, though Georgia pretends to give the Cherokees the benefit of her laws, such as it would be to a feeble people residing among strangers using a different language, yet, in the last section, as if in derision of her victims, she sweeps away all the protection which she had seemed to offer. For, if no Indian can be a witness where a white man is a party, how can any of the nation ever obtain redress for an injury which is witnessed only by Indians? The whites are, by this provision, licensed, or rather invited, to go into the Cherokee country and ravage and plunder it at discretion, provided they are careful to do all in the presence of Indians only; for no Indian can make a complaint, or be a witness, to substantiate the offender's guilt. This law, however, is not quite so severe as the statute passed by Georgia the preceding year, which prohibited any Indian, residing within the Creek or Cherokee nations, from being a witness in, or party to, any suit to which a white man was a party.

In imitation of Georgia, the State of Alabama, on the twenty-ninth of June, 1829, passed a law, to extend the jurisdiction of the State over the Creek nation. Mississippi, also, on the nineteenth of January, 1830, passed an act, 'to extend the laws of the State over the persons and property of the Indians resident within its limits,' having in February, 1829, passed 'an act to extend legal process into that part of the State now occupied by the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes of Indians.'

It is but justice to the States of Alabama and Mississippi, to say, that their statutes, however indefensible, do not breathe the violence which is but too apparent in that of Georgia.

The avowed design of the statutes of the three States, is, to make the Indians residing within what those States regard as their respective boundary lines, subject to their respective State laws. The real object is, to compel the Indians to cede their territories, and retire beyond the Mississippi.

The Cherokees being alarmed at the legislation of Georgia, their delegation addressed a letter, February 17, 1829, to the late Secretary of War, in which they asserted, that their nation was independent of the individual States, and complained of the act of Georgia which had previously passed, as being made 'in defiance of the laws of the United States and the most solemn treaties.' To this letter, the present Secretary of War, by direction of the President, returned an answer, dated April 18, 1829, in which he informs the delegation, that Georgia, being a 'sovereign and independent State,' has a right to extend 'her legislative enactments' over the Cherokee country; but acknowledges their right to the possession and occupancy of their territories, and assures them, that they shall be protected by the United States in the enjoyment of this right. He, however, thinks that the only means by which they can obtain protection and peace, will be a removal beyond the Mississippi, which he urges upon them with great earnestness.

Thus repulsed by the President, the Cherokees took measures, which they describe in the following terms.—'Some months ago,' say they, 'a delegation was appointed by the constituted authorities of the Cherokee nation, to repair to the city of Washington, and, in behalf of this nation, to lay before the Government of the United States such representations, as should seem most likely to secure to us as a people that protection, aid, and good neighbourhood, which had been so often promised to us, and of which we stand in great need. Soon after their arrival in the city, they presented to Congress a petition from our National Council, asking for the interposition of that body in our behalf, especially with reference to the laws of Georgia, which were suspended in a most terrifying manner over a large part of our population, and protesting, in the most decided terms, against the operation of these laws. In the course of the winter, they presented petitions to Congress, signed by more than four

thousand of our citizens, including probably more than nineteen twentieths, and, for aught we can tell, ninetynine hundredths of the adult males of the nation (our whole population being about sixteen thousand), pleading with the assembled representatives of the American people, that the solemn engagements between their fathers and our fathers, may be preserved, as they have been till recently, in full force and continued operation; asking, in a word, for protection against threatened usurpation, and for a faithful execution of a guaranty, which is perfectly plain in its meaning, has been repeatedly and rigidly enforced in our favor, and has received the sanction of the Government of the United States for nearly forty years.'

The Creek nation, also, sent a deputation to Washington, who presented a memorial to Congress, at its last session, in which they also invoked the protection of the United States, against the legislation of Alabama.

We do not know whether the Choctaws and Chickasaws addressed any memorial to Congress on the subject of the laws of Mississippi; but the Choctaws dread the extension of the State laws over them, and are averse to a removal beyond the Mississippi. Mr Everett, in his speech, says;—

'I have seen an authentic account of the proceedings of the Choctaw Council, lately convened to consider this subject of emigration. It was a scene, as we are told by the Mississippi papers, that could not be witnessed without tears. After the new chief had been installed in office, "he introduced to the council the subject of a removal in this way: he first stated some of the laws of Mississippi, and then inquired of them, whether they would remain where they were, and submit to these laws, or remove over the Mississippi. He also stated the substance of the last talk to them of the President of the United States. The captains and others rose and spoke: the general sentiment was—we are distressed—we cannot endure the laws of Mississippi—we do not think our great father loves us—we must go, as he will not help us while we remain here."'—p. 8.

The applications of the Indians to Congress for protection, were neglected. A law, however, was passed, 'to provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the States or Territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi.' By this act the President is authorised to exchange United States lands, west of the Mississippi, for lands

of the Indian tribes on this side of that river, 'within the bounds of any one or more of the States or Territories, where the land claimed and occupied by the Indians is owned by the United States, or the United States are bound to the State within which it lies, to extinguish the Indian claim thereto.' The third section provides, that, in making these exchanges, it shall be lawful for the President 'solemnly to assure the tribe, or nation, with which the exchange is made, that the United States will, forever, secure and guaranty to them, and their heirs, or successors, the country so exchanged with them.' The President is authorised to pay for improvements, and to furnish aid to the emigrants to assist in their removal, and for their support one year afterwards; and also to protect them against other Indians, and to extend the same protecting care over the emigrating Indians, which he now does to them in their present residences; 'provided, that nothing in this act contained shall be construed as authorising, or directing, the violation of any existing treaty between the United States and any of the Indian tribes.' The sum of five hundred thousand dollars is appropriated to carry the act into effect.

This act is, perhaps, not to be considered as an expression by Congress of an acquiescence in the pretensions of the three States; but, taking into view the circumstances under which it was passed, it must be regarded as an attempt to avoid a direct decision of the question as to the rights of these States, and to assist them in their efforts to drive the Indians beyond the Mississippi. Congress, however, is not the tribunal which is finally to pronounce upon the conflicting claims of the Indians and the three States. The Supreme Court of the United States may be called on to decide the legal rights of the parties. The Indians have hitherto refused to remove beyond the Mississippi. Their fate is not yet fixed. No apology, therefore, can be necessary for a discussion of their rights and the obligations of the United States.

Our purpose in the ensuing pages, will be, to examine the claims of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi to jurisdiction over the Indians residing within their respective nominal limits; and the claim of Georgia to the property of the soil of the Cherokee country, which, as we have seen, she asserts, though she has, as yet, not attempted to enforce it. We shall, in the first instance, and for convenience, consider the case of Georgia and

the Cherokees. We are not aware that it in principle differs materially from that of the other Indian nations, except that the claim of Georgia may, perhaps, in some particulars, be more plausible than those of Alabama and Mississippi.

Are, then, the Cherokees, residing in their own territories, but within the State limits of Georgia, as settled by compact with the United States, within the jurisdiction of that State? Is Georgia the absolute owner of the soil which that nation occupies? Are the Cherokees tenants at her will, and liable to be expelled from their lands at her pleasure? Are the statutes of Georgia binding on the Cherokees? If they are not, are the United States under any obligation to protect these Indians? And if this question be answered in the affirmative, in what mode should this protection be afforded?

Perhaps the difficulty which many persons feel in perceiving the right of Indian nations to their territories, does not arise from any consideration of the relations which these tribes have sustained to Great Britain and the United States, or from any examination of the claims to jurisdiction over their lands, but simply from the circumstance of their having always been accustomed to see these territories in the maps marked as integral parts of the different States, or of the United States. Those who have been long in the habit, perhaps from early childhood, of judging of the extent of our whole country and of the different parts of it, by examining maps, find it hard to realize that a large portion of this vast surface, is occupied by free nations, who are not in any sense subjects of the United States, or of any State.

The Cherokees are, in point of fact, acting as a sovereign nation, not under the jurisdiction of Georgia, and occupying the soil which she claims. As the Cherokees, then, are the party in possession of the subject of controversy, it is incumbent on Georgia, before attempting to annihilate their government and appropriate their possessions, to make her right to do so, clear.

But the title of the Cherokees does not depend on mere present possession. In the language of the Essays,—

'The Cherokees are human beings, endowed by their Creator with the same natural rights as other men. They are in peaceable possession of a territory which they have always regarded as their own. This territory was in possession of their ancestors, through an unknown series of generations, and has come down to them

with a title *absolutely unincumbered in every respect.* It is not pretended, that the Cherokees have ever alienated their country, or that the whites have ever been in possession of it.

'If the Cherokees are interrogated as to their title, they can truly say, "God gave this country to our ancestors. We have never been in bondage to any man. Though we have sold much land to our white neighbours, we have never bought any from them. We own the land which we now occupy, by the right of the original possessors; a right which is allowed in all countries to be of incontestable validity. We assert, therefore, that no human power can lawfully compel us to leave our lands."

'If the Cherokees are correct in their statement of facts, who can resist their conclusion? We might as well ask the Chinese, what right *they* have to the territory which they occupy. To such a question they would answer, "God gave this land to our ancestors. Our nation has *always* been in possession of it, so far as history and tradition go back. The nations of Europe are comparatively of recent origin; the commencement of ours is lost in remote antiquity."

'What can be said to such a statement as this? Who can argue so plain a case?

'It has been alleged, that the savage of the wilderness can acquire no title to the forests, through which he pursues his game. Without admitting this doctrine, it is sufficient to reply here, that it has no application to the case of the Cherokees. They are at present neither savages nor hunters. It does not appear that they ever were mere wanderers, without a stationary residence. At the earliest period of our becoming acquainted with their condition, they had fixed habitations, and were in undisputed possession of a widely extended country. They were then in the habit of cultivating some land near their houses, where they planted Indian corn, and other vegetables. From about the commencement of the present century, they have addicted themselves more and more to agriculture, till they now derive their support from the soil, as truly and entirely as do the inhabitants of Pennsylvania or Virginia. For many years they have had their herds, and their large cultivated fields. They now have, in addition, their schools, a regular civil government, and places of regular christian worship. They earn their bread by the labor of their own hands, applied to the tillage of their own farms; and they clothe themselves with fabrics made at their own looms, from cotton grown in their own fields.'—*Essays*, pp. 7, 8.

The account which an earlier author gives of the Cherokees, supports their pretension to immemorial occupancy. 'It may be remarked,' says the writer to whom we refer, 'that the Che-

rokees differ in some respects from other Indian nations that have wandered often from place to place, and fixed their habitations on separate districts. From time immemorial they have had possession of the same territory which at present they occupy. They affirm that their forefathers sprung from that ground, or descended from the clouds upon those hills. These lands of their ancestors they value above all things in the world. They venerate the places where their bones are interred, and esteem it disgraceful, in the highest degree, to relinquish these sacred repositories. The man that would refuse to take the field in defence of these hereditary possessions, is regarded by them as a coward, and treated as an outcast from their nation.'*

The title of the Cherokees depends on long possession.—What, then, are the grounds of the claim made by Georgia?

In stating the arguments advanced by the advocates of Georgia, we shall follow the highest authorities; among which are the Report to the Legislature of Georgia already mentioned; the Report made at the last session of Congress by Mr White to the Senate, from the Committee on Indian Affairs; the Report made by Mr Bell to the House of Representatives from a similar committee, and the letter of the present Secretary of War to the Cherokee delegation, dated April 18, 1829.

The general course of argument is as follows. The king of Great Britain, through the discovery of the United States by his subjects, obtained the right of soil and sovereignty over the vast territories between the Atlantic and Mississippi, then occupied only by wandering savages. Even if this right of discovery did not make the king sovereign over the Cherokees, yet he was, in fact, sovereign over them as well as other Indian tribes; for the Cherokees acknowledged him as such, and the charter of Georgia was an assertion of sovereignty over the savage nations comprised within its boundaries. 'By the declaration of independence, and subsequently by the treaty of 1783, all the rights of sovereignty pertaining to Great Britain became vested respectively in the original States of the Union, including' Georgia, 'within whose territorial limits, as defined and known,' a part of the Cherokee nation resided. Since that time the Cherokees have been permitted to dwell and hunt on certain territories. But this mere permission is not an abandonment of the original right of sovereignty. It is, also, some-

* Historical account of South Carolina and Georgia, published in London, 1779, Vol. II. p. 201.

times said, that the Cherokees are a conquered nation, and, therefore, that Georgia may exercise over them the rights of a sovereign. In support of this chain of title, it is urged, that the right of discovery, as here asserted, is recognised by all civilized nations; and that most of the original States have asserted the same right of sovereignty over the Indians residing within their limits, whenever they have thought it expedient, and that the property of all the land in this country is founded on this title.

We shall say nothing of the humanity of the doctrines which we have just stated, without any exaggeration, from the publications on the Georgia side. But the whole argument is hollow and unsubstantial. We are far from admitting the rights of discovery as stated by the most approved writers on the law of nations; but the principles which they lay down, even if correct, afford no support to the pretensions of Georgia.

Vattel, after asserting that the cultivation of the soil is a natural obligation, says, that nations who live an idle life, usurping more territories than they would have occasion for were they to use honest labor, 'have no reason to complain, if other nations, more laborious and too closely confined, come to possess a part. Thus, though the conquest of the civilized empires of Peru and Mexico was a notorious usurpation, the establishment of many colonies on the continent of North America, may, on their confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful. The people of these vast continents rather overran than inhabited them.'* In another place he says, that there is 'a celebrated question to which the discovery of the new world has principally given rise. It is asked, if a nation may lawfully take possession of a part of a vast country, in which there are found none but erratic nations, incapable, by the smallness of their numbers, to people the whole.' After referring to the passage just cited, he says, that their removing their habitations through these immense regions, cannot be a true and legal possession, and that 'the people of Europe, too closely pent up, finding land of which these nations are in no particular want, and of which they make no actual and constant use, may lawfully possess it, and establish colonies there.' The earth, he proceeds to say, was made to supply subsistence for the human race in general, and would not be able to sustain a tenth part

* Vattel, Book I. sec. 81.

of its present inhabitants by hunting, fishing, and wild fruits. 'People have not, then, deviated from the views of nature in confining the Indians within narrower limits. However, we cannot help praising the moderation of the English Puritans who first settled in New England; who, notwithstanding their being furnished with a charter from their sovereign, purchased of the Indians the land they resolved to cultivate. This laudable example was followed by Mr William Penn, who planted the colony of Quakers in Pennsylvania.'* In another place, he says, that unless a nation is in absolute want of land, and under a pressing necessity, it has no right to take any part of the territory of a wandering tribe of shepherds, who possess their lands in common. †

It appears from these passages, that, in Vattel's opinion, three things were necessary in order to give a civilized nation a right to take a portion of the lands of a savage tribe. 1. The territories of the civilized nation must be crowded with an overflowing population. 2. The savage nation must support itself by hunting and fishing, and not by regular labor. 3. The savage nation must have abundance of land to spare. These extracts also imply that sufficient land ought to be left for the savage tribes. Now it cannot be questioned that the Cherokees have supplied, very liberally, every claim for land which, upon the principles of Vattel, their white neighbours can have, and that Georgia is not so crowded with population as to render any further accession of territory necessary for its support. Besides, the Cherokees are no longer a savage nation supporting themselves by hunting. They now derive their support from the cultivation of the soil, of which no better evidence can be given than the following statistical table, which we take from Mr Everett's Speech.

'A STATISTICAL TABLE, EXHIBITING THE POPULATION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, AS ENUMERATED IN 1824, AGREEABLY TO A RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL; ALSO, OF PROPERTY, &c. AS STATED.

Population		15,060
Male Negroes	610	1,277
Female Negroes	667	
Grand Total of Males and Females		13,783
Total Number of Females		6,900
Females over 40 years of age		782
Females from 15 to 40 years		3,108

* Vattel, Book I. sec. 209. † Book II. sec. 97.

Females under 15 years of age - - - -	3,010
Total number of Males - - - -	6,883
Males over 59 years of age - - - -	352
Males from 18 to 59 years of age - - -	3,027
Males under 18 years of age - - - -	3,054
Add for those who have since removed into the nation from North Carolina, who were living in that State on reservations - - - - - - -	500

'*Remarks.* There are one hundred and fortyseven white men married to Cherokee women, and sixtyeight Cherokee men married to white women.

'There are 18 schools in the nation, and 314 scholars of both sexes, 36 grist mills, 13 saw mills, 762 looms, 2,486 spinning wheels, 172 wagons, 2,923 ploughs, 7,683 horses, 22,531 black cattle, 46,732 swine, 2,566 sheep, 430 goats, 62 blacksmith's shops, 9 stores, 2 tan yards, and 1 powder mill, besides many other items not enumerated; and there are several public roads, and ferries and turnpikes, in the nation.'

It is evident from this table, 'that agriculture is the principal employment and support of the people.' There is no answering such a document as this, and, therefore, we shall not trouble our readers with the great mass of evidence that corroborates it. We shall only add one remarkable fact, which, though strikingly expressed by Mr Everett, is a literal truth; namely, that the Cherokees, 'in their official papers, written by themselves, plead for their rights, in better English, than that of the high officers of government, who plead against them.'

It is also to be observed, that though Vattel admits the propriety of civilized nations obtaining a share of the unoccupied land of savage tribes, he does not assert, or even imply, that the civilized nations have a right to all the land of the savage tribes, or any jurisdiction over them, while residing beyond the limits of the land actually occupied by the civilized State.

But the claim arising from the right of discovery, as made by Great Britain, is very different from what the advocates of Georgia now represent it to have been. It is stated, with great clearness and accuracy, in the following extract from a Report made by Mr Everett to the House of Representatives in 1827, as chairman of a select committee with regard to the then existing controversy between the State of Georgia and the Creeks.

'The civilized nations of Europe, who, at different periods, discovered and settled the various portions of the American Continent, founded, principally on the right of discovery, a claim to the sovereignty over the regions so discovered. This claim of sovereignty does not appear, at least in the case of the English Government, to have extended, in itself, beyond an exclusion of the claims of other nations. The Committee are not aware that the English Government, or its representatives, the Colonial Governments, ever assumed, in virtue of this claim of sovereignty, to exercise the power of internal legislation over the persons who composed the various Indian tribes, within the regions to which the claim of sovereignty extended. These tribes were, on the contrary, considered and treated as separate, and, to a certain degree, independent nations. A friendly intercourse with them was kept up by means of conferences and councils; boundaries, the right to establish and maintain military posts, and occasionally the right of passage, were matter of stipulation, by formal conventions, entered into between the Crown or Colonies on the one hand, and the Chiefs and Warriors of the tribes on the other. When the provisions of these treaties were broken by the Indian tribes, or when, in any other way, a state of hostility arose, wars ensued, as between separate civilized countries, and these wars were concluded by treaty. No doubt, in the most early periods of our history, and in reference to the remnants of tribes, which had ceased to have a separate existence, transactions may have occurred, which imply a different principle of action on the part of the British or Colonial Governments: but it is believed that no attempt was ever made by those Governments, or any of them, to incorporate the Indian tribes into the body politic, or to carry the right of sovereignty farther, than to exclude the sovereignty of other free States, and to regulate, at discretion, the intercourse with the tribes thus subjected.

'In like manner, the European Governments claimed, in virtue of discovery, a right in the soil occupied by the Indian tribes. It is not necessary, nor perhaps possible, to define the precise extent to which this claim was carried, in all instances. It is well known, however, that it was a claim of a right of pre-emption residing in the Government. By various public and legislative acts, individuals were disqualified from acquiring a title to Indian lands, by direct purchase of the Indians; and the Government recognised a right of occupancy in the Indians, which it claimed to itself the exclusive prerogative of extinguishing. This well known fact has received the sanction of Judicial decision, (8th Wheaton,) in the case of Johnson and Graham's lessees, vs. McIntosh. Such was the state of things before the Revolution.'

It is sometimes suggested that the king of Great Britain acquired the sovereignty over the Cherokees, by their voluntary acknowledgement, when six of their chiefs made a treaty at London, in 1730, and in other treaties; and that he also obtained it by right of conquest. But this treaty does not imply any absolute sovereignty in the British king. All that it says on the subject, is, that the chiefs were deputed by Moytoy, the chief warrior of the Cherokees, 'to attend Sir Alexander Cumming to Great Britain, where they had seen the great king George: and Sir Alexander, by authority from Moytoy and all the Cherokees, had laid the crown of their nation, with the scalps of their enemies and feathers of glory, at his Majesty's feet, as a pledge of their loyalty.' If we suppose the Indians to have understood these flourishes, which it is almost certain they did not, the expressions only conform to what we suppose to be their actual relation;—that of a sovereign nation under the protection of the king of England. It is, however, scarcely necessary to answer an argument on which even its supporters place but little reliance. We only remark that this treaty and the rest were annulled by ensuing wars; and that the king's right of sovereignty must be judged of by the actual relations of the parties. So, too, with regard to the right of sovereignty supposed to be acquired by conquest, admitting such a conquest ever to have been made; if this right was at first indefinite, it was limited by the treaty of peace, by which the conqueror is bound, as well as by the construction which is given to the treaty by usage. Now the king of Great Britain never, in fact, extended his jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation; and the nature and extent of his sovereignty are shown by the power which he actually exercised over them.

We may admit, that Great Britain claimed a sort of sovereignty over the lands in possession of the Indian tribes. There is no doubt, that the charter of Georgia assumed to grant lands stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and covering the territory of the Cherokees. There is no doubt, that many of the Indian tribes acknowledged themselves to be under the sovereignty of the king of Great Britain, and that they considered themselves as under his protection. Yet when we examine the real situation of the parties, and their acts during a long course of years, it will be obvious that the Indians were regarded as distinct and sovereign nations, governed by their own laws and usages, sometimes at war and

sometimes at peace with Great Britain. We never find, that the king attempted to extend the common law, or the laws of the colonies, over the Cherokees, or to deprive them of their own laws. We never find, that he attempted to regulate their government, or sent them governors; or that he attempted to take their lands for his colonies, except by purchase. They were never taxed. They were not called the subjects, but the allies of Great Britain. Their wars, though conducted with cruelty, and said by the English to be unprovoked and unreasonable, were still called wars, not rebellions or insurrections. Those wars were terminated by treaties, and cessions of land were obtained from them by treaties. The captives taken from them were not called or punished as rebels, but regarded as prisoners of war. The rights of Georgia, as successor to the sovereign power of England, cannot extend beyond those exercised by the king of England, and recognised by the Cherokees. The sovereign power of Georgia, if it exists at all, must be limited by the actual mode in which it has been exercised and understood for the last century. If it belonged to Georgia, it would be, as has been already stated, a mere right of preemption, a right to acquire the soil when the Indians sell or abandon it, in preference to any other State or people, without any jurisdiction whatever over the Indians.

Is, then, the mere name and claim of sovereignty,—for, beyond the defined right of preemption, it is nothing but a name,—to deprive these Indians of that right of self-government, which they have exercised beyond the memory of man? Is this dormant claim of no more vigor in fact than the claim of the kings of England to the crown of France, which lasted for centuries after they had recognised the actual government of France; or the title of the king of Spain to America, by virtue of the bull of Pope Alexander VI.,—is such a claim to have power to destroy the government and laws of free and sovereign nations? Suppose that the parliament of George III., pretending that he was king of France in fact, because he and his predecessors had so long borne that title, should have passed a statute bringing all the territories of France under the jurisdiction of the common law, annulling all the laws of France, and prohibiting Louis XVI. from calling himself king of France, and all persons from acting as officers under him,—it would not have been an act of more absolute and obvious injustice, than the statutes of Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama.

The rights of the Indians could not be decided by the mere formal claims of the king of Great Britain. They could not be made his subjects, or his slaves, by charter. Their relation to Great Britain is defined by the conduct and mutual understanding of both parties. About these, there can be no question. Great Britain, as we have already remarked, always treated the Indians as sovereign nations. The charter of Georgia, it is true, in words, gave a sovereignty over an immense extent of territory, comprehending all the territory of the Cherokees which is within the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. But it appears that this charter, though absolute in its terms, was not considered as giving any title to the land against the Indians; for, one of the first steps taken by Gen. Oglethorpe when he made his settlement at Savannah, in 1733, was to make a treaty with the Creeks, by which they granted to the Trustees for Establishing the Colony of Georgia in America, a free and complete right and title, 'for all the lands between Savannah and Alatamaha rivers, extending west to the extremity of the tide waters,' with reservations of certain tracts to the Indians.

Even before this time, as early as the year 1721, a congress was held by Gov. Nicolson, of South Carolina, with the Cherokees, 'a powerful nation, computed at this time to consist of no less than six thousand bowmen,' at which congress, the governor, it is said, 'marked the boundaries of the lands between them and the English settlers.'* The historian, after mentioning a treaty made with the Creeks at the same time, by which the Savannah River was fixed on as a boundary between them and the English, says,—'Such negotiations were in many respects useful and important; for where Europeans take possession of lands contrary to the inclination, and without permission and consent of these free and independent nations, it would puzzle a wise man to vindicate their tenure on any principles of equity and justice.'†

In 1755, Gov. Glen, of South Carolina, had a congress with the Cherokees in 'their own country.' 'At this congress,' the historian says, 'a territory of prodigious extent was ceded and surrendered to the king. Deeds of conveyance were drawn up, and formally executed by their head men, in the name of the whole people. It contained not only much rich

* Historical Account of South Carolina and Georgia, Vol. I. p. 297.
† Ib. p. 298.

land, but there the air was more serene, and the climate more healthy than in the maritime ports.' *

In 1759, a war broke out with the Cherokees, in which the provinces of Georgia and South Carolina suffered severely. A peace was finally concluded with them, in 1761, at Charleston.

In 1763, 'the head men of the Catabaws, Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Creeks, were invited to a general treaty to be held at Augusta;' which was attended by the Governors of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, and Capt. John Stewart, Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Southern Department. This treaty was concluded November 10, 1763; and it was agreed, that a further territory, described in the treaty, should be annexed to Georgia. 'The Cherokee and Creek nations of Indians, being indebted to the English Indian traders in greater sums than they could pay in peltries, and being desirous to discharge their debts, ceded and granted to the king this tract of country *upon the frontiers* of Georgia; that the same should be sold, and that the proceeds of the sale should be appropriated to the payment of their debts to these traders.' † Capt. M'Call, after giving an account of this treaty, adds;— 'I believe it may be said of Georgia, that there has been no instance in which lands have been forced from the Aborigines by conquest; and that, in all cases, the Indians have expressed their entire satisfaction at the compensations which have been given them for acquisitions of territory.' ‡

In June, 1773, another treaty, of a similar character, was made at Augusta, by which the Cherokees and Creeks ceded a tract of country to the king, for the purpose of having their debts to the traders paid out of the sales.

These treaties show, as we think, most conclusively, that Great Britain, in fact, did not claim the land occupied by the Indians, until it was obtained by purchase, and neither claimed nor exercised jurisdiction over them.

That these savage nations had rights which Great Britain respected, is proved by the celebrated proclamation issued by the king in 1763, soon after peace was concluded with France. This proclamation says, that it is just, and essential

* Historical Account of South Carolina and Georgia, Vol. II. p. 204.
† M'Call's Hist. of Georgia, pp. 301, 302. ‡ Ib. 302.

to the security of the colonies, that the 'nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their hunting grounds.' It therefore prohibited the governors of the colonies 'for the present, and until our future pleasure be known,' from granting warrants of survey, or passing patents 'for any lands beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers, which fall into the Atlantic ocean from the west and northwest, or upon any lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by us, as aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.' The proclamation then declares it to be the royal will to reserve under the king's 'sovereignty, protection, and dominion, for the use of the said Indians,' all the lands lying westward of the sources of the same rivers, and forbids all the king's 'loving subjects' from settling on those lands without his license; orders all persons, who have inadvertently settled on lands which have not been ceded by the Indians, to remove; forbids the purchase of lands from the Indians by private persons, and directs, that all purchases shall be made in the king's name, at a public assembly of the Indians, held by the governor of the colony in which they lie, but that, in proprietary governments, the purchases be made in the name of the proprietaries. It is to be observed, that the charter of Georgia having before this time been surrendered to the king, the government had ceased to be proprietary.

This proclamation shows, that, at that time, the Indians were considered as having a title to their lands, which could be taken from them only by cession or purchase. It also proves, that they were regarded as nations having a distinct political existence. They are called the nations, or tribes, 'with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection,' not whom we have conquered, or who have become our subjects by right of discovery.

The relation of the Indian nations to Great Britain before the independence of this country, then, is clear. They were sovereign nations, living under the protection of the king, with a complete title to their soil and the undisputed right of self-government. For their protection, trade with them was regulated, and the whites were prohibited from encroaching on their territories. The Indians, however, were not absolutely inde-

pendent; for the right of purchasing the soil was considered to be solely vested in the crown, or in the proprietary governments. Yet this restraint, it will be observed, did not operate directly upon the Indians, but only upon purchasers from them, and was not any exercise of jurisdiction over them.

If Georgia, therefore, succeeded to the rights of the crown over the Indians, as it is asserted that she has done, it would not tend, in the slightest degree, to substantiate her claims to the absolute ownership of the soil of the Indian territory, and to jurisdiction over the Indians within her State lines. But we deny that Georgia ever succeeded to all the rights of the crown. It is well known, that, from a very early period in our national history, a controversy had existed between the United States and the State of Georgia, as to the right in the territories actually occupied by the Indian tribes, but within what Georgia regarded as the bounds of the State, each party claiming to have succeeded to the rights which the king of Great Britain had previously to the revolution. Similar controversies, on the part of other States, were settled by voluntary cessions to the United States. In this controversy, however, the nature of the Indian title, and the character of the rights of the Indians, were not, that we are aware, brought into question.

At the time when the articles of confederation were formed, the United States were in great danger from the tribes of Indians on the borders of our settlements, who were either in a state of actual hostility, or liable to be made so by the emissaries of Great Britain. Under these circumstances, the propriety of giving the regulation of all intercourse with these tribes, to the General Government, was obvious. Accordingly the articles of confederation contained a provision, that the United States should have the sole and exclusive right and power of 'regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States; provided, that the legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated.'

It has been urged, from this law, that the right of the old Congress did not extend to the Indians within the chartered limits of any State. But the expression, 'not members of any State,' we should think, was meant to describe, not Indians who resided without the chartered limits of any State, but those who had not been subjected to the laws or jurisdiction of any State,

whether within its chartered limits or not. Any one who considers the extent of territory covered by the charters of the different colonies, will at once perceive, that to give a right of managing affairs with Indians *out* of the chartered limits of any State, would have been nugatory. Besides, the proviso shows, that it was the intention of this article to operate on Indians within the chartered limits of the States; for it carefully protects the legislative rights of the individual States, within whose limits the Indians may happen to reside. What was the precise object of the proviso, it is not easy to determine; and, to our present purpose, it is not important, for no such proviso is contained in the Constitution. But the mode in which Indian affairs were actually regulated, before the Federal Government was formed, is worth considering.

We find, then, that as early as 1775, even before the articles of confederation were made, Congress appointed commissioners to treat with the Indians, and keep them in friendship with the United States. From that time, down to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, Congress was constantly passing resolutions, and appointing commissioners in relation to Indians within the chartered limits of the States, and making treaties with such Indians; among which are those of Hopewell, entered into in 1785, with the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, all then within the chartered limits of Georgia. Congress also passed, in 1786, an ordinance for the regulation of Indian affairs, by which the trade with them was to be governed, and issued, in 1783, a proclamation, which prohibited the purchase of land from the Indians without the consent of the United States, and another, in 1788, to secure the Cherokees against intruders from North Carolina. In short, if we go through the history of this period, we shall find Congress uniformly claiming the right of treating, and regulating the intercourse, with the Indians occupying lands within the chartered limits of the States.

Georgia, it is true, at this time, did not acknowledge the powers of Congress in this respect, but claimed a right to treat with the Indians within what she considered her State limits, and actually entered into treaties, both with the Cherokees and the Creeks, and obtained cessions of land from them, and settled the line between them and the State. It is also true, that the House of Representatives of Georgia formally protest-

ed against the treaties of Hopewell. But, in all these state papers, we are unable to find that Georgia ever pretended tha the Indian title amounted to nothing, that the Indians were her tenants at will, or that she had any right of governing them. On the contrary, by the very acts of treating with, and purchasing lands of them, she acknowledged, in the strongest manner, their sovereignty and their right to the soil.

But, even if the opinions of Georgia as to her sovereignty at this time, were not clear, the rights of the Indians were well understood by others. While the commissioners of the United States were, in 1785, negotiating with the Creeks at Galphinton, a short time before the treaties of Hopewell were made, the agents of Georgia entered a formal protest against the proposed treaty as tending to deprive the State of a part of her soil and sovereignty. To this, the commissioners gave a written answer, from which the following is an extract:—'We find, moreover, that the several Indian nations have uniformly, both before and since the revolution, been treated with as free and independent people, and the sole proprietors of the soil, until any part of it is fairly and willingly purchased from, or relinquished by them; that the protection and guardianship of these their rights, which were universally allowed to have been in the king of Great Britain, are now devolved upon, and vested in the Congress of the United States, which they have exercised before as well as since our independence, and very early divided the execution of this trust into three districts, the northern, middle, and southern.'*

When the Federal Constitution was formed, the importance of having the General Government regulate intercourse with the Indians, was still felt. Accordingly, Congress has the power given it 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes,' without any exception to the generality of the provision; and the power to make treaties is vested in the President and Senate, and these treaties are declared to be the 'supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'

The omission of the expression, 'not members of any State,'

* The resolves referred to, were passed July 12, 1775. The southern department included the Cherokees and all the Indians south of them.

and of the subsequent proviso in the clause relative to regulating commerce with the Indians, which, as we have seen, are found in the articles of confederation, was not made inadvertently, but for the very purpose of giving Congress a power beyond dispute in this respect, with regard to the nations of Indians within the chartered limits of any State. Mr Madison, in the Federalist, speaking on this subject, says;—'The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes, is, very properly, unfettered from two limitations in the articles of confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory.'

Since the Constitution went into operation, the treaties which have been entered into with the Indian tribes, in pursuance of the power given to Congress, are very numerous, being many more than all the treaties entered into by the United States with all other nations. Without considering the treaties with other Indian nations, though they strongly confirm our positions, we shall merely examine those between the United States and the Cherokees, from which it will be apparent, that those Indians have always been regarded as a free nation, living under the protection of the United States, the owners of their country, and not, in any manner, subject to Georgia. This examination will show, not only what are the rights of these Indians, as recognised by the United States, but what claims they have upon the General Government for the protection of those rights, in the present exigency of their affairs.

Here, however, we are met by two objections, either of which, if it prevails, is supposed to be fatal to the cause of the Cherokees. It is said, first, that they are not sovereign and independent nations, and therefore, that the compacts formed with them are not strictly treaties; and, second, that the Constitution did not confer the power of treating with Indians within the chartered limits of any State. But in these treaties, the Cherokees always act as a sovereign nation. They are called a nation; and the treaties are executed by their chiefs, their head men, and their warriors in behalf of the nation. All this implies an independent political existence, and an organized government. On the part of the United States, too, these compacts are not merely treaties in name, but they are all ratified as such, by the President and Senate, in the same manner as all other treaties. It is only as treaties, that they are binding on the United States; for, if not treaties, the ratification of the President and Senate would not give them validity, and every com-

pact with the Indians would require an act of Congress to confirm it. But this is not all. During the forty years which the Federal Government has been in operation, the binding obligation of these treaties as treaties, has, we believe, until very recently, never been disputed. Many laws of Congress have been passed to carry their provisions into effect, without a question, that we are aware of, as to their validity.

Georgia, too, has herself distinctly acknowledged their obligation. In the articles of agreement and cession between the United States and Georgia, of 1802, which we shall notice more fully hereafter, one of the conditions of the cession made by Georgia, is, that the United States shall extinguish the Indian title to lands in that State, peaceably and upon reasonable terms. Before this compact was made, the United States had entered into many treaties with the Indians, by which cessions of lands were obtained. It was well known that the only mode of obtaining lands from the Indians authorised by law, and permitted by the National Government, was by treaty or convention, entered into under the authority of the United States. When, therefore, Georgia became a party to these articles, she not only acknowledged the right of the General Government to treat with the Indians, but actually bound it to enter into such treaties. And it is not too much to say, that Georgia, by entering into this compact, deliberately recognised the existing treaties with the southern Indians, and ratified, as far as was in her power, such future treaties as the United States might enter into, in order to perform their part of the contract. Yet Georgia now says, that the very treaties which the United States have entered into, in performance of this obligation, are not binding upon her, though they are, both in form and substance, according to what were then her wishes and expectations!

The legislature of Georgia, too, has on many other occasions, and in various ways, fully recognised the binding force of Indian treaties, and a very large part of the acknowledged territory of the State, is now held by virtue of them. Nay, the authorities of Georgia have, for a long time, and in every way, been urging the United States to extinguish the Indian title by means of treaties, which they now pretend are mere nullities!

It is further contended, that Georgia being a 'sovereign and independent State,' no treaty which diminishes that sovereignty by depriving her of her territory and jurisdiction, can be binding on her, and that such a treaty made by the United States is

unconstitutional. We are not disposed to dispute that Georgia is a sovereign State; but, being a part of the United States, she is certainly not independent, but bound by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the General Government. This argument assumes the sovereignty of Georgia over the Cherokee country, which is the very point to be proved, and which has never yet been proved, unless taking it for granted is proving it. Besides, the power of making treaties, as given to the President and Senate, is under no such limitation as this objection supposes. The power is absolute and unconditional; and the treaties made under it, are declared to be the supreme law of the land, anything in the laws or constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

The President and Senate would no doubt shrink from ratifying a treaty by which any part of any State actually occupied by our citizens, should be ceded to a conquering enemy, as the price of peace. No American is willing to imagine, that a sacrifice of this description can ever become necessary. Yet should such a cession be ever duly made by treaty, which we trust never will happen, it would be difficult to show that it would not be binding on the country. But how different is the case before us! The territory in dispute is not occupied by our citizens, and it is not ceded. The treaties merely acknowledge the fact, which was not disputed when they were made, that the title of the Indians is paramount to that of the United States and of any State; while Georgia now pretends, what she did not then assert, that she has a title superior to that of the Indians. Even if Georgia had then advanced such pretensions as she now does, yet there would have been good reason for extinguishing them by treaty.

It has been also argued, that the provision in the Constitution, that 'the United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union, a republican form of government, and protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic violence,'—renders the treaties with the Cherokees void as it respects Georgia. For, it is said, 'How can Georgia have a republican form of government, coextensive with her limits, unless a majority of her citizens are permitted to prescribe rules, to which *all must conform?* How will the United States have made good the guarantee against domes-

tic violence, if they permit a portion of the population *within her limits*, to establish a government contrary to her will, with authority to prescribe rules inconsistent with those prescribed by herself?'

In presenting this argument, we have adopted the very words of Mr White, in his Report to the Senate, to show the wretched sophistry to which men will resort in support of a favorite opinion. This reasoning, though much relied on by the advocates of the Georgia doctrines, seems almost too feeble to require an answer. It assumes, like the preceding argument, the very points which it is brought to support. It takes for granted that the Cherokees are within the limits of Georgia, that their territory is a part of the State, and that they are her subjects and a part of her population. But if they are not a part of her population, if they are not her subjects, if their territory is not a part of her State, how is Georgia aggrieved by a recognition of these facts in treaties?

It is, then, we think, clear, that the treaties made with the Cherokees are binding on the United States. They are fifteen in number, commencing with the treaties of Hopewell, made under the Confederation in 1785, and ending with a treaty made at Washington in 1819. Our limits will not allow us to go into a particular examination of all the provisions of these instruments. The reader who is interested in the subject, will find such an examination executed in a masterly manner in the Essays of William Penn. All these compacts, however, as we have already remarked, recognise the existence of the Cherokees as a sovereign nation under the protection of the United States, and entirely independent of Georgia. The assent of Georgia is never supposed to be necessary to their validity. As remarked by the writer from whom we have already quoted so largely, a treaty—

'Is a compact between independent communities, each party acting through the medium of its government. No instrument, which does not come within this definition, can be sent to the Senate of the United States, to be acted upon as within the scope of the treaty-making power.

'If the agents of the United States purchase land for a public object, such a purchase is not a treaty. If the State of Virginia, on the application of the United States, cedes a piece of land for a navy yard, or a fort, a compact of this sort is not a treaty. If the State of Georgia cedes to the United States all its claim to

territory enough for two large new States, and the United States agree to make a compensation therefor, such cession and agreement are not a treaty. Accordingly, such negotiations are carried on and completed by virtue of laws of the National and State Legislatures. Of course, compacts of this kind are never called treaties; and the idea of sending them to the Senate of the United States for ratification would be preposterous. One of the confederated States is not an independent community; nor can it make a treaty, either with the nation at large, or with any foreign power. But the Indian tribes and nations have made treaties with the United States during the last forty years, till the whole number of treaties thus made, far exceeds a hundred, every one of which was ratified by the Senate before it became obligatory. Every instance of this kind implies that the Indian communities had governments of their own; that the Indians, thus living in communities, were not subject to the laws of the United States; and that they had rights and interests distinct from the rights and interests of the people of the United States, and, in the fullest sense, public and national. All this is in accordance with facts; and the whole is implied in the single word *treaty*.' —*Essays*, p. 20.

We do not think that our author insists too much upon the circumstance of the Cherokees having made treaties with the United States. The same conclusion is drawn, in a case somewhat similar, by Ward, a learned and acute writer upon the law of nations. In order to prove that the Hanseatic League constituted a sovereign power, although some of the cities of which it was composed were under the control of several different sovereigns, he mentions that it exercised the rights of sovereignty, such as declaring war, and making alliances with princes; and then says, that the language of the treaties entered into by the League, proves it to have been a sovereign power. 'The very titles of the deeds import them to be, what none but sovereigns can make, namely, *treaties of peace*.'

Among the principal objects stated in the treaties with the Cherokees, are, 1. To maintain peace, friendship, and trade between them and the United States, and fix the boundaries between the two parties. 2. To obtain cessions of land from the Cherokees. 3. To obtain, for the United States, the right of regulating trade with the Cherokees; and certain privileges for our citizens, as that of navigating the waters, and making and using roads, within the Cherokee territory. 4. To obtain, for the Cherokees, payment in annuities, and otherwise, for the

lands which they cede. 5. To obtain for the Cherokees a guarantee for their remaining lands, and protection against crimes committed by citizens of the United States, and against intrusions on their lands. 6. To obtain for the whites a similar protection against the crimes of Cherokees. 7. To promote the cultivation of the soil, civilisation, and a regular government among the Cherokees.

We have stated the common objects of these treaties, because they seem to us, without examining any particular provisions, to show the dealings between two nations, both sovereign, but one living under the protection of the other; which we suppose to have been the actual relation of the parties. Most of these objects have, we believe, been in general effectually accomplished.* But the legislation of Georgia has brought before the President and Congress, whose protection the Cherokees have invoked, the question as to the meaning of the guarantees, and the duties of the United States.

The words of the treaty of Holston are,—'The United States solemnly guaranty to the Cherokee nation, all their lands not hereby ceded.' The treaty of 1798, also, declares that the United States 'will continue the guarantee of the remainder of their [the Cherokees,] country forever, as made and contained in former treaties.' These guarantees are still in force, extending to all lands which have not been subsequently ceded. But Georgia now contends, that they were intended to secure to the Indians, not the sovereignty, but merely the occupancy of their territories; and that the guarantee even of this occupancy must cease to operate, whenever Georgia chooses to exercise her sovereign authority and turn the Cherokees out of possession. On the other hand, it is said that the guarantees were absolute, both of the soil and jurisdiction as then exercised by the Cherokees, against the United States, every individual State, and all foreign nations.

* A controversy now exists between the State of Georgia and the Cherokees, with regard to a portion of territory which is claimed by Georgia as having been ceded by the Creeks, and which is claimed by the Cherokees as a part of their territory; the question being as to what was the true boundary between the Creeks and Cherokees. We have avoided entering into this question, as we have no room to discuss it. For the same reason we have not examined in the text, the right to the occupation of improved lands, which have been left by emigrating Cherokees, within the acknowledged Cherokee territory. We trust that our silence will not be regarded as an acknowledgement that the Cherokees are wrong on either of these questions.

That the latter was the meaning, as understood by the parties when the treaties were made, is almost too obvious for argument. They were made with the Cherokees as a sovereign nation. The land secured to them is called 'their country.' It is secured to them as a nation. Such a guarantee to a nation, cannot have the meaning which would be attached to a similar covenant with an individual. When a territory is guarantied to a nation, the jurisdiction is necessarily implied. It is evident that the Cherokees understood such to be the meaning, for in the very treaty of Holston, in which one of the guarantees occurs, they acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States, and of no other sovereign, and stipulate not to hold any treaty with any foreign power or individual State. Is it not clear, from these expressions, that they could have no suspicion of any latent claims of jurisdiction on the part of Georgia?

On the other hand, the construction contended for by Georgia, is not only at variance with the plain meaning and obvious intent of these guarantees, but defeats the very object for which they were made. The Indians feared the encroachments of the whites upon their territories. The guarantees were given to quiet their fears, and protect them against the power of their neighbours. There can be no mistake in the meaning of the words. A guarantee is a protection against all claims, unless some are expressly excepted. The remarks in the Essays of William Penn, upon the guarantee in the treaty of Holston, are unanswerable.

'The seventh article is short, and will bear repeating.—It reads thus: "THE UNITED STATES SOLEMNLY GUARANTY TO THE CHEROKEE NATION ALL THEIR LANDS NOT HEREBY CEDED." This seems to be, upon the face of it, a plain sentence. A man of moderate information would at least suppose himself to understand it. He would not suspect that there was a secret, recondite meaning, altogether incompatible with the apparent one. But it seems that there *was* such a meaning. How it was discovered, or by whom, the public are not informed. The present Secretary of War, however, has lately adopted it, and urged it upon the Cherokees as decisive of the whole question at issue. The true meaning of the article, then, as explained by a public functionary thirtyeight years after it was made, would have been accurately expressed as follows: "*The United States solemnly declare, that the Cherokee Indians have no right nor title to any lands within the territory of the United States, as fixed by the*

treaty of 1783; *but the United States permit the Cherokees to remain on the lands of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, (south and west of the above described boundary,) until the said States shall take possession of the same.*"

'This is the guarantee of the Cherokee country! It is certainly the interpretation of the Secretary of War. How would other treaties bear a similar explanation? The newspapers tell us, that Russia, Great Britain, and France, have engaged to *guaranty* the territory of Greece within certain limits. Does this mean that the Greeks are to be permitted to live, for the present, on lands which belong to the Turks; but that the Turks, whenever they please, may take possession of their own lands, and massacre the Greeks?

'The Federal Constitution says, (Art. IV. sec. 4,) "The United States shall *guaranty* to every State in this Union, *a Republican form of government;*" the true meaning of which may hereafter appear to be as follows: "The United States shall *permit* each State to have a Republican form of government for the present; and until *a monarchical form of government* shall be imposed upon the people thereof."

'The true meaning of an instrument is that which was in the minds of the parties, at the time of signing. Can the Secretary of War prove that General Washington understood the treaty of Holston, according to the explanation now given? Can he prove that the Cherokee chiefs and warriors understood it in the same manner? Surely he would not have it signed and ratified in one sense, and carried into effect in a totally different and opposite sense. He must therefore suppose, that the Cherokees intended to admit that they had no right to "their own lands;" and that they stood ready to remove whenever requested. But he must allow, that, if this were the meaning of the parties, it was very strangely expressed; and however sincerely he may entertain the newly discovered opinion as to the meaning, he may still find it extremely difficult to convince the world that he is right.'—*Essays*, pp. 26, 27.

The following passage from the speech of Mr Frelinghuysen, will show that these guarantees were not provisions thrown into the treaties hastily or accidentally—mere words of pomp and form, to signify something or nothing, as might be convenient—but inserted on mature deliberation.

'The annexed extract from the Journals of the Senate illustrates the principles of Washington's administration. It follows:

'"SATURDAY, August 22, 1789.

'"The President of the United States came into the Senate,

attended by General Knox, and laid before the Senate the following statement of facts, with the questions thereto annexed, *for their advice and consent.*"

'This was a most important document. It developed all the collisions that existed between the Indian tribes and the States; and referred to the consideration of the Senate certain leading principles of policy which he thought it was wise to pursue.

'These principles are embodied in seven distinct interrogatories; the fourth of which submits to the Senate "whether the United States shall solemnly guaranty to the Creeks their remaining territory, and maintain the same, if necessary, *by a line of military posts.*" This question "was wholly answered in the affirmative" by that body, and the blank (for an appropriation of necessary funds) was ordered to be filled at the discretion of the President of the United States. Again, on the 11th of August, 1790, President Washington sent a special message to the Senate by his Secretary, the subject matter of which he introduces by the following suggestion:

'"*Gentlemen of the Senate:*

'"Although the treaty with the Creeks may be regarded as the main foundation of the future peace and prosperity of the Southwestern frontier of the United States, yet, in order fully to effect so desirable an object, the treaties which have been entered into with the other tribes in that quarter must be *faithfully performed* on our part."

'He then proceeds to remind the Senate, that, by the treaty with the Cherokees, in November, 1785, (the treaty of Hopewell,) "the said Cherokees placed themselves under the protection of the United States, and had a boundary assigned them;" that the white people settled on the frontiers had openly violated the said boundary, by intruding on the Indian lands; that the United States in Congress assembled, on the first day of September, 1788, had, by their proclamation, forbidden all such unwarrantable intrusions, enjoined the intruders to depart without loss of time; but that there were still some refractory intruders remaining. The *President* then distinctly announces his determination to exert the powers entrusted to him by the Constitution, in order to carry into faithful execution the treaty of Hopewell, unless a new boundary should be arranged with the Cherokees, embracing the intrusive settlement, and compensating the Cherokees in the cessions they shall make on the occasion. And in view of the whole case, he requests the advice of the Senate, whether overtures shall be made to the Cherokees to arrange such new boundary, and concludes his communication with the following emphatical question: "3d. Shall the United

States stipulate solemnly to guaranty the new boundary which may be arranged?"

'It produced as pointed a response—for the Senate

'"*Resolved*, In case a new or other boundary than that stipulated by the treaty of Hopewell, shall be concluded with the Cherokee Indians, that the Senate do advise and consent solemnly to guaranty the same." A new boundary was arranged by a second treaty; the solemn guarantee was given to the Cherokees; and cogent, indeed, should be the causes that now lead us to think or speak lightly of such sacred obligations.'—pp. 4, 5.

The construction of the guarantees, contended for by Georgia, would also defeat other important objects in these treaties. Special provisions, for instance, were introduced, to prevent intrusion of the whites upon the lands of the Cherokees, and to give the United States the power to regulate trade with them. If Georgia, or any other State, could destroy the jurisdiction of the Cherokees, and extend its own jurisdiction over any part of their territories, and seize their lands, it would deprive the Cherokees of the power which the treaty gives them of punishing intruders, and would take away the power of the United States to regulate trade with them.

Many other provisions of these treaties are equally inconsistent with the new Georgia doctrines; and serve also to show how these guarantees are to be understood. By the treaty of Hopewell, the punishment of the innocent for the guilty, under the idea of retaliation, is not to be practised, except there is a violation of the treaty; 'and then it is to be preceded first by a demand of justice, and if refused, then by a declaration of hostilities.' Is not this the language of independent nations? Is not the declaration of hostilities one of the highest acts of sovereignty? The Cherokees, whom Georgia supposes to be within her jurisdiction, and component parts of the State, have the undoubted right of making war; a right of which the Constitution deprives the whole State. If the Cherokees were under the jurisdiction of Georgia, this provision of the treaty would be absurd and unmeaning.

The treaty of Holston establishes peace between the United States and the Cherokees. This admits that the Cherokees were a distinct nation, and had the power of making war and peace; powers, as we have already remarked, utterly inconsistent with the claims of Georgia.

In these treaties, the citizens and inhabitants of the United

States are often spoken of, as contradistinguished from the Cherokees. But if the Cherokees were under the jurisdiction of Georgia, they would be inhabitants of Georgia, and therefore of the United States. The words show that these Indians were not supposed to be subjects of the United States, and of course not of any one of the States. By the tenth section of the treaty of Holston, Cherokees stealing horses from, or committing capital crimes against citizens or inhabitants of the United States, are to be delivered up to be punished by the laws of the United States. If the Cherokee territory were within the jurisdiction of individual States, this provision could not be tolerated; for the offence would then be against the sovereignty of the State within whose chartered limits it was committed. The United States claim to punish in these cases, not by virtue of a jurisdiction within the Cherokee territory, but for the security of persons who are under their protection; and to do this, a treaty stipulation is thought necessary. It is also to be observed, that the United States, even by treaty, do not ask for any right for their civil officers to enter on the Cherokee territory, but the Cherokees, as a sovereign power, agree to deliver up offenders.

By the eighth section of the treaty of Holston, if any citizen, or other person not an Indian, 'shall settle on the Cherokees' lands, such person shall forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Cherokees may punish him or not, as they please.' Is not this an explicit acknowledgement of a government of the Cherokees, which has jurisdiction within their territories? Yet how can the Cherokees execute the power implied in this article, if Georgia may take away their government?

By the eleventh section of the same treaty, it is provided that, 'if any citizen or inhabitant of the United States, or of either of the territorial districts of the United States, shall go into any town, settlement, or territory belonging to the Cherokees, and shall there commit any crime upon, or trespass against the person or property of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians, which, if committed within the jurisdiction of any State, or within the jurisdiction of either of the said districts, against a citizen or any white inhabitant thereof, would be punishable by the laws of such State or district, such offender or offenders shall be subject to the same punishment, and shall be proceeded against in the same manner as if the offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of the State or district to which

he or they may belong, against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof.' Can any stronger language be devised to show that the Cherokees are not within the jurisdiction of Georgia? It is stronger than a direct affirmation that the Cherokees are not within the jurisdiction of any State. From such an affirmation we might have been led to suppose that there had been some doubt upon the subject. The words used show that it was an admitted fact, which no one thought of questioning.

The Cherokees agree, in various treaties, to allow roads to pass through their territories, and to allow a free passage on them for citizens of the United States. Yet if these lands were within the State jurisdictions, no such agreement of the Indians was necessary. If they were only occupants of the land, and had no jurisdiction over it, the respective State authorities ought to have made these roads, and they could not have been made except under an authority from a State.

By the treaty of January 7, 1806, two tracts of land are reserved out of a cession made by the Cherokees; the first to be the common property of the Cherokees who then lived on it, the other to be considered the property of two persons who are named. An appropriation of land in this manner by the Cherokees, is utterly inconsistent with the Georgia doctrine with regard to their rights. It is an entire disposition of lands, as if the Cherokees were complete owners, and not mere occupants. No application to the State was supposed necessary to give effect to these reservations.

By the same treaty, the United States agree to use their influence and best endeavours to prevail upon the Chickasaws to agree to a certain boundary between them and the Cherokees; but, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, it is added, 'that the United States do not engage to have the aforesaid boundary or line established, but only to endeavour to prevail on the Chickasaw nation to consent to such a line.' Here, certainly, seems a very needless formality, with regard to two little nations, whose rights to land were so precarious as is represented by Georgia. Indeed, the variety of modes, in which the Cherokees' ownership of their lands is expressed in these treaties, is well worth remarking, being entirely at variance with the theory of Georgia. In the treaty of Hopewell, their lands are called 'their hunting grounds;' in the treaty of Holston, the 'Cherokees' lands,' the 'lands of the Cherokees,' the 'Cherokee country,' 'territory belonging to the Chero-

kees.' In the treaty of 1798, they are designated as 'Indian lands,' 'Indian land,' the 'lands of the Cherokees.' In several treaties, they are spoken of as 'their country.' In the treaty of 1816, they are called 'their lands;' in that of 1817, 'lands to them belonging.' All these expressions show an absolute ownership, which neither party thought of questioning.

It is agreed in the treaty of March 2, 1816, that 'the citizens of the United States shall freely navigate and use as a highway, all the rivers and waters within the Cherokee nation.' If this territory was within the jurisdiction of any State or of the United States, no such stipulation would be necessary.

The object of the treaty of September 14, 1816, as stated in the preamble, is, 'to remove all future causes of dissension, which may arise from indefinite territorial boundaries.' This is the language of sovereign nations. No intimation is given, that the territories of the United States are held by a higher or a stronger title than those of the Cherokees.

The preamble of a treaty made with the Cherokees, July, 1817, recites that, in 1808, a deputation from the upper and lower Cherokee towns went to Washington; the first named to declare to the President 'their anxious desire to engage in the pursuits of agriculture and civilized life in the country they then occupied,' and 'the impracticability of inducing the nation at large to do this, and to request the establishment of a division line between the upper and lower towns, so as to include all the waters of the Hiwassee river to the upper towns, that, by thus contracting their society within narrow limits, they proposed to begin the establishment of fixed laws and a regular government: the deputies from the lower towns to make known their desire to continue the hunter life, and also the scarcity of game where they then lived,' and 'their wish to remove across the Mississippi river, on some vacant lands of the United States.' It further recites, that the President answered the petitioners as follows:—'The United States, my children, are the friends of both parties, and, as far as can be reasonably asked, they are willing to satisfy the wishes of both. Those who remain may be assured of our patronage, our aid, and good neighbourhood. Those who wish to remove, are permitted to send an exploring party to reconnoitre the country on the waters of the Arkansas and White Rivers. * * * When this party shall have found a tract of country suiting the emigrants, and not claimed by other Indians, we will arrange with them

and you the exchange of that for a just portion of the country they leave, and to a part of which, proportioned to their numbers, they have a right. * * * When established in their new settlements, we shall still consider them as our children, * * * and always hold them firmly by the hand.' In order to carry the objects, expressed in the preamble, into effect, the Cherokees ceded a tract of country, part of which fell to Georgia, in exchange for land between the Arkansas and White Rivers, to which those desirous of living as hunters, were to remove.

The preamble to the treaty, made in 1819, having stated, that 'a greater part of the Cherokee nation have expressed an earnest desire to remain on this side of the Mississippi,' and that they wish 'to commence those measures, which they deem necessary to the civilisation and preservation of their nation,' the Cherokees, therefore, cede a tract of land to the United States; the ceded territory being supposed to be at least as much as the United States would be entitled to under the treaty of 1817. Part of the ceded land fell into Georgia. One of the express objects, then, of this treaty, as well as of that of 1817, was to assist the Cherokees, remaining on this side of the Mississippi, in carrying into effect their designs 'for the establishment of fixed laws and a regular government,' and 'for the civilisation and preservation of their nation.'

If Georgia denied that the Cherokees were a sovereign nation, having an inherent right to improve their own government and laws, she should have immediately refused these cessions. But, by accepting them, she recognised that right; and it is now a breach of good faith on her part to deny it. She takes all lands which the Cherokees cede, and yet denies them the right of improving their government, the very consideration for which the cessions are made.

The ninth article of the treaty of 1817, by which the exchange of lands was made, declares, that 'nothing in the foregoing articles shall be construed so as to prevent any of the parties so contracting from the free navigation of all the waters mentioned therein.' This provision could have been introduced only on the supposition, that, without it, the grant of land to the Arkansas Cherokees, then becoming an independent nation, would deprive the citizens of the United States of the right of navigating the waters within the territory granted, unless it was expressly retained.

We have cited but a few passages in the treaties. We might have brought forward many more. Indeed, their whole spirit and object is adverse to the claims of Georgia; and there is scarcely an article in any one of them which does not assert or imply something irreconcilable with her sovereignty over these unfortunate Indians. On the other hand, search these voluminous instruments through, and not one sentence can be found in which either the United States assert, or the Indians recognise, any jurisdiction on the part of Georgia; not one sentence, which any ingenuity can torture into a plausible argument in support of her present pretensions.

But the United States have not only entered into treaties with the Cherokees, but they have made laws to execute those treaties with good faith. On March 30, 1802, an act was passed by Congress to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes. This act, however, did not introduce a new system; for most of its important provisions are to be found in preceding temporary acts on the same subject, the first having been made as early as 1790. Indeed, before the formation of the Federal Government, some of the measures of Congress were parts of the same system, being a continuation of the policy previously adopted by the British government. As this act, which is still in force, shows clearly the relation in which the Indian tribes were then considered as standing to the United States, we shall examine some of its provisions.

It is provided by the first section, that the boundary line, 'established by treaty between the United States and various Indian tribes, shall be clearly ascertained and distinctly marked;' which line is then stated, including the line established by treaty of October 2, 1798, with the Cherokees. Should this boundary line be varied afterwards, the provisions of the law are to apply to the new boundary line.—It will be observed, that the line is to be established between the United States and the Indian tribes. This is natural language. It shows that Congress then understood, that the Indian nations, on our frontiers, were not, except in a very modified sense, within the United States.

The second section makes it an offence, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for 'any citizen, or other person resident in the United States,' to cross over the boundary line to hunt, or to destroy game, or to carry horses or cattle 'to range on

any lands allotted or secured by treaty to any Indian tribes.' It is evident from this provision, that the Indians are not considered as residents in the United States.

The third section makes it an offence, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for any such person to 'go into any country which is allotted or secured by treaty,—to any of the Indian tribes south of the river Ohio, without a passport—from the Governor of some one of the United States, or the officer of the troops of the United States, commanding at the nearest post on the frontiers, or such other person' as the President may authorise to grant the same.—The Indian territory is so far from being within any State jurisdiction, that no person is authorised even to enter upon it without a passport.

The fourth section provides, that if any such citizen, or other person, shall go into any 'territory belonging, or secured by treaty with the United States, to any nation or tribe of Indians, and shall there commit robbery, larceny, trespass, or other crime, against the person or property of any friendly Indian or Indians, which would be punishable, *if committed within the jurisdiction of any State* against a citizen of the United States; or, unauthorised by law, or with a hostile intention, shall be found on any Indian land,' such offender shall receive the same punishment as is provided in the second section.—This section is nearly in the words of the eleventh section of the treaty of Holston, already commented upon. It shows, conclusively, if anything further were wanted for this purpose, that the Indians were still considered as not within the jurisdiction of any State.

By the fifth section, persons making settlements on Indian territories, or surveying, or attempting to survey them, forfeit a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, and suffer imprisonment not exceeding twelve months; and the President is authorised to adopt such measures and employ such military force, as he may judge necessary to remove such intruders, making, or attempting to make, a settlement on the Indian territories.

The twelfth section provides, 'that no purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian, or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the United States, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention, entered into pursuant to the Constitution.' Negotiating such a treaty without the authority of the United States, is punishable by fine and

imprisonment.—This section, like the rest, takes for granted that no State has any right of jurisdiction over the Indians. For if any of them were a part of the population of a State, the United States could not thus interfere to prevent purchases from them, if made under the State authority. It is not allowable to obtain land from the Indians by purchase or cession, unless made under the authority of the United States. Yet this provision is nugatory, if a State, as is now pretended, may take their lands from them by force, without any purchase.

The fourteenth section provides, that if any Indian shall cross over the boundary line 'into any State or Territory inhabited by citizens of the United States,' and steal or destroy any property 'belonging to any citizen or inhabitant of the United States,' or of any territorial district, or shall commit murder, violence, or outrage upon any such citizen or inhabitant, application may be made on behalf of the injured party, through the Superintendent or other person authorised by the President, to the nation or tribe to which the Indian belongs, for redress. If they refuse to make satisfaction in a reasonable time, it becomes the duty of the Superintendent, or other commissioner, to make return to the President of his doings, and of the evidence in the case, that such further steps may be taken as are proper. The United States guaranty the party whose property has been stolen or destroyed, against eventual loss, provided he does not attempt to obtain satisfaction or revenge himself, in violation of this act; and the President may deduct the sum paid for the property stolen or destroyed, out of the annuity of the tribe to which the Indian belongs. This act is not to prevent the legal arrest of the Indian offender 'within the limits of any State or district.'—Similar remarks are applicable to this section as to those which precede it. It is taken for granted, that the Indian territory is not within 'the limits of any State or district;' that the process of the United States does not run into it; that unless the offender is taken somewhere out of the Indian territory, he cannot be punished, except his tribe or nation will give him up. If they should refuse to do so, no punishment for him is provided by the law. The case is exactly that of any other offender, who should take refuge in a foreign country.

The sixteenth section declares it to be lawful 'for the military force of the United States to apprehend every person who shall or may be found in the Indian country, over and beyond the said boundary line between the United States and the said In-

dian tribes, in violation of the provisions or regulations of this act, and him or them immediately to convey, in the nearest convenient and safe route, to the civil authority of the United States in some one of the three next adjoining States or districts, to be proceeded against in due course of law.'

The seventeenth section authorises the military force to be called out in aid of the civil magistrate, to arrest offenders against this law, found within any of the United States.

We may make the same remark upon this act, that we have made upon the treaties. Its whole object is utterly irreconcilable with the positions taken by Georgia. The main design is to protect the Indians against the whites. It can hardly be pretended, that, if this statute is enforced, the Georgia statute can be carried into operation. The opinions which it expresses as to the rights of the Indians, conform entirely to the practice of the British government before the revolution, and of the American government, both before and since the passage of the act, down to a very recent period.

The case of Fletcher *vs.* Peck, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1810,* is confidently appealed to by the Committee of the Georgia Legislature, as supporting their positions. But this case, so far from supporting, is entirely at variance with them. The question presented in it was, whether Georgia was seized in fee of lands occupied by free Indian nations within the chartered limits of the State. The decision of the court was, that Georgia was so seized. Chief Justice Marshal concludes the opinion of the court by saying, 'Some difficulty was produced by the language of the covenant and of the pleadings. It was doubted whether a State can be seized in fee of lands, subject to the Indian title; and whether a decision, that they were seized in fee, might not be construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an ejectment for them, notwithstanding that title. The majority of the court is of the opinion that the nature of the Indian title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the State.'

This decision merely proves, that the interest of Georgia in the Indian territories, was a seisin in fee; that is, such a title as might be conveyed, it having been contended by one party in

* 6 Cranch, 87.

the case, that it was a mere possibility, which could not be granted. But the case is entirely fatal to the present assumptions of Georgia. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the interest of the State is *subject to the Indian title;*—according to the Georgia statesmen, the interest of the State is paramount. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, a purchaser under Georgia could not maintain an ejectment; that is, could not turn the Indians out of possession;—according to Georgia, he might turn them out at any moment. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the *Indian title is to be respected in all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished;*—according to Georgia, the Indian title is a nullity. It should also be borne in mind, that these acknowledgements of Indian rights, are made in a case in which they are not represented, in which their title is not brought directly, but only incidentally into question, in a controversy between other parties. Can it be doubted that their title will still be respected, when it is brought directly before the court?

We do not think it necessary, in a publication of this kind, to go into an examination of the case of Johnson *vs.* Mackintosh, reported in the eighth volume of Wheaton, which is often spoken of in connexion with this subject. It is sufficient to say, that the right of the Indians to the possession of their lands, until their title is legitimately extinguished, is fully recognised in this decision, and their right of self-government is not questioned.

The articles of agreement of 1802, between the United States and Georgia, have been much relied upon, in support of the pretensions of the latter. It has, however, been justly remarked, that the Cherokees were no parties to that agreement, and therefore that their rights could not be affected by it. But admitting, for a moment, that they could be so affected, we shall find that these articles leave them wholly untouched.

We have already spoken of the controversy which existed between the United States and Georgia, as to which of them succeeded to the rights of the British crown in the vast territories occupied by free Indian nations, but comprised within the chartered limits, as they are called, of Georgia. The Constitution of Georgia, dated May 30, 1798, with a view to this controversy, declares the boundaries of the State, which are made to extend from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, 'including and comprehending all the lands and waters within the said limits, boundaries, and jurisdictional rights.' These boundaries, of course, comprise the disputed Cherokee territory. It also declares, 'that

all the territory without the present temporary line, and within the limits aforesaid, is now, of right, the property of the free citizens of this State, and held by them in sovereignty, inalienable but by their consent; provided, nevertheless, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent a sale to, or contract with, the United States by the Legislature of this State, of and for all or any part of the western territory of this State, lying westward of the river Chatahoochee, on such terms as may be beneficial to both parties, and may procure an extension of settlement, and an extinguishment of Indian claims, in and to the vacant territory of this State, to the eastward and north of the said river Chatahoochee, to which territory such power of contract or sale shall not extend.'

In order to terminate the controversy in question, certain articles of agreement and cession, not a treaty, were entered into by the parties, on the 20th of April, 1802.

By the first article, Georgia cedes to the United States, 'all the right, title, and claim which the said State has to the jurisdiction and soil' of certain lands, which are now included within the territorial limits of Mississippi and Alabama, on condition of the United States paying Georgia one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, out of the first net proceeds of the sales of land, and certain other conditions, among which is the following;—'That the United States shall, at their own expense, extinguish, for the use of Georgia, as early as the same can be peaceably obtained on reasonable terms, the Indian title' to certain Creek lands, and 'shall, in the same manner, also extinguish the Indian title to all the other lands within the State of Georgia.' By the second article, the United States accept the cession, and 'cede to the State of Georgia whatever claim, right, or title they may have to the jurisdiction or soil of any lands lying within the United States, and out of the proper boundaries of any other State, and situated south of the southern boundaries of the States of Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina, and east of the boundary line herein before described.'

The object of these articles of cession, was, to settle a dispute between the United States and Georgia, and not to ascertain the rights of the Indians; yet, even here, the Indian title is honestly recognised by both parties. It is a title which is to be extinguished by the United States at their own expense. It is therefore a title of some value, and which must be paid for.

Yet Georgia now pretends that the Indians have no title at all to their lands, that they reside there merely by her permission, as tenants at her will. The United States are to obtain this title 'peaceably.' Why? Because both Georgia and the United States felt that it would be cruel and unjust to acquire it in any other manner, and that neither of them had any right to expel the Indians by force. Yet Georgia now asserts, that she has the right to drive them from their country by open violence. Further, the United States are not obliged to acquire this title, except on 'reasonable terms.' Why is this stipulation? Evidently, because both parties knew that the Indians might lawfully refuse to quit their lands, except on terms which the United States might consider unreasonable, and in such case that the United States could not carry this compact into effect. Yet, if the present doctrines of Georgia be sound, she would be justified in teaching reason to the Indians at the point of the bayonet. The Cherokees would hardly hesitate to accept any terms offered by the United States, if the militia of Georgia might lawfully be used to enforce them.

The assertion of sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Constitution of Georgia, is made in sounding terms. Yet these swelling words were aimed at the United States, not at the Indians. The Indian claims to territory are fully recognised; and the legislature is authorised to procure an extinguishment of these claims, and an extension of settlement into this Indian territory, by a bargain with the United States, as was afterwards done. The people of Georgia then knew, and declared in this solemn instrument, which in this part of it is drawn with evident care and deliberation, that they could not rightfully extend their settlements into the Indian territory, until the title of the Indians was extinguished by their own consent.

Georgia has chosen to accuse the United States of not having performed their part of the contract. This is most unreasonable; for every exertion has been made by the National Government to purchase the lands of the Cherokees; but for many years past they have utterly refused to make any further cession. The United States have, at a great cost, extinguished the Indian title to more than twentyone million acres in Georgia. It is no fault of theirs, that the Cherokees refuse to make any further cessions.

But it is argued that the United States have ceded the jurisdiction and soil of this territory, to Georgia. What is ceded,

however, is only the claim and title of the United States to the jurisdiction and soil, whatever that claim and title may be; and this claim and title are still subject to the Indian title, which is not, and was not intended to be affected by the cession. Georgia gained by these articles, an indisputed title to the soil and jurisdiction of the Indian territory, whenever the Indian title should be extinguished, but not till then. This was all the United States ever claimed; this was all they could, and all they intended to surrender.

Whatever claims Georgia may have under this contract with the United States, the States of Alabama and Mississippi have none. When the Indian title is extinguished to any part of the territory within those States, the soil belongs to the United States, and the jurisdiction to Alabama or Mississippi, in the same manner as in other new States formed out of the territories of the United States.

We shall not attempt to go into a particular examination of the rights of the three Indian nations, over whom Alabama and Mississippi are endeavouring to extend jurisdiction. It is sufficient to observe that these rights, as far as they are involved in the present controversy, are substantially the same as those of the Cherokees. They have entered into many treaties with the United States, very similar, not only in their general character, but in their particular provisions, to those of the Cherokees. The provisions of the intercourse law apply equally to them; and they have hitherto continued under their own governments, entirely independent of Alabama and Mississippi.

It remains to consider what measures ought to be adopted by the United States, to afford that protection to their allies, to which they are bound by so many treaties, and urged by every feeling of justice and humanity. It seems to us, that the provisions of the intercourse law, if duly carried into effect, are, in themselves, sufficient for this purpose. Any citizen going into the territory of the southern Indians without a passport, is, as we have seen, subject to fine or imprisonment. Any State officer, therefore, by crossing their line, makes himself liable to this penalty. Any person going into their territory, and committing any crime or trespass against the person or property of an Indian, is liable to a similar punishment. A State officer, serving process by arresting the body, or seizing the property of an Indian, makes himself liable to this punishment; for, since the individual States have no jurisdiction over

the Indian territory, the officer is a trespasser, though acting under the forms of law. The military force of the United States is authorised by the act, to seize upon any persons going into the Indian territory in violation of its provisions, and to convey them to a neighbouring State for trial by the civil authorities. We think that it is clearly the duty of the President to issue orders to the military commanders now among the southern Indians, who are threatened with State jurisdiction, to seize upon all sheriffs, constables, and other civil officers, who, in any way, violate the act of 1802, although by virtue of any assumed State authority. This prompt interference would immediately bring the question of State jurisdiction before the United States' tribunals. If the President should not pursue this course, which is hardly to be expected with the opinions which he has avowed, Congress, at their next session, ought to pass an act, levelled more directly at the unconstitutional laws of the three States. Such an act, or, at least, resolutions declaratory of the Indian rights and of the obligations of the United States to protect them, ought to have been passed at the last session. We trust that the subject will soon be brought before the National Legislature, and such measures adopted as the urgency of the case demands.

We cannot forbear to remark, that the President, in refusing to give the Indians the protection which the treaties and laws bind him to do, has assumed a high and extraordinary responsibility. It appears from the letter of the Secretary of War, that the President thinks that he cannot, consistently with the Constitution, oppose the sovereign State of Georgia, in any assumption of jurisdiction, and he therefore declines assisting the Cherokees. But the President is not the officer to decide on the constitutionality of statutes. The Congress which passed the act, the Presidents and Senates who ratified the treaties, held them to be constitutional, and were the proper judges on this point, in the first instance. It is the duty of the Executive to enforce them, until the proper tribunal, the Court of the United States, has decided them to be unconstitutional. The consequences of the President's assuming this power to judge of the constitutionality of laws and treaties, are most alarming. In the present case, the effect may be, from a mere constitutional scruple, to place the Indians, the party which has the apparent right, at the mercy of the three States, until the highest court shall have decided the question, which it may

not do for months or years. If the President may thus refuse to obey a statute in one instance, he, and other officers, may in others. The moneys, voted by Congress for internal improvements, or any other object, may be stopped, if the Secretary of the Treasury thinks such appropriations unconstitutional. If he has a similar scruple with regard to any act for increasing duties, he may send orders to every collector in the country to cease to receive such duties.

We have, thus far, considered the rights of the Cherokees upon strict legal principles. But, if the actual relations and condition of the Cherokees, the United States, and Georgia be regarded, without any minute criticism of written documents, we can entertain no doubt of the obligation of the United States and of Georgia, to assist and protect, not to crush and oppress this remnant of the great family of nations, which once overspread this country. The Cherokees are now a feeble tribe. They have long lived under the protection of the United States, and have usually been treated by the government with kindness and generosity. Hitherto they have enjoyed their own laws and customs. They have been assisted by the United States in making advances in civilisation. Under this fostering care, they are advancing in wealth, and beginning to realize the blessings of moral and religious culture. They have adopted a form of government suited, as they believe, to their condition. They and their ancestors, have, from time immemorial, occupied the country in which they now reside. They are deeply attached to their native soil, and wish to live under their own institutions. They believe, if the laws of the States should be extended over them, that all hopes of further improvement must vanish; that, remaining in their present abodes, their nation must perish in contact with the worst part of the white population; or, retiring beyond the Mississippi, they must suffer hardships in the removal, at which humanity shudders, be wasted in making a new settlement, and perhaps destroyed by hostile barbarians. Whether their fears are well or ill founded, it seems scarcely to admit of a question, that the great mass of the Cherokee nation is resolved not to remove, unless compelled to do so by an irresistible force. The State of Georgia, with a very moderate population, possesses a great territory. She has yet room for a vast increase of numbers within her acknowledged limits. She is not driven by a pressure of population within her own domains, to seize upon the

territories of her neighbours. She cannot now fear them as hostile savages; for their savage habits are lost, and the laws afford ample protection to her frontiers. It has not been pretended, that her legislation has been actuated by any fears of this kind. If we should admit, then, that the pretensions of Georgia could be supported on strict legal principles, yet humanity and justice present claims for the Cherokees, which nothing but cold and calculating avarice can resist. But the Cherokee lands are rich with gold; to add them to Georgia would improve the shape of the State, and they might be disposed of by a land lottery, or preserved for future sales, as a certain source of revenue. These are the true reasons for which Georgia is willing that the property and lives of the Cherokees should be sacrificed, her own character stained, and the faith of the nation, pledged in fifteen treaties, violated. But we hope that we are judging too severely of Georgia. We trust that her citizens have not perceived the fatal consequences of the course of measures, which she is now pursuing, and have not felt their deep injustice. Before they proceed in their work of destruction, let them again consider their own strength and the weakness of their neighbours. Let them reflect on the law of kindness which is taught by nature and religion, and be sure that they are not going to transgress it. Let them scrutinize their own motives, and the arguments by which they support the policy of their State. Let them reflect on the words of Washington,—'Whenever I have been called upon to decide between an Indian and a white man, I have always found that the white man had been the aggressor,'—and be sure that they are not earning the bitter reproach which his language conveys.

The removal of the Indians beyond the Mississippi, supposing it to be made with their free consent, has been a favorite object with some of our statesmen. The policy of such a measure, under any circumstances, seems to us extremely doubtful. But we have not room to discuss the question. Nor is it necessary; for Mr Everett, in his speech, has most thoroughly examined the whole subject. He has shown, that to urge the Indians to remove at the very time that the States are suffered to extend jurisdiction over them, is to remove them by force. He also demonstrates the extreme suffering to which a general removal must expose the Indians, the enormous expense in which it must involve the United States, and

the melancholy ill success which has attended former experiments of the kind. The following extract, from the Address of the Committee and Council of the Cherokees to the People of the United States, will show their feelings on this subject, and will be sufficient to satisfy any unprejudiced mind of the cruelty of the proposed measure.

'But if we are compelled to leave our country, we see nothing but ruin before us. The country west of the Arkansas territory is unknown to us. From what we can learn of it, we have no prepossessions in its favor. All the inviting parts of it, as we believe, are preoccupied by various Indian nations, to which it had been assigned. They would regard us as intruders, and look upon us with an evil eye. The far greater part of that region is, beyond all controversy, badly supplied with wood and water; and no Indian tribe can live as agriculturists without these articles. All our neighbors, in case of our removal, though crowded into our near vicinity, would speak a language totally different from ours, and practise different customs. The original possessors of that region are now wandering savages, lurking for prey in the neighbourhood. They have always been at war, and would be easily tempted to turn their arms against peaceful emigrants. Were the country to which we are urged much better than it is represented to be, and were it free from the objections which we have made to it, still it is not the land of our birth, nor of our affections. It contains neither the scenes of our childhood, nor the graves of our fathers.

'The removal of families to a new country, even under the most favorable auspices, and when the spirits are sustained by pleasing visions of the future, is attended with much depression of mind and sinking of heart. This is the case, when the removal is a matter of decided preference, and when the persons concerned are in early youth or vigorous manhood. Judge, then, what must be the circumstances of a removal, when a whole community, embracing persons of all classes and every description, from the infant to the man of extreme old age, the sick, the blind, the lame—the improvident, the reckless, the desperate, as well as the prudent,—the considerate, the industrious, are compelled to remove by odious and intolerable vexations and persecutions brought upon them in the forms of law, when all will agree only in this, that they have been cruelly robbed of their country, in violation of the most solemn compacts which it is possible for communities to form with each other; and that, if they should make themselves comfortable in their residence, they have nothing to expect hereafter but to be the victims of a future legalized robbery.

'Such we deem, and are absolutely certain, will be the feelings of the whole Cherokee people, if they are forcibly compelled by the laws of Georgia to remove; and with these feelings, how is it possible that we should pursue our present course of improvement, or avoid sinking into utter despondency? We have been called a poor, ignorant, and degraded people. We certainly are not rich; nor have we ever boasted of our knowledge, or our moral or intellectual elevation. But there is not a man within our limits so ignorant as not to know that he has a right to live on the land of his fathers, in the possession of his immemorial privileges, and that this right has been acknowledged and guarantied by the United States; nor is there a man so degraded as not to feel a keen sense of injury, on being deprived of this right and driven into exile.'

The southern Indians compose but a moderate part of the number of those who will be affected by the course of policy which our government may adopt. The writer of the Essays says;—

'It is computed, that there are within our national limits more than 300,000 Indians; some say 500,000; and, in the southwest States, the tribes whose immediate removal is in contemplation, have an aggregate population of more than 60,000. The interests of all these people are implicated, in any measure to be taken respecting them.

'The character of our government, and of our country, may be deeply involved. Most certainly an indelible stigma will be fixed upon us, if, in the plenitude of our power, and in the pride of our superiority, we shall be guilty of manifest injustice to our weak and defenceless neighbours.

'It should be remembered, by our rulers as well as others, that this controversy, (for it has assumed the form of a regular controversy,) will ultimately be well understood by the whole civilized world. No subject, not even war, nor slavery, nor the nature of free institutions, will be more thoroughly canvassed. The voice of mankind will be pronounced upon it;—a voice, which will not be drowned by the clamor of ephemeral parties, nor silenced by the paltry considerations of local or private interest. ——Any course of measures, in regard to the Indians, which is manifestly fair, and generous, and benevolent, will command the warm and decided approbation of intelligent men, not only in the present age, but in all succeeding times. And with equal confidence it may be said, if, in the phraseology of Mr Jefferson, the people of the United States should "feel power, and forget right;"—if they should resemble a man, who, abounding in

wealth of every kind, and assuming the office of lawgiver and judge, first declares himself to be the owner of his poor neighbour's little farm, and then ejects the same neighbour as a troublesome incumbrance;—if, with land enough, now in the undisputed possession of the whites, to sustain ten times our present population, we should compel the remnants of tribes to leave the places, which, received by inheritance from their fathers and never alienated, they have long regarded as their permanent homes;—if, when asked to explain the treaties, which we first proposed, then solemnly executed, and have many times ratified, we stammer, and prevaricate, and complete our disgrace by an unsuccessful attempt to stultify, not merely ourselves, but the ablest and wisest statesmen, whom our country has yet produced;—and if, in pursuance of a narrow and selfish policy, we should at this day, in a time of profound peace and great national prosperity, amidst all our professions of magnanimity and benevolence——drive away these remnants of tribes, in such a manner, and under such auspices, as to insure their destruction;—if all this should hereafter appear to be a fair statement of the case;—then the sentence of an indignant world will be uttered in thunders, which will roll and reverberate for ages after the present actors in human affairs shall have passed away. If the people of the United States will imitate the ruler who coveted Naboth's vineyard, the world will assuredly place them by the side of Naboth's oppressor.—*Essays*, pp. 4, 5.

It has been supposed, that the statute passed at the last session of Congress, was an abandonment of the Indians to the States which claim jurisdiction over them. There is no doubt, as we have before remarked, that the passage of this act was intended to assist the States in the expulsion of the Indians, and that it must encourage them to persevere in their present projects; while the entire neglect of the entreaties for protection made by the Indians, must depress them, and render them more ready to yield their rights, and retire beyond the Mississippi. Yet even in this act, we find one ray of encouragement in the proviso, that nothing in the act shall be construed as authorising or directing the violation of any existing treaty between the United States and the Indian tribes. This is a deliberate and solemn recognition by Congress of the obligation of these treaties, and an assurance that this nation will not see them violated. It is a pledge, which may be relied on with confidence, that, let the construction given to these treaties by the supreme tribunal be as adverse to the claims of the three

States as it may, this nation will enforce them, and protect the Indians, in conformity with that construction. Let the Cherokees, then, continue to maintain their rights, not by arms, but by reason, with the same temper and dignity which have marked their recent state papers, and we cannot but hope that truth and justice will finally triumph. But, whatever may be the result of the contest, they and their brethren will have, at least, the consolation that they have received the earnest support of able advocates in Congress, and the warm sympathy of a large, we believe the larger, portion of the American people.

The State of Georgia accuses the National Government of great negligence in extinguishing the Indian title, in pursuance of the articles of 1802, and even of a want of good faith. These accusations, as we have already intimated, are wholly unfounded. But yet she may have some ground of claim against the United States. It is probable, that when the articles were entered into, both parties supposed that the Indian title would be extinguished in a few years for the benefit of Georgia; and it is true, that she has not yet acquired all the lands which she expected, and is not likely soon, if ever, to acquire them. A case has occurred, which neither party, probably, contemplated, when the agreement was made. The Cherokees absolutely refuse to sell their territory. The United States, however, having done all in their power to purchase the Cherokee country, are not, perhaps, in strictness, bound to make Georgia any compensation for her disappointed expectations. But yet, we think, a liberal sense of obligation would dictate some payment to be made her for her not having received all the consideration, which she reasonably anticipated for her cession. It seems to us a case, in which the wealth of the nation might well be applied to put an end to a serious and agitating controversy, which otherwise might remain a perpetual source of uneasiness and contention. We venture, therefore, to suggest the propriety of an act of Congress being passed, authorising the payment of a sum of money to Georgia, upon her relinquishing all claim to jurisdiction over the Cherokees, and all title and claim to the soil and jurisdiction of their territory. Or an act might be passed, authorising the appointment of commissioners on behalf of the United States, to meet commissioners on the part of Georgia, by whom the terms of a compromise might be settled. By such a compromise the rights and interests of all parties would be happily adjusted. The Chero-

kees would be enabled to proceed in their experiment of civilisation and regular government under the happiest auspices, enjoying the protection and friendship of the United States, without being harassed with solicitations to remove, and freed from all fears of the encroachments of Georgia. The United States would get rid of an unpleasant dispute, avoid all danger of a collision with Georgia, and vindicate the national faith and honor; while Georgia would escape from a question, the issue of which she must admit to be extremely uncertain, and obtain full compensation for giving up a doubtful claim to a moderate territory.

The only objection to the course proposed, is the great expense in which it would involve the United States. But, even supposing that the United States would have to pay the State of Georgia, for thus relinquishing her pretensions to the five or six millions of acres owned by the Cherokees within what are called the limits of that State,* at the same heavy rate at which the Creeks were paid for their last cession, the amount would be considerably less than a million of dollars. But, considering that Georgia must be well aware how uncertain it is, whether any measures, which she can legally adopt, will ever put her in possession of the lands in dispute, the amount which she could reasonably ask would be much smaller.

If the Indian controversy should be thus disembarrassed of the claim of Georgia, the course with regard to the two other States which assert a right of jurisdiction over the free Indian nations, would be easy. The United States are not bound to either of them, to extinguish the Indian title; and the soil of all the Indian territory, over which those States claim the jurisdiction, will, when the Indian title is extinguished, belong to the United States. It will only be necessary, then, to enforce the intercourse law of 1802, according to its plain meaning, or to provide such new measures of legislation as new modes of aggression by the whites, may render necessary.

Since the foregoing remarks went to the press, we have seen the opinion of Mr Wirt, who had been consulted by the Cher-

* The authorities, which we have consulted, do not agree exactly as to the number of acres.

okees, in relation to the statute of Georgia extending jurisdiction over their territory. We are happy to find that we are fully supported in our views of the rights of the Indians by the authority of this eminent jurist. The following are the conclusions at which he arrives.

'1. That the Cherokees are a sovereign nation: and that their having placed themselves under the protection of the United States does not at all impair their sovereignty and independence as a nation. "One community may be bound to another by a very unequal alliance, and still be a sovereign state. Though a weak state, in order to provide for its safety, should place itself under the protection of a more powerful one, yet, according to Vattel (B. 1 Ch. 1 § 5 and 6.), if it reserves to itself the right of governing its own body, it ought to be considered as an independent state." 20 Johnson's Reports, 711, 712, Goodell *vs.* Jackson.

'2. That the territory of the Cherokees is not within the jurisdiction of the State of Georgia, but within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Cherokee nation.

'3. That consequently, the State of Georgia has no right to extend her laws over that territory.

'4. That the law of Georgia which has been placed before me, is unconstitutional and void; 1. because it is repugnant to the treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation; 2. because it is repugnant to a law of the United States passed in 1802, entitled "an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers;" 3. because it is repugnant to the Constitution, inasmuch as it impairs the obligation of all the contracts arising under the treaties with the Cherokees: and affects moreover to regulate intercourse with an Indian tribe, a power which belongs exclusively to Congress.'

ERRATUM.—On pp. 20, 25, 26, for עולם read עולם.

THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NO. XLI.

NEW SERIES—NO. XI.

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ART. I.—*Christian Consolations. An Offering of Sympathy to Parents bereaved of their Children, and to others under Affliction; being a Collection from Manuscripts and Letters not before published; with an Appendix of Selections.* Boston: S. Dickinson, 1830. 18mo. pp. 224.

WE wish to give our passing commendation to this little volume, though our purpose in the following article is to add some thoughts of our own to this Offering of Sympathy, rather than to draw extracts from the volume itself. The work is chiefly made up of contributions from several of our clergy, whose names will doubtless be sufficient to recommend it to general perusal. We acknowledge our obligations to the compiler, for having taken the trouble to gather from his brethren, this collection of wise and excellent thoughts, expressed in words which well deserve to be denominated 'words fitly spoken.' We find in these compositions the calmness, tenderness and delicacy that belong preeminently to 'christian consolations.' There is none of that minute and circumstantial detail, that tearing open of the wounds of affliction, which can be exceeded, in impropriety and painfulness, only by that horror in private life, the horror of formal condolence. As to this latter method of offering consolation, indeed, we are tempted to say, in passing, that we know not why the experience of every deeply afflicted mind does not satisfy it, at once and forever, that all words but those of the most intimate friendship must be an

unwelcome intrusion into the sanctuary of private sorrow. The customs of society may, perhaps, have made these formal visits of condolence a requisite manifestation of sympathy; but if so, we cannot hesitate to say that the customs of society, in this respect, ought to be changed. As evidence of sympathy, in such circumstances, they cannot be needed; to question the existence of the feeling, is to distrust the attributes of common humanity.

Indeed, the impotence of all words to comfort the bereaved, the necessity, by them most deeply felt, of entering into solemn and still communion with their own hearts and with their God, may dispose them, for a time, to look coldly upon books of consolation. But when the first burst of grief is over,

'The first dark days of nothingness,'

are ended, 'the overflowing of the waters has passed by,' it will be grateful to most minds, to commune with the thoughts of the wise and pious; and for such a purpose we can heartily commend the volume before us, as containing much that is fitted to guide and sustain the troubled and sorrowful, expressed in the appropriate language of christian advice and consolation, and often with great beauty and pathos.

We shall now proceed to offer some reflections of our own, on the great subject to which it has principal reference—death. We have thought that there are many erroneous impressions prevailing, with regard to this solemn event; and it will be our principal business to examine them.

Christianity was designed to introduce into the world, new views and feelings concerning death. We seem to see its character and office typified in the visit of Jesus to the house of Mary and Martha, on occasion of the death of their brother. It was a house of affliction. Wailing and lamentation were heard in it, as they are, at one time or another, in all the dwellings of this world. But our blessed Saviour approached it in the calm consciousness that he was commissioned with a doctrine and clothed with a power that would triumph over death; that death, in fact, was not the end nor the interruption of existence; that death, indeed, was only death in appearance, while in reality the spirit's life is progressive, ever continued, immortal. What less do his words import, than the annunciation to the world of this new view of mortality? 'I am the

resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall *never* die'—shall die not, at all, forever! The apostles, in like manner, evidently considered themselves as commissioned to teach new views of death. They taught the christian converts to 'sorrow not as others who had no hope.' They represented the coming of Christ as designed to 'deliver those, who, through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to bondage.'

The severity of this bondage in the ancient world, is sufficiently apparent from its funereal customs, and the whole tenor of its writings, and from the very terms by which they represented death as the great calamity of human existence. That language which has conveyed to us the largest portion of ancient literature, contains more than thirty epithets, all indicative of the deepest dejection and dread, which were familiarly and constantly applied to this event. Death was denominated the terrible, the mournful, the inexorable, the insatiable. It was cold, cruel, bitter, merciless death. It was represented as deaf to the cries of mortals, unpitying to their miseries. It was the dire necessity, the dark day, the fatal calamity, the iron sleep, the eternal night. Imagination can scarcely conceive of anything more appalling than the scenes of lamentation to which this event gave rise among heathen nations; which came to be a matter of custom and form, indeed, but which could never have been a matter of custom and form, without having originated in the most horrible ideas of the reality. In the houses of the deceased, for days together, their relations set up the most dismal wailings and outcries of grief. They upbraided the very dead with ingratitude and cruelty for leaving them; so unreasonable and violent was their sorrow. Nor can we easily blame them, if we consider their actual and effective belief. Heaven was to them scarcely more than a dream of poetry. The future world was a world of shadows. In that dim and solemn land of vision, a train of unsubstantial phantoms passed before their eyes; but no living thought or feeling was there—the termination of life was the end of all reality. If it were so, indeed; if this conscious being were to cease at death; if every cherished thought and feeling, which we grasp with all the strength of our souls, were doomed to utter extinction; if the venerated and the loved were to be lost beyond recovery; if all this were true, human nature

could not refuse to its sad fate the tribute of inconsolable sorrow. If all this were true, we might justly say,—Speak not to us of consolation—there *is* no consolation; there is no support for such a lot; nothing but dulness can bear it; nothing but indifference can tolerate it, and nothing but idiocy, we were ready to say, could be indifferent to it.

But 'thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory' over these awful and overwhelming anticipations. Christianity, we repeat, was designed to introduce into the world new views of death and futurity.

But in this, as in several other respects, we apprehend, that it has made as yet but a feeble impression upon the mass of those who have received it. We have not yet partaken of the cheerfulness, tranquillity, and triumph of him, who 'has abolished death and brought life and immortality to light in the gospel.' We have not so 'lived and believed' in Jesus, as triumphantly to feel that we 'shall never die!' There is more, we are tempted to say, of heathen despondency and dread among us, than of christian hope and trust.

Indeed, the usual treatment of the subject of death, is one, as we apprehend, which is scarcely in accordance with the spirit of the christian religion. The place which the fear of death occupies in the religious emotions of multitudes, is one which Christianity by no means assigns to it. A consideration of this event, a dread of it, an activity awakened by this dread, a mournful countenance when it is mentioned, and tears shed at a funeral, with many, form too large a part of the whole sum and evidence of their piety. To think of death is too often considered as the very beginning of religion; to prepare for it, as the very business of religion, and to pass safely through that great ordeal, as the very end of it. Surely, the great object of our religion is *not* to make us ready for some temporary exigency, nor to meet one dreadful event or moment, but to prepare for the sublime happiness and glory of an immortal life. This glorious aim would justly inspire, cheer, and elevate the soul; but to fix its attention too much upon one point in time, however serious, interesting, and trying in our moral progress and account—thus to fix the attention upon one point of dreadful apprehension, must narrow, depress, and darken the whole noble work of religious endeavour, faith, and fidelity. What effect this tendency of religious sentiment has had, both upon the prevailing religion and irreligion of the times, is a very

serious and interesting inquiry, but one which we cannot now pursue much into detail, beyond the hints that will naturally arise in the prosecution of the subject. We will only observe for the present, that mistaken and exaggerated ideas of the evil of death, tend evidently to prevent the calm and settled expectation of dying, and rational and just views of the preparation for it. They are fitted to make the impression, that, to be prepared to die, we need some qualification analogous to so dreadful an event; that we need a state of mind altogether unusual, altogether beyond the simple tenor of a good life, altogether different from the calm and conscientious performance of our common duties. Thus, these ideas of death tend to resolve religion into a kind of unnatural excitement or overwhelming agitation. They also occasion the world infinite unhappiness; and, what is worse, an unhappiness closely associated with religion. That bondage through fear of death, from which Christianity was intended to relieve us, still lays its iron yoke upon the timid, the thoughtful, and the anxious; while to the careless multitude, who need to be impressed, an image is presented, which is, at once, the more terrific and the more useless, because they 'cannot discern the form thereof,' and can give it no steadfast attention.

We must also express our apprehension, that this subject has not always received a proper treatment from the pulpit. Death, it may be, has not been spoken of, in that calm and temperate, though solemn manner, that becomes the christian preacher. It may have been, sometimes, the argument of his impatience or his displeasure. It may have been made the occasion for eloquence or declamation, when it should have been of calm instruction or sober and wise admonition. He who regards death as the greatest of calamities, as the most terrible thing that can befall us, has not yet learned Christianity. Sin is worse; odious and besetting vice is worse; and, to a good man, there may be many things in life that are worse than death; especially inaction, unprofitableness, and to disgrace his sacred calling. He who is ever resorting to this subject as a last argument, and on all occasions presenting it to terrify men into their duty, is yet in the childhood of the christian life, if not among the weak and beggarly elements of a still earlier dispensation.

We must, also, venture to question much that often passes around the beds of the dying. The last scene should be as

far as possible calm and quiet. The infirmity of human nature, the agonies of friendship in such an hour, we would speak of with indulgence; but it should be remembered, that it is our duty, as far as possible, by our resignation and fortitude, to sustain the sufferer, that we should not add to the last solemn trial of the sinking spirit the disturbing influence of violent agitation or clamorous grief. He who walks with his friend down that valley of shadows, has need to do it with a sustained demeanour, with a calm aspect, with a firm step, with a sympathy full of all human gentleness, with a purity full of divine and immortal hope. Above all, religion should not come to the scene of a death-bed, to urge, as a matter of course, its questions or its formalities. Let it speak its holy words, or rest in its holy silence of faith and prayer; but the dying hour is no time for intricate casuistry. Friendship may indeed whisper its anxious inquiry; but formality should speak nothing. Abstruse questions of faith or of experience should not then be agitated; still less should there be such stress laid, as with surprising frequency is done, upon the question, whether the dying man is 'willing to die.' No inquiry could be more unsatisfactory as a test of character; and, indeed, it avails nothing but to spread among the living the false impression, that a preparation for another life, is a willingness, when it is unavoidable, to leave this. The reply of the pious and learned President Dwight to all such questions, contains a volume of instruction on this subject. 'My life,' he said to his inquiring friends, 'my life must answer for me.' Neither with technical questions, then, nor yet with any indispensable formalities does religion approach the dying hour. Is there no prayer but that which is formal, loud, and vociferous? Can those who stand around the dying bed, if they are ever capable of prayer, fail, in the silence of their grief, in the extremity of their impotence, to lift up their hearts to God? In that scene, where 'reality is dealing with us,' set forms should not, uncalled for, intrude themselves. To hear, as we have sometimes heard, loud and agonizing voices of prayer, that startled and shocked into temporary consciousness the sinking and bewildered senses of an expiring mortal, has struck us with a horror, that overcame our awe even at death, and seemed to turn the solemnities of dissolution into sacrilegious disorder and confusion. So would we not have our own departure marked; but we would that stillness—where all pray in silence, where the affections

of the spirit only move in the hushed atmosphere of death, where the soul breathes its unutterable thoughts—that stillness should settle down upon that last scene that is to usher us into the world of spirits!

But it is time that we should enter more formally upon our design in bringing this subject before our readers, which is, to consider some of those prevailing views of death, which are either erroneous, or which, being just, are nevertheless, through our want of christian faith, suffered to occasion more distress and despondency than they ought. This discrimination of views that are wrong, or of views, which, though right, are suffered to exert a wrong influence upon our feelings, will mark the division of the subject, which will govern us in what we have now to offer.

We shall speak of this subject, not without solemnity and the tenderness due to a theme so affecting—of these we can scarcely fail—but we shall not speak of it with an awe that forbids us to reason upon it. We shall speak of it as those, who, God helping, do not fear it, with any excessive and unreasonable dread. We believe that it is the great course of nature, the appointment of God, a wise and good appointment, and that it is to be met with pious submission, calmness, and trust. We believe in One, who has destroyed 'the power of death;' who has come to deliver us from this very fear that has struck so deep a horror into the world, who has unfolded to us the bright and exalting hope of an endless and blessed life.

The dread which is felt of this event has manifested itself in many popular impressions of the most erroneous and indefensible, as well as painful, character.

We call death 'the king of terrors,' and in the conceptions of the body of mankind, it is clothed with every terrific attribute. In the excess of fear, their imagination bodies it forth as an actual being. They speak of a person being 'struck with death;' as if there were some dread power that ruled over the last hour of mortal existence. Even this popular phraseology, though it may scarcely be thought to indicate any error to which reflecting minds are liable, is not unworthy of a moment's attention, in connexion with the errors that are prevailing on this subject. Death is the gradual exhaustion of our faculties, the sinking away of the powers of animal life, till they finally cease to act, and to be. Now, this process may be hastened or retarded; may have its progress and its different stages;

one power after another may yield—the faculty of speech, of hearing, of motion; but to fix on one particular moment rather than another, and to say that *now* the deceased person is 'struck with death,' is to use language without any foundation in philosophy, or support from observation. There *is* no power—there may be precursors, indeed, which the experienced may descry with greater or less certainty—but there is no power, that, at any one moment, strikes a fatal blow; that fastens a hold upon its victim from which it may not be shaken; that sets its mark upon the diseased frame, as it were the mark of destiny: but 'while there is life there is hope,' and from any state of exhaustion the sinking faculties may rise to a briefer or a longer continuance of life. It is not, in fine, by some mysterious harbinger, that death announces its coming. All decay is but dying; all disease is a progress towards death; every beating pulse is wearing away the channels of life; every breath of that heaving bosom is preparing for the time when it shall breathe no more.

There prevails also an erroneous or an exaggerated idea of many of the circumstances that attend the dying hour.

In particular, it is thought that this final event passes with some dreadful visitation of unknown agony over the departing sufferer. It is imagined that there is some strange and mysterious reluctance in the spirit to leave the body; that it struggles long to retain its hold, and is, at last, torn with violence from its mortal tenement; and in fine, that this conflict between the soul and the body, greatly adds to the pangs of dissolution. ' But it may be justly presumed from what usually appears, that there is no particular nor acute suffering; not more than is often experienced in life; nay, rather, that there is less, because the very powers of suffering are enfeebled, the very capacities of pain are nearly exhausted. Death is to be regarded, rather as a sleep than an acute sensation, as a suspension rather than a conflict of our faculties. Our Saviour once said in relation to this event, 'Our friend Lazarus sleepeth.' The martyr Stephen, we are told 'fell asleep,' though he died amidst the blows and shouts of murderers. And the scripture denominates the pious dead, 'those who sleep in Jesus.' Death is the sleep of the weary. It is repose, the body's repose, after the busy and toilsome day of life.

We have all witnessed, perhaps, the progress of this change; and what was it? Let our senses and our understanding an-

swer; and not our imagination. What was it, but gradually diminishing strength, feeble utterance, failing perception, and total insensibility? The change, as it passed before us, may have been attended with accidental circumstances of mental experience or bodily sensation; but the change itself, death considered as an event, was only a gradual decline and extinction of the powers of life. This is all which we saw, or could know, as necessarily belonging to this crisis in the progress of our being. And yet, from this ignorance, we allow ourselves to be troubled by the phantoms of agitating conjecture. We imagine, and indeed it is common to say, that because 'no one has returned to tell us what it is to die,' there must be some mysterious and peculiar sensation, some awful physical experience attending it. But we see nothing, we see indications of nothing, and we ought not to presume anything, of this nature.

Neither are we to presume, that death arouses the mind, in the last moments of its earthly existence, to the keenest attention, or to the most intense action of its powers. The subject, when distinctly contemplated beforehand, may do so; it may often do so, in the midst of life; and well were it, if it far more frequently aroused us to do, in season, the work of life. All we wish to say, is—and we wish to say it to preclude all appeals, at once, to mysterious fear and unfounded hope—that there is no peculiar, no fearful nor hopeful activity of mind amidst the solemnities of dissolution; that, in most cases, there is no activity. It is probable, that the exhausted faculties usually sink to their mortal repose, as they do to nightly sleep; and that the convulsive struggles which are sometimes witnessed, are often as unconscious, as those with which we sink to the slumbers of evening rest.

Nor, when the veil of delirium is spread over the mortal hour, can we regard it as the evil that it is often thought to be. It has seemed to us rather, in many cases, as a friendly veil, drawn by the hand of nature over what would otherwise be the agonies of separation, over the anguish that the parent would feel at leaving children orphans and destitute, or that the friend would feel, in saying farewell, to those who were dearest upon earth. Delirium often interposes, we believe, by the kind providence of God, where nature would be too weak, or faith too infirm for the trial.

Nor yet is there anything but fancy in what is sometimes

said of the loneliness of the last hour. To the selfish and the bad, and in proportion as they possess this character, there is, indeed, solitude in death, and it may then be doubly felt. But to them, there is solitude also in life; solitude in the chamber of sickness, in the hour of retired meditation, nay, and it is oftentimes deeply felt in the throng of society. If we deserve to have friends, they are with us in death, as truly as in life; so long as we are conscious of anything earthly, we are conscious of their presence. It may sustain and soothe us, till the last moment of our stay on earth. 'I walked with her,' —said one who laid down the remains of a beloved companion in a distant land—'I walked with her down the valley of shadows; I wiped the cold damps of death from her forehead; and saw her ascend to the mansions of the blessed!'

But we must hasten briefly to consider some of the errors, that relate, not to the mode or circumstances, but to the nature, the essential character of this solemn event.

When our Saviour says, 'He that liveth and believeth in me, shall never die,' he adds, 'believest thou this?' The question might still be put to multitudes even in a christian land, and, we doubt not, with the strongest implication of their unbelief. They do not believe it. Death is regarded as the extinction, rather than as the continuance of being. Whatever the words of our theology may say, the real impression upon most minds is, that death sunders almost all the ties that united us to our former existence; that it changes not only our state, but our nature; that the soul, as it travels to the 'undiscovered country,' is passing beyond the borders of all that it has known, and sought, and valued. We are apt to feel, as if on the passage from life, we parted with all that our thoughts had familiarized and our affections cherished. But is not this an error? We take with us—so to speak—our thinking and conscious selves; and it is no vanity, but a simple truth, to say, in a very important sense, that ourself is our all; for it embraces all our mental acquisitions and attachments, our joys and hopes, our attainments of piety, our treasures of knowledge, all elevated and holy contemplations that we may have indulged in, all our habits of thought and feeling that are estimable and pure, all that is precious in happiness, all that is sacred in memory; and the record of all this, death will not erase, but will only impress upon it the seal of perpetuity. It has not erased these things, we may believe, from the venerated and pious minds

that have gone before us. The dead, the departed, should we rather say, are connected with us by more than the ties of memory. The love that on earth yearned towards us, is not dead; the kindness that gladdened us is not dead; the sympathy that bound itself with our fortunes is not dead, nor has it lost its fervor, surely, in the pity of an angel. No; if our christian guides speak truly, it still yearns towards us, it would still gladden us. It still melts in tenderness over our sorrows. The world of spirits—we know not where it is, whether far or near; but it may as well, for all that we can understand, be near to us, as far distant; and in that fervent love, which knows nothing of change or distance or distinction, it is forever near us. Our friend, if he be the same and not another being—our friend, in whatever world, in whatever sphere, is still our friend. The ties of every virtuous union, are, like the virtue which cements them, like the affections of angels, like the love of God which binds them to the eternal throne, immortal.

The evil of making this wide separation, this violent disruption of the present from the future, as well as of other prevailing views of death, is in many ways great. Our thoughts do not easily pass to live in the future, or to draw from it the motives of action. Our theological views of this subject, our contemplations of futurity, are too much like the ancient poetic dreams of an Elysian land and a Tartarean region, visionary and ineffectual. There is a fearful retribution, there is a sublime beatitude, we admit; but our conceptions of both are vague and unreal; and our fear does not deter us from sin, and our hope does not allure us to purity and heaven. Between us and our future recompense we look upon death as 'a great gulf fixed,' and it cuts off the communication of our thoughts. Between the good and the bad, a great gulf is fixed, indeed, but not between us and the departed. Death is not that gulf; yet we so regard it. We do not sufficiently consider it as a stage, a necessary stage in the progress of being; as a natural passage from the childhood to the maturity of our existence. We are deterred, too, from the thoughts of futurity, by the imaginary glooms and mysteries of the entrance to it. Even the most attractive ideas of a future life, even a spiritual relish for its joys, and a conscience free from alarms, could scarcely overcome our reluctance to so fearful and dismal an approach to it. We could hardly think of home, or welcome the prospect of admission there, if we must pass to it through unknown con-

flicts and woes, if we could reach it only by braving the horrors of shipwreck, if we could gain its threshold only by rushing over the burning ruins of a conflagration.

Again; death is commonly regarded as the visitation of God's wrath, as the fruit and punishment of sin. We do not forget the language of scripture on this subject; that 'death entered into the world by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.' It is to be remembered, however, that, in many passages where death is said to be the fruit of sin, the word death is used figuratively; that mortality is not meant, but misery. This may be seen in the whole of that account which is given of Paul's experience and reasonings in the seventh and eighth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans; and in other instances. And upon the text, before quoted, it has been justly argued, that the death which 'entered by sin,' is not the specific calamity of being mortal, but all the evil brought upon us by sin, including whatever is evil in mortality itself. That all this is meant by the word death, we say, has been argued from the circumstance, that it is set in contrast with all the benefits derived from the interposition of our Saviour. As these benefits include more than mere continuance of life, so, it is contended, the contrasted evil which sin is said to introduce, cannot be death to the body merely, but rather death to the soul; that is, misery, fear, disquietude and gloom.* And it might be still more strongly urged with reference to this point, that, if mortality were the specific and only evil meant in that passage, it is said to be removed by the interposition of our Saviour. This is the very point which we are laboring to establish. Jesus Christ has abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light in the gospel. He has presented new views of mortality. He has taught us, that it is the death of the body only; that the good man, that the spirit of goodness which is in him, that the intrinsic and intellectual being, 'shall never die.'

We are not, however, anxious to deny, for it is obviously true, that sin has given a complexion to this event; that it has, to a certain extent, connected pain, and doubt, and gloom, with mortality. In some respects, we can see this influence. Sin, which partly consists in the undue indulgence of the body, has made all our diseases more severe and painful. Sin, too, has clouded and darkened the mind, and filled it with inquietude

*I. B. Koppe in Rom. V. 12.

and fear. Sin, then, we repeat, has given a complexion to this event. It has made our departure from this world, not a translation, but a death.

Yet, surely, the departure simply considered, is not to be regarded as an ordination of God's wrath, but of his infinite goodness. Whatever is universal and unavoidable, must always be held to be good. Sin only, the choice of man, is essentially evil. Events, laws, the ordinances of God, are ever good. When we approach the dwelling where death has entered, when we join the circle of mourning friends and kindred, over which the mortal stroke has just brought its stupifying horror, or its heart-rending agony, when that solemn silence, that dread vacuity of death is around us, broken only by the sighs and shudderings of grief and despair, we are apt at first to feel as if we stood in some awful chasm where God is not, or in some overshadowing cloud where he is present only in displeasure. But when we remember that this is the inevitable lot, that there are thousands of such scenes, passing every hour on earth, ten thousand human hearts rent with like sorrow, we are ready to ask—Can this universal fate be otherwise than an ordination of wisdom and goodness? Can the unvarying allotment, to which all the creatures, to which all the children of God are subject, be vindictive? Can that, which befalls all earthlybeings, fills all time, and spreads before the eye of Heaven such an uninterrupted scene—can it be a signal measure of God's wrath? The catastrophe, in the darkest view of it, would not be so horrible as the supposition which thus explains it.

Besides, a dissolution of the body, and a departure from this world, results from the very nature and necessity of things. The human frame was not made to live always, and the earth, as evidently, was not designed to support the accumulating generations of mankind. Nay, more; departure at some time or other, from this life, so far from being a penal requisition, must, to every reflecting mind, appear in the highest degree desirable. Let the question be put to our calmer and loftier reflections, and there can be no other answer. *Would* we live always? Would we always bear the burden of imperfection and infirmity? Would we always pant for knowledge and happiness that we cannot attain; and shall we ever cling to that load of flesh, and of all the ills that flesh is heir to, which drags us down to the earth? No; we would die; we would depart; we would be released and be at rest. We might desire to

mount on the winged chariot of Elijah; but it has pleased God to appoint for us a different way. Be it so, that it is for our sins, or that our sins have cast a shadow over the passage out of this world; shall we not then the more humbly and submissively yield ourselves to it?—not with terror, not with slavish dread, for God does not chasten, even for our sins, in unpitying wrath, but in tender mercy.

We would not, then, live always. Earth could not bear us. Humanity could not bear its load. Still more; the mind could not be satisfied. It would ask for other scenes, for other regions, for other sources of knowledge, for other fountains of joy. We would depart, then; and this is but saying, that we would die. We must yield our powers to the sleep of death, that we may awake to a new life. We must change the form and mode of our existence, that we may exist in a higher sphere. We must cease to live as men, that we may begin to live as angels. The unsightly worm must sink to inaction and death, that it may rise from its grovelling in the dust, that it may become an inhabitant of the air, that it may unfold its wings in a new region, and become the creature of life and beauty that God designed it to be. The soul in like manner must drop its 'mortal coil,' that the now undeveloped, the half dormant powers, that mysteriously sleep within it, may awake to their own intellectual and immortal life. It may be as unconscious now, of what it is hereafter to become, as the reptile that crawls upon the earth is of rising to the air and light of heaven. The transformation may be as great, and as much more glorious, as intellect is more glorious than dark and blind instinct. Nor may death be the soul's last transformation. 'There shall be no more death,' indeed; but there may be many changes in its mode of being, while it is passing from glory to glory, through its everlasting progress.

But we must not delay longer to consider some of those views of death, which are, indeed, more just than those already noticed, but which, nevertheless, are liable to be wrested into error, through the excessive dread which is entertained of this event. Mortality is not the interruption of being, nor is it any peculiar visitation of God's wrath; but it is still a serious crisis in our existence; and our views of it are not likely to be too serious, if we will only guard our seriousness from superstition, and from all irrational and extravagant influences of the imagination.

Death is a serious event, inasmuch as we are taught that 'after death is the judgment.' With regard to the formalities of that judgment, if it can be supposed that there are any formalities, we know nothing. The passages in scripture which speak of a throne and a tribunal, or which speak of the soul as *meeting* its Judge after death, are evidently figurative, and teach us only the general truth, that there is a solemn and strict retribution awaiting us. We cannot *meet* the universal presence in which we ever are; in which we are now, as truly as we ever can be, though we may be hereafter more conscious of it; and we cannot reasonably suppose that the soul is to be called to any literal bar. But there will be a trial of conscience, under circumstances which will give to conscience all its power; and if we could understand what that must be, we should feel that no formalities could add to the fearfulness of that coming hour. It will be enough to leave the sinful man alone with his conscience, to strip him of all the blinding delusions of sense and passion, to strip him of all this world's distinctions, and all its treacherous maxims, and its supporting example and its flattering countenance, to throw aside every screen and veil of self-deception, and to empower memory, in that all-searching light, to call from oblivion every past misdeed, every erring thought, every guilty passion, and every secret and disguised offence; and this, we believe, is the judgment that shall be, in the presence of God and of conscience, after death. Men may do wrong now, and boast of it, may purpose evil and glory in its accomplishment, may oppress and injure, and silence the voice of remonstrance; but an hour of unveiled retribution is approaching them; the time is near when every evil gratification and unjust deed shall become a piercing arrow of conviction. Forms, appearances shall soon give place to realities; the body's enslaving control, to the spirit's action and life; and passion, indulgence, sin, to the manifested and the no longer mistaken judgment of Heaven.

There is a passage in the memoirs of a distinguished author, which we confess strikes us, whenever we read it, with nothing less than the profoundest awe. He mentions an individual, who, though entirely unlearned and ignorant, was accustomed, in fits of insanity, to repeat with great fluency, long passages from Latin and Hebrew writers. The phenomenon drew much attention, and was thought by some to be capable of no other explanation, than that of referring it to demoniacal possession.

After much inquiry, it was ascertained that this individual had, in early life, resided in the family of a learned clergyman, who was accustomed to read and repeat aloud, passages from his favorite authors; and the excitement of insanity had quickened the slumbering memory of the hearer to recall, with such amazing distinctness, the faded and forgotten images of past impressions. 'And this,' exclaims the writer, 'this, perchance, is the dread book of judgment, in whose mysterious language every idle word is recorded! Yea, in the very nature of the living spirit, it may be more possible that heaven and earth should pass away, than that a single act, a single thought, should be loosened or lost, from that living chain of causes,' which has formed the abiding character of the soul.*

Still however, solemn, and justly solemn as this view of death and of the revelation of a future life, is, it is possible to lay too great, or, at least, too exclusive a stress upon that event which is to unfold to us those revelations. Every future moment—not that of death only, not that of the judgment which is immediately to follow,—but every future moment of our being is to answer for every present moment. This is the great law of retribution. None less strict, or less severe belongs to our moral nature. And it does not apply to the future life only, but equally to the present; and all the difference is, that it is now less clearly seen and felt. And it does not apply to any one epoch alone, but to all the periods, to all the moments of our endless being. It is not death, then, that we should fear, but the eternal retribution of conscience. It is not at the moment of death that we should tremble, but at every moment of the future that is to answer for the neglects, and errors, and offences of the mispent past. Virtue is deathless. It is more; it is blessed life. On the 'path of the just that shineth brighter and brighter,' no shadow abideth. The shade of death itself but opens the way to a brighter and more glorious existence. Nay, we must declare a stricter doctrine than this. Virtue *alone* is thus deathless. He who will not obey the great moral laws of his nature, he who lives in hostility to his conscience and in estrangement from his God, can have nothing said to him to mitigate his fears of the mortal hour. He must fear it; he must in reason fear every future hour, and every future scene. If hell is dreadful to the sinful man, heaven would be

* Biographia Literaria, Chap. VI.

more dreadful; if the company of evil beings can yield him no joy, the society of heavenly beings would fill him with despite and agony. Whither shall he flee? Where shall he go to escape fear or misery, whose present courses are raising up enemies in every future habit, feeling, and remembrance of his soul? Whither, did we say? Alas! it is not time or place only, it is not circumstance or situation, it is not the revealing light or the overshadowing darkness; but it is himself that he has made an enemy and an avenger more dreadful than death!

Again; death is the separation of friends. And we are not of those, who can speak lightly of this separation. We have heard of some who were able to lift up a radiant and almost smiling countenance over the earthly remains of all that was dearest on earth; but it enters not into our conception to regard it as anything but extravagance and enthusiasm. We do not take upon us to set limits to the support which God may give to bereaved friendship or afflicted piety; but that triumph in the countenance, surely, is not their fit demeanour. No; the sundering stroke of death is stern, and cold, and bitter reality.

We have sometimes ventured to wonder, and that in the more fervent meditation upon God's goodness, why the trial is made so severe, and, for a time, so almost inconsolable. Could one glimpse, we have been ready to say, could one glimpse of the future world be opened to us, could the situation of the departed, for one moment, be made known to us; or might it have been the order of Providence that families should be removed at once and together to the 'spirit land'—but reflection and faith have soon arisen to check the remonstrances and questionings of anxious and yearning affection, and have soon shown, as they usually do, that God's providence is wiser than our own hasty presumption. Were families removed together, how certainly would our social affections gather up and concentrate themselves upon those narrow circles, and all the evils—the peculiarities, the prejudices, the selfish and exclusive attachments—of that limited intercourse, to which we are already sufficiently liable, would be inflicted on society; and all the benefits of a wide and generous diffusion and reciprocation of sentiments and feelings, would be cut off from the social body. If, again, the future world were opened to us, it might produce in us an utter distaste to this; it might disturb the well balanced and wisely ordered influences, under which we were made to

act in the present state. If we could see, what we so ardently long to behold, beyond this veil of earthly shadows, we might have no eyes for the scene around us; we might be rapt in meditation, when we are called to the action and trial of all our virtues.

It was evidently designed, that we should be trained up here, by a severe and lofty discipline, for some glorious state of being and enjoyment hereafter. The moral economy under which we are placed, the spiritual life on earth, was not designed to be vision, but faith,—not rapture, but trial. The departure of friends and kindred to another world irresistibly draws our thoughts thither, and constantly renders us more indifferent to acquisitions and objects here. Heaven claims our treasures, that our hearts may be there also. Faith, moreover, in the invisible, the spiritual, the eternal, is the appropriate faith of beings whose welfare lies in the invisible mind, whose nature is spiritual, and whose destiny, immortal. It is meet that we should be trained by the influences of a world which we see not, and from which no sound reaches us. It is our happiness, also, not only to love God, but to love him with the fervor and assurance of perfect trust. Love is ever doubtful, without that trial; and it is but an impassioned feeling, without that quality of absolute confidence.

Yet a little while therefore are we required to wait, till we can behold those objects and those beings, on whom, next to God, it is right that our hearts should be set. The interval will not be too long for the trial of our faith, and the preparation of all our virtues; not too long to prepare us for the blessedness of a future life; nay, it may not be found too long to prepare us *to die*, as the Christian should die. To meet the last hour calmly, to resign all the objects which our senses have made familiar and dear, in the lofty expectation of better things for the mind, is itself a great act of faith, and one for which many days' reflection and experience may not be too much to prepare us. To take our last look at the countenances of beloved friends and companions; to close our eyes to the bright vision of nature; to bid adieu to earth, sky, waters; to feel, for the last time, the thrill of rapture with which this fair and glorious scene of things has so often touched the soul—this is an hour for faith unshaken in the immortality of virtue, and for trust unbounded in the love of God, and for the triumphant assurance which long tried and lofty experience alone can give.

The feelings of the infidel Rousseau have seemed to us thus far natural, and such as even a Christian may entertain. When he apprehended that his last hour drew near, he desired the windows of his apartment to be opened, that he might 'have the pleasure,' as he said, 'of beholding nature once more. How lovely she is!' he exclaimed; 'how pure and serene is the day! O Nature! thou art grand indeed!'* Yet not as Rousseau died, does the Christian die; but with a better trust.

And with that trust, with a firm confidence in the perpetuity of all pious and virtuous friendships, there is much, surely, to mitigate the pain of a temporary separation. Let us remember, too, that we do submit to frequent separations in this life, that our friends wander from us over trackless waters and to far distant continents, and that we are still happy in the assurance that they live. And though, by the same providence of God that has guarded them here, they are called to pass beyond the visible precincts of this present existence, let us feel that they still live. God's universe is not explored, when we have surveyed islands, and oceans, and the shores of earth's spreading continents. There are other regions, where the footsteps of the happy and immortal are treading the paths of life. Would we call them back to these abodes of infirmity and sin? Would we involve them again in these toils, and pains, and temptations? Or shall we sorrow for them, as those who have no hope? No; we would rather go, and die with them. What do we say? We will rather go, and live with them forever!

But, the awful entrance to the world of spirits—may still be our exclamation—how dark and desolate is that passage! It is a fearful thing to die. Nature abhors dissolution!

Let something of this be admitted, but let it not be too much. Does nature abhor dissolution? Behold the signs of decay and dissolution which the season now spreads around us. Behold nature in her annual death—the precursor of renovated life. But we will not argue from emblems. We will admit that a living being must naturally dread to part with life. But he dreads to part with life, only in a greater measure, as he dreads to part with everything that is his. He is averse to the loss of property, and in some instances, almost as much so, as to the loss of life itself. He is reluctant to part with any one of his senses; and this reluctance, compared with the natural

* Grimm's Correspondence.

dread of death, is in full proportion to the value of that organ. Let us rationally look at the subject in this light. Doubtless we dread the loss of the sense of hearing, for instance; and, when that is entirely gone from us, hearing is dead. We dread the loss of sight; and, that light extinguished, seeing is dead. Thus one faculty after another departs from us, and death is at work within us, while we say that we are in the midst of life. So let us regard it. So let us familiarize to our minds, the thoughts of death, and feel that this dreaded enemy, dreaded, partly, because imagined to be so distant and unknown, has already made its lodgment in our frame, and, by familiar processes, is approaching the citadel of life. As disease is making its inroads upon us and the system is wearing out, as the acuteness of sensation is failing us and the vigor of bone and muscle is declining, let us say and feel, that we are gradually approaching the extinction of this animal life. Let no skeptic doubts, let no thoughts of annihilation mingle with our apprehensions of mortality; let us believe as Christians, that not the soul, but only the body dies—and death cannot be that dread and abhorrence of nature which we make it.

We fear that we have occasion to crave the patience of our readers for the length to which our discussion has run; but we would dwell upon this point a moment longer—the natural dread of death. It seems to us strange, it seems as if all were wrong, in a world, where, from the very constitution of things, death must close every scene of human life, where it has reigned for ages over all generations, where the very air we breathe and the dust we tread upon was once animated life—it seems to us most strange and wrong, that this most common, necessary, expedient, and certain of all events, should bring such horror and desolation with it; that it should bring such tremendous agitation, as if it were some awful and unprecedented phenomenon; that it should be more than death—a shock, a catastrophe, a convulsion; as if nature, instead of holding on its steady course, were falling into irretrievable ruins.

And that which is strange, is our strangeness to this event. Call sickness, we repeat, call pain, an approach to death. Call the weariness and failure of the limbs and senses, call decay, a dying. It is so; it is a gradual loosening of the cords of life, and a breaking up of its reservoirs and resources. So shall they all, one and another in succession, give way. 'I feel'—will the thoughtful man say—'I feel the pang of suffering, as it

were piercing and cutting asunder, one by one, the fine and invisible bonds that hold me to the earth. I feel the gushing current of life within me to be wearing away its own channels. I feel the sharpness of every keen emotion and of every acute and far-penetrating thought, as if it were shortening the moments of the soul's connexion and conflict with the body.' So it is, and so shall it be, till at last, 'the silver cord is loosened, and the golden bowl is broken, and the pitcher is broken at the fountain, and the wheel is broken at the cistern, and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns unto God who gave it.'

No; it is not a strange dispensation. Death is the fellow of all that is earthly; the friend of man alone. It is not an anomaly; it is not a monster in the creation. It is the law, and the lot of nature.

'Not to thy eternal resting place,
Shalt thou retire alone. * * *
Thou shalt lie down
With patriarchs of the infant world, with kings,
The powerful of the earth, the wise and good,
Fair forms and hoary seers of ages past,
All in one mighty sepulchre. The hills,
Rock-ribbed and ancient as the sun; the vales,
Stretching in pensive quietness between;
The venerable woods, rivers that move
In majesty, and the complaining brooks,
That make the meadows green, and poured round all,
Old ocean's grey and melancholy waste—
Are but the solemn decorations all,
Of the great tomb of man.'

But of what is it the tomb? Does the spirit die? Do the blessed affections of the soul, go down into the dark and silent grave. Oh! no. 'The narrow house, and pall, and breathless darkness' and funereal train—these belong not to the soul. They proclaim only the body's dissolution. They but celebrate the vanishing away of the shadow of existence. Man does not die, though the forms of popular speech thus announce his exit. He does not die. We bury, not our friend, but only the form, the vehicle in which, for a time, our friend lived. That cold, impassive clay is not the friend, the parent, the child, the companion, the cherished being. No, it is not: blessed be God, that we can say, *It is not!* It is

the material world only that earth claims. It is 'dust' only, that 'descends to dust.' The grave!—let us break its awful spell, its dread dominion. It is the place where man lays down his weakness, his infirmity, his diseases and sorrows, that he may rise up to a new and glorious life. It is the place, where man ceases—in all that is frail and decaying—ceases to be man, that he may be, in glory and blessedness, an angel of light!

Why, then, should we fear death, save as the wicked fear, and must fear it? Why dread to lay down this frail body in its resting-place, and this weary, aching head, on the pillow of its repose? Why tremble at this—that in the long sleep of the tomb, that body shall suffer disease no more, and pain no more, and hear no more the cries of want nor the groans of distress—and, far retired from the turmoil of life, that violence and change shall pass lightly over it, and the elements shall beat and the storms shall sigh unheard, around its lowly bed? Say, ye aged and infirm! is it the greatest of evils to die? Say, ye children of care and toil! say, ye afflicted and tempted! is it the greatest of evils to die?

Oh! no. Come the last hour, in God's own time!—and a good life and a glorious hope shall make it welcome. Come the hour of release!—and affliction shall make it welcome. Come the hour of reunion with the loved and lost on earth!—and the passionate yearnings of affection, and the strong aspiration of faith, shall bear us to their blessed land. Come death to this body—this burdened, tempted, frail, failing, dying body!—and to the soul,—thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory!—to the soul, come freedom, light and joy unceasing! come, the immortal life! 'He that liveth'—saith the conqueror over Death—'he that liveth and believeth in me, shall NEVER DIE!'

ART. II.—*Elements of Dogmatic History. By William Muenscher, S. T. D. and Ordinary Professor of Theology at Marburg. Translated from the Second Edition of the Original German.* By JAMES MURDOCK, D. D. New-Haven: A. H. Maltby. 1830. 12mo. pp. 401.

THIS work is a mere outline, as the translator confesses, and was originally drawn up, it would seem, as a syllabus of a course

of lectures for the use of the hearers. It is too succinct, not to say meagre, to interest or satisfy the general reader; but will be of considerable value to theological students, by giving in a few words the results of much study, and a multitude of references to other works, in which the same subjects are discussed more at length. Our confidence in a manual of this description, will depend almost entirely on what is known of the character and habits of the author, and the fairness and thoroughness of his investigations. Aware of this, the translator has given the following notices of Dr Muenscher in his preface.

'Dr William Muenscher was born at Hersfeld, on the 11th of March 1766; became a stated preacher, in the cathedral church in his native place, till the age of 26, when he was made Professor in ordinary, in the university of Marburg in Hesse-Cassel, and consistorial councillor there, for 22 years, or till his death, 28th of July, 1814. He composed the preface to a popular edition of Luther's bible; and a volume of printed sermons, which are said to be characterized by their religious fervor, and by the constant and happy use made of the holy scriptures. He was also the principal conductor of a journal, devoted to the interests of schools and religion: but his greatest and most noted work was his Manual of Dogmatic History, in IV. volumes 8vo. extending over the first six centuries. Beside these, he composed an Elementary Church History, and the work here presented to the public. Of his large work, C. F. L. Simon, in his Continuation of Noesselt's Guide to the Literature of Theology, says, (Sec. 299,) "The author has happily combined the chronological order, with that of the relations of things; and the whole work is distinguished, alike, for the persevering, learned, and critical industry, manifested in collecting the materials; and for the solidity and independence of judgment, with which they are methodically arranged, and agreeably expressed." And he adds: "The same commendation is due to the author's Elements of Dogmatic History." Brettschneider, in his Entwickelung der Dogmatik, p. 99, ed. 2d, says of the Manual: "It is to be regarded as *(hauptwerk)* the *best work* on the subject." The Elements, notwithstanding it had to contend with several rival works, has, since its first appearance in 1811, gone through three editions in Germany, without alteration,—two of them since the author's death; and it is still in high reputation, in that country.

'The theological sentiments of Dr. Muenscher, the translator regrets, that he is not able definitely to state; since a knowledge of them, might serve to show, where, and how, the author's prepossessions were most likely to mislead him. In several

passages of this work, as well as of the Manual, the translator thought he discovered indications of much laxer views in theology, than his own. Yet, he supposes, Dr Muenscher was classed, by his countrymen, with Michaelis, Doederlein, Planck, and others; who stood on middle ground, between the ancient, pure Lutheranism, and the modern neology of Germany. After all, the private opinions, or the commendations and censures of the writer, which occasioually escape from him unconsciously, ought not to influence the reader. It is his *facts*, and his arguments only, that deserve regard. And these, he is supposed to state, with as much fidelity, and impartiality, as reasonably can be expected, from an able and honest man, who felt his reputation to be staked on the correctness of his narration.'—pp. 7–9.

It is unnecessary, after this, to go into a general commendation of these Elements; and it would be hardly possible to give a formal analysis of what is itself but an analysis, and a brief one. We must content ourselves, therefore, with giving a few extracts, which will, at the same time, serve as specimens of the work, and throw light on the history of doctrines now in controversy among us. We begin by citing two paragraphs, in which the author speaks of our Saviour and the apostles, in such terms as to lead us to suspect, that Dr Murdock has overrated his Orthodoxy.

'The Jewish nation was distinguished from the surrounding nations, by giving homage to the one God, in accordance with their sacred books; with a splendid worship and numerous ceremonies. As the original character of the Mosaic religion was disfigured by speculations, by narrow conceptions, and immoral practices, Jesus Christ appeared, as one sent from God, for the purpose of establishing *a kingdom of God* on the earth. His doctrine was simple and practical, and was exibited as occasions drew it forth. Yet in compass and extent, it far surpassed the Jewish; and it embraced the superlative germs of truth, for the profounder reflection and investigations of the succeeding ages.—

'The apostles, who continued to propagate and spread the doctrines of Christ, and who were led by their circumstances to explain those doctrines more fully, compensated for their lack of a learned education by their deep feeling, their noble spirit, and their devout sense of religion. Notwithstanding it has been questioned, whether they all, with equal success, penetrated into the *whole* system of their master's doctrine, yet it is certain that the *Spirit* of Jesus animated them all. Paul, who was one of them, and the most active among them, employed his Jewish learning in explaining and enforcing Christianity.'—pp. 24, 25.

The following is the account which Dr Muenscher gives of the primitive church and its creed.

'The views and the convictions of such as united with the Christians, in the earliest times, could not but be exceedingly various and unlike; for they had differed extremely in religion, in education, in habits, and other circumstances; and it must have been a considerable time, before the community could annihilate, or even diminish greatly, the peculiarities of individuals. *Here*, labored zealous teachers, (the apostolic fathers,) in the true spirit of the apostles, though with diminished power. *There*, other Christians formed a closer union with Judaism. And a *third* class, (the Gnostics,) wishing to separate Christianity altogether from Judaism, shaped it according to their own speculations.—

'The disorders arising from this diversity of views, and which tended to the prostration of the christian cause, might contribute, at least, to induce various churches to unite together, and to acknowledge none as true Christians, who did not embrace a definite but simple creed. A belief in the *Father, as the Creator of the world;* in the Son, who became a man, and died for the salvation of men; in the Holy Ghost, who guided the ancient prophets, as well as the apostles; joined with the expectation of a future judgment and divine retribution; were the chief articles of this creed, which was propagated *by oral instruction.* Yet with it, the holy scriptures of the Old Testament, were used; and *gradually* also, the writings of the apostles and the apostolical Fathers.'—pp. 25, 26.

Respecting the consummate perfection and majesty of the Father, he says, in another place, there was no disagreement among them; but the more they labored to define the nature of the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and the mode of their relation to the Father, the more they differed. Like other historians, he finds the first germs of the popular doctrine of the trinity in the speculations of Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, and Tatian, in the second century; who thought to explain the Logos, or Word, of John, by those passages in the Old Testament, in which mention is made of the creative power of God, (Gen. i.) and of the divine Wisdom, (Prov. viii. Eccles. xxiv. Wisdom, vii.) The Platonic philosophy, combined with the emination system, as taught at Alexandria and held by Philo, led them into this error, and contributed to give it currency. The gradual formation of the doctrine is rapidly traced through the successive ages of the church down to Athanasius and Augus-

tin; the former of whom, A. D. 362, was the first to insist on the equality of the Holy Ghost with the Father and the Son; and the latter, about half a century afterwards, was the first to insist on their numerical unity.

The doctrines of grace, falsely so called, are not taught in scripture; neither were they held by the first Christians; but found their way into the church principally through the agency and influence of Agustin, who flourished in the beginning of the fifth century.

'Jesus and his apostles,' says Dr Muenscher, 'represent faith and reformation, sometimes as the work of man, and sometimes as being the gift of God. Hence efforts were made, to reconcile these opposite representations. The Greek church took the ground of the *perfect freedom* of man's will; and therefore taught, that it depends on the purpose and exertions of man, to attain to faith and virtue; yet that the grace of God, comes in aid of man's exertions, by imparting to him strength, assistance, and excitements. Of course, man must render himself a fit subject of divine *grace;* which he has power to use properly, and also to abuse. These ideas, which were fully stated by *Clement* and *Origen*, were also advanced by the fathers of the fourth century; by *Cyril* of Jerusalem, *Gregory* of Nazianzum, *Gregory* of Nyssa, and clearest of all, by *Chrysostom*. The Latin fathers did not deviate essentially. For, although they painted, in glowing colors, the excellence of divine grace, yet they left room, for the spontaneous activity of man to have a part in his reformation. An irresistible work of grace, and an unconditional election, were not thought of; and the divine purposes were always traced back to God's foreknowledge.—

'*Augustin*, the renowned Bishop of Hippo, by his aims to glorify the grace of God, and by some passages of scripture, was led to a mode of thinking, which deviated from the earlier system of belief, and which attributed all goodness in men, exclusively, to divine operation. On this subject, he fell into a contest with *Pelagius* and *Coelestine*. And through the influence of his reputation, and the cooperation of the African churches, and of the Bishop of Rome, the Pelagians were condemned, as heretics; notwithstanding the Council of Diospolis was favorable to them. This controversy related to the subjects of *sin*, *grace* and free will, and *election;* with which were connected, those of infant baptism, redemption, and perseverance in holiness.—

'The *Pelagians* believed, that Adam's sin had no bad effects, upon the character and condition of his posterity; that sin arose,

merely, from imitation; that all men are, from their nature, mortal; and are born, undepraved. According to *Augustin's* doctrine, all men, in consequence of their descent from Adam, are mortal; are chargeable with hereditary sin; and are obnoxious to damnation. These doctrines he endeavoured to prove, from infant baptism, from the practice of exorcisms, and from Rom. v. 12. Against him it was objected, that his doctrine of hereditary sin and its propagation, was absurd; that it would lead to the disapproval of matrimony; and that, affirming the corruption of human nature, and a connate worthiness of punishment, was making God the author of evil, and an unrighteous judge.—

'Desirous of explaining, precisely, the activity of man, and the influences of God, *Pelagius* discriminated between the *power*, the *will*, and the *act;* and he attributed the first to God, the second to man, and the third to both united. [When a man *wills* to do good, God gives him the *power*, and so both have a part in the *act*.] By the ambiguous term *grace*, he understood, sometimes, divine instructions, and sometimes, other means of moral improvement; but never, any divine energy that impaired the free operations of the will. *Augustin*, on the contrary, subverted, substantially at least, the freedom of the will; and derived all that was good in man, solely from divine *grace;* by which he understood an internal operation upon the soul, whereby it received, not only the *power*, but also the *will*, to do good. This grace, he maintained to be indispensable to man, at all times, and for all duties: without it, no man can do a good act; and even with it, no man is entirely free from sin. All this he inferred either from his idea of hereditary sin, or from such passages of Scripture as John viii. 31, 32. Phil. ii. 13. 2 Cor. iii. 5, 6. But he exposed himself to the objection, that, like the Manichaeans, he annihilated the freedom of the will, and must look upon all precepts and exhortations to virtue as nugatory.

'From his conviction, that all men are totally depraved, and incapable of good deeds, there was no way left, for *Augustin* to answer the question, Why are some converted and saved, and others not,—but to ascribe it to the sovereign will of God. And thus was formed, his doctrine of *unconditional predestination;* according to which, God destined some men to blessedness, without regard to their merits and conduct, from his mere good pleasure; while he leaves others in their sins, and sentences them to punishment, in order to exhibit his justice. These doctrines not only forced themselves upon him, as consequences of the other parts of his system; but he believed, they could be established by the Scripture, Rom. ix; and he took great pains to soften down their harsh features, and to meet the objections to

their injurious practical tendency. From them flowed, spontaneously, the ideas of irresistible divine influences, of special grace, and particular redemption, and of the infallible perseverance of the elect.—

'Great as the influence of Augustin was, his principles gained no currency, among the Eastern Christians; and even in the West, opposition was raised; especially by the Gallican divines, who believed that, men still have some ability to do good, by means of which, though they cannot *merit* divine grace, yet they can *prepare* themselves to receive it; and that God's purpose to save, depends on the foreseen use made of this power. *John Cassianus* was the most noted divine of this party; and *Faustus*, Bishop of Riez, brought *Lucidus* an Augustinian, to change his sentiments, A. D. 475. The controversy between the *Massilians*, (Semi-Pelagians,) and those called *Predestinarians*, continued for some time; but in the year 529, the opinions of the former were condemned, in the Councils of Arausio (Orange) and Valentia (Valence;) and the decision was confirmed by the Romish Bishops.'—pp. 73–7.

The Orthodox of the present day lay particular stress on their explications of the atonement, or the effects of Christ's death; thinking, it would seem, that on this point the Scriptures are too plain and decisive to admit of the possibility of an honest difference of opinion. Dr Muenscher shows, however, that there was no question, in the whole compass of theology, respecting which the early Christians were so confused, inconsistent, and utterly at fault.

'Jesus Christ was described, as being, in various respects, the greatest benefactor of mankind; and for proof, mention was made of his excellent instructions, his noble example, the communication of powers for holiness, his overthrowing the dominion of evil spirits, and procuring immortality. At the same time, as *Irenaeus*, and even *Gregory* of Nazianzum, assert, the theologians were left free, to form their own conceptions of the design and effects of the incarnation and sufferings of Christ: and it is not strange, therefore, that we should find them to have entertained different views.—

'Both *Irenaeus* and *Origen* had, in their day, represented the death of Christ, sometimes, as *a ransom given* to the devil, and sometimes, as *a debt paid* to God. In accordance with the first of these hypotheses, most of the fathers spoke of the death of Christ, as being the means of the rescue of mankind from the dominion of the devil, under which sin had brought them: and they sometimes go upon the assumption, that on the principle of

distributive justice, the power of the devil was taken from him, because he misused it upon Jesus Christ; at other times, they represent redemption as being, either *a combat*, or *a bargain*, with the devil. *Gregory* of Nazianzum, however, rejects the idea, that Jesus Christ paid a ransom to *the devil*. Others of the fathers,—as *Athanasius* and *Cyril*,—go upon the principle of *a debt paid* to God; and they consider the death of Christ, as the *stipulated condition*, on which God can, without injury to his veracity, release men from the death threatened to them. Some of them also assert, that Jesus Christ paid more than was necessary for the redemption of the human race. Lastly, there were some, who supposed, that the whole *mass* of human nature, was elevated and ennobled, by the Son of God's participating in it. It remained undetermined, whether the death of Christ was *indispensable*, in order to the salvation of men. Respecting the *extent* of redemption, *Origen* advanced the idea, that Christ died, not merely for men, but for all intelligent creatures: but this idea was, by all the other fathers, except perhaps *Gregory* of Nyssa and *Didymus*, either silently rejected, or expressly disapproved.'—pp. 78, 79.

In giving a history of the doctrines which have been held in the church since the Reformation, Dr Muenscher dwells particularly, as might be expected, on the controversies, and the present state of opinion, in Germany. Speaking of the views prevalent in that country respecting the scriptures, he says;—

'In Germany, about the middle of the eighteenth century, the criticism of the Bible had made considerable advances, when investigations were renewed, respecting its Canon. *John Sol. Semler* commenced them, and also assailed the common ideas of inspiration; by which he would understand, the practical effect of the biblical doctrines. With more calmness and distinctness, *John Gottlieb Toellner* endeavoured to explain the nature of inspiration, and to establish the different gradations of it. The consequences of these investigations were, that the more recent theologians distinguished, more accurately, the christian doctrine (the word of God) from the Bible; that they considered the latter, not so much as one entire revealed record, as a collection of writings, in which every man must perceive the peculiar characteristics and modes of thinking of the respective writers; that they endeavoured, by means of the higher criticism, to ascertain the origin and compilation of the scriptures; and that they considered them, as containing (μυθους) fictions or allegories.'—p. 165.

Great dissimilarity of opinion prevails, he tells us, among the German theologians, respecting the trinity; but those who

profess to believe the doctrine, agree, generally, after the example of Toellner, in ascribing to no one of the different theories on the subject so high importance, as was formerly ascribed to them; and by many the doctrine, under all its forms, is openly impugned.

Following in the steps of Dr Sykes and Dr Farmer, J. S. Semler was the first, in Germany, who declared the demoniacs of the New Testament to be persons laboring under natural disease. In the controversy that ensued, most of the divines inclined to the opinion, that the whole doctrine concerning the devil, was merely an accommodation, derived from Judaism. We learn, too, that, of late, the high ideas heretofore prevailing, respecting the perfection of the first human beings, have been greatly lowered; and the Mosaic account of the creation, and of the transgression of the first man, has been regarded as either partially, or wholly, a figurative representation, or as being an ancient fable or fiction. The German divines have deviated also as widely, according to Dr Muenscher, from the views held by the first reformers respecting original sin, and sin itself.

'The doctrine of the Protestant churches respecting hereditary sin, was as strong, as Augustin ever advanced; for, the milder statements of *Zwingle*, were not regarded. It did not indeed deprive men avowedly of liberty; but it made them absolutely unfitted to perform anything morally good, and deserving of damnation. It was decided, however, in the Formula of Concord, in opposition to Matthias Flacius, that hereditary sin is not a part of the substance of man. The Council of *Trent*, on account of the prevailing differences in the bosom of the Catholic church, did not venture to establish a definition of hereditary sin; so that different explanations of it, continued to be given; for the *Dominicans* and *Augustinians* held more closely with Augustin and Thomas Aquinas, while the *Franciscans* and *Jesuits* departed farther from them. The *Socinians* rejected hereditary sin, altogether: and the *Arminians* would not allow of a connate desert of punishment, and an unfitness for what is good. Attempts were made, in the Protestant churches, to render the imputation of Adam's sin more comprehensible. *Joshua de la Place* rejected the immediate imputation of it; but his idea was not embraced, by his own church, or that of Switzerland. At last, several voices were raised in England, against hereditary sin; as those of *John Locke*, *Thomas Burnet*, and *John Taylor*. *Daniel Whitby* would derive the universal prevalence of sin, from man's mortality; which Adam's

transgression had brought upon all his posterity. In Germany, the foundation for a change of sentiments, was laid by the Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy; and subsequently, *Toellner* and *Eberhard* directly assailed the doctrine of hereditary sin, and its imputation: and notwithstanding *Seiler*, and others, advocated the other side; it became more and more common, to trace the sinfulness of mankind, not from the apostacy of Adam, but as *Jerusalem* does, from the influence of the senses. Even those theologians, who, like *Reinhard* and *Storr*, continue to maintain the existence of hereditary sin, have abandoned the old doctrine of the church, in some very important particulars, The *Kantean* hypothesis, of a radical evil in human nature, continued no longer, than the charm of its novelty endured: yet it has contributed to establish the principle, that every sin originates from a man's own fault.'—pp. 176, 177.

The following is a brief sketch of the recent changes in the explication of the doctrine of atonement.

'While some English divines, as *John Taylor* and *Anth. Ashley Sykes*, were advancing new theories respecting the atonement, the Germans remained true to the earlier belief, and endeavoured to support it by philosophical arguments. Yet *J. Aug. Ernesti* rejected the representation of a three-fold office of Christ. By his critical inquiries respecting the active obedience of Christ, *John Gottl. Toellner* caused the idea of it, to be almost universally given up. *S. Steinbart, Joh. Aug. Eberhard*, and others, ascribed the forgiveness of sin to the death of Christ, only in so far, as this death contributed to reform sinners, and thus, indirectly, procured them forgiveness of their sins. *George Fred. Seiler*, and *G. Christ. Storr*, defended the earlier opinion. *Jos. Fred. Loeffler* declared the doctrine of satisfaction for sin, to be untenable; and he considered the biblical doctrine of the sin-offering made by Christ, to be the mere dress of the idea, that the first Christians had no reason to fear punishment, for the sins they had committed in their former state of Paganism and Judaism. Others perceived in the death of Christ, an emblematic representation, and a sensible confirmation, of the fact, that God is ready to forgive sinners. But, in general, theologians have ceased to regard any particular explication of this doctrine, as essential to Christianity.'—pp. 185, 186.

It is the fashion to speak disparagingly of the labors of the English divines, especially when compared with the modern Germans; but it will be seen that the latter, after all, have, on many subjects, only followed out suggestions, which they borrowed from the former. Dr Priestley's merits as a historian and particularly his History of the Corruptions of Christianity,

have also been treated by some with affected indifference and contempt. The last mentioned book, however, is the only English work on 'dogmatic history,' which Dr Muenscher includes in his list of authorities on the subject. That it contains some mistakes and blunders, is granted; but none greater, it is believed, than Dr Muenscher's respecting Priestley himself, whom he represents as 'placing the resurrection of men, immediately after their death.' We have room for but one more extract.

'The various speculations concerning the place, and the condition, of the blessed and the damned, scarcely deserve to be described. Of more importance is the inquiry, respecting the *duration* of future punishment; on which subject, all the variety of opinions, that existed in former times among Christians, still continued. Yet the prevailing sentiment, and that which was expressed in the Augsburg Confession, and in other Creeds, was in favor of the *eternity* of future punishment. This was evinced, not only by proofs from the holy Scriptures, but also on rational grounds. The *Socinians*, however, held to a punishment, which would terminate, with the annihilation of the damned. Besides, there were always some, who advocated a full restitution, of all men, to virtue and blessedness; among whom, *John William Petersen, Thomas Burnet, William Whiston, Maria Huber*, and *Petitpierre*, were the most distinguished. Many theologians have begun to soften down the common representation. *John Tillotson* and *Godfrey Less*, admitted, that God had *threatened* everlasting punishment to the wicked; but they doubted whether he would execute his threatenings, in their full extent. *James Vernet* believed, that the goodness of God, in remitting punishment, ought not to be circumscribed. The *Wolfian* philosophy was, at first, employed to evince the eternity of hell torments; but it afterwards led to a confutation of this doctrine; by advancing the principles, that the *justice* of God is merely his *goodness*, directed by wisdom; and that the grand object of divine punishments, is the reformation of offenders. And hence, *J. A. Eberhard, B. Basedow*, and *J. F. Grüner*, held forth the reformation and salvation of the damned. Others, have either left the question wholly undecided, or have referred the eternity, mentioned in the Scripture, only to *the place* of punishment; or have stopped at the never-ending *disadvantages*, which the neglect of repentance in the present life, will bring along with it in the life to come.'—p. 202.

We cannot close this notice without expressing a hope, that Dr Murdock will meet with encouragement in this work, and

in other similar undertakings, in which he is understood to be engaged. Every doctrine, we are aware, must be proved from scripture, or refuted from scripture, and not from history. Still it will do not a little to break the influence, which many corruptions of Christianity have gained over the public mind, to point out when, and by whom, they were introduced.

ART. III.—*Poetry of the Magyars, preceded by a Sketch of the Language and Literature of Hungary and Transylvania.* By JOHN BOWRING, LL. D., F. L. S., &c. &c. London, 1830. 12mo. pp. 396.

No little credit is due to Dr Bowring for the zeal with which he explores the before neglected and obscure repositories of foreign poetry, and for the enthusiasm and despatch with which he brings his collections successively forth into fair English day-light. And in these times of literary competition, it is fame enough for one man, that he has struck into a new path, and traversed it in many various windings, with excellent success, and hitherto without a competitor. The speed of his travelling is exemplary. From the snows of Russia, he is away, in an instant, to the olive-yards of Spain; then back to the fens and flats of Holland; again over the hills to Servia; next to poor divided Poland, to hear what they have to sing to him there; now he is among the peasants of Hungary; and by and by, he tells us, we shall hear of him from Denmark and Norway and Bohemia. This rapidity is proof of a quick and fervid genius, a capacity of constant effort, and a great facility in the acquisition of languages; while the countries which he selects for his investigations have a wild, romantic, indefinite interest about them, which is fitted to attract attention to his labors, and excite curiosity with regard to the result.

We have a misgiving, however, that these translations of national poetry are produced rather too fast for their best reputation. Or perhaps the translator has parted with a little of the early zest with which he first set out upon his course. Or perhaps we ourselves are unjust to what has lost in some degree the charm of novelty. Certain it is that the first of Dr Bowring's series of specimens appears to us to be the best.

We have not forgotten the regale which we received, some ten years ago, from the sweet fragrance of the Russian Anthology. We have waited for such another in vain. The odors have come fainter to us from other lands. It seems to us that such poetry as that of Derzhavin and Lomonosov, replete with such noble and beautiful sentiments, and translated with such spirit and so musically, has not been presented to us, in the succeeding collections. Perhaps there was none such to be offered; and if so, the translator is in no way responsible for the character of what he translates.

One thing we are ready to acknowledge; which is, that if the volume before us is inferior to the Russian Specimens in its poetry, it has the advantage over them in its nationality. That is to say, there are more pieces in it which bear the stamp of something peculiar and distinct in national habits, customs and modes of thinking and feeling, than there are in the Russian Anthology, the poetry of which is of a civilized, polished, and less original character. We are under great obligations to Dr Bowring for introducing us, as he has in the present volume, among the people themselves, and teaching us those little peculiarities and familiar ways, belonging to them as a branch of the universal family, which cannot be taught so well, if at all, by sober history. The knowledge which we gain, and so pleasantly too, through his varied labors, assists us greatly in the comprehension of history itself. When we read historical accounts of a foreign nation, whose popular songs have been repeated to us by him, we feel that we already know something of them, and have, almost unawares, formed an acquaintance with them and their country, which we could hardly have acquired in any other way, except by actually visiting and conversing with them. And when we say that the Russian Anthology of Bowring is preferred by us to his later works of the same kind, we mean only that the former bears the marks of being executed with greater care and attention, and contains a higher order of poetry than the latter. We do not mean that the latter are not executed tastefully and spiritedly. Our admiration is, that he translates so much, and translates so well.

The work before us, is introduced by an essay on the Magyar language, or common language of Hungary, followed by interesting biographical notices of the Magyar poets. In these notices we have accounts of no less than fifty individuals, beginning with Tinódi, who flourished in the middle of the six-

teenth century, and ending with Kisfaludy, Kázinczi, Döbrentei, and other living authors. The language is of unknown antiquity, is euphonous, and, though for a time it was greatly neglected, is now diligently cultivated by a host of distinguished writers.

The three principal and almost engrossing topics of the specimens presented to us, are love, war, and wine. The feeling manifested in the amatory pieces, is, generally speaking, chaste though ardent. The war and drinking songs may be good of their kind, but we have no disposition to quote any effusions, on those subjects, original or translated; though it was highly proper that they should be exhibited in the work, to complete the design of its publication. As we went along through the book, we met with little poetry of a moral or religious nature, and still less which expressed moral or religious sentiments in such a manner as to rouse the attention and warm and elevate the soul. The Magyar literature, is, we should think, still young and simple.

A few extracts, taken, with some care of selection, from different parts of the volume, may enable our readers to form a judgment of its contents, and engage their favorable interest.

The pensive, domestic tone of the following sonnet by Francis Kázinczi, must ensure for it a kind perusal.

'My little bark of life is gently speeding
Adown the stream 'midst rocks, and sands, and eddies,
And gathering storms, and darkening clouds—unheeding,
Its quiet course through waves and winds it steadies.
My love is with me—and my babes—whose kisses
Sweep sorrow's trace from off my brow as fast
As gathering there—and hung upon the mast
Are harp and myrtle flowers, that shed their blisses
On the sweet air. Is darkness on my path?
Then beams bright radiance from a star that hath
Its temple in the heaven. As firm as youth
I urge my onward way—there is no fear
For honest spirits.—Even the fates revere
And recompense—love, minstrelsy, and truth.'—p. 63.

A comparison, not an original one, however, is thus prettily expressed in four lines by Michael Vitkovics.

'Love, my sweet Lidi! resembles the fugitive shadows of morning;
Shorter and shorter they grow, and at length disappear.

Friendship—*our* friendship—is like the beautiful shadows of evening,
Spreading and growing till life and its light pass away.'—p. 99.

There is more novelty in another comparison of the same length, by Verseghi, and quite as much truth.

'Empty yet and green, that corn-ear tosses high its lofty brow;
See it ripe and full and golden, bend in meek submission now.
Such is boyhood in its folly—shallow, proud, and insolent;—
Such is manhood in its wisdom—modest, and in calmness bent.'
p. 200.

Our next specimen is from the Popular Songs, and is of a higher character. The original was written, we are told, as early as the year 1657.

'Time flies on eagle-wings away,
It will not for a moment stay,
But like a stream glides on—glides on;
It never turns its footsteps back,
But sinks all ages in its track,
And reigns and rules alone.
The poor, the rich, alike pursues;
The poor, the rich, alike subdues;
Who can withstand it? None!

'There 's only one whose mightier strength
The strength of time o'erpowers at length,
And sits in quiet victory;
Time's sickle mows it not; time's flight
Brings nor decay, nor death, nor blight,
But passes harmless by;
There 's only one—'t is virtuous fame,
Through shifting ages still the same,
It shines eternally.'—p. 209.

The following popular song is interesting, as the tale of a poetical and affectionate custom among the Hungarian boys. It is thus explained by Dr Bowring in a note. 'When in the spring the storks first appear on Csalóköz, (one of the islands of the Danube,) the boys of Hungary assemble with drums, and fifes, and violins, and welcome the birds with this simple song. It is an universal opinion among the lower classes of the Hungarians, that the storks (which they look upon with great tenderness) pass their winter in Turkey, where, according to the

stories of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, every species of cruelty was practised upon them.'

'Stork! Stork! poor Stork!
Why is thy foot so bloody?
A Turkish boy hath torn it,
Hungarian boy will heal it,
With viols, fifes, and drums.'—p. 237.

We close our extracts with the following Song of Departure, also one of the Popular Songs.

'God bless ye! God bless ye! God bless ye! I say;
The horses are harnessed, and I must away!
Old friends! Early home!
All blessings be yours!
Let angels look smilingly down from heaven's shores,
Let the grace of the Deity hitherward come,
And fling all its light o'er futurity's day.

'Farewell, holy Love! Sweet Affection, farewell!
Here let sports full of joy, gay-toned harmony dwell,
And freedom and peace.
Can I linger? O no!
The steeds are prepared—I must go—I must go;
For the duties of life will allow no release,
And its pleasures are buried in memory's cell.'—p. 282.

One fault we have now to find with this book, though it is one which respects only its mechanical structure. To us, economical Americans, there seems to be an unpardonable waste of paper in it, producing, of course, a considerable enhancement of price. We have no objection to splendid type, dazzling paper, and margins of a generous width. But when a bit of poetry, no ways remarkable in its character, and of the length of two lines, must have a whole page to itself, like Selkirk on his island, the 'monarch of all it surveys,' we think the noble science of book-making is carried a little too far. This is done in the volume before us, not once or twice only, but often. Indeed, however short the pieces may be, two are never placed together on the same page. For instance, the second extract which we gave, consists of four lines. It is installed on its white and solitary page. The next in the book, by the same author, consisting of two lines, occupies another page; and the next, of four lines, monopolizes a third. Three

pages to eleven lines! In our eyes, there is not even beauty in this fashion, to recommend it. Like some other fashions, it is expensive, without being suitable or graceful.

ART. IV.—*Sermons, accompanied by suitable Prayers, designed to be used in Families. Second Edition.* Edited by the Rev. J. R. BEARD. London, 1829. 8vo. pp. 492.

IF our readers will suppose a volume of the Liberal Preacher to have been published at once instead of being issued in monthly numbers, they will have a precise idea of the manner in which this collection has been made. It is in fact the Liberal Preacher of England, containing specimens of the sermons of seventeen Unitarian ministers in different parts of the kingdom. The subjects are of a practical character, without any mixture of doctrinal controversy, as would be expected in a selection designed for use in domestic instruction; and the discourses probably give a fair notion of the every day style and manner of the pulpit among our English brethren. In this point of view the volume is particularly interesting. We in this country have known little of the preaching in our English chapels, except through the medium of occasional discourses delivered at anniversary celebrations; and these being of course uniformly of a doctrinal or polemic cast, the impression has become pretty general that such is the usual character of Unitarian preaching in the mother land. Now nothing could be more unwarranted than such an inference; it being evident, at a glance, to any one who reflects, that occasional discourses will naturally have occasional subjects, and instead of indicating a preacher's usual choice of topics, are to be taken as express departures from it. Certainly, any one of the preachers amongst ourselves, who have been accustomed of late years to use extraordinary celebrations as opportunities for doctrinal and controversial discussion, would be extremely mortified at its being thence inferred that this is his habitual mode; and we should smile, as well as grieve, at the simplicity of the man who should believe, on the testimony of such discourses, that our denomination is mainly given to this class of teaching, and that our pulpits are forever ringing with the unprofitable din of po-

lemic war. For we know very well, that there is no one who thus preaches often, many who do so almost never; and that some who have been most decided and loud in their proclamation of Unitarian peculiarities at extraordinary seasons, are among the most noted for a thoroughly practical, devotional, and experimental tone, in their ordinary course of duty. Yet a foreigner, who should judge of us only by those publications which reach him at a distance, and which are for the most part those that the times have called forth, might readily imagine that we are a people more given to dispute than godliness, and that our pulpits are wholly devoted to contention and strife. It is, however, precisely in this way that we ourselves have too thoughtlessly come to fancy the preaching of our English brethren to be prevailingly controversial. It is an ungrounded impression. Any one, who has been among them, knows, that on ordinary occasions, that is, in their own chapels from sabbath to sabbath, their preaching is altogether practical. Polemic discourses are as seldom heard and strongly disrelished as on this side the water; so that when it seems necessary or expedient that such should be delivered, extraordinary seasons have been appointed for them, with the very intention of not interrupting the regular course of practical instruction, by discussions, to many unprofitable and unacceptable. Hence those courses of doctrinal lectures, which we have seen advertised on the covers of their theological magazines, and which have led some to accuse them of being perpetually engaged in polemic warfare, but which in fact are proof of the contrary.

The volume before us is calculated to remove the impression of which we have been speaking;—much more so, we are constrained to add, than the Liberal Preacher to remove any similar impression which might exist in regard to ourselves. We must confess, that, in this respect, that valuable periodical has disappointed us. We could have wished, we had hoped, that while we have magazines and tracts designed and adapted to advance, defend, and disseminate our views of doctrinal and controverted truth, the Preacher would have gone on to speak of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, without mingling, in any degree, in the differences and disturbances of the time. We had hoped that it would act on the principle of the old worthy, who begged, that, while all others were engaged in preaching to the unhappy times, he at least might be permitted to speak for eternity. And this the rather, because

a fairer view would thus have been given of the actual state of our pulpits, which we are sure have been less infected by the disastrous differences of the day, than the few controversial sermons in the Liberal Preacher would lead us to infer. Mr Beard has done better, we think, in altogether excluding such topics from his volume.

We do not know how far we should be safe in deciding, from the volume before us, concerning the state of preaching as an art, and the standard of clerical ability in England. It is not easy to know whether these seventeen names fairly represent the whole body of ministers, or whether the sermon of each individual fairly represents its author. In the parallel case of the Liberal Preacher, we have a strong impression, that a stranger would be led by it to an erroneous judgment. At any rate, we are sure with respect to several individuals, that they have done themselves great injustice in the discourses which they have selected for publication in that work. They are discourses which have by no means given proof of the actual excellence, which their authors ordinarily exhibit. We are indeed quite sure, that the work, as a whole, is below the actual standard of pulpit composition, and furnishes an eminently striking illustration of the common remark, that a preacher is the most unfit of all persons, to judge of the comparative merit of his own discourses. Now it is possible that Mr Beard's volume may be an equally fallacious guide; and we would not rashly decide from its testimony, respecting the state of pulpit eloquence, or the character of individual sermonizers. We will say, however, that it is a volume of which no men need be ashamed. We have read it with great satisfaction. And we recommend it, with confidence, to those who would acquaint themselves with the style of preaching among our brethren abroad, or would possess a book of valuable practical divinity for domestic perusal, or would furnish a parish library with a wholesome work for circulation. It reached a second edition at home, within a few months after the publication of the first, and it is not improbable, we understand, that it may be followed by another similar volume. If it be so, we shall hope to meet with some names which we have been disappointed not to find in the collection before us.

The subjects of these discourses, as we have said, are all practical, and adapted to the object of the work as a book 'for family use.' Family worship, early piety, education, the gov-

ernment of the temper, the social and relative duties, the connexion of religion with common life, its inward power, its uses in friendship, its power in sickness and affliction, &c., are the topics treated.

Of such a volume, we shall not, of course, be expected to give an analysis. It is enough to have indicated the general character of its contents. A few extracts will serve as specimens. The first is from a sermon by the venerable William Turner, of Newcastle, on Bearing one another's Burdens. Mr Turner has been one of the most actively useful men of his generation, and no one could see him without believing that his whole life has been regulated by the spirit of kindness, which breathes in the following passage.

'But, perhaps, you will say, "Such a one's temper and manners are quite provoking, or ridiculous and contemptible." But is the fault really in him, or in yourself? Are not *you* too easily provoked, or too prone to ridicule and contempt? But, be it as you say, you tell me only that he is but a man, and consequently imperfect; and you, as an imperfect human being also, ought to bear with him. Would you be thought to be his superior? Show your real greatness of mind and good sense, by patience and forbearance. He gives you a fair opportunity to take the lead of him in true excellence; in which case, all the world will soon acknowledge your superiority; and he himself will be sensible of it at length. But you say, "You see no reason why you should make yourself a slave to another's unreasonable temper and whimsical humor." But why that harsh word *slave?* These severe and unkind expressions do more than we are aware, to indispose us for the performance of our harder duties, and to aggravate our disagreeable feelings. Must you not endure the other inconveniences to which this imperfect world subjects you; and is not it prudent to make as light of them, to call them by as soft names, and bear them as easily, as you can? This also is one of the unavoidable inconveniences of human life, to meet with imperfect tempers and characters in those with whom we converse. Bear it as easily as you can; and to this end, forbear harsh words and strong expressions, which only tend the more to inflame the tempers of those who indulge in them. "But people ought to correct and alter their own bad propensities and selfish whims, and not torment other persons with them." *Torment*, do you say? Will you still go on to use these harsh and bitter terms? Depend upon it, they will, in their consequences, really torment *you* much more. But consider what a law you are establishing against yourself. Are you sure that *you* have nothing wrong to

correct in *your own* temper? Are you sure that *you* have eradicated everything perverse and whimsical out of your own spirit? Have you nothing that requires patience and forbearance from others? While you talk in such strains as these, we can never believe it, because these very expressions discover, at least, great peevishness and vanity. It would be much better for you, and for every one, to observe and correct their own imperfections as much as they can; but to be less quick-sighted with regard to those of others: to consider that ourselves and others, after all our care and pains with ourselves, must still continue subject to many defects, for we shall still be only human creatures; and ought to make all due allowance for each other as such. Good-nature could find out many pleas to fortify patience, if we were only disposed to practise it. For instance, we know not under what unhappiness of natural constitution, and of temper arising from such constitution, our friends may labor; on account of which, they are rather to be pitied and borne with, than blamed, at least by us. We know not what prejudice may have been done to the general frame and temper of their minds, by an imprudent or improper education, or by the ill-treatment or the misfortunes they may have suffered, or by casual distempers and infirmities. We know not how deeply they may have themselves been sensible of their particular infirmities, and how much they have been mortified with, and what pains they have on many occasions taken to correct, them. We should consider, also, their peculiar excellences, as well as their defects, and balance the one against the other. We shall often find that they who have some peculiar weaknesses, have also some peculiar perfections of character, which entitle them to a very high degree of esteem. Nay, often the weakness will be found to rise out of some unfortunate turn or direction of the peculiar excellence. These, and many other such good-natured excuses, we should all be ready to make in favor of one another. We all owe them, we all need them, and by means of them we should all become much more tolerable, much more agreeable, much more amiable, in the estimation of one another.'—pp. 170–2.

We quote next from a sermon by Mr Robberds, of Manchester.

'Unbelief, or, what is nearly the same thing, a belief of the lips, of form, of custom only—an assent of the opinion, without the consent of the heart and will—is the great obstacle to the diffusion of Christian principles and Christian energies among mankind. It is the stone rolled to the mouth of the sepulchre, in which all truly Christian feelings lie buried, and made as secure as the world's seal can make it. One word alone, received into

the depth of the heart, and understood in all the glories and all the terrors of its meaning, has the power of lightning and thunder and earthquake, to roll away all worldly impediments, and to bring forth the Christian principle new-risen and triumphant over the death of sin. Believe—not as those who know not what or why they should believe—not as those who repeat the words of welcome to a deliverer, without feeling any need or desire of deliverance—not as those who hear the word, without either understanding or caring to understand it, who receive the scriptures without reading them, and call Jesus Lord, without inquiring what are his commands;—but as those who have heard what holy men and prophets and apostles do witness, and who know that their witness is true—as those who gave up all things for Christ, and "counted all things as nothing, compared with the excellency of the knowledge of Christ." Believe—that God hath indeed raised from the dead our Lord Jesus Christ, and that in this he hath given assurance that, by the same Jesus, he will judge the world in righteousness. Believe—that every hour has its work, every action, word, and thought its importance as well as its witness. Believe—and be not as those indifferent, those sleeping Christians, whose life is a mere dream of a good-natured Deity, exacting no services, winking at all offences, and inflicting no punishments: but beware, lest you also fall asleep, like them, in this golden dream of life and heaven, and awake at last, where you can only "believe and tremble."'—pp. 324, 325.

We have room but for one more passage, and that shall be taken from the discourses on the Religious and Moral Education of the Young, by Mr Montgomery of Belfast. It forms part of an address to parents.

'But, whilst you manifest your Christian spirit and temper, by all becoming acts of reasonable kindness, never forget, that religion gives no sanction to those criminal indulgences, which corrupt the heart and degrade the character. It is natural, it is laudable, it is useful to be indulgent; it is even right, perhaps, not to appear to observe trifling faults and follies, involving no depravity of principle, and leading to no injurious results: but, wherever the gratification of an appetite or a desire might lead, even in its remote consequences, to destructive habits or immoral actions, the firmest resistance should be maintained. It is chiefly from mothers, that undue indulgence is to be apprehended. Beneficently gifted by the Deity with a stronger portion of natural affection, to sustain them in the discharge of the irksome and important duties which devolve upon them, they can scarcely be blamed for an excess of tenderness; although it is our bounden duty to warn them of its consequences. I would ask, then, any

Christian mother, why she often withholds correction, which she believes to be necessary, and indulges with gratifications, which she knows to be injurious? Her probable answer would be—that she cannot bear the idea of inflicting pain upon a creature that is so dear to her heart! But, were her child laboring under a dangerous disease, would she not administer the most nauseous medicines, or subject it to the most painful operation, in order to restore it to health and soundness? Or, suppose that it clamored for some sweet, that was mingled with a deadly poison, would she gratify its palate at the expense of its life? No: in such cases, she would not only judge correctly, but also act rightly. And, is the case less urgent or less important, because her child only labors under a moral distemper, or because he only desires to enjoy a momentary gratification, which will poison his mind and corrupt his heart? Surely, every argument which would influence her, in the instance of bodily suffering, or the refusal of the poisoned dainty, ought to have a thousand fold the force, in the case of moral disease, or moral contagion. Just in proportion to the difference between body and soul, time and eternity, should be her serious estimate of her maternal duty! Never ought she to shrink, in destructive weakness, from a prompt obedience to the command of Scripture: "Withhold not correction from thy child: if thou beatest him with a rod, he will not die, and thou mayst thereby deliver his soul from destruction." The pain of a moment, may save him from years of suffering; and the unwarrantable indulgence of an hour, may be followed by ages of remorse! The malignity of a demon could devise no system more destructive to virtue and happiness, than one which is often generated in the fond heart of a Christian mother. I refer to the deeply culpable practice, of concealing the offences of children from the knowledge of their fathers; and the still more criminal custom, of supplying them in secret with the means of frivolous or sensual gratification. Were a mother to place a dagger in the hands of her son, to be turned against his own breast, she would be arming him with a much less dangerous weapon, than a supply of money for purposes of riot and debauchery. By such disastrous means, millions of young persons have been overwhelmed with destruction. And, yet, unfortunate mothers who practise these things, often complain of the ingratitude of their children, and wonder that they do not love them more, and respect them more! Now, the only wonder to me is, that such mothers should expect any return of gratitude or affection. After having corrupted their children from infancy, by ruinous indulgence; after having taught them hypocrisy and fraud, by their own example; after having put the poisoned cup of sensuality and crime into their very hands—it would be amazing, if they entertained towards them any other

sentiments than those of contempt and aversion. The very indulgences upon which they rest as a ground of affection, have destroyed all the native and amiable sensibilities of the heart. I do not recollect having seen, in the whole course of my life, a weakly and indiscriminately indulgent mother, sincerely respected and beloved by her children; but I have known many, who have been repaid for their injudicious kindness, by heart-rending neglect or insult. The firm and prudent mother alone, who has the good sense to unite general kindness with occasional and salutary restraint, becomes an object of permanent respect and affection. Her tenderness is justly appreciated, because it is considered as a proof of approbation, and not as a mere thoughtless, instinctive impulse; and even her very denial of hurtful gratification is accompanied by a manner and an explanation, eminently calculated to enforce conviction and secure esteem. Such a mother walks amidst her children as an object of affectionate reverence, an equitable distributor of rewards and punishments; from whose justice, propriety of conduct is always secure of a recompense, and from whose weakness, criminality cannot speculate upon impunity.'—pp. 404–7.

We had marked many other passages, but find that we should fill our number, if we should go on to print all which we wish our readers to see. We therefore stop here, and wait in expectation of another volume.

ART. V.—*The Vestal, or a Tale of Pompeii.* Boston. GRAY & BOWEN. 1830. 12mo. pp. 220.

WE were attracted by the title of this work. There is a charm in the very name of Pompeii. For nearly seventeen hundred years, the ill-fated city was supposed to be forever lost; and even its site could not be precisely ascertained, till about the middle of the last century, when some accidental excavations led to the discovery of the subterraneous town. Its wonderful preservation, under the ashes of Vesuvius, has contributed large stores to our knowledge of ancient arts, civilization, and modes of life. The city remains unchanged by the wasting influence of time. What it was eighteen centuries ago, it is now. The moving tide of population, the hum of business, the mirthful sounds of pleasure, alone are wanting. Material forms appear 'fresh as if left but yesterday.' Here are private dwell-

ings, retaining the names of their proprietors; theatres, temples; culinary utensils of various descriptions, many of them resembling those now in use; articles of food, bread, fruits; surgical instruments, remarkable for their elegance; children's toys, and female ornaments,—bracelets, rings, 'pins for the hair ornamented with ivory;' tombs, bearing legible inscriptions, some in an unfinished state,—blocks of marble necessary to their completion being strewed around, as if the workmen had just been called off from their labors; human skeletons in various positions, indicating the situation of the individuals to whom they belonged, at the moment they were overwhelmed,—some in the act of flight, taking along with them such light articles as they were most anxious to preserve—some at table, where they had just been dining, the relics of their meal still lying before them,—some prepared for plunder, having keys and picklocks about them; soldiers at their posts; and prisoners with their feet in stocks. A strange and mysterious interest is attached to every object of sight and touch.

The present tale is of slight texture, not overloaded with incidents, but forming the frame-work of much pleasing sentiment and description, and embodying many facts and incidents of the times and country in which the scene is laid.

With regard to 'places and things' described in the work, the author has been guided, as he assures us, by information obtained on the spot, and has adhered strictly to facts, except in two or three instances, which he specifies in his preface. With respect to 'dates,' he has given us fair warning that he has taken some liberty. Pompeii was overwhelmed in the year 79, during the reign of Titus. But to enhance the interest of his story, he has deferred the event till the persecution of the Christians, under Domitian, A. D. 95.

His hero, whose name is Lucius, is made, for the most part, to relate his own adventures. The influences under which his youthful character—visionary, reserved, impassioned, and indolent—was formed, are thus described at the commencement of the narrative.

'Born amid the free and beautiful scenes of nature, solitude produced its usual effect on a sensitive temperament, and, I may say, a rather cultivated mind. I loved it. I wooed it, as a lover a mistress. I was never happy but when wandering under the leafy arches of the woods. The noonday sun and starry midnight found me still faithful to this first love. Often would I pass

the long summer's day, stretched lazily on the bank of a little stream, that flowed noisily enough through the depths of a wood, which I had made my favorite haunt, watching the figures of the clouds that seemed to float over me as lazy and as listless as myself. There I bowed in secret to the Dryads, and Naiads, and Oreads; while a little Harpocrates stood crowned with flowers upon the bank of the stream, which I had thus dedicated to silence and myself.

'My character, suffered thus to fashion itself amid such scenes, became, as commonly happens under such circumstances, dreamy and visionary. I was naturally shy, and proud, and diffident. Of course, I was reserved; and many took reserve for coldness, and believed the heart to be cold as Alpine snows, whose feelings were deep and intense as the secret fires of Vesuvius. What mattered it to me? I cared not, or I thought I cared not, for the opinions of others. But I knew not myself. I knew not that such an education causes at the same time extreme sensibility to the opinions of others, and perfect inability to step boldly forth on the arena of life, and wrestle manfully against them.'—pp. 2, 3.

From this retreat his father resolves to remove, and occupy a villa in his possession 'in the suburbs of Pompeii, and just without the gate;' chiefly, it seems, for the purpose of enabling his son to form a matrimonial connexion suited to his rank. Their course 'lay through the laughing vineyards of Campania, and along the base of the ever-burning Vesuvius.' Lucius is impatient to see the city, which, it seems, he had never visited; but night setting in before their arrival, he is obliged to defer the gratification of his curiosity till the following day. The next morning, hastily throwing on his clothes, he proceeds to visit the town. On his way, he passes through the 'street of tombs,' * indulging the while melancholy musings, and making

*The following interesting extract relating to the 'street of tombs,' is found in the notes at the end of the volume.—'Pompeii is entered by one of its *faubourgs*, a village called Augustus Felix. This village, discovered principally between 1812 and 1814, which stretched from the gate and the walls of Pompeii a considerable way on the ancient route to Herculaneum, was founded by the colonies of Sylla and of Augustus, whose name it retained. It might now be called the *faubourg* of the dead, from the great quantity of tombs that cover it. There is but a single country-house as yet disinterred there. But on the declivity of the hill may be observed remains of every kind, not yet uncovered, but marked by the swellings of the green turf. There the citizens the most distinguished by their offices, sacred, civil, or military, established their homes; and there they obtained public and honored tombs. These dwellings and tombs were most closely connected; and hence the remark of C. Nepos, that the ancients in quit-

reflections on the vanity of life, as it presented itself to his view, untinged with the bright hues imparted by the hope of futurity. The family name, Diomedes, engraved on a sepulchre, is among the first objects which arrest his attention, and here the deep feelings of nature burst forth. The effect is thus described.

'"And here," then, thought I, "lie the poor ashes of what was once my mother, never to revive again. Here is the desolate end of that deep love, which, through the wide world, and the long life, comes not a second time to any. In bitterness of spirit I wept over the ashes, that never before were insensible to my grief, as I twined a coronal of fresh flowers around the alabaster urn;—for there is something in our hearts that always claims kindred with flowers—a language that *will* touch the heart;—for they too fade

ting life merely changed their habitation. The shades of the dead wandered silently around their ancient dwellings; they partook at each instant the same sentiments, and thoughts, and even tears, with their surviving family. In the deep silence of a dark and stormy night, they assisted at the domestic altars, where they were invoked under the name of Lares, and received at the foot of the sepulchres, which were the first temples of every nation, the sacrifices and vows of their children.

'Immediately upon entering the *street of tombs*, there may be seen at a single *coup-d'œil* the whole extent of it, as far as yet uncovered, and the tombs which adorn it on each side, up to the entrance of the city. What magnificence! How many forms unknown to architecture and to the arts!

'These tombs, raised on superb pedestals, are crowned with flowers and shrubs of a perpetual verdure. There, entire families repose together within their own domains, as if they still dwelt together; the mother sleeps at the side of the father, and the children, according to their age, at the side of the mother. The inscriptions are simple, and in a style at once tender and manly.

'Cenotaphs, whose extremities terminate in the graceful tangling of palm and laurel boughs, altars which present the beautiful forms of *lectistenia*, and of temples which had been raised to the memory of the citizens worthy of them, who had died far from their country, embellish, by the beauty of their marbles, these fields of silence. One would take them for so many altars raised by the Genius of the arts to the silent Genii of mystery and death.

'As this abode of the dead offered coolness and shade from the heat of the sun, it became a favorite promenade and rendezvous. There the Pompeian slept at the foot of the cypresses, and sat on the pedestals of the monuments.

'The games, the sports, and the liveliness of a people naturally idle, formed there a singular contrast to the calmness and silence which reigned over the spot sacred to the repose of the dead.

'Here might once be seen mothers burning perfumes before the tombs of their children—girls watering with their own hands the poppies planted over the graves of their lovers—others pointing out to their children the spot where slept the ashes of a father who had been their stay. All were lost in the bitterness of sorrow and regret—a profound grief which makes no boast of empty parade, and which nothing can alleviate.—*Translated from Bonucci.*' pp. 188–190.

away like all loved and lovely things; and on the blossom in whose bosom the bee has revelled to-day, the canker-worm will banquet to-morrow, and we may mourn and moralize over the beautiful ruin, but the spoiler within will not heed us." '—pp. 6, 7.

On his return, he finds his father in conversation with 'a plump, rosy-cheeked, merry looking' priest of Isis, by the name of Caius Marcus, who forms a prominent figure in the narrative. In company with the priest, he resolves to witness the exhibition of 'gladiators, wild beasts, and Christians,' given in honor of Domitian, then on a visit to the city. Passing through the Civil Forum, and pausing to contemplate the several beautiful edifices in its vicinity, they at length arrive at the amphitheatre, attended with a domestic bearing a basket of refreshments, consisting of eggs, chickens, and a flask of 'true Falernian,' comforts deemed indispensable by the priest. Here Lucius is introduced to Cennius, a Roman knight, an old friend of his father, and to his son Julius. Among the sights which particularly attract his attention, are some ladies with 'long, white, purple bordered robes,' and heads 'adorned with fillets and ribbons,' or, as we should rather say, a lady—for his gaze, it seems, was riveted on *one*, with a 'large, soft, black eye, looking out under her high white brow,' a 'soft flute-like voice,' a complexion 'pale,' and an expression of countenance indicating calm, serious thoughts. This lady, who, as our readers will anticipate, is to be the heroine of the tale, was a Vestal, by the name of Lucilla.

The show proceeds, and after the other sports are finished, the Christians are brought forward. A magnificent procession is formed, headed by the priests; and as it passes by a statue of Jupiter, at whose feet was an altar, 'decked with flowers,' and a fire burning on it, each one is required to throw incense on the flame, in token of his reverence for the Thunderer.

'Soon it came the Christians' turn to acknowledge or deny their Saviour. Then, indeed, curiosity and interest were intensely excited. The first pair walked calmly and steadily by, without even looking at the altar. They were instantly withdrawn from the procession, and placed in the middle of the arena, as were all who refused to throw incense upon the flame. Of the second pair, one seemed to hesitate, but his companion walked steadily on. The pause of the first was but for a moment. The voice of nature *would* be heard—that of religion prevailed; and he too at last passed the altar. The third pair seemed of a

different mould; and carelessly taking some incense from the censer, they jerked it lightly upon the altar, and passed along with the procession. Of the next pair, one was remarkably disturbed. His first impulse was to stop before the censer, and his hand was half stretched out to take the incense, then drawn back, as if irresolute—then "My child! my child!" burst from his pale lips. "Thy God!"—said the deep, stern voice of his companion. The incense dropped from his trembling hand. But the voice and the agony of nature again prevailed, and again he seized some incense. "Choose," repeated the deep voice of his companion, "salvation and eternal life, or an hour and eternal death." The incense again dropped from his hand, and with a desperate resolution he passed the altar; but, as he turned away to join that band of fearless martyrs in the centre of the arena, he stopped abruptly, and in a tone of agony, and as if unconscious that any one saw him, he again ejaculated, "My child! my poor, fatherless, deserted Marcia!"

'At that moment I chanced to look at the fair Vestal; and though her face was turned down, I caught a glance of her eye, as it rested a moment upon the poor desolate father. It was swimming in tears; and mine, I confess, were not dry. But why protract the painful description? Enough, that many that day denied their Saviour, and many, too, stood faithful to his cause. Some, as they passed, sang hymns with loud, clear voices—some prayed—others wept. But enough. Let us trust that He who requires not ten talents where he has imparted but one, who knows both the weight of the burden and the strength of him who is to bear it, will not punish his children for wanting the fortitude and strength of nerve that He created them without—that they who that day "denied Him before men," may find mercy in His sight who knows at once our temptations and our frailty—that the repentant sigh may have arisen and found acceptance before Him, and that hereafter they, too, may not be denied "before the angels in heaven." Let those who would condemn *their* weakness, first search their *own* hearts, and be still.

'I have already said, that they who threw incense upon the altar, passed on with the procession and were dismissed. The rest were conducted away under a guard of soldiers, but to return again; and shortly I was condemned to witness a spectacle, whose bloody cruelty surpassed immeasurably all that I had hitherto witnessed. Armed only with short, straight swords, these men were obliged to contend with furious wild beasts, and were soon torn limb from limb. Some, who had fought successfully with single beasts, had two fresh ones let out against them. I was grieved when any of these poor men came off victorious, for it was evidently only prolonging their sufferings; since they were instantly beset by fresh and more numerous assailants.'—pp. 38–40.

Lucius returns home 'wearied, disgusted and disappointed,' to dream of 'fights, amphitheatres, and death,' the image of the fair Vestal blending 'strangely with all.' The next day he accompanies Julius on a tour of 'sight seeing,' dines with old Marcus, at the temple of Isis, and in the afternoon attends the funeral rites of Saturninus, an old friend of the family of Cennius. These rites were performed in the usual affecting manner of the ancients. The body was consumed on a pile, and the 'bones and ashes of the deceased were then carefully collected by his children; and, sprinkled with the richest perfumes, were placed in an alabaster urn, along with a small glass vial full of tears.' The urn was then placed in the sepulchre. The friends crowded around the tomb, to utter the last farewell, and testify their affection by kind wishes and prayers. The multitude withdrew, and the family remained to partake of the customary funeral repast in the sepulchral chamber. The whole ceremony is well described, but is too long for extract.

'Passing the tomb some time after with Julius, I saw them busied in the rite of oblation to the dead; an offering periodically performed, and consisting of liquors, victims, and garlands. The tomb was strewed with flowers, and covered with crowns and fillets. On the little altar before it, libations were poured, and incense was burnt; while within, the cavern of death was lighted by ever-burning lamps.'—p. 51.

The next day Lucius is invited by his recently acquired friend, to be present at the marriage ceremony of his sister. Here he is surprised to meet the Vestal, about whom, to his great grief, he had hitherto failed of obtaining any satisfactory information. He could, therefore, only 'gaze and admire and lament that she was a Vestal.' To all other eyes, however, 'the bride was the great object of attraction.' After the usual ceremonies at the house of her father, she was conducted in procession to that of her future husband, the 'door and door-posts of which were adorned with leaves and flowers.' She was lifted over the threshold, it being deemed ominous to touch it on this occasion. The keys of the house were put into her hands, and a sheepskin was spread beneath her to indicate 'her future employment in the spinning of wool.' The nuptial feast was then given by the husband, accompanied with the usual song. The following day, another entertainment was given, 'when presents were sent to the bride by her friends and relations. Here she began to preside over the family, by performing sacred rites.'

Julius had appeared, all along, grave almost to sadness. At the amphitheatre the Christians evidently shared his sympathy; and he even ventured to ask why these 'poor men should perish for worshipping a different deity from the rest of the community.' That he was himself a Christian, however, was not as yet suspected by Lucius, though he had marked his sad and thoughtful manner. At the next interview the fact was announced. He had become a 'victim to that fearful delusion,' as it was deemed by his friend. After some conversation, he succeeded in persuading Lucius to accompany him the next morning, 'before day-break,' to a meeting of the new sect, having first taken the necessary precaution to require a promise of secrecy.

An obscure, winding passage, the entrance of which was closed by a door opening in obedience to a secret spring, conducted to a subterraneous apartment or cave. Here the Christians were assembled, and among them Lucius again, to his astonishment, encounters the sight of the mysterious Vestal, who proves to be a sister of Julius, and a Christian. The preacher, Vetullius, was recognized as the aged man, who had been a few days before brought out on the amphitheatre, to contend with a lion, and whose life was saved by the circumstance that he had reared the animal; and the keeper, himself a Christian, aware of the fact, had selected this particular beast for the purpose. The noble animal crouched before his old master, the superstitious populace regarded so unusual an event as an indication of the will of the gods, and the Christian was led off unharmed. The instructions of the venerable man made a deep impression on the mind of Lucius, to whose hands, on parting, he confides a roll, containing the sacred books of the Christians. Lucius often sees and converses with him at the house of an unsuspected Christian, where he lay concealed, though the occasional presence of the lovely Vestal seems to have produced, at times, some distraction of thought.

Meanwhile suspicions are afloat. Matho, a tool of Domitian, had gained access to the assembly of believers by feigning himself a Christian, and had given information of the conversion of Lucius. It is whispered, too, that all is not right among the Vestals. The good-natured Marcus, alarmed for the safety of his friends, gives them notice of the dangerous rumors that were abroad. The meetings of the Christians in the cavern are suspended. Lucius becomes anxious for the fate of Lucilla, and has the temerity to enter the temple of Vesta, where she was

engaged in watching the sacred fire, and urges her to fly with him. She heard his entreaties, without yielding. She informed him, however, that she was making preparation to leave the city secretly with her brother, but 'continued the performance of the sacred rites to avoid suspicion, and to spare her friends, as much as possible, in the painful step that she felt compelled to take.'

No doubt existed of the machinations of the dark and profligate Matho. He had repeatedly crossed the path of Lucius, and had just now dogged him to the gate of the temple. Lucius had incurred his enmity, and was aware that he and his friends had everything to fear from his malicious arts. The wretch had been observed in close conference with a priest of Isis. An oracle was to be consulted the next day with great pomp and ceremony, to ascertain if any of the Vestals were really guilty, and, if so, how they might be detected; and there was every reason for believing that the response would be such as would gratify this base spy, of whose breast lust and revenge had now taken entire possession. In his distress Lucius repairs to the merry and kind-hearted Marcus, and his apprehensions were by no means alleviated by the information obtained during the interview. On his return home, he finds that his family had been alarmed by the report of his danger. He had been charged with an intrigue with 'a Vestal, to accomplish which,' it was said he had abandoned his religion, and had 'seduced her from hers.' Of the falsehood of a part of this charge, he found no difficulty in satisfying the minds of his friends.

'"And is it false, then," asked Porcia, [the sister of Lucius] "that you have attended the secret meetings of the Christians—nay, that you have joined yourself to that terrible sect?"

'"Porcia," I said, "I should indeed be unworthy the name of that persecuted sect, if I hesitated to avow my belief, whenever and wherever and however it may be questioned. I know the fearful persecution that pursues all who avow their belief of Christianity—I know that it may bring me to the prison—to the arena—to the grave;—but I shall not the less abide unshrinking by the result."

'My father groaned aloud at these words, and Porcia, my ever gentle sister, wept. The sublime firmness, or, as it was termed, the obstinate obduracy, with which they who had once embraced Christianity, dared and endured tortures and death, rather than abjure their belief, caused it to be considered as it were a mortal and irremediable disease, in which nothing could be done for the wretched victim, but to weep over his hopeless fall;

—and his friends watched him with much the same sensations as they might feel, who, standing securely on the river's bank, should see a son or a brother swept by them, on its swift current, to be dashed in pieces over a cataract, without the power to aid or to save him.——

'Distressing as was this scene, the wishes, the prayers, the tears, and, last but not least, the *silence* of those I most loved, I was glad to retire to my room and unroll the sacred scroll, that I might finally draw from its pages the consolation and support that I so much needed, and that thence I had never sought in vain. While thus engaged, a soft tap at the door announced the presence of my gentle sister. She came to supplicate me, by my love to her, by the remembrance of all our childish joys and hours, by all the love and respect that I bore to the memory of our dear, lost mother, by all that I owed to our living parent, by my regard to my own name and character, and all that I owed my family, to abandon my perilous creed. Half playfully taking from me the scroll that I was reading, she rolled it up and placed it in her bosom. I made no opposition to the act, for I felt a hope that she, too, might yet be led to drink of the waters of life, by means of that blessed scroll.'—pp. 99, 100.

The oracle was consulted, and returned for answer, 'Beware of her who shall suffer the sacred fire to be extinguished.' For several nights the flame burns undimmed. Matho, however, continues to urge in the ears of the Vestal his 'licentious passion,' and threatens speedy revenge, in case she refuses to yield. At length a plan of escape is agreed on. A boat was to be ready, at an appointed time and place, with disguises for Julius, Lucilla, and Lucius. One night more was to intervene before the plan was put in execution, and that night it fell to Lucilla to guard the sacred fire. By the arts of Matho the oil destined to feed the flame had been withdrawn from the vessel in which it was kept, and water substituted in its place. At the customary hour the Vestal proceeds to replenish the 'broad plate-like lamp,' and beholds with dismay the flame sink and grow dim. The next moment all is darkness. Matho now deemed his triumph certain; and entering the temple about which he had been prowling, offers to relume the sacred light, if she will consent to his wishes. 'Your victim I may be,' was the reply, 'but not the victim of dishonor.'

Lucilla is arrested, thrown into prison, and, after undergoing a sort of mock trial, during which the first question which was asked her was, 'Are you a Christian?' as if that name included all odious crimes, is condemned.

The interview with her mother in prison, after sentence had been pronounced, and the last parting scene, in which her father, old Cennius, is introduced, is described with pathos and feeling. The dreadful moment at length arrives.

'Lucilla, assisted by the executioner, stepped upon the fatal ladder, and with a firm bearing descended into the living tomb destined to receive her. A small bed was then lowered into it, upon which she was seated. A table was placed beside it, on which was a lamp burning. A small flask of oil, a loaf, a little milk, and a little water, were then placed upon the table. Immediately the ladder was drawn up from the tomb. The assistants applied strong iron bars to the heavy stone, and at length succeeded in heaving the weighty mass over the mouth of the opening, and closing the light of day upon the unhappy girl. In a few moments the rattling of the gravel was heard as it fell heavily upon the broad stone, the hollow ground giving forth a sullen echo to the first few shovelfuls of earth that struck upon it. This sound gradually ceased as the earth settled deeper and deeper over the spot, till at length the last shovelful was thrown over it. It was then carefully smoothed over by the assistants. The crowd gradually dispersed, and at last nothing was seen about the place, except two lictors, who paced slowly backward and forward to prevent any one from attempting her liberation.'—pp. 133, 134.

Fortunately, the grave in which the unhappy victim was thus immured alive, was near one of the subterranean galleries connected with the cavern of the Christians. Thither implements for digging had been previously conveyed, by the care of Vetullius and the friendly Marcus, who, with Julius and Lucius, immediately fell to work, and after much labor succeeded in undermining the floor of the tomb, and Lucilla stood among them unhurt. The three friends, after encountering some difficulties arising from the machinations of their old enemy, Matho, escape to Neapolis, and take refuge in the cemeteries, which the Christians in those days used for prayer and for the interment of their dead. Vetullius remained behind, promising to join them in a few days. By his advice, contained in a letter he had found the means of conveying to them, they soon leave the catacombs, and retire to the little island of Palmaria in the Tyrrhene sea, where they are kindly received by Flavius Piso, a Christian, and a friend of Vetullius.

The narrative of Lucius soon after breaks off, and the remaining incidents we are to consider as recorded by Piso.

Julius, whose memory fondly dwells on the charms of Porcia, returns to Pompeii, where she soon after became his wife. The escape of the Vestal had been discovered, and her mother, Farella, had been imprisoned, and was threatened with death in the amphitheatre, if she was not found before an appointed day. The filial piety of Lucilla induces her, on receiving the sad intelligence, to fly to Pompeii, to save her aged parent, and she is then thrown into prison. Lucius, from whom she had concealed her intention, on discovering her flight, follows. Meantime the terrific thunderings of Vesuvius begin to be heard. Preparations, however, continue to be made for the approaching exhibition at the amphitheatre.

'The morning of that eventful day at length appeared. Calm, and bright, and beautiful, the sun arose in a cloudless sky. Vesuvius, too, seemed to be reposing after her fearful displays of the preceding day. A thin column of smoke alone was seen rising perpendicularly from the yawning crater, till high in the air it gradually spread in a horizontal direction, overhanging the steady column that was perpetually rising, like the spreading foliage of some colossal tree. Long before this hour, the streets and every avenue to the city were crowded with those about to become spectators of the cruel sport of the day. All seemed gay and smiling and happy. Again the preparatory crowding and jostling took place—the streets were again filled with beasts, and men, and women; cars, chariots, and wagons containing the beasts for exhibition; laughing and railing, oaths, invocations, yells, and growls—in short, all the noise and confusion of a city like Pompeii, previous to such exhibitions.

'Gradually the smoke rose denser and blacker from the crater. An unnatural stillness seemed to reign over everything but man. The waters of the Sarnus and the bay slept without ripple or wave. Every leaf upon every tree hung motionless. The very shouts that were occasionally heard, were repeated and re-echoed along the motionless air for minutes after the sound had ceased, seeming as if every particular voice were caught up and repeated in mockery by a thousand others. When the sullen roar of Vesuvius was growled forth, the repetitions and reverberations were painful and deafening. Gradually the soft blue sky changed to a sullen, coppery hue, as it was seen through the fast increasing smoke. The sun, shorn of his beams, hung like a disk of copper in the frightfully serene heavens. The flashes of the mountain became more frequent and more vivid, shedding at the same time over every object a glare of such ghastly light as to induce the idea that light itself had perished, and that this

staring glare was but the color of its corpse. A darker and a darker gloom settled every moment over the horror-struck city. In the amphitheatre it became unnecessary to wait till night should bring darkness for their torch-light hunt. Still the games went on. What mattered it to the dying gladiator, whether he fell amid the sickness of nature or under the calm blue sky? What mattered it to the ravenous beast or to the martyred Christian? That light cheered not the eye of the dead—it added not to the torture of the beast the sight of the demon man—nor did it hide the Christian from the eye of his God.

'A sort of sepulchral twilight was all that remained. The crowd for the most part was now seen traversing the city with their valuables in their hands, to save themselves from the terrible and unknown danger. Nothing was heard in the street save the heavy, incessant tramp of feet—and an occasional call of some mother upon a loitering child—a sister to a brother—a husband to a wife—a child to a parent.'—pp. 172–4.

The prisoners are at length released by the terrified jailer; but, in attempting to leave the devoted place, are soon buried beneath a shower of stones, ashes, and other substances, which choked up the streets, and caused the city to disappear from the surface of the earth.

Such is a general outline of the tale. Two or three episodes occur in the course of the narrative, quite pretty and imaginative. The author excels in light and graceful description. He has a lively fancy, and gives evidence of possessing a cultivated understanding and refined taste. His words are in general well chosen, and his style simple and unaffected.

The moral character of the work is of the purest kind. The tender and social affections particularly, are represented in all their truth and beauty, and have the effect of throwing a peculiar charm over many parts of the narrative.

The production is not without blemishes, but these are such as will be easily overlooked. The writer has a few favorite terms and phrases, which he is a little too fond of repeating. In one or two instances he has put sentiments into the mouths of Christians, not quite in unison with the mode of thinking of the time. And the story of the priest, on the thirty-fourth page, is told, we think,—possibly, however, we may be a little fastidious,—in language not exactly corresponding with the tone of refined delicacy, which pervades the other parts of the tale. We think we have evidence that the author is a young writer.

If so, the work affords very pleasing promise. We have been truly gratified with its perusal, and hope the author may be induced to continue his efforts.

ART. VI.—1. *An Oration delivered at Cambridge, before the Society of Phi Beta Kappa, Aug.* 26. By the Rev. ORVILLE DEWEY. Boston. Gray & Bowen, 1830. 8vo. pp. 32.

2. *The Age of Print. A Poem delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cambridge,* 26 *August,* 1830. By GRENVILLE MELLEN. Boston. Carter & Hendee, 1830. 8vo. pp. 40.

THE anniversary of the society, before which the above performances were delivered, stands at the head of our literary celebrations. The lovers of eloquence and poetry generally anticipate a rich entertainment, and have almost uniformly been gratified. Gentlemen distinguished for their genius and attainments, have been selected to celebrate the occasion, and their efforts have done honor to the society and themselves.

The moral purposes to which this occasion may be made subservient, are of high value. It is attended generally by a large assembly of the most accomplished and intelligent portion of our community, and not unfrequently by distinguished visiters from distant parts of the country. The animation and excitement of a literary festival, during which the cares of professional and active life are laid aside; the rivalries of politics forgotten; the dreams of ambition dissipated; the friendships of former days, already fading dimly from the memory, again restored; classic associations, half obliterated by the throng of busy and anxious and tumultuous projects, brought back, like coins recast at the mint, to their original brightness; the warm and generous enthusiasm of unblighted youth rekindled—the animation and excitement of such an occasion, open the heart to the reception of the loftiest and noblest principles, which, if worthily inculcated, must sink deep, and exert an influence no less beneficial than permanent. High-toned sentiments and eloquent expositions of truth, whether in morals or literature, have uniformly been received with enthusiastic applause. Judging of public taste by such an index, we should consider it very

high, and in a state of constant improvement. The want of some safe public amusement, gives an increased value to every celebration of this kind. The theatre, which is the universal resort for entertainment in Europe, is so far degraded in this country, either from the want of sufficient patronage among the respectable and influential members of society, or from some inherent inaptitude in our countrymen for dramatic amusements, that we should as soon think of recommending the pest-house for a residence, as the theatre for a public resort. In ancient Greece, the drama was cultivated by the best minds in a nation unrivalled for intellectual glory. The sublimity of the Prometheus,—the patriotic associations aroused by the soldier-poet in the Persians,—the dreadful visitations of the gods upon a land stained with blood, in Œdipus—the awful manner in which that crime was expiated, in Œdipus Colonos—the majestic virtue of a Grecian heroine, braving a tyrant's wrath and defying a threatened death, that her unhappy brother might enjoy the supposed privileges of sepulture, in Antigone—these, with others not surpassed by them, were the usual treat served up for an Attic audience. With few exceptions, the theatre then taught the best morality that was known. In France, faulty, cold, and constrained as theatrical literature has generally been, immorality is the last offence that can be laid to its charge. Corneille, Racine, and even the prince of scoffers, Voltaire, are uniformly respectful to the moral and religious sense of a cultivated nation; and the ingenious comedy of that unrivalled wit, Moliere, subserves effectually the cause of virtue and morality. The labors of Goethe, Schiller, and others, have raised, in some cases, the German theatre to a degree of purity and excellence which other nations, on comparison with their own, might well envy. The theatre of Weimar, while under the care of the patriarch of German literature, and adorned by such productions as Mary Stuart, the Maid of Orleans, Wallenstein, Don Carlos, the Bride of Messina, Egmont, Tasso, Iphigenia, &c., might justly be considered a school of refinement and taste. But among us, it is scarcely possible to attend the theatre a single evening, and not be insulted, either in the principal piece, or in some farcical afterpiece, with expressions or allusions so grossly indecent, that a lady of refined sensibility, it seems to us, would never expose herself to their contamination a second time.

It is on this account that we rejoice to find this anniversary made an occasion for inculcating correct principles. The oration of Mr Dewey, which we have placed at the head of the present article, gave great satisfaction at the time of its delivery, and the public have reason to thank him for submitting it to the press. He maintains with eloquence and ingenuity, a doctrine which the current of popular feeling is carrying, we fear, rapidly into disrepute. We will quote his own words.

'What is the true science, the *rationale*, if I may say so, of thorough improvement and refinement? What are the true means of spreading at once wealth and beauty over the paths of literary labor?

'From the wide range of discussion which this question opens to us, I shall select two views, two principles of intellectual culture—(this is my general subject)—the one practical, the other theoretical; both of which derive urgent claims to attention, as I think, from the character of the literature that is prevalent at the present day, and from the state of our own little republic of letters. My practical principle is, that the loftiest attainments of the mind in every sphere of its exertion, are immediately—much as the original tendency or temperament may vary—are *immediately* the fruit of nothing but the deepest study; that, for instance, the great poet and the great artist, as well as the profound metaphysician or astronomer, is by nothing more distinguished than by this thorough and patient application; that natural genius, as it is called, appears in nothing else, and is nothing else, but the power of application; that there is *no* great excellence without great labor; that the inspirations of the muse are as truly studies, as the lucubrations of philosophy. In other words, it is the deepest soil that yields not only the richest fruits, but the fairest flowers; it is the most solid body which is not only the most useful, but which admits of the highest polish and brilliancy; it is the strongest pinion, which not only can carry the greatest burden, but which soars to the loftiest flight.

'That the most intense study is necessary to the loftiest attainments in every department, whether of philosophy or poetry, of science or imagination, of reality or fiction, of judgment or taste, would perhaps be best made to appear, by showing the strict and close connexion there is between them; and that there is such a connexion is indeed my theoretical principle.'—pp. 3, 4.

The tendency of present systems in education we agree with Mr Dewey in thinking decidedly hostile to profound attainments. A standard of utility, falsely so called, has become the rallying

point of a host of second-rate philosophers, who industriously circulate their superficial doctrines through the community. With all the boasted superiority of modern times, the ancients were not fools. Eloquent and profound as was Dr Thomas Brown of Scotland, Plato of Athens, was more so. Acute as was Dr Reed, Aristotle of Stagira, was no less so. If the question *Cui bono?* be applied to the study of the immortal sages of old Athens, the same question may be asked in reference to the sages of Scotia. The plain fact is, in both cases, it would be an indication of a weak and unmanly style of thinking. An intimate acquaintance with the results of a great man's intellectual experience, whether those results were obtained three or three thousand years ago, whether they conduce or not to the physical comfort of this generation, is a worthy object for the labor of any mind, be it ever so great. The modern doctrine of utility, which is, in point of fact, the origin of the superficial dogmas that appear to have gained ground among us, is as false in theory, as it is pernicious in its consequences. The principles of it are essentially infidel, striking out of the sphere of useful thought, all those ennobling considerations, on which the hopes of immortality finally rest. They cut off the soul from its far reaching associations with the mighty spirits of past generations, and its ardent visions of a future interminable existence. They rob this life of all its glory, by breaking the moral links, which bind us to each other in the belief of a spiritual life. By obliterating, as far as they may, all traces of associations with other objects than those immediately around us, they deprive the soul of half its motives to virtue, and finally chain it down to a merely material, earthly existence. Such is the tendency of that system, which, under the name of utility, has led to the superficial character of the intellectual culture of our day. We do not, indeed, believe this system has gone to its utmost. It is only a tendency, and can never become an established, admitted scheme. We have a most undoubting faith in the energies of human nature. Trampled upon as it has been, by political and priestly misrule, led astray, as it often is, by atheistic utilitarianism, still it has a regenerating principle within, a native and lofty sentiment of immortality, an inherent love of the Beautiful and the Good—which, by a delightful speculation of Grecian philosophy, were twin sisters sprung from the same Eternal Parent—an irrepressible looking forward to a diviner life, which rises, from time

to time, and prostrates in the dust the strongest bulwarks erected by Atheism in defence of her dismal, annihilating doctrines.

The view which Mr Dewey takes of intellectual culture, is, we are happy to say, directly opposed to the utilitarian scheme. If this be the true scheme, what use have we of intellect, except to plan machines for the furtherance of bodily comfort? What need of poetry, except to help the memory in retaining trigonometrical tables, the number of days in the months, or perchance, one of Jeremy Bentham's codes set to music, as we read was once done with Justinian's? That view of society, which teaches the necessity of long, severe, deep, intellectual labor, and which is at war with the poor cant of the day, we regard as advocating the best interests of man. The following passage contains some important suggestions in the philosophy of mind.

'The questions to be asked here are very simple, but they are very decisive. What *is* the mind? Is it not one intelligence? And is it not the same intelligence and no other, that is employed in every intellectual effort and in every department of literature? Is not that intelligence, I still ask, whether it builds up a science or an art, deals with theory or practice, constructs a problem or a poem, one and the same thing? Is not the aliment, by which the mind is to grow, truth,—simple, single, harmonious, divinely accordant truth? And is not the right order in which its faculties are to rise to their highest excellence, that of perfect proportion? And must not all disproportion among its powers indicate an imperfect and crude developement? Furthermore, is there any clashing among the natural powers of the mind? Is there to be found, in fact, on an accurate analysis, any of the commonly supposed incongruity between reason and fancy, between the judgment and the imagination? What is reason? It is usually defined to be the power of comparing our ideas, and of discriminating their resemblances and differences. What is the imagination? It is the power of calling up at will, and assembling congruous ideas, so as to form harmonious pictures. These powers, then, do not exist in a state of war, but of perfect alliance with each other. They are mutually necessary to each other's strength and perfection. Fancy without judgment is extravagance and folly. Judgment without fancy is unproductive drudgery. It may be correct as far as it goes; but without any of that power called fancy, without any new or extensive combinations of thought, without any capability of stirring from the field of observation immediately before it, the judgment does not

go far. In the habit that still prevails of regarding the mind as if it were divided into distinct departments, thought and feeling are constantly distinguished, as if they were opposite powers. But what is feeling? It is an emotion arising from the perception of some object; arising, that is, from, or rather with, some thought. Feeling, then, so far from being opposed to thinking, is oftentimes but a more vivid and intense thinking; and Pythagoras, when he demonstrated the Forty-seventh Proposition and offered his hecatomb in thanksgiving for that discovery, no doubt *felt* as strongly as Homer, when he described the wrath of Achilles or the tears of Andromache. Different minds possess indeed different capacities, both of thought and feeling; but with this qualification, and speaking as I now do, not of animal sensations, but of intellectual states of mind, I say, that the strong feeling is the strong thought.'—pp. 6, 7.

That the 'strong feeling is the strong thought,' is pretty evidently a mistake in metaphysical observation. That strong feeling accompanies strong thought, or results from strong thought, is plain. The strong feeling which impelled Pythagoras to offer a hecatomb to the gods, was very different from the strong thinking, which led to the geometrical truth that 'the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides'—and though the ardor of discovery animated the breast of the philosopher with a *feeling* of the proudest triumph, yet the proposition, now, is not particularly exciting to the student who ponders over the pages of Euclid. Homer's description of the parting of Hector and Andromache, is addressed to the universal and strongest feelings of the soul, and will continue to affect them, even to tears, so long as man has a soul to be moved. With the exception of this slight inaccuracy, the above passage is well worthy an attentive consideration.

The orator proceeds to show, in a series of happy and beautiful observations, the harmony that exists among those powers of mind, which have generally been supposed antagonist principles. This discussion serves to illustrate the doctrine, that all the intellectual faculties must be subjected to 'one grand condition,' that of 'improving by exercise,' and the consequent necessity of severe and thorough study, to the attainment of excellence in any one of them. The following strictures on the tendency of some of our modern literature, have, we are sorry to say it, too much truth.

'From that fair proportion of the mind, of which I have spoken, from the severe old models of united strength and grace, and

more than all, from the study necessary to the imitation of them, I apprehend, it is the tendency of much of our modern literature, as well as of many maxims among us, to depart. And the peculiar situation of scholars in this country, or of those who should be scholars, is lending its aid to the same result. I ventured to say, of those who should be scholars; for the truth is, that we are, so many of us, men of business and men of action, rather than of study, and there is as yet so little division of intellectual labor among us, that superficial acquisitions, and vague pursuits, and negligent habits of mind, are our greatest dangers.'—p. 11.

And again;—

'In short, the very first article in a sound literary creed, is but half believed among us; and this skepticism vitiates all our faith. We believe in genius, and eloquence, and poetry; we believe in glorious thoughts, and intellectual inspirations, and visions of beauty; but we do not believe in—STUDY; and we do but half believe in truth. "Truth!" says the skeptic sage, "it is a very dangerous thing." "Truth!" says the small, practical philosopher, "what is truth good for, if it will not give us a warmer hearth, or a more plentiful board?" In short, utility, we are told, is taking such a lead in the affairs of mankind, that the world must grow intellectually dull, tame, and spiritless; it is getting to be too cultivated for poetry, too comfortable for eloquence, too busy for literature, and too sharp-sighted for faith. All its nobler productions, it is said, must decline amidst this grand modern improvement; and the world must henceforth be governed, not by mind, but by machinery: it is no longer to seek for truth,—painful toil! but for comfort. Whatever will promote this,—sciences or arts, governments or manufactories, rail-ways or books, no matter what, that tends to this result, is to engross the future attention of mankind.'—p. 19.

Poetry has been commonly supposed a species of inspiration above and beyond the reach of art. Its noble productions stand apart from the other labors of men, and are viewed as the creations of a divine spirit, like that which kindled the prophetic enthusiasm of the seers of old. In a certain sense this is undoubtedly true. A man in whom the sensibilities of human nature are not easily excited; whose blood flows no quicker, and whose pulse beats no stronger, at the recital of heroic deeds and sublime suffering; whose soul is not attuned to the divine harmony between the moral and natural worlds,—may possess the spark of poetry, but it is so smothered by the earthly principles of his being, that no art, no toil, no study, can fan it into a steady and brilliant flame. With this qualification, we

offer our readers the following passage, as at once correct and beautiful.

'What, then, is poetry? The common answer would be, that it is some peculiar gift, some intellectual effluence, distinct, not merely in form, not merely in rhythm, but essentially and in its very nature distinct from all prose writings. Its numbers are mystic numbers; its themes are far above us, and away from us, in the clouds, or in the hues of the distant landscape; it is at war with the realities of life, and it is especially afraid of logic. It is using no extravagant language, it is committing no vulgar mistake to say, that poetry is regarded as a kind of "peculiar trade and mystery," nay, in a sense beyond that of this technical language, as a real and absolute mystery. * * * * What *is* poetry? What is this mysterious thing, but one form in which human nature expresses itself? What is it but embodying, what is it but "showing up," in all its moods, from the lowest to the loftiest, the same deep and impassioned, but universal mind, which is alike and equally the theme of philosophy? What does poetry tell us, but that which was already in our own hearts? What are all its intermingled light and shadows; what are its gorgeous clouds of imagery, and the hues of its distant landscape; what are its bright and blessed visions, and its dark pictures of sorrow and passion, but the varied reflection of the beautiful and holy, and yet overshadowed, and marred, and afflicted nature within us? And how then is poetry any more inscrutable than our own hearts are inscrutable! To whom or to what, let us ask again, does poetry address itself? To what, in its heroic ballads, in its epic song, in its humbler verse, in its strains of love, or pity, or indignation,—to what does it speak, but to human nature, but to the common mind of all the world? And its noblest productions, its Iliads, its Hamlets and Lears, the whole world has understood,—the rude and the refined, the anchorite and the throng of men. There *is* poetry in real life, and in the humblest life; and in this, if it may not misbecome me to say so, is one of the noblest of our English poets right; though in the application of his theory, I would venture to assert, with the same reservation for my modesty, that he has sometimes made the most lamentable, not to say ludicrous mistakes. There *is* "unwritten poetry;" there is poetry in prose; there is poetry in all living hearts.'—pp. 20, 21.

The popular misapprehension of the quality of genius, is described in the following graphic terms;—

'The favorite idea of a genius among us, is of one who never studies, or who studies, nobody can tell when—at midnight, or

at odd times and intervals—and now and then strikes out, *at a heat*, as the phrase is, some wonderful production. This is a character that has figured largely in the history of our literature, in the person of our Fieldings, our Savages, and our Steeles—"loose fellows about town," or loungers in the country, who slept in ale-houses and wrote in bar-rooms, who took up the pen as a magician's wand to supply their wants, and when the pressure of necessity was relieved, resorted again to their carousals. Your real genius is an idle, irregular, vagabond sort of personage, who muses in the fields or dreams by the fire-side; whose strong impulses—that is the cant of it—must needs hurry him into wild irregularities or foolish eccentricity; who abhors order, and can bear no restraint, and eschews all labor: such an one, for instance, as Newton, or Milton! What! they must have been irregular, else they were no geniuses.—p. 28.

Of all the foolish opinions that ever entered into the mind of man, this shallow view of genius is the consummation. No doubt there are original and unchangeable differences in mental powers. There is something bordering upon inspiration in the rapidity, brilliancy and unerring effect, with which a man of true genius combines and moulds his glowing thoughts to whatever form he pleases. But he must muse until the fire burns; until his powers become clear by long and concentrated devotion; until his subject gradually assumes a distinctness of form and feature, so to speak, which enables him at length to transfer it, *currente calamo*, with all the warm impulses and vivid flashes that light up his path as he moves along in the train of his thoughts, to the page beneath his burning pen. Besides this, he must have acquired a felicitous style by frequent and laborious practice in composition, or he will ruin his conceptions, how glorious soever they may be, by imperfect and awkward expression. Let thought be ever so much the result of resistless inspiration, the hardiest advocate of 'genius,' in the cant of the day, would scarcely dare to claim the thrice-elaborated rhetoric or verse of our best writers, to the credit of country lounging, or bar-room meditations. The Fieldings and Savages, great as were their powers, have met with the common fate of misguided genius. The loose habits they acquired by frequenting the low resorts of depravity and vice, fixed upon their pages so deep a taint, that they are irrevocably banished from the circle of polite literature. Walter Scott has criticised them with much seeming lenity, it is true; but his own refined taste and high moral principles have completely

guarded him against the commission of similar offences against the laws of literary decorum. The low, the vulgar, the obscene, with which alone a 'genius' becomes familiar by his aberrations into the haunts of vice, for the purpose of acquiring 'a knowledge of human nature,' as it is called, are not fitting elements of literature. They are no part of human nature. It would be proof of as good a taste in the painter or the sculptor, to select the disgusting deformities, which constitute an exception to the general beauty of the human form, and impress them upon the canvass, or embody them in the marble, as for the poet or novelist to choose the moral deformities which mar the soul of man, for the themes of his prose or verse, and call this a picture of human nature. Productions of this sort come as near to the true standards of literary excellence, as the horrible figures of the Hindoo gods approach to the matchless proportions and unrivalled beauties of Grecian statuary. The soul of man issues from the hand of God as pure and stainless, as when it first woke to life in the morning of creation, amidst the glories of paradise. It is only by tasting of 'the forbidden fruit' of sin, that it becomes depraved, and wanders far from virtue and religion. It is only by violating the exalted capacities of its being, that it loses its high converse with pure and thrilling meditations and immortal hopes, which may, in something more than a figurative sense, be likened to the blessed privilege enjoyed by the patriarchs of old,—that of 'conversing with God.' One purpose of literature, in connexion with religion, is to restore the soul to its native sinlessness, by delineating whatever is true, and affecting, and noble; by awakening the half slumbering affections that seem often to be paralysed amidst the din of the world, and which, when aroused, shed a holy light over this scene of trial and struggle, by animating the hopes of immortality, often lost amidst the contending cares of material life; and, by appealing to the first principles of our nature, to recall the soul to those 'eternal fountains of beauty,' from which it may drink and 'be whole.'

If the prevailing notion of a genius be a pernicious one, that of a *gentleman* is no less so. Mr Bulwer, the most popular novelist in this age of evanescent reputations, has contributed his full share to the supremely absurd fancies, which have formed that nondescript creature, called, in fashionable technics, a gentleman. It is unnecessary to state, perhaps, that we allude to the abuse of that term, which, in its true signification,

comprehends the principles and qualities that are most estimable in our nature, and can justly be applied only to those, who, in addition to all others, possess that best of accomplishments—an elevated religious character—not in a sectarian or exclusive spirit—but made up of the gentleness, kindness, unaffected purity of mind and charity of heart, which Christianity is so pre-eminently fitted to inspire. This writer, by the aid of a terse and beautiful style, an exuberant imagination, and something that bears the same relation to wit that tinsel does to gold, has succeeded in inflicting a deeper injury upon society than any author of our times. His Pelham came forth, recommended by these brilliant traits, and spread its influence through the British and American public with the rapidity of a subtle and deadly poison. The title of this book bears 'The Adventures of a Gentleman'—for no other reason, that we can perceive, but that Mr Pelham, the hero, possesses scarcely a single gentlemanly characteristic. His affected listlessness, his coxcombry, his impudence, if embodied in any living individual, ought to shut the doors of every circle of refined society forever against him. Nor is this all. He has thrown an air of seducing sentiment over the violation of the strongest of social ties. The betrayer of innocence, the nurturer of infernal passions, the reckless Glanville, is made to possess the loftiest feelings of honor, the most generous impulses of romance, the highest attributes of genius. Many a deluded youth, we doubt not, has taken the first step in the career of ruin, by having his imagination diseased with these false and fascinating pictures—false and deadly as the treacherous Duessa, 'that many errant knights hath brought to wretchednesse'—and destined to the fate of the same sorceress, who, 'when witches wont do penance for their crime,' appeared in the form of 'the devilish hag' and undeceived the hapless Fradubio, though too late for him to escape,

> ——'through charms and magicke might
> That all his senses were bereaved quight.'

The Disowned followed rapidly upon the heels of Pelham, and, though containing many beautiful passages, and free from the insinuating immorality of its predecessor, was pronounced, by critics who had puffed the Adventures of a Gentleman beyond measure, decidedly inferior. Then came Devereux—and to complete the climax, Paul Clifford. The general design of this last work may be thus summed up;—to

prove that every class of peaceable citizens, who live in obedience to the laws and in the practice of virtue, are either fools or hypocrites; and that the only honest people in the world, are highwaymen—not thieves on a small scale, but gentlemanly highwaymen, who present the pistol with the grace of a carpet knight, and rob ladies with an air so irresistibly fascinating, that the fair creatures beg their despoilers to accept a gold watch or a diamond ring, in token of remembrance. But the tendency of this work has been treated at large in a late number of the Examiner, and we abstain from any further comment.

The point, to illustrate which we have introduced these remarks, is simply this;—the manners of the present day are beginning to exhibit sundry affectations, the tendency of which is, to sap the foundations of social virtue. This commenced with a class of melancholy personages, who attempted to ape the sublime misery of Byron, but could get no farther than the Byron head and the Byron neck, with a dash of the Byron profligacy. Then came Mr Pelham, with his nonchalant style of manners, his beautiful curls, and the gentlemanly 'scorn which sits so beautiful upon the lip'—and the mania seized a large class of young men, whom an evil star had cursed with leisure. It was scarcely possible to enter a drawing-room without encountering some youthful fop, possessed of the Pelham spirit, and striving most vehemently to enact an imitation of a copy drawn from a most despicable original—the aspirant for this high honor, making simple people stare, friends grieve, and sensible men despise him,—and then retiring with a smile of self-complacent triumph, and congratulating himself on being a gentleman.

Let it not be supposed that these are too trifling matters for notice. Manners and morals are so intimately associated, that in ancient systems of philosophy the same word is used to express both. The moment our young men assume the ridiculous and effeminate manners, which come to us adorned by the charms of perverted genius, heightened by the beauties of imagery and the fascinations of style, and above all rendered seductive by a vitiating *sentiment* which makes them tenfold more dangerous by making them less revolting,—we may bid farewell to the moral purity, the hitherto unstained sanctity, of our beloved New England homes. Better, ten thousand times better restore the banished austerity of our Puritan ancestors,

whose severe manners fastened upon them the reproachful epithets of Crop-ears and Round-heads among the profligates of their age, than mimic the degrading vices and disgusting manners of a worn-out European aristocracy, as they are described to us in the pages of that prostituted portion of literature, the fashionable novel. But, happily, we are not without a remedy. We are not cursed with an hereditary peerage. We are driven by stern necessity to work, if we would live, and work we must. We can indulge in fashionable vices only by snatches from our daily avocations, and thus the follies of one generation cannot affect another. The large fortunes, which supply the means of dissipation to-day, are scattered, to-morrow, among another tribe. With few exceptions, we are subjected to the primeval law of earning our bread by the sweat of the brow. These exceptions are a few unhappy men, ruined by the possession of fortunes, not won by their own industry, but by the mistaken apprehensions, or restless avarice of short-sighted fathers—having no fixed pursuit but pleasure, and finding that quenched in satiety—solitary, cut off from sympathy, because such fortunes are rare in a country like ours—destined to close a useless life by sinking into an unhonored, unlamented grave.

But there is a class of young men, who are temporarily exposed to the contagion of which we have spoken, in a peculiar degree. We mean, those engaged in a course of academic or professional education. Separated, during the most precious years of life, from the active business and anxious cares which occupy the minds of others, the opportunities of indulging in folly and vice receive a tenfold strength of temptation. The foolish opinions of genius and gentlemen, which we have commented upon, lend their aid to the dangers that assail the integrity of this numerous class. Accordingly, examples are not unfrequent, in which the fondest hopes of parents and friends have been blasted by a downward course of vicious indulgence, beginning with the imitation of some fashionable folly, and ending in the utter destruction of mind and desolation of heart, which are the inevitable results of a course of debauchery. When, therefore, a man of Mr Dewey's reputation and influence, devotes both to the inculcation of a sound intellectual creed, the first article of which is 'STUDY,'—or, in other words, a continued and intense application of mind to some worthy object—the only security for those who are relieved from other

and more pressing duties—the only preservative, next to strong religious faith, and even the best auxiliary to that, against the dangers of which we have spoken—we feel a debt of gratitude which we can repay only by urging the subject which he has so happily illustrated, upon the serious reflection of all who are interested in the intellectual, moral, and religious character of the rising generation.

We have extended our remarks so much farther than we intended, that we have but small space left for the Age of Print. The poetical reputation of Mr Mellen raised the expectations of the public too high; and they were, as usual, disappointed. This disappointment may be traced to a mistake in the judgment of the poet. With many ill-judging people, it is thought necessary that the poet, on this anniversary, should relieve the wearied minds of his auditory, by a satirical or witty production. This opinion is a reflection upon the character of the hearers, who are surely possessed of sufficient taste to discern and relish poetry of the highest and most exquisite description. If a man has wit it is very acceptable; but no such Procrustes' bed is appointed by the gentlemen who select the annual bard. Mr Bryant's poem, the Ages, though serious as a moral lecture, was extremely popular, and has since risen to the dignity of a classic piece in our literature. Had Mr Mellen, instead of giving heed, in an evil hour, to the unfounded opinion that a man must be witty to be acceptable, resigned his cultivated mind and deep poetic sensibility, to the free impulse of genius, he would have succeeded, like his distinguished predecessor. To be a satirist requires certain intellectual qualities, which Mr Mellen does not seem to possess. A mind adapted to a keen and scrutinizing observation of the faults and foibles of others, a discriminating perception of the line beyond which satire should never be permitted to trespass, and a felicitous tact in expression, so that the diction shall be as pointed as the thought, are indispensable to the satirist, whether he attempts the playful wit and easy raillery of Horace and Addison, or the stern denunciations of Juvenal, Johnson, and Gifford, or the inimitable polish and epigrammatic sarcasm of Pope. Some men, either from nature or peculiar habits of mind, possess this nicely discriminating power, and every word in their productions *tells*. Others are destined to lose their accustomed vigor, in an attempt so widely diverging from their usual style of thinking and writing. As a satirist, therefore, we must say, Mr Mellen

has failed. It seems to be *uphill work* with him. He has undertaken a task to which his genius is not at all adapted. It is curious to observe the effect which this mistake has produced upon the mere style, the language of the poem. His former pieces have been remarkable for an easy flow of poetical diction, and splendid imagery, selected with taste and used with effect; but the Age of Print is disfigured by clumsily constructed lines, bad rhymes, imperfect figures, ill-chosen epithets, and unmeaning contrasts, to a very extraordinary degree; —we mean that portion of the work designed to be satirical. But it is no disgrace to fail, where Byron could not succeed. Brilliant as was the success of the English Bards and Scotch Reviewers, that production is deficient in one essential, at least, to a permanent, genuine satire. A proud spirit lashed to desperation by a supposed deep and deadly wrong, pours out the burning lava of its fury, with indiscriminating wrath—like Ajax among the flocks and herds of the Grecian camp—upon an unoffending tribe of authors, whose forgiveness he was destined afterwards to solicit, and whose wounded feelings to allay, by suppressing, as far as possible, the offending pasquinade. It was deep personal indignation that gave to the English Bards its astonishing power of expression, and that fierce sarcasm, which would have been withering, had it been just. The opinions, in nine cases out of ten, which he has embodied in it, are manifestly, grossly wrong, springing from private pique and a maddening desire of revenge. But Mr Mellen had no feelings of this sort to gratify. On the contrary, his productions have been received with uncommon applause, and very justly. It must be confessed, this was an unfavorable situation for the satirical muse to unfold a vigorous wing. The satire in the Age of Print, is deficient in nerve, point, and oftentimes in justness. The language is deficient in energy and correctness, and occasionally a conceit, rather ungraceful, occurs; as—

> '*Bullets* and *bulletins* together sped,
> Joint couriers of the living and the dead.
> How changed the face of empires!—and how dull
> The modern mode to test *the strength of skull!*
> To paper now the generation runs,
> And *polished Goths* succeed to warlike Huns.'—p. 6.

The following passage contains several of the faults which we have enumerated. The point of some of it we are unable to

take. The ladies, probably, will not be much gratified by such a commemoration.

'——— Ye critics, look!
She writes—and talks—and moves—a living book!
She scans the times—and weighing all results,
Makes classics for the cradle—and adults;
With wide material at her quick command
To new forms springing from her plastic hand,
In each event incalculably *brisk*,
Now builds a Monthly, now an Obelisk;
And with a *glowing ardor* panting still,
Fights for new victory on Bunker Hill!
Where, in that work of ages, just begun,
Each father's daughter beats each father's son;
And where to *take* that minstrel we begin,
Who erst in moral melody did sing,
"Sermons in stones, and good in everything"—
Since, strange to tell, so tongues and titles vary,
E'en Quincy granite preaches—and is literary!

'Next wander on, *with closed voluptuous eye,*
To those dear books we read, but never buy;
There see, in linen backs, romances, tales!
Flood half the land, and *circulate by bales*—
In such expansion that you well might deem
There 's no condenser of your moral steam.
Lo! Fancy here on high endeavour goes,
Spurns the sad poem, and runs mad in prose;
No longer stalks your grave and metre'd bard,
Whose heroes all talk passion by the yard,
In a thin, thankless pamphlet at the best,
Rant half its worth and scenery the rest;
But the smart novel in two volumes, comes,
Ushered along by editorial drums,
And with a silent and complacent grace,
Exiles the formal Drama from her place.'—pp. 8, 9.

As to 'those dear books we read but never buy,' we strongly suspect the ledger of Messrs Carey and Lea and the Carvills, not to mention our own booksellers, would give a 'various reading,' as the critics say. An edition of ten thousand copies, exhausted in a few months, looks very much as if somebody bought—and the fact that new annuals start into being almost every year, is, according to the doctrines of political economy we were taught at college, rather a strong symptom of

a corresponding demand existing somewhere. We have an antipathy to such expressions as '*your* moral steam,' '*your* grave and metre'd bard,' and most especially to heroes who '*talk passion by the yard.*' The passages we have quoted are selected at random, and may be considered favorable specimens of the satire in the Age of Print.

But if Mr Mellen has not the talent of a satirist, he has something higher and better. He possesses a deep fountain of true poetic feeling, a kindling sensibility to the beautiful and sublime, a strong sympathy with moral excellence; and when he touches upon a chord in harmony with these, the inspiration of his heart, like the pure waters of a concealed stream, gushes irrepressibly out, giving dignity to his thoughts and exquisite felicity to his language. For example;—

'And must it be that poesy shall die,
And ye tread crownless, children of the sky!
O no! new triumphs and new garlands wait
The gifted hearts that round her congregate.
Woman yet lingers at the loftiest fount,
And guards the waters of the sacred mount;
No rival wreath is gleaming from the height,
But the proud priestess stands—alone—in light!
And a clear voice is there—whose thrill commands
In echo-tribute back, the "Lays of many Lands."'—p. 11.

The following lines on Byron are a beautiful and feeling tribute to the erring, but mighty poet of the Pilgrimage.

'Then let the bard in splendid rest remain
With glory sepulchred on Græcia's plain!
Be ours to view him when his living lyre
Felt Nature's passion, not his own, inspire;
When to its ringing melody there rose
Thoughts born in beauty, mid that deep repose,
When the heart turns to virtue like a child,
And the bright waters leap, unmingled, undefiled!
These were the nobler fountains of his fame—
There to his feet a world in worship came!
And now, while he, a brother of the band,
Unveils the minstrel with unsparing hand,
Though colder hearts may think, 't was wise to tell
Such thankless humors so the book sold well;
Though thousands hasten to his graceful page,
There to repeat the poet's Pilgrimage,
Let him his doubtful eulogy rehearse—
Be ours the epitaph of simpler verse!

When Byron woke, new lustre crown'd the years—
When Byron slept, a world was veil'd in tears!'

pp. 16, 17.

We close this article with the indignant and splendid apostrophe to Americans, on the violated rights of the aborigines.

'And well it were, America, for thee,
Could Fame's broad pen record but eulogy!
But while in lustre she reveals thy name,
She will not dash the story of thy shame!
Already blazoned on the flying page,
Speeds the foul tale shall thrill through every age—
Already there a blushing world shall read
Of horrid perfidy, the crowning deed.
Nay—tell me not of freedom—'t is but dust,
And all it touches withered and accurst;
I feel no freedom where one creature bows,
Crushed by a nation that forgets its vows;
I feel no freedom—none—but with the dead!—
My country perjured—and her glory fled!—
And ye that judge not by what beams within,
But guide your sympathies by tint of skin;
Who deem that truth, to God and virtue dear,
May turn to falsehood in an Indian's ear,
And that no sanction lingers with the deed
Whose simple ties are wampum and the bead;
Go—and though scorn may gather on your brow,
And slighted faith plead vainly with ye now,
Yet on the far unveiled futurity
The fearful judgment of the past I see—
The stern tribunals where all lips are dumb—
A death-bed and a conscience yet to come!
And when a race of whiter hearts than ye,
Shall gather round your loved ancestral tree,
And bid you from its shadow forth to roam
And seek some new and visionary home,
Trample your hearths, and give to long despair
All bright and blessed hopes that cluster there;
Then breathe not—think not—but in peace depart,
Veiling the spirit's ire and bursting heart—
Let the sealed lip, in that eventful hour,
Confess the justice, and admit the power!'—pp. 24, 25.

ART. VII. *Dyspepsy Forestalled and Resisted: or Lectures on Diet, Regimen and Employment; delivered to the Students of Amherst College; Spring Term*, 1830. By EDWARD HITCHCOCK, Professor of Chemistry and Natural History in that Institution. Amherst. J. S. & C. Adams & Co. 12mo. pp. 360.

WE claim to be among the oldest, the most constant and the most consistent friends of the cause of temperance, if not among the most successful of its advocates. We have never failed, as occasion offered, to press upon the public mind, the overwhelming importance of an attention to this subject, during the whole period that this journal, in its several forms, has had an existence. When others have despaired, when their zeal was flagging and their hopes giving way, we have still continued to hope and to speak. There was an interval of several years, after the first efforts to rouse the minds of men to the evils of intemperance had been made, and apparently with little effect, during which even many of those most zealous in the cause of humanity, had begun to fear that the task was too mighty to be attempted, and were ready to fold their arms and give it up in despair. But we did not despair; and our volumes will bear witness, that if our voice was not powerful, it was firm—that if we made no new impression, we were at least not disposed to suffer any which had been already produced, to be effaced, however slight it might have been.

We do not say this by way of self-gratulation, nor with the intention of claiming, as the result of our own exertions, any considerable share of the wonderful success which has attended the efforts of the benevolent for the few last years. We believe that we have contributed something towards the gradual formation of correct opinions on the nature of the proper remedy for intemperance, and something towards keeping up the interest of the community in the whole subject; but beyond this we merit nothing but the praise of constancy, consistency and perseverance in our purpose. This, however, should save us from any suspicion of disaffection to the cause, if we presume to differ on some material points, from those who have shown themselves the most zealous, and we do not hesitate to say,

the most effective advocates of temperance. What we have done in times when others took little interest in the subject, gives us a right to speak plainly now, when it is commanding universal attention. If we encouraged others when they were too timid and desponding, we may with the better grace check them, when they seem too bold in their attempts; particularly, when they strive after that which has no necessary connexion with their principal object, but which, if too intimately connected with it, may serve to bring disrepute on all their efforts, and in the end injure the cause they intend to serve.

Nobody who has taken any interest in this subject now doubts, that the principle of total abstinence from ardent spirits, is the only one upon which we can safely proceed in making any efforts for the destruction of the habit of excessive drinking. We take it for granted that they must be banished from all moderate use, except as medicine, before we can hope that their immoderate use, or their abuse, will cease. It may be admitted as an established doctrine, that their employment in health, in any quantity, is always useless, and probably always pernicious, as an article of stimulus or refreshment; and that their habitual employment in any community, in moderate quantities, for either of these purposes, will always be followed by the formation of habits of excess, in no inconsiderable proportion of those who originally considered themselves as merely conforming to an innocent, if not a salutary custom.

There are two ways in which we think the over-zealous partizans of temperance have been in danger of doing an injury to the cause. First, by endeavouring to fix the same reproach upon the use of some other common articles of luxury and indulgence, which is attached to the use of ardent spirits, and endeavouring to show that there is the same reason for enforcing total abstinence with regard to the former, that there is for enforcing it with regard to the latter. Secondly, by confounding the reasons for abstinence from ardent spirits, with those which may be urged for general temperance and moderation in regard to all the luxuries of life, whether of food or drink; and by speaking of this universal moderation in our indulgences, as if it were recommended by the same sort of considerations as abstinence from ardent spirits.

Now, in both these respects, we apprehend that the persons in question labor under a great mistake; and a mistake that tends seriously to lessen the effect of their benevolent exer-

tions. There is no other article which deserves to have the same stigma affixed to its use, which is so justly attached to that of ardent spirits;—there is none, the moderate use of which tends in any measure to produce the same evils. And further, the doctrine of total abstinence from ardent spirits, should be enforced by considerations totally distinct from those which may be brought to show the general expediency of moderation in our enjoyment of the luxuries of life.

What, then, is the distinct objection to the use of ardent spirit in any way or quantity? Not that it injures the health of him who uses it—though no doubt it does this more or less—but that it will very likely make him a drunkard. Not that it injures the tone of his stomach, destroys his health, and leads to dyspepsy, consumption, and dropsy, like stuffed meat, cake and pastry; but that it injures the tone of his mind, and leads him to a vice as fatal in its effects upon his character, as swearing, gambling, or lewdness. We do not proscribe it on account of its effects upon the body, bad as these are; but on account of its effects upon the mind, leading, as it does directly, to one odious and disgusting vice, and indirectly to many others.

If ardent spirit were used among us only in moderate quantities, if no one were ever led on to injurious excess in it; or if it were in its nature only capable of injuring the health, as it now does, without producing the farther effect which it also does, upon the mind, there would still be a strong objection to its use, and a sufficient reason for insisting upon abstinence from it. But in this case the argument against it would be of the same nature, as that which exists against the habitual use of wine, porter, cider, and various kinds of food, and not much stronger; whilst now, in addition to all this, we can urge the powerful and peculiar considerations of which we have just been speaking; viz. that it leads its votaries directly to vice, which the other habits referred to, do not.

Now the danger is, of confounding in the public mind these two very distinct objects; viz. preventing the use of ardent spirit from its tendency to produce the vice of intemperance, and preventing it as a habit injurious to health and life,—that is, preventing it in the same way and for the same reason that we would prevent immoderate indulgence in any of the customs of society, either as to eating, drinking, or amusements, which tend to undermine the constitution and unfit it for the purposes

of existence. All, or almost all, are agreed with regard to the expediency of the first of these objects; and so long as we confine ourselves to the evils of ardent spirits alone, we may safely support our arguments against them as leading to intemperance, by dissuasives founded upon their pernicious influence on the health. But if, at the same time, we exert ourselves in support of a general moderation in eating and drinking, and recommend abstinence from wine, cider, beer, &c., by arguments which are but partially true with regard to them, though wholly so with regard to ardent spirits,—those who are disposed to indulgence will judge of the whole of our reasoning by the weaker part of it, and, perceiving that we do not make out our case against the former articles, will readily draw the conclusion that we are equally at fault in respect to the latter.

We consider it therefore injudicious, at the present moment, to unite the consideration of these two subjects so closely as has been done by the author of the work before us; and we may regard him as the representative of that class of the friends of temperance of which we have been speaking. Not that we object to a free and full consideration of both these subjects. Excess in eating and drinking of all kinds, is a fair subject for attack. The habits of society in these respects, are most erroneous and pernicious. Philanthropists and Christians may well employ themselves in disseminating correct views concerning them, and they will thus indirectly contribute to the promotion of the religious and moral, as well as of the physical health of the community. We only object to too close a connexion between them.

We have been led to make these remarks from the fact, that, in the work of Mr Hitchcock, and more particularly in that part of it which constituted an essay written by him for the prize offered by the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, the objections against wine, opium, and tobacco, are represented as of the same nature, and nearly as great in degree, as those against ardent spirits. Entire abstinence from the whole, is urged, upon grounds almost identically the same, as a duty upon all who are engaged in the suppression of intemperance. Now we maintain that this is false in point of fact, and unwise as a matter of policy. The moderate habitual use of ardent spirits necessarily produces drunkards—the same use of the other articles has no such effect. They injure the

health, they may waste the property, the habit is idle and useless. Say all this, and as much more as is true; but do not group them with ardent spirits. By so doing you do not strengthen the argument against them, but you most essentially weaken that against ardent spirits, and lay open the whole subject to ridicule. Now, where our views are impregnable with the strength of truth, the weapons of ridicule should inspire no dread and need not be regarded; but where they are in any respect false and ill-founded, these weapons will prevail to the destruction, not only of that which is false, but of that which is true with it.

Let us briefly examine what is alleged against the use of these several articles. They are all capable, in greater or less quantities, of acting as poisons, and of either immediately destroying life, or of seriously interfering with the performance of its functions. They produce more gradually, when used habitually in smaller quantities, diseases of the digestive organs and of the nervous system, dyspepsy, vertigo, apoplexy, palsy, &c. They are alike useless in preventing the effects of cold and heat, and as a refreshment during labor. They are expensive, and lead to a general habit of wastefulness and extravagance. All this may be true, and almost equally true of all these substances. But there is one thing further, true of ardent spirits, more important in a certain respect than everything else; viz. that whenever, in any community, they are articles of common use in moderate quantities, they inevitably produce intemperance in a greater or less proportion of those who use them.

We have, we believe, sufficiently explained our views concerning the true nature of the objection to ardent spirits, and the course which should be pursued with regard to their use by the friends of temperance; viz. that they should be wholly proscribed, but alone, and for their own sake, and that the objections to them should not be confounded with dietetic objections to other articles. But so much has been said against the use of tobacco and wine, and more especially the latter, that it seems worth while to enter into a little examination of the truth of the case, with regard to their alleged evil effects.

We are no advocates for the use of tobacco in any way or shape. We look upon a confirmed chewer, smoker, or snuffer, as the slave of an idle and disgusting habit. It would be our most earnest advice to every young man, particularly every young man engaged in literary pursuits, to avoid the formation

of any such habit. But we would have the truth, and no more than the truth, spoken with regard even to things the most noxious. Exaggerated and extravagant statements defeat the purposes for which they were made. Common sense and common observation soon teach men that they are not all true, and they are very apt to infer, because a part is false, that the whole is. Now, what does common sense and observation teach us of the effects of tobacco? That, as it is ordinarily used, it produces all the deplorable consequences which Mr Hitchcock and other writers enumerate? By no means. Are those who use tobacco freely, marked off from the rest of mankind, by a peculiar state of the physical system, by peculiar diseases, a peculiar state of mind, and even by a peculiar physiognomy, as those are who use ardent spirits? Certainly not. He who drinks rum freely, shows its pervading influence in every fibre of his frame. He is a man with a seal upon him. Nobody mistakes him. He cannot walk the streets, he cannot look you in the face, he cannot speak to you, but you perceive at once from his gait, his countenance, his voice, how matters stand with him. Is it so with the lover of tobacco? He may be a filthy and disgusting object, a nuisance to society, an offence to our senses. He is the slave of a certain filthy habit, and so are all of us of one habit or another; but except this, he is master of himself,—of his body and of his mind.

Look at those who use tobacco as a class—and it is a class unhappily sufficiently numerous, and one, too, which has existed long enough to afford us materials for satisfactory results,—are they more liable to disease, more debilitated in body, or less vigorous in mind, than those who refrain? Experience says no. Had it been otherwise, the truth must have forced itself irresistibly on men's minds after the observation of so many years. Whole generations, whole nations, we might almost say, have been in the constant use of this pernicious weed in various ways, yet no marked deleterious effects on their minds or health, have been the result. This is a practical proof, worth volumes of theoretical objections. That there are many individual cases of disease, and perhaps of death, from the use of tobacco we do not doubt; but that it is productive of any general morbid effects, we see no reason whatever for believing.

We may make mainly the same remarks concerning the use of wine. If used habitually, and particularly in large quantities, it is no doubt the cause of derangement in the functions of the

body, and, in many individuals, produces disease and death. In this respect, it stands upon precisely the same ground with a great number of other articles of food and drink. The effects of porter, cider, perry, rich and high-seasoned food, frequently and in large quantities, are not less injurious to the health than those of wine. They all produce an immense amount of disease and suffering. But when we come to what is styled a moderate but habitual use of wine, we suspect its bad effects fall far short of many of our most common dietetic habits. We believe that many a man may better drink two or three glasses of wine, with or after his dinner, than a corresponding quantity of cider or porter; and more especially that it will impair his digestive powers less than eating constantly newly baked bread, rich cake and puddings, and minced pies, or other pastry.

In speaking of wine, it ought always to be understood, that we mean the pure liquid, and not the vile mixtures which are so often manufactured and sold under its name. Many of them, undoubtedly, have all the essential qualities of ardent spirits. But in speaking of the effects of wine upon the health, it is not just to lay to its charge all the evils which these are capable of producing; and this more particularly, since those who use wine habitually, are careful to procure it of a proper quality. It is wrong, also, to speak of wine as producing deleterious effects equal to those of that quantity of alcohol which may be procured from it by distillation. A bottle of Madeira, to be sure, contains within itself about a pint of proof spirit; but it does by no means follow, that its effects upon the system are equivalent to those of that quantity of spirit. We know very well that they are not, by observing those immediate consequences which may be taken as in some degree the measure of the ultimate ones. It will be admitted, we presume, that, on most men, a single glass of raw spirit will produce more decidedly the effects of intoxication, than a quantity of wine containing twice the amount of alcohol. And this is because the alcohol in the spirit, acts simply as a stimulus, and is not probably digested at all, whilst in the wine it is combined chemically with certain other ingredients, which render it capable of digestion to a certain extent, and consequently of nourishing the body.

The same remarks apply, with more or less truth, to all similar liquids—porter, ale, cider, and perry. If the objections urged are good against wine, they are so against all these. We do not deny that there are objections to the free use of all of them.

We are not advocating their use, we only wish to let it stand on its true and proper grounds, and to have no objections advanced, which cannot be thoroughly made out. There are states of health, and there are constitutions, in which the constant and habitual employment of some of these liquors may be beneficial, or even necessary.

The same general tone of exaggeration pervades the whole of that part of the work of Professor Hitchcock which relates to diet. His views are founded upon certain general and very important truths; but he carries all his doctrines to an unreasonable extent. He draws the reins too close. He does not allow enough for difference of constitution, and the effects of previous habits. He would bring all men down too much to one uniform standard of living; and this standard he would fix at the lowest quantity and simplest quality. He has long been a dyspeptic himself, and seems disposed to measure the constitution of others by his own. There is in fact a very considerable latitude, both as to quantity and quality of food, which is consistent with perfect health. The digestive organs of mankind are capable of education. They can accommodate themselves to a greater quantity of food than is absolutely necessary for the support of life, without the smallest detriment to their healthy state. There is a power in the system of disposing of superfluous nourishment, without any injury to it, or even of devoting it to the gradual improvement of the animal structure. The doctrine of our author would seem to be, and indeed that of many writers upon dietetics is, that the smallest quantity of food, and that of the simplest quality, which will suffice for the support of the body under its usual habits of labor and exercise, is on the whole the best for it, and will in the long run contribute most to health and long life.

This opinion, we presume, has been chiefly adopted by way of inference from what is found to be advantageous in most diseases. It is no doubt true, particularly with respect to those of an acute character or recent origin, that a very sparing administration of nourishment contributes most essentially to their speedy and favorable termination. It is also true of most disorders of the digestive organs themselves, such for instance as dyspepsia, that they are recovered from, most readily and completely, upon a very moderate and carefully regulated diet. Now it has been argued that the course of diet and regimen, which is found so well adapted to the removal of disease, must

be most efficacious in preventing it; and particularly that, if dyspeptic complaints are to be removed by adhering rigidly to a certain course, it must follow almost necessarily, that an adoption of something like the same course will prevent them.

This view of the case has at first a strong appearance of probability, yet we suspect there is not so much in it as would seem. It is not always found, we think it may be safely said, it is not generally found, that what will cure a disease will prevent it. The instances to the contrary are very numerous, but the statement of them belongs rather to a medical consideration of the subject. As to dyspeptic complaints, and those of literary and sedentary persons in particular, their production is as much to be attributed to their other habits as to their habits of eating. The same habits of eating do not generally produce disease in other men—the same habits of life in other respects would produce disease in almost all. We have a right hence to argue, that as much is to be attributed to the latter as to the former.

The singular tendency of mankind to carry their opinions to an extravagant excess, has been manifested in regard to this subject, as well as to many others. Physicians themselves have not failed to partake in this disposition. Some of them have looked upon the animal system, as a machine which could be made more vigorous and powerful, according to the quantity of food and drink put into it,—just as a steam engine may be made to operate with greater force by increasing the quantity of fuel. Others have considered every excess of nourishment beyond the exact amount necessary to keep the organs in healthy activity, as absolutely prejudicial, as wearing them out too fast. No doubt the system will be injured if plied too liberally with nourishment; and so, on the other hand, it may suffer as to its powers of activity and endurance, from a strict adherence to that quantity and that quality, which is only just sufficient to keep it in repair. There is a medium speed at which an engine should be driven, if we wish to get from it the greatest amount of work, consistently with the safety of the machine. If driven too slow, we do not obtain from it all the advantage of which it is capable in a given time; if too fast, we accomplish more, but it is at the expense of the machine itself. Something like this is true of the animal system; and this leads us to the consideration of a very important principle with regard to the changes produced in the constitution of all living things, by the quantity and quality of their food.

The form, physical qualities and vital powers of all things which possess life, are capable of being modified by external circumstances of various kinds, among which one of chief importance is their food. It is familiar to us that plants become much improved by being transplanted from their natural soil, placed in the beds of our gardens, nourished by rich manures, trimmed, and protected from cold, heat and wind. Marvellous changes are wrought by these means, both in the beauty of flowers and in the excellence of fruit. To cultivation we owe the delicious varieties of the pear, peach and apple, which were all originally mean and comparatively disagreeable fruits. The potato, the parsnip, and other esculent roots, have undergone as great an improvement. The rose has naturally but five petals—we see it around our houses with an hundred; and the same thing, or something like it, takes place with respect to many other flowers.

In a similar manner animals are modified by domestication, in regard to their form, size, strength and dispositions. To it we owe the beauty of form and great strength of the horse, and all those varieties of this species which render it valuable to our race in so many respects. The almost innumerable forms under which the dog appears to us, are to be attributed to the same cause. The wool of the sheep, the fatness and flavor of the hog, have been produced by domestication. There is probably no animal permanently subjected to the dominion of man, whose form, size, strength and adaptation to the purpose of our food, have not been essentially improved. And what happens in domestication? The animal is better, more constantly, and more plentifully fed. The supply of food in a state of nature is more precarious; it is less palatable, and less stimulating. Other circumstances contribute, such as being well housed and sheltered from exposure—but the improvement of diet is an important item, in effecting the change; and the result of the whole is, that the good qualities of an animal are brought out and developed by the influences to which his association with mankind exposes him.

Let us go a step farther, and see how it is with man. Man, in civilized society, is a domesticated animal, and he is subjected to the operation of the same sort of causes with the species of which we have been speaking. To say nothing of other circumstances in which he differs from the savage, he is distinguished from him by the more abundant quantity and savory

quality of his food. Cookery gives to it an additional power of affecting the organs of taste, and of course of stimulating the appetite. It is furnished to him, also, at regular intervals, and without intermission. The digestive organs do not at one time undergo the trial of an unnatural abstinence, nor at another of great indulgence after too prolonged a fast.

The effect of this state of things upon man, corresponds, as we apprehend, to that which is produced upon plants and animals. His physical system is improved by it. The observation of those who have been conversant with barbarous and savage tribes, teaches us that they are much inferior to civilized nations in beauty and strength. We know that that race of mankind to which the inhabitants of Europe belong, is decidedly superior to all the rest, not only in beauty of person, but in ability for enduring labor and fatigue. This is the race which has enjoyed for the longest period the blessings of civilization, and whose physical capacities have been in consequence most fully developed.

The same thing has been witnessed on a smaller scale in smaller communities. In some of the South Sea Islands, the rich and noble form a distinct class by themselves, and are much larger, more finely formed and stronger than the poor. In the former, wealth and rank, and consequently good living, are hereditary. In the course of years the effect has been to produce as much difference in the frame and physical constitution of the two classes, as exists in regard to their rank and situation. The same effect has been observed to have been partially produced in some European countries, where wealth and rank have belonged to certain families for a long series of years.

We do not by any means intend to attribute the difference between savage and civilized man, and between the well fed and the ill fed classes of society, wholly to difference of food. Other circumstances in their relative situation no doubt contribute much to these results. But difference of food, is one circumstance, and a pretty important one, which contributes to the improvement of the physical constitution of man, both as an individual and as a species. For many striking illustrations of the actual advantages which the well fed, clothed, sheltered and warmed portion of mankind have over others, in regard to health and long life, we may refer our readers back to a previous number of this journal, in which some very important

and interesting results of late inquiries concerning these subjects, were briefly detailed.*

Now it may be inquired, admitting the statements which have been made to be true, so far as nourishment is concerned, how are these effects brought about? by what process or upon what principle is this improvement produced, and whether the remote evil consequences upon the health of mankind in the production of disease, may not have been such as to counterbalance all the good which has been otherwise derived?

We may account for the changes thus produced in the physical constitution of mankind, by considering, that, in the ordinary course of things in the human body, none of our organs are tasked to the utmost labor which they are capable of performing. They are all capable, if excited by their proper stimulus, of accomplishing a great deal more than is usually demanded of them. The stomach and nutritient organs, for instance, receive and digest a certain limited amount of food, and the system is well nourished, and every function goes on well; yet they have the power of receiving and digesting a good deal more than what is barely enough, and that without any embarrassment; and the system at large has the power of appropriating this superfluous nourishment, and thus of bringing about a more full developement of its organs. In short, it would seem that the food which we take in civilized life, either from its quantity, from its variety, from its agreeable impression on the organs of sense, or else from its stimulating quality, does actually excite the organs of digestion to more vigorous efforts than the more plain and sparing and irregular diet, with which nations in a ruder state of society are obliged to content themselves. The consequence is, that a larger quantity of the circulating fluid is prepared and sent into the blood vessels. Perhaps it is of a more stimulating quality, or of a quality better adapted to excite into action the organs to which it is distributed. These organs have the same power of increased activity with the digestive, and hence are more abundantly nourished. Thus the whole system becomes more fully developed, each organ more capable of action, and all this within the limits of perfect health; for the organs themselves on which the labor first and chiefly falls, viz. the digestive, partake in the same increase of strength and capacity, and gradually become so accustomed to the increased labor, that

* Christian Examiner, N. S. Vol. II. p. 240. Medical Statistics.

they perform it as easily as that which originally belonged to them.

Let us not be understood as carrying this doctrine to an unlimited extent. We wish only to express such opinions as are strictly supported by facts and by sound physiology, and trust that they will not be perverted, so as to countenance gluttony and luxurious indulgence. This power of accommodation in our system, can be carried only to a certain extent. If we increase the quantity or variety, or increase the stimulating quality of our food beyond a certain point, the organs become oppressed, they labor in the performance of their function, they perform it imperfectly, and derangement and disease is the final result. It is only by a due regard to the proper mean in our manner of living, that we can secure all the advantages of this capacity for improvement, without suffering from any of the evils incident to its abuse.

We may now answer the question proposed above, whether the evils actually endured from this source, are not sufficient to counterbalance all the good which proceeds from it. We answer, no. It cannot be doubted that this principle of improvement in our corporeal frames, is open to much abuse; that, by the possession of this power of accommodation, we are tempted too strongly to sensual indulgence, and that too many of us pay the penalty with our health, or even with our lives. We are not even disposed to deny that many individuals suffer in the same way and to the same extent, from a limited and proper use of the appetite, on account of some peculiarity of constitution. Yet we still maintain that the good far outweigh the evil results. The analogy is exact between the improvement of the body which thus takes place, and that cultivation of the intellectual and moral nature which is equally the result of the state in which civilized and refined society places us. This cultivation is the effect of excitements to activity, of various kinds, growing out of the connexions of social life, and the demands for intellectual efforts, which the association of men with one another necessarily occasions. Education supplies the same sort of stimulus to increased activity, and—if we choose so to call it—unnatural developement of the mind, that improved diet does to the body. The result in each case is the same. Within certain limits and in well balanced constitutions, there is an increase in the strength of the powers, and in the ability for proper exertion. In excess, or in constitutions not well balanced, derangement and disease may follow, either of body or of mind.

Much is generally said by writers on dietetics, of wearing out the organs by this system of over-nutrition, even where no immediate evil is the result; and this is probably true, wherever there is any excess. The difficulty is in determining, with regard to each individual, what the measure of excess is. A great difficulty it is; one, indeed, which we cannot well get over—so much do constitutions differ, and so remote may be the evil consequences of excess. We can judge fairly only by looking on society in a mass, and comparing the health and length of life of civilized nations with those of uncivilized. The comparison is decidedly in favor of the former. It is true that civilized man is the subject of a much greater number of diseases than the savage; but then he has a greater power of enduring and resisting disease, and of recovering from it; and notwithstanding the multiplicity of his diseases, he enjoys on an average a greater length of life.

We beg that what has thus been said, in explanation of a principle which is as true in a physiological point of view, as it is beneficial in its operation on the physical, moral and intellectual powers of our race, may not be perverted or misconstrued so as to serve as an apology, in any degree, for indulgence. We believe with our author, that, generally among ourselves, and among the richer and middling classes of all civilized nations, the error is, that too much and too stimulating food is consumed. Yet that the error, on an average, is not the enormous one which some represent, is shown by the results to which we have before referred. But it seems to us as clear, that a considerable proportion of mankind, take the world through, suffer from the other extreme, in health, in length of life, and in mind.

We do not doubt, that, to many, the opinions now expressed will seem dangerous, and perhaps false. We sincerely believe them to be founded in truth; and if true, they cannot be dangerous. We must confess that we have no sympathy whatever with the doctrine which would deny to those in health a moderate indulgence of the natural appetites. Was the exquisite sense of taste, corresponding as it does to a profusion of objects around us calculated to excite it agreeably, bestowed upon us only to be mortified and denied its natural gratification? We hold, on the contrary, that the power of accommodation in the animal economy, was intended to allow of this gratification within certain limits, and that the indulgence of the taste and the appe-

tite in moderation, as is done in the social circles of civilized life, has its share in promoting kind feelings and affectionate intercourse between man and man.

The evil, and truly a great one it is, lies in the abuse of the privileges which have been thus bestowed on us. Everything should be done to circulate just views and promote correct habits in so important a particular. Excess is a great mischief; but it does not therefore follow that entire abstemiousness is the proper course in order to avoid that mischief. Let us not be accused of letting down the standard of true temperance in taking this ground, or of parleying with our vicious dispositions for indulgence, and recommending an easy virtue. It is not so. Abstinence is an easier virtue than temperance. It is easier to deny entirely the appetite, than, when excited by indulgence, to stop it at a point short of satiety. The hardest lesson we can learn is that of moderation.

ART. VIII.—*An Address delivered before the Massachusetts Charitable Mechanic Association, at the Celebration of their Eighth Triennial Festival, October* 7, 1830.—By JOSEPH T. BUCKINGHAM.—Boston: John Cotton, 1830. 8vo. pp. 32.

THE society before which this address was delivered, is composed of mechanics. It was instituted in 1795, and incorporated in 1806, with authority to accumulate a capital fund 'for the purpose of relieving the distresses of unfortunate mechanics and their families, to promote inventions and improvements in the mechanic arts, by granting premiums for said inventions and improvements, and to assist young mechanics with loans of money.' These noble designs have been faithfully accomplished. The society has a fund of fourteen thousand dollars permanently invested. On the decease of any member, his family is entitled to receive forty dollars. For several years past, a school for the instruction of apprentices in reading, writing, and arithmetic, has been kept for three months in the year, and a course of scientific lectures has been instituted, continuing weekly, from October to April, at which some of the most distinguished citizens of the State have gratuitously filled the chair.

These are the honorable objects of a society containing on its rolls the busy, active and working mechanics of the Commonwealth. Thus faithfully have they been pursued. Yet so jealous were the Legislature, at the time of granting the act of incorporation, lest some injurious design lay concealed beneath the cover of these fair promises, that they limited the original charter to a period of ten years, and reserved the power of dissolving the corporation at any time when they should see fit so to do.

A consequence, in some degree derived from the association for which this society provides, and quite as useful to the whole community as any to which the charter or the rules of the company have been directed, is that lofty bearing, that conscious dignity of character, that self-respect, and public estimation that follows it, which the mechanics of Massachusetts maintain and enjoy. These are not, indeed, the effects of mere association. They follow from the character of the class of which the society is composed. But very much of this honorable independence results from the concert and union of individuals engaged in the same course of industry, and the manliness and respectability which they have thus the means of encouraging and sustaining. It follows, therefore, that in proportion to their numbers, the mechanics of Massachusetts are the most important and influential class of the community, and, together with the yeomanry, the fee simple possessors of the soil, regulate, in an essential manner, the political concerns of the State.

The address before us, delivered by the Vice President of the society, contains much good sentiment and correct opinion, in clear, plain and forcible language. As a specimen of the lofty tone of its thoughts, as well as its style, and as particularly connected with some observations we are desirous of presenting to our readers, we have selected the following paragraph, to which we most cheerfully assent.

'This middling class of society is, at least, half made up of mechanics—hard-laboring, industrious, practical mechanics. The obligations, which society owes to this class of citizens, are universally acknowledged. If the occupation of a mechanic can, in any part of the world, be cause of reproach, or if the name could ever be made to imply anything dishonorable, this is not the region, nor is this the day, for either the one or the other. You, who hear me, need no prompter to remind you of men, who, though

bred in workshops, have honored, embellished, and defended your country. That grateful country knows and remembers that the mechanics have ever been foremost in her cause, when she has had battles to be fought, or wrongs to be avenged. They have given statesman to her councils, generals to her armies, and plenipotentiaries to establish her rights at foreign courts, who met the cunning policy of foreign diplomatists with sagacity and prudence equal to their own. In the war of the revolution, they boldly faced the mercenary troops of her unnatural parent, and forced that haughty parent to relinquish its claim to dominion over her soil and her sons. The soil of this country is theirs; they fought for it; they bled for it; their fathers died for it; and perish the tongue that shall ever consent to relinquish one particle of its dust to foreign domination or domestic despotism.'—pp. 15, 16.

In further presenting the claims of the mechanics to the consideration of the public, the author, in addition to such arguments as we very willingly admit, has presented another, which strikes us as original, although we are certainly not prepared to question its accuracy.

'Celibacy prevails among other classes; (whether from necessity, or choice, or fashion, need not now be considered;) but among active mechanics, a bachelor of thirty is as rare as a phœnix among birds, though much less an object of admiration or desire—and among practical farmers, he is as useless, as unseemly, and as much dreaded, as snow in summer or rain in harvest.'—p. 18.

The subject of this address leads us to advert to various indications, throughout the United States, of an attempt to arrange the citizens into political and hostile parties, in consequence of their supposed condition as depending upon employment, wealth, numbers, and a common interest, by which it may be thought one class is governed, or by which it ought to be governed for the future.

If parties must exist in our community, it is certainly much better that they should grow out of real or supposed differences in political principles or conduct, than that the line of division should be formed by the condition of men in society. Inequality in personal affairs does exist, and always must exist, where there is freedom of action and security for property. Let the state of things be at first ever so equal, industry and intelligence and economy would soon make a difference; and time and chance, which happen to all men, and confound the calcula-

tions of the prudent and the efforts of the strong, would in a very little period derange this artificial equality. Some would grow richer and others poorer. Society could not exist if it were otherwise, nor would it exist with the character of a free state, if acquisitions, honestly made, were not secured, against invasion or rapacity, to those to whom they properly belonged. The liberty to preserve what is justly acquired, is quite as necessary to the well-being of a community, as the liberty to acquire; for acquisition would be of exceedingly little advantage, if it served merely to invite aggression and justify plunder.

There are higher objects, no doubt, to be maintained by civil government than the mere security of property. Life, character, civil and religious liberty, are among these superior objects. But the world is now too intelligent to make them a matter of doubt. They are not now put into question. The withering power of public opinion scorches and burns up that ancient tyranny, which once pressed upon the rational liberties of mankind; and where the direct force of opinion has not yet been felt, the indications of its future movements are already discernible. The power of government, except for the good of the governed, is no longer maintained by the supposition of divine right, nor can it be continued by oppressive military force. Such is either the condition or the prospect in other countries of the civilized world. We know and feel its reality here. Ours is the government of the people; and the only question for us to settle, is, whether, under a popular government, there can be any such opposition among different classes, as reasonably to divide them into parties, to raise up factions, to set one side in array against the other, and, if not to repeat those scenes of violence and bloodshed which have desolated other countries with the miseries of civil war, to do even so much as to diminish a mutual affection and esteem, to abate any part of that harmony which is the cement of national greatness, as it is of private happiness, or to lessen that kindness and interchange of good offices which give the finest polish to society.

Before parties can be formed with design to divide the rich from the poor, or the working men from the idle, it should be ascertained whether any classes, properly so distinguished, do in fact exist in our community. In our estimation they do not.

Wealth is a term that is used for comparison. In reference to the vast fortunes of individuals and families in Europe, we

have here certainly no wealthy men. There are several noblemen in England, and more on the continent of Europe, each of whose annual income is supposed equal to the whole capital of our richest citizens. In comparison with our own people, to be sure, one man is richer than another; and there are those among us, who, in respect to the mass of the community, are justly denominated opulent. But who are they? Mostly the architects of their own fortune. Commerce has thrown its treasures into their laps. An honorable enterprise and a lofty intelligence, while they have supplied the means of honest occupation to a crowd of their contemporaries, have, by the blessing of Providence, showered their larger favors on them. But we have here no *class* of rich men. There are none among us, who belong to a prescriptive body of wealthy citizens. Property, to be sure, is inheritable. The ability to transmit to one's children the acquisitions of a life of labor or prosperity, the security of which is the most certain and efficient stimulus to regularity and industry, is indeed a part of our social rights; but the state of public opinion, to say nothing of natural affection or the dictates of justice, secures a very equal division of it by testamentary bequest, and public law does the same in case of intestacy. We find, therefore, that inheritable wealth is ordinarily very small in comparison with that which is acquired, and scarcely ever remains in the same family beyond the third generation.

This prohibition of any prescriptively affluent class, forms the most beautiful feature of our political system, and seems to take away all excuse for any controversy among our citizens, founded on distinctions of wealth. Gather any of the ordinary associations of our people, and whom do you find? Take the merchants,—that liberal, adventurous, and intelligent body of our population, whose avocations are more likely to be favored by fortune than those which do not so boldly challenge her favors. Among them are many eminent citizens—what patriot does not wish there were more?—enjoying a noble independence for themselves and their children, as a compensation for their days and nights of anxious solicitude, their careful and exact calculations, their provident forecast and their hardy adventure; and among them, too, are how many—what philanthrophist would not diminish the number, if he might?—whom adverse winds or the accidents of life, neither to be foreseen nor retrieved, have run upon the shoals and quicksands of dis-

appointment? The class of merchants, truly and justly the wealthiest of our citizens, is surely not a class whose wealth should excite either envy or alarm. Let them count their numbers, estimate their strength, form their plans, project any scheme of personal aggrandizement;—they are outweighed in double proportion by associates, who can have no sympathy in any aristocracy of wealth. Gather together professional men. Let the lawyers be estimated by their property, and, obnoxious as they now happen to be to particular opponents, it would be the idlest of all possible apprehensions, to fear any harm which their opulence must pay for. As a body of men, deriving their funds from professional employment, the bar of this country is unquestionably poor. Shortly after the revolution, and again subsequent to the last war, individuals acquired a handsome property by the accumulation of business then thrown into their hands; but fortune, independence, or competency even, is now in very few instances secured by professional labor. The profession is crowded beyond the requirements of the business that devolves upon it. Eminent men have the means of making fortunes, as intellectual greatness must have, wherever it is placed with power for free exercise; but the great majority of lawyers barely live by their labor, and a very considerable number are absolutely poor.

When individuals of this class seem to be better off in the world, than this representation would allow them to be, a more close inspection would show, that some other cause than the emoluments of their profession was the source of their prosperity. The profession of the law is, or has been, the favorite resort of aspiring young men; and the wealthy of other classes have urged their sons into it, and supplied them with the means of spending, in a supposed elegant if not profitable leisure, the honorable avails of a more lucrative life. Separate the patrimonial from the acquired property of the bar, and it has been supposed the whole profession would be insolvent. But if the bar is not rich, it is educated. It has necessarily the advantage of cultivated and enlightened minds. A long and arduous preparation of the intellectual powers is the condition of admission to its honors; and although there are some in its lower departments, who form exceptions to the common rule, yet, as a general position, it may be safe to assume, that there is in this profession at least as much intellectual character, the result of study and assiduous preparation, united with as thorough

an acquaintance with men and manners derived from intercourse with the world, as is to be found in any other class of our society.

But on questions concerning the influence of wealth, if it should be brought to bear on any of the other essential interests of the state, what reliance could an aristocracy place on the assistance of the bar? This very intelligence would make them, in any future time of like need, what they were in the revolution,—the advanced guards of liberty, sentinels on the watch towers of freedom, determined and inflexible supporters of public and personal rights, by the forms of the Constitution, so long as it was to be defended by argument—and when the time for discussion had passed, then with the illustrious members of this and other professions, who proclaimed the independence of their country, ready to pledge to its welfare, 'their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honors.'

The medical profession is certainly not eminently the walk of rich men. It presents little chance for those bold speculations, which, in their fortunate results, are the sources of affluence. It confines its attentive professors to a quiet, retired, and private circle of duties, little connected with the bustle and business of the moving and active world. It has other thoughts and other feelings for its daily conversation—other and deeper tones of sentiment, that sound the utter feebleness of all the wealth of worlds to give happiness or peace. The medical man, who has the confidence of society in his professional skill, has a mind too much occupied with the distresses of his fellow beings, is drawn too constantly into the chamber of disease, is a witness too often of disappointments, which the feebleness and frailties of life interpose between hope and enjoyment, to be in any respect a money-making man. His professional emoluments may be large. They are justly so, if they can in any degree repay that anxiety and interest, which throw on him no small part of the agony he may be unable to alleviate; or if they would reward that deep solicitude and care with which he ministers to a family diseased. But professional fees, even at the close of a long and very active life, hardly compare with the profits of one fortunate voyage, or the successful operations of a single day on the exchange. If wealth comes to the medical man by the accumulation of his daily gains, it comes only when the desire of using it to any personal advantage has passed away, and its great end is to portion off a daughter, or aid a

son in that education which may lay the foundation of his usefulness in society.

But the medical profession, like that of law, is crowded with ardent competitors. The success, which may enable a man to accumulate a fortune, is rare. It is the result of accident, which unfrequently occurs, or of great talents and sagacity, which very few possess. Most men are contented with a competency, and many fail of acquiring even that. As an intellectual, and thus a very useful class of a community, medical men are entitled to high respect and esteem. As a class indispensable to the preservation of the greatest of human blessings, they are invaluable. As a generous, liberal, disinterested class, forward to render their aid in charitable and beneficent operations, where benevolence or humanity can be promoted or suffering can be relieved, they are in this country eminently entitled to the gratitude of their fellow citizens. But, as a wealthy class, able if they were willing, or willing if they were able, to do anything for the support of a monied aristocracy, or to give any assistance to any scheme adverse to popular rights, the medical men of the United States, are of all others the most distant from any possible suspicion.

Of clergymen it may hardly be necessary to speak in this connexion—men they are known to be

> ——' to all the country dear,
> And passing rich *with twenty pounds a year.*'

Among the mechanics of our country there are rich men. The same good judgment and good fortune, which have in other professions crowned individuals, have here also been rewarded with similar results, and a youth of labor has been followed by an age of ease. But with them, too, the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. Attend a meeting of those hardy citizens, and you will find every variety of condition, as regards the prosperity of their personal affairs, without being able to distinguish the causes of the difference. In the great lottery of their occupation, there have been more blanks than prizes; and it is not easy to see by what other cause than that we call chance, the highest prizes have been drawn. This is eminently the working class, and the influence of the whole on the political machinery of our society, as we have already remarked, is as great as it is obvious. In our elective republics, a mechanic who has talents, and leisure for their employment, is invariably invited to take part in the public coun-

oils, as often as it is his turn in the crowd of similar competitors, and commonly with some preference in this respect in his favor. We say talents and leisure, because both are necessary for the service of the public in any of the departments of office. Talents, to a certain extent, are indispensable. We do not mean the mere art of public speaking, but that acquirement of facts, and ability to marshal and understand them, which are not less necessary in the halls of legislation than in the workshop of the artisan, and give preeminence and distinction to the individual who possesses them in the greatest degree, whether in the one place or the other. We say also leisure, because the public business, no more than an individual's, can be carried on without large demands on individuals' time, and requires preparation and assiduity in research, as surely as care and correctness in execution. Some preliminary study must be devoted to the business of legislation, as certainly as to ship-building, or sail-making. A man would make a poor figure at the anvil, who, never having before been in a blacksmith's shop, should undertake to make a horse-shoe; and he would not have better success if he undertook, in like ignorance, to draw a statute of the State or an ordinance of the City. In our free governments, however, where education is so universally diffused, most men are instructed in the principles of government, and in the mode of making, administering, and amending the laws. It is this education which is to elevate and advance the laboring classes. This enlargement of mind, this cultivation of the intellectual powers, will carry with it, everywhere, its corresponding influence and weight, and, as far as it goes, will wear down and obliterate all other distinctions in society.

But while the mechanic and working classes are rising in power by intellectual cultivation, it is not to be supposed that the other classes of the community will go to sleep, or stand still even, and be overtaken, in this march of mind. The impulse is a general one. The force applied is universal, and the results will be everywhere apparent. Its tendency will be to render more plain, practical, and simple all the political and conventional arrangements of society; to place in broader view the great end of human existence, and multiply and facilitate the means by which that end can be attained; to make that contest, which first begins in regard to talents and intellectual power, a more honorable competition of individual virtue and moral worth; to enlarge the benevolence of mankind, extend the charities of life, soften the violence of passion, and thus increase the harmony of human existence.

It has seemed to us, however, that the true elevation of the working classes is to be effected, rather by a respect for their own condition than a jealousy of any other; by a pride in their situation in the community, and not any such fractious complaining as shows a dissatisfaction with it, without the possibility of a change. While the wants of society require laborers, such laborers, whatever the branch of labor may be, will of necessity be found; and the respectability and influence of this number are to be maintained, not by escaping from its duties, but by performing them in an exemplary and creditable manner. The mechanic who abandons his trade for the engagements of traffic, does not thereby become a better man; nor does the mechanic's son, who quits the employment of his father, do anything to give respectability to his father's profession.

We are not to be misunderstood as saying that trade or employments should be hereditary. Nothing is more opposite to the sentiments we would inculcate. Let every man pursue his own free course for honor or wealth. Let every man seek, as he may, by all honest means, to better his fortune. The question we have to ask, is, whether to better a man's prospects in society, it is necessary to leave the employment in which his parents have been engaged with honor and success, and try a new plan for himself at the bar, in the pulpit, or the counting-house. The question we propose is, whether they who practically undervalue the mechanic arts, by leaving the pursuit of them as soon as they acquire the means,—sending one son to college, another to a store, and another, it may be, to sea,—do not themselves do something to diminish the respectability of an employment, which they thus act as if they were ashamed of, and seem to think they elevate their children by teaching them to avoid.

It is impossible, in our free and liberal forms of government, that respectability should depend on the mode of life, which, among the vast variety of human pursuits, a man has selected for himself. How a man's duty is performed, is the true subject of inquiry. Real respectability is undoubtedly as great, when the moral and intellectual faculties are employed at the bench of the artisan, as in the forum or at the merchant's desk. But public opinion may be influenced by general conduct. If a man, with the energy of a parent's love, insists that to promote his son's interest he will not permit him to follow his own employment, what is such conduct but the most effectual of all modes of declaring, that there are other avocations more

respectable and desirable than his own? That something of this kind has occurred here, is too obvious to require any illustration. Men of most industrious habits have used the success which has crowned their efforts, not in continuing them with the accumulated impulse of experience and practice, and the aid of good judgment and long observation, but in making an effort at excellence, and for their children, in other professions, sometimes indeed with like favorable results, and sometimes with a failure as lamentable as it is severe. It is to the opinion that any other class of men are more respectable than themselves, which more than any other class the mechanics have themselves encouraged and maintained, that all the causes of complaint are attributable. So long as any other class or employment *is* more respectable, most certainly it is to be opened to the competition of every man, to whatever portion of the community he may belong. So long as it is *thought* to be more respectable, it should be sought for and adventured on and occupied, by any and every competitor, who may be able to acquire the means of honorably filling it. But why should it be deemed superior? By no innate or natural cause, by no inevitable state of things, but by that public opinion, which they do most to create and assuredly influence, who show their dissatisfaction by removing their children from particular employments as speedily as they may.

If, however, there is not any class in the community, which can properly be called a rich class, is there, it may be asked, any common principle of combination, which takes the affluent from all classes, and unites them in concert and in uniform phalanx, for the preservation or promotion of their peculiar interests, whether separate from their fellow-citizens', or otherwise? This is probably supposed to be the case. Wealth produces certain feelings, habits, and associations, which must, of course, be peculiar to itself. So does health, learning, pleasure, business, any occupation, indeed, or employment, in which the happiness of individuals is concerned, or about which their faculties are exerted. The gregarious character of mankind brings them together, and the association, to be useful, must be composed of similar materials. The innocent, and even laudable pleasures of the rich, cannot by possibility be enjoyed but in company with others, having, if not equal, yet like means for the same pursuits. The intercourse of the learned, or the associations of the gay, like those of the young, are governed by the same principles; but they are not an exclusive and

cold abstraction from all that are dissimilar, nor a retreat from everything that has not the same profound thought, or the same buoyant spirits with itself. Each maintains a general regard to all, and a familiar acquaintance with some; but he will preserve a more intimate and cordial and interesting connexion with his own particular friends. If this be wrong, it is an error which seems to be inherent in the very nature of man, and to be as justly chargeable on one class of men as another.

If the conduct of individuals or classes extends beyond this, it is undoubtedly censurable. The world offers no vainer spectacle, and our society none more contemptible, than a man proud of his fortune. A haughty and supercilious demeanour, vaunting itself on the possession of extraordinary wealth, which may have been gotten without merit, as it may be lost without blame, is a poor and pitiful exhibition of folly, that merits the contempt it is sure to incur. There may be such instances here, but we think they are too rare, and meet too invariably the censure they deserve, to be in any respect an excuse for ill feelings towards the affluent. The general tone of our society is too uniform, the elevation of the highest is too little above the common level, the strong voice of public opinion is too powerful and impressive, to allow of that irritating and impertinent self-sufficiency, which cannot be exhibited without exciting very general disgust. The affluent do not rise, and do not feel that they rise, into any independence of their fellow men. They are as dependent on their good offices, on their labor, service, attention, and care, as if they were not able to pay for it. They can *command* nothing. There are no slaves here to be under the despotism of their pride; there are no classes so surbordinate as to be compelled to labor for them but as their inclination directs. The rich can get nothing that they do not purchase; and they can buy nothing, if they accompany their intended purchase with that aristocratic insolence, which offends the proud feelings of their equals in everything but gold. A lofty spirit of freedom pervades all classes of our happy community. There is an atmosphere, under our equal constitution, which brings vigor of mind and consciousness of personal dignity to all who respire it. With the many who breathe this air, the comparatively few rich men are brought daily into contact; and it serves to repress all lordly sentiments of superiority, and makes man 'mild and sociable to man.'

The affluent are perhaps inclined, by the impulse of personal interest, to a strong regard for the preservation of property.

Hence those parts of our civil policy, which strengthen the security of titles, and establish the public faith, may expect them for their particular advocates. No man, it has been remarked, would desire a distribution of all the property of the people, unless he expected his share on a new division would be greater than what he now possessed. But this desire to make permanent and immovable the landmarks of personal rights, if it be ascribed to one class more than another, is most of all advantageous to men of moderate property. What would they have as a reward for the toils of labor, the habits of long industry, the sacrifices and self-restraint, which have accumulated a little fund to meet the storms of misfortune, the infirmities of age, the weakness of a dependent offspring, and the solace of a bereaved family, but for the perfect reliance they can place on the protection secured to them by public law? Thank Heaven, we know of no spirit so profligate and base in our community, as to wish to disturb this security; and if a strong attachment to the preservation of it is the worst thing that can be ascribed to those who have the largest stake in its permanency, they certainly will not be the least deserving members of the state.

The protection of property may however be extended too far, by provisions of law; and in our opinion it is carried too far, when the law authorises the imprisonment of an honest debtor, because he is unable to perform a contract he has made. To the whole form and body of such laws, we, as individuals, are heartily and entirely opposed. They are the relics of a barbarous age, and we trust to see them expunged from our statute books. But we do not think their continuance is owing to rich men, or that such men are much in the habit of resorting to their provisions. The enforcement of them is mostly sought by small dealers and petty chapmen, by men generally as poor as their debtors, and often with less feeling. The records of our prisons show, that executions are extended, for the most part, on the persons of debtors for small sums, and that the costs of imprisonment equal, on the whole, the amount of the debt.

Of the liberality with which the wealth of this community is poured out for all purposes of education or charity, no one can be ignorant, who sees the schools and the hospitals it has endowed, and the profusion of its bounties wherever good is attainable, or evil may be averted. A distinguished citizen* has

* President Quincy, in his Centennial Discourse, p. 44.

lately recorded his unimpeachable testimony to this honorable fact. 'It is obviously impracticable,' he says, 'to give any just idea of the amount of these charities. They flow from virtues which seek the shade, and shun record. They are silent and secret out-wellings of grateful hearts, desirous unostentatiously to acknowledge the bounty of Heaven in their prosperity and abundance. The result of inquiries, necessarily imperfect, however, authorise the statement, that, in the records of societies having for their objects either learning or some public charity, or in documents in the hands of individuals relative to contributions for the relief of suffering, or the patronage of distinguished merit or talent, there exists evidence of the liberality of the citizens of this metropolis, and that chiefly within the last thirty years, of an amount, by voluntary donation or bequest, exceeding one million and eight hundred thousand dollars. Far short as this sum falls of the real amount obtained within that period from the liberality of our citizens, it is yet enough to make evident, that the best spirit of the institutions of our ancestors survives in the hearts, and is exhibited in the lives, of the citizens of Boston; inspiring love of country and duty; stimulating to the active virtues of benevolence and charity; exciting wealth and power to their best exercises; counteracting what is selfish in our nature; and elevating the moral and social virtues to wise sacrifices and noble energies.'

Whence, then, did these vast sums come? Where are the fountains of these flowing and fertilizing streams? Surely, wealth can be given only by those who possess it. The best feelings, the kind sympathies, the finer affections of our nature, in numberless cases more beneficent than the treasury of an empire, are supplied by generous hearts, whose goodness may be a compensation for their poverty; but money comes in large masses only from the coffers of the rich.

We do not believe, then, that there is, or ever can be, under our free institutions, anything justly imputed to them, so derogatory to their character, as the fostering of a monied aristocracy, nor that wealth acquired, as it may be, by accident or skill, can ever be applied either to the destruction of the private rights of any set of men, or to the detriment of the public.

It seems to us a little singular that such a supposition should be made and pursued in the regular progress of theoretical inquiry, without in the slightest degree influencing the conduct of those who entertain it. The desire of acquiring property is the great lever of society. It moves, governs, directs, influences everything about which the arts of life are employed, and all with

which human beings are connected. High and low, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, are under the strong impulse with which it acts upon every possible combination of the materials of society. That it is sometimes inordinate is undoubtedly true. It is grasping, mean, overbearing, and penurious. These are its evils. But it is the spirit of industry and enterprise, of assiduity and forecast, of genius and learning, of patience and perseverance,—these are its advantages. Man is so constituted that he must have some motive of action that shall be serviceable to himself, and stimulate the labor that it rewards. There are other motives, indeed, some of which are grander and nobler; but there are none so universal, so constant, so irresistible; none on which the every day business of life so necessarily turns. It cannot therefore be in itself a wrong motive, but, like the affections and appetites, in themselves proper, requires only to be properly directed and controlled. Success in the great struggle in which all are engaged, should not, therefore, become the cause of envy, jealousy or ill will, but should be encouraged either for the talent which it indicates, or the good it may accomplish. Least of all should the working classes allow any animosity to cross their minds; for the obligations of the laborer and the employer are reciprocal, and both are equally benefited when the former is engaged.

We have spoken of the working classes in this connexion, as the phrase is beginning to be used here, meaning thereby the operatives in the great workshop of society. But however exact the term may be in European nations, or elsewhere in the world, the distinction intended to be conveyed by it, is perfectly arbitrary, and, according to our notion, absurd, when applied to the population of an American commonwealth. Every man, or almost every man, is a working man, unless he has grown old in labor, and seeks the necessary repose of exhausted nature. There are two reasons for this. First, the fact that our people begin life under a necessity of working for their own living; and secondly, the strong force of public opinion, which deprives a man of all personal consequence, and almost of all personal respectability, who, at a period of life when his faculties are vigorous and capable of action, contributes nothing to the general welfare of the community.

The age of man here does sometimes enable a successful citizen to acquire a splendid fortune; but if amid the uncertainties of all sublunary affairs, it is kept in one great mass till he dies, the statute of distribution, the true republican leveller

of all aristocratic establishments, invariably breaks it into fragments, and leaves the possessor of any one part to the casualties of affairs by which it is to be enlarged or diminished. Few fortunes are large enough to enable the inheritor of a part to fold up his hands, and rest contentedly on his wealth. To maintain the habits of his earlier years, when he made part of the family circle of his affluent parent, he must add to his possessions, and begin to labor, if not for subsistence, at least for the elevation to which he has been accustomed. It is after all a chance if he succeeds; for Fortune, with her proverbial infidelity, is rarely constant to these family worshippers.

There is, we think, a most happy coincidence in the interests of all the different classes of our community. In public and political rights there is perfect equality. In the exercise of those rights there should be a liberality of sentiment and feeling that may serve for the guarantee of their continuance. The harmony of our institutions is the best evidence of their happy adjustment. In the desolation of other countries which despotism grinds or revolution ravages, we have a picture of the miseries which jarring interests may produce. None such can occur here, if we wisely estimate our advantages and endeavour to sustain the causes from which they spring. There is not among us any class which is not affected by whatever interests either of the others. Mr Buckingham has well expressed this opinion, where it cannot fail of effect. 'In our republic,' he says, 'the distinctions of higher and lower in reference to privilege, employment, and rank, are unknown.' A distinguished jurist,* adverting to the same subject, has beautifully illustrated the utter insignificance of wealth as a distinctive feature of our political system. 'Property,' he says, 'is divided quite as fast as it accumulates. No family can, without its own exertions, stand erect for a long time under our statute of descents and distributions, the only true and legitimate agrarian law. It silently and quietly dissolves the mass heaped up by the toil and diligence of a long life of enterprise and industry. Property is continually changing like the waves of the sea. One wave rises, and is soon swallowed up in the vast abyss, and is seen no more. Another rises, and having reached its destined limits, falls gently away, and is succeeded by yet another, which, in its turn, breaks, and dies silently away, on the shore. The richest man among us may be brought down to the humblest level; and the poor man while he rocks his infant on his

* Judge Story's Speech in Mass. Convention of 1820. p. 136, of Journal.

knee, may justly indulge the consolation, that if he possess talents and virtue, there is no office beyond the reach of his honorable ambition. It is a mistaken theory, that government is organized for one object only. It is organized for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and all the comforts of society—to enable us to indulge in our domestic affections, and quietly to enjoy our homes and fire-sides.'

This is true philosophy. This is the exact estimate to be made of the beautiful theory of our republic. But the very want of a permanent and immoveable class, seems to the statesmen of Europe to be the defect of our institutions. There is no rock, they say, to which the ship can be moored; nothing to prevent the wild surges of public opinion from sweeping it from the shore, and exposing it to all the tempests of an angry ocean. It is so. THERE IS NONE. We depend not for security on any resistance to this opinion, but from the correctness of a public sentiment that can need no resistance. So long as our people are well informed and intelligent, there is no danger. The little occasional variations of the public mind are temporary flaws in the wind, that do no serious injury. But let us take care of the courses on which it blows. We have no force but principle, no other national guards than the moral feelings of the people, no standing army but the power of enlightened mind, no police but the civic virtues of free citizens. Everywhere, good affections, generous and noble sentiments, disinterested and patriotic purposes, contribute essentially to the public welfare; but here, without them, society would be dissolved. Jealousy between different portions of our citizens, suspicions of unfair designs, imputation of unwarrantable motives without justifiable cause, gradually undermine the foundations of our national existence. If there be cause, the destruction would be inevitable. The corollary we would draw, then, from these demonstrations, is the duty of encouraging a high, honorable, and generous course of conduct. Conciliation and kindness are to be inculcated on the one part—forbearance, confidence and esteem on the other. These qualities are the cement of a republic.

From the course of our remarks, the practical results we would inculcate cannot fail to be perceived. The first we particularly attend to, is the duty of endeavouring to make men happy in that condition which Providence has assigned to them. What can be more miserable than a restless, dissatisfied, repining and irritable temper, ill at ease with itself, and impotently envious of all around it? If there are causes of complaint,

this disposition aggravates them; if they are few, it multiplies, and if there are none existing, it contrives to make them. It would be difficult to persuade a man in this country that wealth did not bring happiness, or that any substitute could be found to compensate for the absence of it. But, without denying its importance, it may be easily demonstrated that in itself it is neither the cause of happiness, nor the means of it. A certain portion of property is unquestionably necessary for the enjoyment of life; but this certain portion is no definite or certain quantity. It was described by an eminent merchant, who had the reputation of possessing a larger fortune than any other man in Massachusetts, to be *a little more than one had.* Now, that little more is just as deficient in the coffers of the most wealthy, as of any other individual. It is only a *little* more. Habits, modes of life, customary pursuits, are all regulated, not by any precise amount which a man has, or thinks he may acquire, but by his relative condition in the great scale of society, in which perhaps no two individuals are precisely the same.

We do not attempt the folly of persuading our readers, that wealth is not a good thing; and, whatever our own reflections may be, we will essay no such unprofitable task as an argument against the opinion, that the more a man has the better for him and his children. Be it so. But inasmuch as all men cannot be rich, by the unavoidable and immutable laws of human existence, and because a society in which every man had an unlimited amount of gold, would be precisely the same as one where they were all equally destitute of it; and because, in fine, there must be pecuniary inequality, so that in the various departments of life,

'All nature's difference keeps all nature's peace,'

it is the most useful inquiry to make, how self-satisfaction may best be preserved among those who happen to be on the shady side of the field. Undoubtedly, if they were not permitted to adventure at their will for another and a better condition, the laws or institutions which should so confine them, would deserve their indignation, and ought to be forthwith overturned. But here most truly is no impassable line. Here are no stern laws, nor prescriptive customs, nor restraints imposed by power or influence. The roads are all open and the travel all free. It is impossible to make them more so, and equally impossible that every man should advance with equal speed. The compensations which are enjoyed by those who are not forward in the course, should be wisely, temperately and candidly considered, that, if they do not amount to a complete satisfaction, their value, as

far as they go, may not be misunderstood. He does no service to any classes of men in our society, who excites their ill will, or their bad feelings, or aggravates unavoidable evils by factitious and idle complaints.

A further inquiry, which our subject presents, is, how the various individuals of our mixed society can be most useful to each other; how that benignant and humane spirit, without which the intercourse of men would lose its choicest satisfaction, may be best cultivated and enlarged and made most extensively to operate. And we answer, unhesitatingly, not by arraying one part of the community against another. The hands cannot say to the head, I have no need of thee; nor the head to the foot, I have no need of thee. Society moves on for the prospering of its own great concern—the common and best interests of all the individuals who compose it,—by a happy and harmonious cooperation of joint efforts, each member acting according to his strength, his means, and his influence. Real difficulties it is proper to ascertain, and, if possible, to remedy. Real grievances are to be redressed; but the suggestions of a contrary interest in the different classes of society, may be suspected to be the fruit of an evil design. Such contradiction cannot exist in any permanent form. We have all one great and common interest as citizens, patriots, Christians; a common country to be served by united exertions, and a common faith to be maintained by the cultivation of character, which takes none of its coloring from the accidents of life. He has most to do, who has most power to do it. To whom much has been given, from him will much be required. Let him fulfil the obligations of his station and meet the responsibility which it imposes. Providence seems constantly to indicate to us, that there are higher and nobler objects of pursuit than mere external condition. We are reminded that the cultivation of the mind, the improvement of the heart, the enlarging and purifying and extending the intellectual and moral powers of our nature, deserves the most serious regard. What a man does to multiply his acquisitions, will be much less a subject of concern to him, than how he has used them; and what he may have done for himself, of vastly less consequence in the great day of account, than what he has attempted for the interest of his fellow men. What may be obtained of this world's goods, is as transient as is everything connected with sublunary concerns; but accessions to mind, contributions to the generous and noble affections of our nature, are as durable as the soul, and will survive the wreck of matter, and the crush of worlds.

THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

NO. XLII.

NEW SERIES—NO. XII.

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ART. I.—1. *A Lecture on the Working Men's Party, first delivered October 6, before the Charlestown Lyceum, and published at their Request.* By EDWARD EVERETT.—Boston: Gray & Bowen. 1830. 8vo. pp. 27.

2. *Mr Tuckerman's Second Semi-annual Report of the Fourth Year of his Service as a Minister at Large in Boston.* Gray & Bowen. 1830. 12mo. pp. 36.

THE popular governments under which we esteem ourselves fortunate to live, depend for their success in promoting the prosperity of the state and the nation, on the truth of the axiom that there can be no permanent diversity of interest between any classes of the people. Identity of interest, for all large and general purposes, is taken for true in the theory of our republic; and if it be not true, if there be serious and conflicting interests, which different classes maintain, irreconcilable with any common course of policy in which all may unite, it is not difficult to foresee what must be the tendency of this grand experiment of freedom. And in a government so entirely depending on popular opinion, it is scarcely less necessary that no such diversity of interest should be supposed to exist, than that none should in fact exist; for here, certainly, the sentiment of the poet is no fiction, that 'there is nothing good or bad but *thinking* makes it so.'

We may be excused, therefore, for resuming the subject to which we paid some attention in our last number; and we place at the head of this article two productions having a direct bearing upon it. The first is a striking and beautiful illustration of the mysterious connexion of body and mind, and the necessa-

ry union of physical and intellectual power for all the avocations of life. It bears the impress of genius, and like all the productions of its classic author, is calculated to instruct and improve its readers. We invite to it the early attention of all who feel any interest in this popular subject. The other refers to the actual state and condition of a large and growing class of the community; those, who, by ignorance, poverty, or crime, hang with heavy weight on society. The details which it presents, and the suggestions which are made by its philanthropic and intelligent author, are deserving of very careful regard.

In directing our attention, as we did in our former article, in the first instance to the class of affluent men, it was not by any means from a belief that they were the most important or deserving class of society. But as gain is the great object and the moving impulse of a laboring and active community, it seemed to be proper to inquire who were most forward in the chase, and whether there was any congregation of individuals, who might possess the spirit of a class, distinguished by selfish objects, in which their fellow citizens had no part.

We suppose that wealth, in our community, can very rarely be the harvest of rapacity or crime; and we are not willing to believe that it can in general be fairly considered to be gathered from exactions on the poor. It is sometimes said, that the luxuries of the rich are paid for by the poor. But is it so? Where the public treasury, which is mostly supplied by contributions of the industrious classes, pours out its abundance in pensions, sinecures and salaries, enormously disproportioned to the services for which they are paid, the assertion might be justified. But here there is no such prodigality. Public office rarely makes any man rich. If the compensation paid to the servants of the state is in any case excessive, it is nevertheless fixed by the people, and at their pleasure may be curtailed. Great competition exists to enlist in that service. But rank, power, and honor, form no small part of the inducement, and the emolument is sought for, not so much to accumulate a fortune, as to sustain life.

We do not of course mean to include every individual case in our general remarks. There are exceptions in this as in other rules. But if, as a general assertion, it may be safe to say, that the acquisition of fortune does not imply anything at variance with the common good, how is it in the expenditure?

Here, again, there are great differences in individual cases. But we can deal with the subject only as it presents itself on the whole. We can examine it only in its broad and general outlines, and in its indications of general character. It has such a character, as distinctive and well defined as the national character of which here and everywhere it makes a very considerable part. Of diffusion of wealth by charity or enterprise, it is not necessary to say anything. To the former we have already adverted, and the latter is seen in the vast establishments of commerce, the magnificent edifices of manufacturing industry, the roads, canals, wharves, stores and public edifices, which contribute to the prosperity and ornament of our country. It is rather to humbler and narrower fields, that our inquiries now lead, because these, in want perhaps of more attractive ones, are made the more recent subject of animadversion. The personal enjoyments of the affluent are sometimes the causes of uneasiness, and offer occasions for expressions of slight regard. But the matter candidly considered, does not give much cause of complaint. What is luxury, but a tax which wealth pays to labor? What would be the condition of many of our most respectable and industrious citizens, if this tax were not very liberally levied and very willingly paid? A magnificent mansion, with its splendid display of costly decorations, ministers to the elegant indulgence of a single family, but its erection and maintenance give employment to an hundred. A style of living that is very apt to excite something of envy at the fortunate condition of the individual who supports it, gives to numerous classes of active men their principal means of subsistence. Even the gratifications, which, so far as the moralist may be concerned, are most objectionable, are not without their advantages in this respect. A ball room, where the affluent and gay may assemble to pass, if not waste, as much time as would be equivalent to the life of one individual for a month, or of thirty individuals for a day, can hardly be prepared for the reception of its pleasure seeking inmates, without demanding from honest labor a much larger employment of time, which is liberally paid for; and when the indirect as well as the immediate demands which fashion makes for its display on these occasions, is taken into the account, it would be no extravagant estimate to place the employment of labor at the value of ten times the period employed in the indulgences of amusement. Strike from the list of accommodations, those which taste and luxury, and, if you

please, pride and vanity, require, and what would be left to occupy the thousands who now live comfortably and contentedly by supplying them? When it is considered how intimately the diffusion of wealth is connected with all the departments of mechanical skill and labor, even those which at first view are most distant from it, the attempt would surely seem unwise, to excite ill-will towards any who may have the power of contributing to it. Under our forms of government, this attempt is peculiarly injudicious. In other countries, wealth places its possessors in a good measure above the power of the people. Rich men dread the exactions of magistrates, but hold popular feelings in very little respect. Not so here. So soon as the use of property brings them into disfavor, its use will be changed or discontinued. There is here no strength in a shield of gold to blunt the arrows of popular indignation. The people will be obeyed; and it is therefore the more important that their commands should promote their own essential interests.

We repeat, therefore, that there is an indissoluble connexion and mutual dependence among the classes of our society, and that the happiness of all, and in fact their existence, under free institutions, is mainly concerned in preserving a mutual confidence, respect, and esteem; so that it is a most unpatriotic, as well as unchristian effort, to attempt to separate these classes into opposite, conflicting, and irreconcilable parties.

Where this connexion to which we have alluded, is so direct and important, there may be other circumstances in addition to the general considerations of propriety and duty, which may tend, in a greater or less degree, to unite or to sever the various individuals who compose our communities. These circumstances may be improved by care and attention, by suitable concessions of one set of men or another, and by the mutual cooperation of all. Some of these we proceed to consider, and to offer such suggestions as in our opinion may promote this important end.

Among the first of those institutions which tend to promote harmony among all the citizens of the commonwealth, are our public free schools. We do not so much allude, now, to the immense advantages of general education, which they, and they alone, are able to secure, as to the benefit of an early association of youth under our system, where there is a common object and equal means of attaining it, and no superiority is possessed by any one, that is not acquired by industry, talent, and

virtue. On the perfect level of this broad platform the children of rich and poor meet together, and forget the temporary inequalities of life, in exertions for the more durable elevations of mind. The strength of attachments formed at school, are rarely broken in the various vicissitudes of life; and the respect and esteem, which are generated in the friendly contests for intellectual distinction, bring down all overweening regard for the artificial differences of society.

We could not but smile at the utter ignorance of a recent traveller in our country, who undertook to become very wise in regard to our institutions and manners, when he spoke with disdain of these public schools, as partaking somewhat of an eleemosynary character.

Our people understand that what is given by the government, is only in another form a donation of their own. They are the government. Their property founded these establishments, their labor and contributions maintain them. The poorest child who receives the rudiments of his education in our public schools, feels the same consequence and pride that he would do if the master was a private tutor, paid from the pocket of his parent. It is his own. He claims it as his birthright. It is his inheritance as a citizen of New England, and he knows no better or more honorable title by which the most affluent member of the community holds any portion of his wealth.

There seem to us to be two circumstances, which may tend to diminish the advantages of this beautiful system of republican policy, against which it is well to be on our guard. The first is an attempt to discountenance those schools in which the highest branches of learning are taught, preparatory to a college education. The idea that these are only for the rich, is a libel on the capacity and talent of the middling and working classes. They are truly for those who have talents and genius to profit by the instruction; and such qualities are hereditary in no family, nor exclusively the characteristic of any classes of the community. It is, perhaps, the opposite extreme, to press the expenses of these public establishments to an extravagant and burdensome taxation. Whenever this shall be found to be the case, there will be danger of a revulsion in the public mind, hazardous to the system. The weight of public contributions are not borne by the rich, nor the poor. The last pay nothing; the first, though in single cases the amount is large, are yet too few in number to bring a very considerable

proportion into the treasury. Most of the available funds of the public, are derived from the active, moving, busy men, who give life and energy to society; men who do not profess to have a fortune, and are nevertheless far above want; men who owe nothing beyond their means, and live well, but are yet subject to all the laws of economy and prudence. There is nothing which this useful and solid body of our citizens more cheerfully pay for, than the legitimate expenses of a sound, useful, practical education, for all the children of the district in which they live; but there is nothing which we think they would more dislike, or ought more decidedly to resist, than the expending of time and money for the mere ornament and parade of learning, which must be too superficial to be valuable, and too foreign from the daily pursuits of life, ever to be of general practical utility.

The means of all societies have limits, beyond which it is unreasonable and unwise, even for the success of a favorite object, to attempt to strain them; and the double, or perhaps opposite danger, arising from the necessity of schools for higher branches of learning, with reasonable regard to the amount of expense, requires some liberality of mind, and some concession of interest. The experiment of giving a complete and thorough education for all useful purposes, to every child of both sexes, at the public charge, is a bold, and certainly a novel, experiment. To a certain extent the public is interested. That intelligence which the public requires, it should provide the means of obtaining, and probably this is the limit of its duty; but whether its duty is to provide for professional and business education, may admit of much doubt.

The other circumstance to which we allude, is the ancient habit of assembling all classes for public worship under one teacher in the same temple of the Lord. Religion, like death, dissolves all earthly distinctions. In the eye of Heaven there is no wealth but virtue, and no poverty but sin. At the altar of devotion there is generated a solemn sensibility to the weakness of a common nature, a regard for the professors of the same faith, and a sentiment of kindness for all who in like spirit are objects of the same divine dispensation. To the early habits of New England in this respect, is owing very much of that harmony and good will, and that reciprocal affection and esteem, which distinguished, not indeed the poor and the rich, for those classes hardly existed, but the more and the less favored individuals of society, the happy and the unfortu-

nate, the distinguished and the obscure, and united different professions and occupations of life, bringing together men, who, meeting but seldom in the course of daily avocations, might become aliens to each other, but for this weekly consecration of their feelings on the same solemn occasion.

Another obvious mode of promoting the harmony and common good of society, is by diminishing the number of that class which has nothing in common with the multitude;—we mean the class of paupers, whether they become so by misfortune or by crime. So long as a man has any stake in the general welfare, however small, he will readily understand that it is to be preserved on the same principles by which the larger interests of others are protected; but when he has none at all, there is no dependence to be placed on him. It then requires stronger moral principle to resist the force of temptation, which urges him to violate or abrogate the laws. If at any time it should be found that the physical power of the state was in the hands of those who had no advantage from the existing laws, and no hope of obtaining any, the result would speedily be revolution and civil war; or if, by the agency of such a class at the ballot boxes, the form of government might be changed, it is not easy to believe there would be any permanency in its establishment. We see in Europe, what we trust never to see here, the maintenance of civil power by military force, and the frightful disorders and distress which are incident to despotism. To avoid it there is a necessity of diminishing pauperism; and to diminish it, there is need of a prevailing spirit of industry, frugality, and integrity. The cause and the prevention of it, are subjects of deep interest to the statesman as well as the philanthropist; and the means of checking it, which Dr Tuckerman has suggested in the report before us, are important enough to be very seriously and deliberately considered.

'At the hazard even of falling under the imputation of arrogancy, I am constrained to say, that the great error, as I think, of legislators and of political economists, has been, that they have looked upon man only, or almost exclusively, as a creature of time, and a subject of human government; almost alone as he is seen in the class in which he stands of his fellow beings; and forgetting, or lightly regarding, his moral nature, they have sought for the causes, and the remedy of evil in society, altogether in outward circumstances; and everywhere, but where alone these causes and remedies are to be found, in the elements, and springs, and

capacities of that nature, which makes us what we are, *men*. It is not indeed surprising that the poor, and that criminals, under despotic governments, have been treated as beings of altogether a distinct nature from that of their rulers and oppressors. But it is wonderful, that, under a goverment in any measure elective, and free, and under the light of Protestant Christianity, a criminal code should have been retained till the 19th century, which was the disgrace of the 16th; and, that it could ever have been hoped to have restrained the growth of poverty, under institutions which as effectually excluded the great mass of the poor from the means of intellectual improvement, as they would have been excluded by a law which forbade their instruction. It is wonderful that, in a Protestant country, and in the 19th century, the very means employed for the punishment of criminals, should be the means best suited, of all others, to produce an indefinite extension, and aggravation of crime; and that there should have been annual assessments, to an immense amount, for the support of the poor, which from year to year have been most manifestly a bounty upon idleness, and a legislative provision for the progress of want, and misery, and sin. These are causes and effects, which should be well understood, and seriously pondered, in a young country; and especially in a country, whose law is the will of the people; whose institutions, of every character and name, rest on the will of the people; and whose only true greatness, and security, and happiness, is in the intelligence and virtue of the people. The truth is, that both political economists, and legislators, have too generally looked to *wealth* as the supreme good of a nation; and to the means of increasing wealth, as the means of national greatness and happiness. The working classes have therefore been regarded by them as is machinery, in relation alone to their productiveness of wealth. The question, therefore, respecting both the poor, and criminals, has been, how are they to be disposed of at the smallest expense? This very course of procedure, I believe, has quadrupled the expenses which would have been required, if legislators and political economists had acted upon the doctrine, that a nation is truly great, and powerful, only in the intelligence and the virtue of all the orders of its subjects. Let the wealth of a nation be a thousand times that of England, and let it be in the possession of the few, while the many are reared in ignorance, and are left to be goaded by want; and, when they fall into crime, are treated in any way but that in which men should be treated; and the day will come, when all this wealth will not be sufficient to appease the passions of a blind and infuriated mob. Mr Peel, in the same breath, speaks of "the prosperity of the country," and of what he calls "the

frightful difference," in that country, "between the increase of crime, and the increase of population." I will only say, may God save our country from such prosperity as this!' pp. 14—16.

Dr Tuckerman has modestly put this matter in a note; but it is in our opinion a part of his report that is worthy of grave consideration. Pauperism originates in misfortune or crime; and, as it proceeds from one or other of these sources, it is, we think, to be treated with different applications. An almost universal spirit of enterprise, laudable efforts for commercial prosperity, and that general activity among our countrymen, which must incur hazard, as the only means of success, sometimes prove in the end so disastrous to many, that the whole prospect of future life is overwhelmed by one dark cloud of debt and embarrassment. We have already entered our protest against laws, which, under such circumstances, subject a man to imprisonment; but something beyond a melioration of their barbarous provisions is necessary, and we think a scheme for the full discharge of the honest debtor, through the process of a bankrupt law, is demanded by the universal interest of society, and cannot much longer be delayed with safety to our institutions.

But insolvency or pauperism from crime, is a matter of different complexion, even when it is not always the result of such actions as the laws of society can punish. There are men, unwilling to labor, who, because they are poor, preposterously enlist themselves under the banners of the working men. There are multitudes, who prefer the resorts of low dissipation and the indulgence of idle habits, to the exertion of those faculties of mind or body, by which subsistence could be honestly acquired, and over whom, if some strong public sentiment does not exercise a salutary severity, there should be enforced the moral guardianship of the laws. From this class, however, are sure to proceed the most noisy and constant clamors against all the requisitions of society, against all the restraints and impositions which public laws can place on the indulgence of their perverted minds. It is the evidence of a bad state of things, when their complaints are regarded. It is the mark of a decay of public principle, when they are countenanced and encouraged by the voice of men claiming to be good citizens. It is a worse symptom, when the magistracy is influenced by their obstreporousness, and laws are either not made or not enforced, which are calculated to restrain them. Public sentiment is

the only power that can keep the walls of the Constitution from their assault, and it ought to be watchful and severe. It should derive tone and vigor from the certainty, which all good citizens ought to feel, that its strength and purity are our only protection.

It is not improbable, that, under the most popular forms of government, laws or customs may grow up, which in their operation may, in time, have a more injurious effect on one class of society than another. Such is the imperfection of everything merely human, that these consequences may be expected. Such, it has been suggested, is actually the case in our free government, and we propose to pay some attention to those arrangements that have been enumerated as deserving of change; but it is a preliminary inquiry, What is the mode of redress, and who is to move it, when such cases exist? To this question we unhesitatingly answer, that, in our own opinion, it is not to be done by the array of one class against another, as if one portion of citizens had an interest to carry by force, what another class of citizens had as strong an interest to oppose. Unless this opinion is correct, it seems to us, that we are wholly in a mistake as to the practicability or advantage of a republican government. Such a government begins with the axiom, that the interests of all its citizens are sufficiently identical to be moulded and harmonized into one mass. Power may enforce imposition. Despotism may make its own pleasure to be law. But republicanism supposes a common consent, and of course a mutual concession and spirit of compromise. The government of the people may be as arbitrary as the mandate of a monarch; and not the more agreeable, because it proceeds from the dictation of many, instead of the command only of one. They who suffer may be fewer, but their suffering is not less.

The common good of all, *ex vi termini*, cannot be the exclusive and peculiar benefit of a part; but it is the common good of all which is to be pursued, and although it may be difficult, and perhaps impossible, so exactly to adjust the scales, as to weigh out to each his fair proportion, no party and no class of men can propose not to make such an object their effort and desire, without in effect declaring that they choose their own arbitrary government, instead of the liberal policy of a true republic. Associations to accomplish some favorite project, may not be objectionable, when their design is to reconcile such project with the common good; but the dan-

ger of such associations, is the tendency they have to exalt their own schemes into an artificial consequence, to stimulate the spirit of party to advance them, and to break down those essential guards which protect the rights of others, either through a carelessness which disregards them, or a recklessness that tramples on them without regret. It would be a very extraordinary and alarming thing, if the affluent classes of society openly associated to carry strong measures of their own; if, for instance, all the landholders, who, although not affluent, would be pretty powerful, should combine to relieve their property from taxation, or enhance their rents; or if, at the other extreme, the idle, the worthless, the criminal and the dependent, forgetting any little shades of difference among themselves, should form one solid mass to move against the laws. It may not be as strange, but it is quite as preposterous, to suppose, that any section of the working class, which entire class, in truth, includes everybody, could form a phalanx with objects so hostile to any portion of the community, that each portion would be bound to oppose them. Any such congregation must necessarily be subject to one or other of the following remarks. Either the objects they have in view are for the good of the whole people, and therefore all the people, properly understanding them, would be bound to give them their aid; or, they are essentially prejudicial to a part of the people, and therefore all, inasmuch as all are the common guardians of every part, are equally bound to oppose them. In truth, there is no need of association. Let the cause of grievance be fairly and fully examined, it follows of certainty, that, if it is well founded, there is a common interest in having it redressed.

On the subject of education, which is one of the points put forward for examination, there may be differences about the mode, but none as to the end; and in regard to imprisonment for debt, which is another, we have already expressed an opinion, which we hope at no distant day to find universal.

A less expensive law system is said to be a further desideratum, and we cordially concur in the sentiment. We do not indeed limit our wishes to a mere diminution of expense, but extend them to a thorough revision of the entire civil and criminal code. This code, if indeed its heterogeneous mass be entitled to the name, has its origin in a period of remote an-

tiquity, among a people little better than barbarians, with no knowledge of commerce or the arts of polished society, in an age of poverty, ignorance, brutality, rapine, cruelty, and blood. Its materials, sometimes flexible and plastic, and sometimes unbending, have been strained to every condition of society, government, and religion, in peace or war, through all the gradual changes, which time and intelligence have elaborated, so that the principles, which were adapted to the times of the Catholics and the supremacy of the pope, were made to suit equally well the vacillating creed of Henry or the infidelity of Charles, and to flourish under Laud or Cranmer, the Pilgrims of New England or the Quakers of Pennsylvania.

Such a monstrous fabric of error and folly in unintelligible Latin and barbarous French, would not have existed as a monument of laws for civilized people, if it had not contained some inherent capacity of change, so that what was law to-day, should, in the fluctuations of society, cease to be law to-morrow; and that principles either too barbarous or too ridiculous to be sustained under the light of reason and religion, should disappear, as ghosts are supposed to do at the dawn of day. To accomplish this necessary change, two powers have concurred, in the country in which this system has its origin, and have been copied in our own; the one is legislative enactment, and the other judicial construction. The acts of the parliament of Great Britain, have from time to time remodelled the provisions of law, and our legislatures have done the same, without changing or attempting to change its principles; so that it resembles some of those ancient castles, which modern architecture has repaired and enlarged, or in part removed, without regarding either their symmetry or style, or anything beyond the temporary purposes for which the alteration was designed. The wisest lawyers have therefore been obliged to confess that they were unable to find their way through the labyrinths of the building, in which it is no wonder that an inexperienced stranger should be lost.

By judicial construction, or the opinion of successive judges for some hundred years, the doctrines of the law have been changed and rechanged, as the supposed purposes of substantial justice from time to time required; so that what was intended to be a system, became, in important respects, the mere individual judgment of a chancellor, a chief justice, or a majority of the bench. When this unwieldly and ill-adapted mass of materials

was imported and erected in our country into a temple of the law, it was of necessity to be changed from the fabric suited to a monarchical, into one designed for a republican government. Directions were given to that effect, but the terms of these directions were so general, that an almost unlimited power was conferred on the judicial department, to receive and reject as they pleased. Of the singular pliability of this law, a memorable instance may be seen in a case decided by one of the most profound jurists of our country in the Circuit Court of the United States.* In the case of the United States *vs. La Jeune Eugenie*, it was maintained by the counsel for the government, that the slave trade was contrary to the law of nations as at present understood and received, and that it was contrary to the law of nations, because it was a violation of the law of nature, which constituted a component part of the law of nations. The learned judge, with as much moral power as legal learning, decided, 'that the slave trade is prohibited by universal law.' 'In respect to the African slave trade,' he forcibly remarks, 'such as it has been described to be, and in fact is, in its origin, progress and consummation, it cannot admit of a serious question that it is founded in a violation of some of the first principles which ought to govern nations. It is repugnant to the great principles of christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith and morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice. When any trade can be truly said to have these ingredients, it is impossible that it can be consistent *with any system of law*, that purports to rest on the authority of reason or revelation; and it is sufficient to stamp any trade as interdicted by public law, when it can be justly affirmed that it is repugnant to the general principles of justice and humanity.'

Any system of Law! How long and arduously did the great men of England struggle to abolish it? How long ineffectually did they contend to prevent its being favored, protected, encouraged by the common law of the land? Under the security of that law, four companies were chartered to deal in slaves,

*The proceedings in this case were on the admiralty side of the court, which does not necessarily proceed on the common law. This circumstance does not injure the effects of our illustration. Either in the same country there are two laws, one in opposition to the other—one of them being against the principles of the law of nature and nations, or they agree together, and therefore either of them sustains the opinion of the court.

one with the name of the Royal African Company, to which the king, one of the princes of the blood royal, and many persons of high rank, were subscribers; and so lately as 1750, an act was passed by the English parliament, for extending and improving the trade to Africa. The decision in the American court was a wise one. We should have blushed for the character of our country, if it had been obligatory on the court, to pronounce any other decree. But the law changes, because it ought to change, after having encouraged for centuries all the atrocity and crime which have desolated Africa and disgraced mankind. The same eternal justice, which made this a righteous decision when it was pronounced, existed in all its force when the law of England sanctioned the slave trade; and a judge, who had had the boldness, and the integrity, and the capaciousness of mind, to have uttered the sentiments of this eminent magistrate, might formerly have been brought to the block.

The monstrous absurdities which the common law has sanctioned, are not confined to great and impressive matters, like that which commands the attention of mankind; it descends to the humblest and smallest of the daily transactions of life, in which there is an amount of error and extravagance to be eradicated, as oppressive, in its way, as that which related to the slave trade; and we are sometimes as much surprised at its unyielding and immovable dogmas, as at others we are astonished by its changes.

We are desirous of fortifying our position by adverting to a case discussed in the Court of King's Bench in 1818, the doctrine and practice of which, as far as we know, form at the present moment a part of English common law.

Shortly before that period, Mary Ashford, a young woman of interesting and exemplary character, was found murdered, with evident marks of previous violence on her person. Strong suspicion existed against one Abraham Thornton, who was indicted as well for the murder, as for the other supposed capital felony, and on each charge was acquitted. In Easter term 1818, he was prosecuted, by appeal, for the same offences, at the suit of William Ashford, the eldest brother of the deceased unfortunate female, a slight and feeble young man, on whom the law devolved that extraordinary right. Thornton being put to answer the appeal, pleaded as follows: 'Not guilty; and I am ready to defend the same by my body; and thereupon taking his glove off, he threw it upon the floor of the

court.' Ashford replied that Thornton ought not to be admitted 'to wage his battle,' or in other words, to try the truth of the charges of murder and ravishment, by a personal contest with the brother of the deceased, because he said that there were violent and strong presumptions of Thornton's guilt, which, in a form of recital called a counterplea, he, Ashford, set forth at full length; and in such case, he contended, the wager of law or duel, was not allowed by the law of the land. After the proper answers were made by the defendant, the court gravely listened to learned and elaborate arguments, not to ascertain whether the law of the country permitted such savage mode of settling a cause, for that was admitted, but whether the case before them was, or was not, by its peculiar circumstances, a case to be excepted from the general rule. Lord Ellenborough said, 'The cases which have been cited in this argument and the others to which we ourselves have referred, show very distinctly, that the general mode of trial by law, in case of appeal, is by battle, at the election of the appellee [the accused party], unless the case be brought within certain exceptions, as for instance, where the appellant is an infant, or a woman, or where the appellee is taken with the mainour [in the fact], or has broken prison. Now in addition to all these, there is the case where great and violent presumptions of guilt exist against the appellee, which admit of no denial or proof to the contrary. Without going at length into the discussion of the circumstances disclosed in the counterplea and replication here, it is quite sufficient to say, that this case is not, like those in Bracton, one which admits of no denial or proof to the contrary. The consequence therefore must be, *that the usual and constitutional mode of trial* must take place, unless, indeed, in respect of the plaintiff's having by his counterplea declined the wager of battle, the judgment of the court must now be, that the defendant should go without day.'

No part of these strange proceedings would be tolerated here; but the system to which they belong is our system, overlaid and lumbered with antiquated forms and innumerable precedents, that serve in a majority of instances to conceal the truth, or prevent the power of it from being exerted to any useful purpose, and reduce the trial of a matter of right to a question of superior adroitness among opposing counsel.

This system, then, should be reformed altogether, not by

occasional and temporary palliatives, but by a profound, extensive, and radical change. Something has been done in this country, from time to time, to soften its harsh features, and humanize its form; and if, on a comparison between the common law as it has until recently existed in England and the United States, the advance of improvement had not been eminently in our favor, it would not now be tolerated for a single day. But it is a just demand, by those on whom the weight and the expense of this cumbrous and dilapidated system hangs, that a complete and thorough investigation and repair should be immediately made. A late Edinburgh Review, * in discussing the condition of the common law, ventures to give the following description.

'England, then, be it remembered, is a country, in which the first lawyers aver that no man but an idiot, or one who cares nothing for his own interest, would ever think of suing another for so small a sum as twenty, or even thirty pounds, in one kind of Court, and for so little as a hundred in another; and where, if he were called on to pay such a sum a second time, by a creditor, whose stampt receipt he had in his pocket, having paid it to the same creditor an hour before, he would at once pay the money rather than gain a suit commenced against him by defending it.—England is a country, where, if a man be knocked down with injury and insult, he has but one substantial means of redress, putting his antagonist to death, for which he will be punished, though not capitally.—England is a country, where, if a man's character, or that of his wife, or his child, be slandered daily for a year, he cannot, without risking the bread he and they have to eat, have any remedy but assassinating the supposed defamer.—England is a country, where no secure conveyance can be made, at any expense, of almost any real property, and no conveyance at all of property under forty or fifty pounds. —England is a country, where, if there be left a legacy of a hundred pounds, the plain and obvious course for a prudent man to take, is to say nothing about the matter, and let the executor keep it instead of himself, unless he will voluntarily pay it over, which he is substantially under no kind of obligation to do.—England, moreover, is a country, which, by the common consent of almost all its own inhabitants, has no equal on the globe, for the excellence of her institutions; and of these the first and most excellent is her system of jurisprudence, which all who understand it extol to the heavens, as the most divine

* No. CII. p. 482.

production of perfect wisdom—which all, who know it by experience of its blessings, curse as the worst mischief that ever proceeded from the infernal regions.'—p. 482.

We do not adopt this language. It is too extravagant and exaggerated even for the meridian of London, and is too deeply colored to suit any part of the United States. But we have no doubt the tendency, the constant and resistless tendency of the common law, is to produce this state of things and even worse than this; and the only reason why it has not, or will not, is, that the common law is every year modified by statutes that do something to correct its evils and promote the public advantage. But the difficulty is, that all the changes thus made are mere modifications, often temporary,—generally arising from the immoderate pressure of a particular state of things, and not formed on those large and comprehensive principles, by which statesmen and jurists should be governed in regard to the great interests of a nation. Of this kind of legislation we have had enough and too much in the United States; and in consequence, the wonder is, not that we have not got along better, but that we have prospered so well. In this respect some States are in advance of others. The examples of New York and Louisiana are particularly worthy of imitation, and it is very probable that a more thorough revision than was had by the former State, would multiply the benefits and reduce the inconveniences which are found in her revised laws.

The English statesmen are aware of the need there is, on their part, of extensive alterations, and are proceeding with ability and success in radical changes, which this country should lose no time to imitate. The criminal law was put in commission at least as early as 1824. Important reports have been made by the learned gentlemen employed on it, and these, during the present year, have been reprinted by order of the House of Lords. Sir Robert Peel's bills, in the mean while, have been passed, embracing several branches of the criminal law, and among others providing for cases of principal and accessory in capital felonies, for the want of which provisions in our code, so much embarrassment attended the recent prosecutions at Salem. We should follow the inquiries which the important amendments introduced by Sir Robert, and the interesting propositions already submitted by the commissioners, would suggest, did we not know with how little pleasure the details of these

concerns are listened to by general readers, who think, and perhaps truly, that they are the appropriate business of professional men. On such men we call with earnestness and solemnity. If our people adopt the fashions and fancies that are transmitted by the most rapid conveyances, and seize on the periodical and lighter literature of the English press, before it has circulated in its own metropolis, it surely does not become them to be indifferent to improvements in the science of domestic jurisprudence, involving not merely life and property, although these *are* in fact involved to immense amount, but the temporal and eternal happiness of the thousands, who, although the elegant and the fastidious never see them, have families to support, children to instruct, and souls to be saved.

On the civil side of the law a more tardy and less efficient reformation is perceptible, partly because inconveniences affecting property, receive, as they are discovered, some remedy at the time, and partly, we feel bound to suppose, because of the strength and influence of those whom the abuses of the system maintain in opulence and dignity. The political condition of Great Britain has also retarded the progress of legislation. The whole energy of the country was for a long period directed to the prosecution of the mighty wars in which it was engaged, and it is only after the repose of peace, and in time of general tranquillity, that her great men can devote their minds to the Herculean task of reforming the system of her common law. But the subject has claimed some share of regard. On the seventh of February, 1828, Mr Brougham directed the attention of the House of Commons to the state of the common law courts, and of the common law itself. The speech, which he delivered on that occasion, occupied six hours, and made a most powerful impression on the house. It was unfortunate, we think, that it mingled certain feelings of hostility towards ministers with sound principles of honest duty to the country, and it diminished our expectations of its efficacy to find caustic expressions and severe censures, which would necessarily excite an animosity that it was unwise to provoke.

The consequence is, that although two commissions were established, one to inquire into the state of the common law at large, and the other to take into consideration the state of the law of real property, little has yet been accomplished under those commissions, excepting the collecting and diffusing the information which must of course precede any intelligent action.

Whether the eminent lawyer, who moved the inquiry, became dissatisfied with the slow progress of the commissioners, we are not informed; but we find in the last session of parliament that he again took the matter into his own hands, and presented, with distinctness, the outlines of his plan of reform, limited however both in its principles and in the district of country to be subjected to them, with the view, no doubt, of avoiding the charge of impracticability, which had formerly been urged upon him, but intending to extend them, if, on experiment, they were found useful. The remedy proposed by Mr Brougham for the existing evils of the common law, is thus described by a commentator. 'He has gone at once to the main body of the evil —the delay, the expense and vexation of justice, as at present administered; and he has, boldly, it must be confessed, propounded his remedy by a very sweeping change in the present system. But it appears manifest that the change is of no rash and unheeding kind; for it is bottomed upon the safest principles; it leaves all the rest of the law untouched; it connects itself with the system without moving it, and it has even a warrant of authority, not only in the minor analogies of that system, but in its original, we may say, its primeval arrangements. The *gist* of the plan is shortly stated. It is to bring justice home to every man's door, at all times of the year, by the establishment of local courts, and at the same time to secure soundness of decision, and preserve perfect uniformity of law, by giving the superintendence over the local judicatures to the central and general courts at Westminster.'—In casting our eyes over the one hundred and seven sections of this bill, we cannot but think Mr Brougham has examined and approved some *Americanisms*,* which are perhaps more allowable in jurisconsults than philologists; but, although he has given no credit to us for anything which seems to have been borrowed, we are willing to allow

* We are glad to hear that a recent order has been received in this country from England for about one hundred volumes of American Reports. Notwithstanding the eagerness with which the decisions of the courts in Westminster Hall are cited here, it is rare indeed that our own decisions are even referred to in the King's Bench. A little more attention to them would satisfy the English judges, that they might learn something in exchange for the light they lend us on the intricate paths of the law; and the commissioners, whether on the civil or criminal department, for whose use we suppose the foregoing order was transmitted, will probably find there are some improvements in our administration of justice, which, if their pride will stoop to borrow them, may promote the interest of their country.

him great praise for other manifest improvements, which, as far as we are informed, are entirely original. It is impracticable, within the limits to which we must confine ourselves, to give any analysis of those improvements; nor does our plan require it. We advert to this splendid effort of a most eminent man, to show, that essential alterations of the common law are desirable and practicable; and that a zealous and intelligent application to it, would be likely to overcome the prejudices by which the system is in a great measure defended. We cannot however forbear to express our conviction, that the most novel part of the new plan, which establishes courts of general jurisdiction by consent, and courts of arbitration and reconcilement, intended to shorten litigation, to accommodate differences, and *to prevent suits at law*, are especially worthy of American legislators. It is not to be supposed that the projected system, carefully as it has been prepared, is yet so perfect as it may be made, or that by our remarks we mean to express entire satisfaction with every part of it. Thus far it seems to be the production of a single mind, a generous and noble benefaction of individual talent for public good. Other minds will add their contributions, and new light will be thrown on the path of improvement. But enough is done to show the futility of the ready objection, that the common law, as a system, cannot be essentially changed, in a country where it has been once established.

We have left ourselves no room to discuss the other great subjects, which have been put forward by those who assume to be exclusively the working class, as deserving of change; to wit, the militia, taxation, monopolies, and the abrogation of all laws in regard to religion;—important and interesting topics, deserving each of them a consideration by itself, and on which we may possibly at some future time offer our reflections to our readers. At present, however, we can do no more than to give our own answer to the inquiry we have already made,—if all these matters require new modification, who is to make it? And we say, they must make it who understand the existing systems, and know how and where the remedy is to be applied. Who doubts the necessity of learning and talent and experience for this extensive work? Who would entrust so momentous a concern to any but the most enlightened, the most careful, the most prudent, and the most comprehensive minds? They who suffer an evil are not always the most competent to

remove it. Any man may tell when his watch is out of order; but the artist who has studied its machinery, is alone able to repair it. We may soon enough ascertain that our health is impaired, and know very well that the body requires medicine; but he proceeds very thoughtlessly who ventures in extreme cases to administer to himself. The constitution of the state, the health of the body politic, the movement of juridical machinery, are not easier known, or managed with less nicety of touch. They can be adjusted only by hands of competent skill. We ask not to what profession or trade the mover of reformation belongs; but it is our duty to inquire whether his talents are adequate to the task, whether his education has given him the requisite information, and whether study and observation have enabled him to acquire the necessary skill. It will be said, perhaps, that honesty is as necessary as intellect, and that the most capable are the most adversely interested, and cannot be depended upon. So it was said of Mr Brougham, a scholar whose splendid talents are equalled only by the extent and range of his vast and various information, and whose information and talents combined are not more than equivalent to his political integrity;—a lawyer at the head of his profession, so constantly and lucratively and laboriously employed, that he could devote but one day to a canvass for a seat in parliament, on which day, if the newspapers are to be believed, he travelled one hundred miles, and made eight public speeches to different assemblies of his electors; a man who owes everything to his success in the profession to which he belongs, yet ready to take the lead in the grandest plans of improvement in education, in jurisprudence, in civil liberty, at whatever loss of personal emolument. But there is no loss to him, or men like him. Real intellectual greatness needs no aid from the abuses of antiquated systems. It derives none of its strength or vigor from the misfortunes and misery of its fellow beings. It stands erect in its own might, by its own energy, and by the favor of that Providence which has given it inspiration. Suspicion, and envy, and jealous mistrust are the vices of other minds, and they obstruct their own purposes. They prevent exertions, which men who have the power would most willingly make for the general good. They discourage effort by the imputation of bad motives. A better feeling must prevail, before any great improvement will be attempted; a more generous confidence must exist, before it can under any auspices be

successful. Let such a temper prevail. Cultivate talents which are capable of great exertions. Cheer and encourage their exercise. Propose for their reward the gratitude that their merit is entitled to expect, and they will be found here, in these quiet departments of practical, unobtrusive utility, quite as abundant and as powerful, as when a nation's independence was to be declared in the hall of legislation, or her freedom to be maintained at the head of her armies.

Our remarks, it will be seen, proceed on the supposition that society is to be maintained on its present basis. The revolution, which atheism or infidelity would introduce, requires different considerations and another style of argument—if indeed argument could properly be addressed to the fool who says in his heart there is no God. They who believe, or affect to believe, in the fortuitous creation of material and intelligent existence, who scoff at the idea of human accountability, who consider all law as injustice, all exclusive property as usurpation on common rights, and all family and domestic associations as absurd and unnatural, are to be dealt with, if at all, with different considerations. Such extravagance carries its own refutation in the innate character of man, and is put down by the power of all those affections and sympathies and kind feelings, which education developes in various degrees, but universally and invariably. The human mind, like a field, will, even under the best cultivation, produce tares as well as wheat. Such opinions are the rank growth of a soil, which is to be weeded, as well as tilled. They are stubble quickly consumed, while the fruit that is ripened by intelligence and truth, is gathered and preserved for the nourishment of the soul.

ART. II.—*The History of the Jews, from the Earliest Period to the Present Time.* By Rev. H. H. MILMAN. New York. J. & J. Harper. 1830. 3 vols. 18mo. pp. 264, 298, 353.

THERE is nothing more humbling than the history of prejudices, when they have ceased to awaken any feeling; and among all human prejudices, none have been more unreasonable and lasting than such as bear the name of religion. In ordi-

nary life it is sad enough to see them separate men and keep them asunder, thus resisting the social feeling which is one of the most important elements of our nature. We feel that there must be a want of generosity in the breast that harbors and defends them, and that nothing can be done for moral or intellectual improvement till they are done away. But such prejudices grow alarming when they come armed with the authority of numbers. Then truth lies browbeaten and still, leaving its wrongs to be redressed by the reformer, Time. The prejudice passes from breast to breast, and from generation to generation. Though in the hearts of a few it was an obstinate and passive affection, in the hearts of many it grows savage, bloodthirsty, and revengeful. It soon forgets its first humble pretensions, and will not be satisfied till it bends the world to its power. Then prison doors begin to grate upon their hinges, and scaffolds to run with blood; no excellence can atone for some trifling mistake in opinion; man appears like an evil spirit exulting in the ruin he has made. Many a page of history is red as scarlet with its registry of religious prejudices, leading on to the worst of crimes. But we do wrong to call these religious prejudices. There is no religion in the matter. Men form opinions of religious subjects, as well as all others. These opinions are no more sacred than any other; they are often formed with even less deliberation. They are called religious, not because they are inspired by religion, but because they supply the place of religious principles and feeling. Men are constantly saying to themselves, Anything but obedience—anything but duty. We will believe the most positive contradictions; we will be converted, once for all, if that will answer; we will do anything and submit to anything, sooner than this weary, heart-breaking and hopeless labor of constantly regarding the divine will. And when they see this channel of prejudice open, one in which their passions may flow without censure, they seize the opportunity, and indulge them to the heart's desire, under the name of religion. Thanks to the growing light of the world, men are now beginning to discover, that, while conviction may make them firm in their own opinions, it is only selfishness that makes them interfere with those of others. Not only is this persuasion breaking down the barricades of different christian factions,—it reaches even to Jews, and beyond them to infidels, by teaching us, that, if we complain of the opinions of others, we are bound to examine our own. This process, if conducted with tolerable fairness,

never fails to show, that, if it is certain that others are in the wrong, it is equally certain that we are not the persons who can safely cast the stone.

We propose to examine the relations of Jews to Christians; and we must say, in the outset, that Christians do not appear to advantage in their dealings with that unfortunate people. They have visited them with all manner of persecution in past ages. Their very attempts to convert them to Christianity have been insulting. They have sent those whom the Jews regarded as apostates and deserters, to conciliate and convince them. For many ages, the name Jew, has been pronounced with a contempt which is harder to endure than oppression, because it humbles and depresses, while oppression kindles and inspires. It is no doubt true, that their condition is improving with the general improvement of the world. There is no longer any direct or visible oppression. The common sense of all the nations would cry out against it. But the reproach still remains. Even where there are no disabilities connected with their religious faith, they are painfully distinguished from other men; and this, too, at a time when the Catholics are exulting over their broken chain, when every injured sect and every oppressed people are rising to be free, and hear the shout of their victory answered from a thousand different lands, over the mountains and beyond the deep. Now it seems to us, that the Jews are entitled to this friendly cheering. Never was there a people who held with more unshaken firmness to the religion of their fathers; and if any man asserts what he believes to be the truth through the sufferings which freedom of opinion is too apt to bring, if he is willing to endure something for the sake of conscience, let his opinions be what they may, he is respectable in the sight of God and man.

Perhaps we in this country cannot easily understand how much the Jews have been called upon to endure in other lands and other times. For in this land, to its praise be it spoken, the Jew is under no such law. On the contrary, those of that race who deserve respect, and the proportion is as great as in any other, are regarded with much interest as living memorials of a distinguished people. Neither is their religion put upon a level with the heathen. It is considered as the faith which Jesus Christ reformed into Christianity, or, as an apostle beautifully expresses it, as a lamp shining in a dark place, till the day should break and the morning star appear. But we

cannot reason from our country to others; because here old associations are broken up, and every one knows that it is old tradition, rather than fear or conscience, which makes the old world so unwilling to give up its narrow practices, so tenacious in preserving the dungeons of the decaying house of bondage. We know, from competent witnesses, that Europe has not yet humbled herself in dust and ashes, as she ought, for her treatment of the Jews. What literary reader does not remember Cumberland's attempt, in one of his plays, to redeem the Jewish character;—an attempt in which the necessary proportion of cause to effect was so ludicrously disregarded? So manful did this effort to resist a nation's prejudice seem to the writer, that he valued himself much on the moral energy it discovered, and could not hide his vexation that the Jews made no acknowledgement to him for maintaining the strange proposition, that a Jew could be an honest man. This, however, was long ago; and it might have been thought that prejudices so absurd would die away. But within a few years, Miss Edgeworth has taken the field on their side again, in a manner which shows that, though she had no prejudice in her own breast, she felt that she was striving against a strong tide of public opinion. Her attempt to rescue the Hebrew name from reproach, was honorable to herself; but the fact that she thought it necessary, shows clearly enough what is the prevailing feeling in her country with respect to the Jews.

But some will say,—There are the Rothschilds! Are they not like the merchants of Tyre who were princes? Do not kings do homage to the golden sceptre which they bear? Have not the great armies of coalitions waited their permission to march? Have not the envoys of nations stood begging loans at their counting-room doors? All this is true; but it only proves that wealth, the god of this world, can raise up and ennoble even the Jew. Men care not how mean is the coffer which contains the gold. But was it not even so a thousand years ago? When religious zeal opened the way for chivalrous adventure, the feudal nobles had nothing but strong castles and barren fields,—the wealth was in the hands of the Jews, who had found consolation under their humiliations, by collecting in silence those treasures which they knew would change their weakness into power, and make the tyrant of to-day a suppliant at their gate to-morrow. So far as wealth could take away their reproach, it did so in those ancient times. But riches can give little more than

the appearance of honor. The painful reality of the oppression and lowliness remains. And so they found it. They could not lift up their heads before their debtors, who despised them while they depended upon them; and when all the resources of prodigality were exhausted, the borrower became a robber. The sword cut through all the bands of moral obligation; and the Jew was thought too happy if he could escape with his life from the vengeance of those who had called him their benefactor. No reader of history can have any doubt, that the thrift and industry of the Jews were the causes of their persecution. It is true, there never was any friendship between Jews and Christians. They had too many hostile recollections to live at peace together. But the right of hunting them like wild beasts, was not assumed till their wealth became so great as to render them desirable victims. From that time, their history has been truly represented in the fable of the Wandering Jew, who is not wholly an imagination, but a picture of the uniform destiny of all the race, presented in the history of one. For ages the Jew has wandered, seeking rest and finding none; rather pitching a tent than building a mansion; driven out from every resort and shelter; exposed to wrongs that cannot be redressed, and insults that cannot be resented, and all the while turning his eyes towards the east for encouragement and consolation, because there the star of Jacob rose, and there he trusts to see it rising again, when the night of ages is past.

It may be curious to reflect on the manner in which the Christians have excused their treatment of the Jews;—a treatment so entirely at variance with all the maxims of the religion of peace and good will. They rely upon the fact that our Saviour was crucified by the Hebrew nation, and that, in punishment of that sin, a curse is to rest forever upon that devoted people. But the obvious reply to this, is, that this was the crime, not of those who were persecuted, but their fathers; and there is no inheritance of guilt. And even in their fathers, great as was the crime, it was not a cold and deliberate murder. It was hardly the act of the people; for they were under the guidance of the Pharisees, who had wound round them a chain which they neither felt nor saw, but which followed them through their public walks and into their private retreats, binding them to the will of their ambitious masters,—men, who, though recommended neither by talent, learning, nor moral virtue, had acquired unbounded influence by sitting in Moses' seat, and using his law for purposes of

their own. When our Saviour appeared, they saw that if he prevailed with the people, their influence was gone forever; and they set all the machinery of darkness in motion, misrepresenting his words, torturing his actions till they made virtue seem vice, and glory shame. Whenever an honest burst of popular feeling decided in favor of Jesus, they were at hand to quench it before it could spread. In this way they kept the people in a blind and melancholy bondage, and at last wrought them up to that moment's madness in which they thirsted for our Saviour's blood. But awful as was the hour, and the power in which that deed was done, we cannot resist the conclusion that this people knew not what they did, and that the guilt rested on those who had basely misled them. We have no doubt, that when, on the day of his death, the city poured forth floods from all its gates, there were many who mourned for him beside the daughters of Jerusalem; that eyes unused to weep were dim with tears, as they saw the gentle firmness with which he bowed his head to die. We believe it, because human nature was the same then as it now is, and equally ready, when the moment's passion was over, to love what was excellent, and reverence what was great.

But allowing that the Jews were ever so guilty,—and in the most favorable view it was a rash and murderous deed,—and allowing that they are doomed to bear the consequences of this transgression for ages, still, this punishment would be the act of God, proceeding from his own agency without the interference of any mortal hand. Men cannot say that God needs their aid in his dispensations; and till he asks their aid, it is no better than a crime for them to usurp the authority of Him, who said, Vengeance is mine. Nor, in truth, is this disposition to fight on the Lord's side often of a kind that does much honor to the cause. It is too apt to be nothing more than a wish to indulge bad passions under sacred sanctions; to indulge them in such a way that the usual self-upbraiding may not follow them. The truth they undertake to defend, is the last thing they care for; and, like hireling soldiers, who never ask the merits of the war, they are ready to fight and destroy on the side on which they happen to be enlisted. That the Jews in our Saviour's time were guilty, there is no doubt. But when he said, that all the crimes of their past history should come upon that generation, he did not mean that they should be punished for the deeds of their fathers, but that their own crimes, and their own sorrows,

should outnumber those of ages past. When it was foretold that the iniquities of the fathers should be visited upon the children, it was an appeal to the nation to consider what bearing their conduct would have on those who came after them. Righteousness exalts a nation, and throws a light of glory and happiness onward for ages to come. In the same manner, the results of national corruption, like blood shed in a stream, pass downward, staining the history, and arresting the national improvement for many future years. The transmission of sin and suffering, was like that which may be seen in families, where the son bears, in a measure, the consequences of his father's vices, not by any direct infliction, but by the common order of nature, which gives man power to influence the happiness of those who stand round, and those who come after him, and makes his responsibility deep and wide in precisely the same proportion.

Do those who look upon the Jews as now suffering under judicial infliction, remember, that this life is not the state of retribution; and that these judgments, as they are called, would be too unequally distributed to answer the purposes of justice? Whether we call them judgments or not, depends on our opinion of those on whom they fall. If it is one of our friends who suffers, we call it a merciful chastening, where, if an enemy endure the same, we say that it is the judgment of God. This is no new impression. Jesus Christ attempted to correct it in the men of his own day, but was so far from succeeding, that it is not even now reformed. He assured his hearers that the persons on whom the tower of Siloam fell, and the idolaters whom Pilate slew, were not so visited for uncommon guilt; intending both to correct the philosophical error, and to prevent their interpreting the acts of God as if he was a party to their love or hatred, their passions or opinions.

Leaving this ground, it may be said that the Jews are, and always have been, a bad people. Certainly their history abounds in examples of general hardness and corruption; but there is no proof that they were worse than the rest of the nations. We must not suppose, because the Canaanites had no historian, that they were a gentle and inoffensive race. Doubtless, in their war with the Jews, the accounts of injury were fairly balanced between them. Nor must we suppose, because the nations round Palestine had no prophets to warn them, that they were pure compared with Israel. The Israelites

were like others—corrupted by prosperity; and, when alarmed by suffering, retaining the fear, only till the shadow passed away. In point of knowledge, they were more favored than others; but, as respects justice, kindness, and humanity, they were on a level with other nations. At least, we cannot tell why they should have been worse. If their religion did not make them better, no one can say that it injured them. When the prophets condemn the prevailing vices, we are not to suppose that there was no place free from the infection. In Rome, in the days of Juvenal, there were upright men in the multitude of bad ones; there were domestic retreats, which the deluge of corruption had not overflowed. And we cannot doubt, that, while the tendency of all things in the Hebrew state was as the prophets described it, there were many who endeavoured to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God in daily life, though the piety of the greater part was like the sabbath lamp, which in every Hebrew dwelling was lighted the evening before the sabbath, and burned only till the next day's close.

It is said, by way of increasing the guilt of the Jews, that they were uncommonly favored by Heaven. But is it from the most favored nations, or individuals, that we expect the most grateful returns? It is true that those who are more blessed than others, are bound to make larger returns, and every weight added to prosperity is so much added to the amount of obligation. But if this truth is not felt in any other quarter, if we are ourselves insensible to it, why should we expect to find this delicate and thoughtful gratitude in the Jews? We should do well to remember, that, however highly they were exalted in their day, it was said of John the Baptist, the last of the Jews, that a greater man never had appeared, and yet the least Christian was superior in knowledge to him. Our Saviour disclosed truths which the world did not know, and the light which he gave the world has been growing brighter and brighter to the present hour. The descendants of those Jews may turn upon us, when we boast the superiority of our light, and ask whether that superiority can be read as plainly in our morality as in our vainglorious boastings. The truth must be told, and they are an example of it, that those who are familiar with divine blessings, soon learn to claim them as rights, rather than welcome them as blessings. They feel as if they came in a regular order of nature, rather than by the unwearied kindness of God; and thus prosperity tends directly to harden the heart.

Cities and nations are no exception to this rule. The most favored have been the most unfaithful. All that have left traces in history, or heaps on the ground where they stood,—you can almost tell the extent of the corruption from the splendor of their annals, or breadth and grandeur of their ruins.

We know nothing else that can be offered to excuse the persecution of the Jews, except that their dispersion was a thing foretold. Suppose that it was foretold. Inspiration has nowhere named its duration. We should suppose that the suffering of more than a thousand years, in which they have been constantly wandering over land and sea, without being permitted to enjoy for a moment the quiet and security which make up the charm of home, would be enough to redeem any pledge which prophetical inspiration has ever given. Enough of suffering there certainly has been, to show that their great statesman spoke with authority when he predicted the sorrows that should pursue them after every violation of his law. We can conceive of no further use for holding them up as a spectacle to angels and to men, and we do not believe that they have ever been thus separated, except by their own choice and peculiar character. Prophetic inspiration, divinely given though it be, must resemble that sagacity which enables the wise, from their discernment of circumstances and character, to tell what the destiny of individuals or nations will be. We do not say that prophetic inspiration is only a higher degree of sagacity, but it must operate in the same way; and if the same power that foretells, arranges circumstances to fulfil the prophecy, the prediction loses its wonder, as human sagacity is lessened in esteem by exerting power to make its predictions good. To us it seems a miraculous thing that Moses should have foretold, with such unerring wisdom, the future fortunes of his race. It seems like a high degree of human sagacity. And so it is—so high, that we cannot explain it without resorting to inspiration.

But, under any circumstances, the power and right of fulfilling these predictions belong to God alone. Even the curse of Cain did not give men a right to injure or destroy him. On the contrary, he was under the protection of the Most High. Man has no right to interfere with the judgments of Heaven, till his aid is solicited. All such attempts to help the order of Providence are intrusive, and are well known to spring, not from real interest in the subject, nor from a spirit like that which dictated the prayer, Thy will be done! Every inch

that Christianity gains in the world, will be so much gained to the cause of liberality; not that liberality which sets bounds for itself beyond which it will not go, and does nothing more than loosen a little the bands of exclusion, but that liberality which is ready to receive to its fellowship and friendship, all who desire to reach the truth and apply it to their lives. Such have been among the heathen—men who are still the admiration of all enlightened minds, for the power with which they cherished their means of improvement, which, compared with ours, were few and small. Such have been among the Jews, and there will be many more when time has eaten away the wall that separates them from Christians. Then, like the Jews who first embraced Christianity, they may retain what they love in their old system, while they seize all that is excellent in the new.

We think, then, that there is not a shadow of excuse for the manner in which Christians have treated Jews. It must forever remain a blot on the history of Christians;—not on the history of Christianity, for Christianity never had anything to do with any persecution, except to lift up its voice against it. As fast as Christianity has prevailed, the spirit of persecution has given place and departed; and that so much of it still remains, is a sad proof how little Christianity governs in the christian world. We may say, then, that the Jews in modern times have had no opportunity of being acquainted with our religion. They have only seen that misguided faith which armed the hearts and hands of Christians against them. In this form only has it been offered to their adoption—in this form only has it been recommended to their choice. If ever they see it as it is; if ever it is offered to them by men whom they respect; if ever it can be presented to their notice without the disguise of party; if ever they can hear how sternly it has denounced their persecutors,—their feeling may be changed. They may learn that it is the friend of the whole family of man, and therefore it cannot be hostile to the Jew. Christianity, too, will do justice to the firmness with which they have kept the faith, while it laments the cause in which their zeal has been thus exerted. For Christianity abhors the spirit of persecution, but honors the self-devotion of him who chooses banishment, humiliation, and sorrow, rather than renounce any religion which he regards as the gift of God.

We are disposed to think very highly of this History of the

Jews. If the reader remembers the design of it, which was not to discuss points of dogmatic history, but to give a popular and interesting account of the most singular people in the world, he will consider this effort very successful. The obscure parts of the history are clearly told, and the more striking events described in language always good, sometimes eloquent and happy. The author approaches disputed points without timidity or rashness, and debates them, so far as the limits of his work admitted, with a good degree of manly freedom. Though we do not always agree with him, we honor the spirit in which his work is written, and we believe that its effect will be to attach new interest and veneration to the scriptures. Nothing has injured the Jewish records so much as the fierce and suspicious violence, with which every attempt to throw light upon them has been resisted. It is true that such attempts may often lead to unsound interpretation, or rash and fanciful conjecture. But there is nothing which ruins a good cause sooner than a manifest disposition to withdraw it from that discussion to which everything human must submit, and which, though sometimes rough and severe, is an ordeal which truth and innocence can go triumphantly through. We perceive, however, that this manliness has not been universally taken in good part. In his preface to the second edition, the writer takes notice of the objections which have been made to the first, and they are all of that sectarian character, which shows that the objector is a slave to a party. We take the following extract from the preface.

'It has been suggested that the Author has not sufficiently regarded the "inspiration" of the word of God. His views of inspiration are nearly those of Tillotson, Secker, and Warburton. "A spurious notion," says the latter, "begotten by superstition in the Jewish Church, and nursed up by piety in the Christian, hath passed, as it were, into a kind of article of faith, that every word and letter of the New Testament (the Bible) was dictated by the Holy Spirit in such a manner, as that the writers were but the passive organs through which his language was conveyed." Warburton proceeds, with his usual vigor, to show the objections to this opinion; but the Author prefers subjoining the lucid statement of the present eminently learned Bishop of London. "This supposition permits us to believe, what indeed we cannot deny to be probable, that Moses may have possessed many sources of information, from which he would be enabled to draw the most material circumstances of the early history of mankind, without being indebted for his knowledge of them to the immediate inspi-

ration of God. Thus much we may conclude with certainty, that where he did possess the means of accurate knowledge, the Holy Spirit would not interpose to instruct him; since God, assuredly, never makes an extraordinary exertion of his power to effect that which may be brought about by the ordinary operation of human means. . . . And in general we ought to be cautious of asserting a revelation, when the lower kind of spiritual interference, (*i. e.* the Superintendence of the Holy Spirit) acting upon the materials of human knowledge, would be sufficient to produce the same result." A late writer,* of great good sense and piety, seems to think, that inspiration may safely be limited to doctrinal points, exclusive of those which are purely historical. This view, if correct, would obviate many difficulties.'—*Preface*, pp. 7, 8.

With respect to the miracles of the Old Testament, he has spoken with judicious freedom. There has been a disposition to represent the whole history as one continued miracle; and this has led to so many absurd conclusions, that many have doubted whether any miracle was ever performed, and consequently been induced so resolve the whole into false perception or imposture. One would suppose that the past history of infidelity would teach Christians wisdom. Unbelievers have assailed Christianity through the Old Testament, and not without success. They have shown that many of the characters and deeds there recorded, are unworthy the adoption of the religion of love. And what have Christians done? Have they said, that Christianity is not responsible for the imperfections of the Hebrew religion? that our Saviour is not to be regarded as the advocate of the sufficiency of a faith, which he came on purpose to perfect? On the contrary, they have labored to make it appear that any attempt to investigate the Hebrew faith, is an insult to Him;—keeping up a delusion, like that of the South Sea Islanders, who believed that the dresses of the navigators who first visited them, were a substantial part of the form. So far from our Saviour's adopting the Hebrew religion in such a way as to make himself answerable for its defects, it appears from his own words, that he felt and acknowledged those defects, and came for the purpose of supplying that which was wanting.

How justly these matters are viewed by Mr Milman, may be learned from the following passage.

'Thus, having provided for the security of the succession, the maintenance of the law, and the lasting dignity of the national religion, David breathed his last, having reigned forty years over the

* Mr Hinds.

flourishing and powerful monarchy of which he may be considered the founder. He had succeeded to a kingdom distracted with civil dissension, environed on every side by powerful and victorious enemies, without a capital, almost without an army, without any bond of union between the tribes. He left a compact and united state, stretching from the frontier of Egypt to the foot of Lebanon, from the Euphrates to the sea. He had crushed the power of the Philistines, subdued or curbed all the adjacent kingdoms: he had formed a lasting and important alliance with the great city of Tyre. He had organized an immense disposable force: every month 24,000 men, furnished in rotation by the tribes, appeared in arms, and were trained as the standing militia of the country. At the head of his army were officers of consummate experience, and, what was more highly esteemed in the warfare of the time, extraordinary personal activity, strength, and valour. His heroes remind us of those of Arthur or Charlemagne, excepting that the armour of the feudal chieftains constituted the superiority; here main strength of body and dauntless fortitude of mind. The Hebrew nation owed the long peace of the son's reign to the bravery and wisdom of the father. If the rapidity with which a kingdom rises to unexampled prosperity, and the permanence, as far as human wisdom can provide, of that prosperity, be a fair criterion of the abilities and character of a sovereign, few kings in history can compete with David. His personal character has been often discussed; but both by his enemies, and even by some of his learned defenders, with an ignorance of, or inattention to, his age and country, in writers of such acuteness as Bayle, as melancholy as surprising. Both parties have been content to take the expression of the *man after God's own heart*, in a strict and literal sense. Both have judged by modern, occidental, and Christian notions, the chieftain of an eastern and comparatively barbarous people. If David in his exile became a freebooter, he assumed a profession, like the pirate in ancient Greece, by no means dishonorable. If he employed craft or even falsehood in some of his enterprises, chivalrous or conscientious attachment to truth was probably not one of the virtues of his day. He had his harem, like other eastern kings. He waged war, and revenged himself on his foreign enemies with merciless cruelty, like other warriors of his age and country. His one great crime violated the immutable and universal laws of morality, and therefore admits of no excuse. On the other hand, his consummate personal bravery and military talent—his generosity to his enemies—his fidelity to his friends—his knowledge of, and steadfast attention to, the true interests of his country—his exalted piety and gratitude towards his God, justify the zealous and fervent attachment of the Jewish people to the memory of their great monarch.'—pp. 202, 203.

We would gladly select some specimen of the author'ssty le from the more eloquent parts of the work, but our limits do not allow it; and besides, we presume that by this time it must have been generally read. We wish that it were possible to give a more full account of the modern Jews; but the materials are wanting. It is as difficult to trace all the fragments of the nation now, as it would be to say on what shore every plank of a shipwreck is cast by the waves; for the nation no longer exists. There are Jews, indeed, who are still united to each other by common hopes and sufferings. But their religion is gone. The worship of the synagogue has supplanted that of the temple, and the rabbins fill the place of the priesthood. Their civil system is gone. All that constitutes a state is wanting. That they should retain their peculiarities under these circumstances, is strange, but not unexampled. We do not mean any disrespect to the Jews when we say that the Gypsy race are equally distinguished by their physical and moral characteristics from the nations in which they dwell. The Jews have a hope ever burning in their breasts, which prevents their wishing for an abiding city. Waiting for a new star in the east, they keep themselves in readiness to start at a moment's warning. Under such circumstances, a modern history of the Jews can be little more than an account of individuals or small societies. It cannot be a history of a single people.

The Jews are expecting a restoration. But they must be sad when they look about them, and ask what there is to restore. They cannot wholly disguise from themselves that a religion of visible signs and unexpressive forms, is not suited to the present age, nor to any that is likely to come. And if they say that its ceremonies shall be done away, they should remark that it will no longer be the same religion. Christianity is Judaism without its corruptions. That faith contained the truth that there is but one God—the same truth that Christianity has spread out into disclosures so profound and momentous. To refer again to an apostle's illustration, Judaism was the lamp, an artificial construction,—Christianity was the rising of the sun. The lamp may be despised when it is no longer needed, but it gave a friendly light in the darkness of the world. Now to restore Judaism to its former station, would be striking out the experience of thousands of years. It would be nothing less than rolling back the sun of righteousness in the heaven, till it sinks under the horizon again. To restore their civil system, would be as

difficult as to restore their religion. It was calculated for a country of narrow bounds, where each might draw an easy subsistence from the soil, while none could become large possessors, and where the simplicity of manners should not require one to acknowledge the superiority of another. To restore such a system, would be renewing the childhood of the world. And what purpose would their restoration answer? A state of peace would be out of the question;—and how would their happiness be advanced by wars of conquest and ambition? The Jews believe that their restoration is to be cotemporary with the Messiah's coming. But when will their Messiah come? Strange indeed, that, when one *mirage* after another in their desert, has encouraged them with hopes that sunk into deep despair, they should still look forward with a trust which no disappointment can alter, no sickness of heart wear away!

The duty of Christians in this matter is clear. It is to present their religion to the Jews in an engaging light, and to show them that persecution is not more odious to those who suffer under it, than it is to Christianity. Wherever the Christain goes to convert others to his faith, he has much to do before he can gain a hearing. He must remove obstacles which the misconduct of Christians has placed in his way. He must show that Christianity is not fairly represented in the lives of many of its believers. Having persuaded them of this, he must show that the truth which Christianity insists upon more forcibly than any other, is, that no man, by opinions only, can ever forfeit his claim to the fellowship of all good men;—a truth which embraces in its broad bright circle, all who do righteously and fear God—all in every nation, Greek or Jew,

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ART. III.—*A Journal of a Residence during several Months in London; including Excursions through various Parts of England; and a short Tour in France and Scotland, in the Years* 1823 *and* 1824. By NATHANIEL S. WHEATON, A. M. Hartford: H. &. F. J. Huntington. 1830. 12mo. pp. 520.

'A DOUBLE portion of praise' is conceded by the North American Review to Captain Hall, 'for keeping his pages free

from the names of individuals, and the detail of what he saw and heard beneath the roofs of those who sought or fell into his society.' * Should this canon be established, the volume before us must expect from its critics little else than a summary condemnation. As, however, we feel some doubts respecting the very unqualified position of the able reviewer, and are anxious to ascertain whether or not the pleasure we have derived from Mr Wheaton's descriptions of individuals and private conversations, must be ascribed to a combined error of judgment in him, and vitiated taste in ourselves, we are inclined to bestow on the subject a little discussion.

The opinion we have just quoted appears to us to be one of those extremes, which are so frequently provoked by opposite extravagances and abuses. Prying, impudent, and gossipping travellers have, no doubt, been often guilty of wounding the feelings of their hospitable entertainers, and ministering to a prurient curiosity among their readers. But to insist that all travellers shall therefore suppress the names of individuals in their pages, and report none of their observations on domestic life and manners, or their private conversations with individuals, is really to impose unwarrantable fetters on the liberty of the press. Few are so coldly philosophic, as to feel no curiosity respecting the personal characters and habits of their cotemporaries, and especially of such as have attained some celebrity. Nor is this curiosity to be blamed. It is a part of our very nature. It springs from our liveliest social sympathies. To repress it, would be to repress a source, not only of great enjoyment, but of great utility. It may tend indeed to a morbid excess. Then, only, let it be reproved and checked.

Travellers have often been condemned for a too great fondness of generalizing. Give us, their unsatisfied critics have said to them, not *your* impressions, *your* inferences,—but descriptions from the spot, details from the life; and leave conclusions to us. But how can this be done, without sometimes raising the curtain of domestic hospitality, and lending to the picture within, a vivid and individual interest, by the inscription of a name?

Were we disposed to legislate on the subject, we might draw some such lines of discrimination as the following, respecting the employment of names in a book of travels.

* North American Review, Vol. XXIX. p. 522.

Persons, whose characters or professions have led them much into public life, may very properly be designated by their names. It were mere fastidiousness or affectation for them to shrink from the notoriety. They court it, or are inevitably exposed to it, by their very pursuits. Not that a traveller, or any other writer, is entitled to take every liberty, even with public men. There is a decorum to be observed in books, as there is in private conversation. When one of our friends returns from abroad, we meet him perhaps in a crowded circle, and while our host is questioning him on his adventures, the whole company slide into the silence of listeners. Here is a little public. The welcome traveller entertains them with various anecdotes of conspicuous or interesting personages, inspiring a mingled pleasure and gratitude, so long as he confines himself within the bounds of modesty and good taste. But it is no difficult matter to render himself ridiculous or odious, by descending into unimportant details, or ungratefully exposing certain peculiarities in those who have treated him kindly when abroad. Why may not the same latitude, accompanied by the same restrictions, be indulged to him, who talks to a wider circle through the medium of a book?

It may perhaps be replied, that the cases are not exactly parallel, inasmuch as the author virtually rehearses his anecdotes in the presence of the persons to whom they relate,—an act, which, in private society, would be a manifest breach of decorum. But neither is this the true statement of the case. It would be more correct to compare the person, who is described by name in a book of travels, to one who overhears conversation about himself in an adjoining room, or who will probably learn it through the medium of a friend. Now let us allow that he feels some annoyance in this. The question is, whether one of the most delightful departments of literature must be suppressed, to save a few distinguished individuals the amount of inconvenience thus incurred. We should say, certainly not. It is one of those taxes, which eminence must consent to pay. It is to be classed with your daily letters of introduction from all parts of the country, or with the buzz of fame in the street and the saloon, which persecutes the modest ear of one who has been making some successful exertion in public. True magnanimity knows how to bear with and smile at what it cannot very well help. If men *will* rise to the highest stations in the legislature or at the bar, or charm and instruct

whole communities by their discourses and publications, they must consent that we, who crowd the lower slopes of the hill, should trouble them with our curious gaze, and search with some interest after their peculiarities in the books of travellers.

True, much candor, delicacy, and discrimination, are required for the task of description. An eye of jealous criticism, and a right spirit of public opinion, should frown down that idle or libellous flippancy, which seeks rather to thrust itself into notice, than to gratify a rational curiosity, or do justice to living greatness. And this is to place the book of travels on the same footing with everything else in this uncertain world, where newspapers, and tongues, and pens, are perpetually liable to press beyond the bounds of strict propriety. Their whole liberty must not be taken away, but the requisite checks must be imposed.

Some individuals, by their eminence and the course of their lives, are so entirely the property of the public, that a desire to learn everything connected with their persons, is not to be harshly resolved into an appetite for scandal. When Fearon, in his Sketches, so minutely described the family dinner of which he partook at the table of the Ex-president Adams, we doubt if any reader of taste and candor felt offended at the disclosure, or could more easily have forgiven any other passage in that boyish book. Did travellers usually give the bill of fare of private tables, it would be intolerable indeed. But here, all mere petty household curiosity was absorbed in a comparison between the republican simplicity of the good patriarch's mode of living, and those images of style and splendor, which the remembered chief magistracy of a great and powerful country naturally suggested to the mind. Even the North American Review quotes willingly from Captain Hall 'the substance of a conversation which he held with Mr Noah Webster,' without reproving him for disclosing the private observations of that eminent man; forgetting, moreover, in this instance, at least, to keep its own pages 'free from the names of individuals.' We blame neither the review nor the traveller for this; since every observation connected with literature, which reaches us through an honorable channel from Noah Webster, shall be received with gratitude.

While on this subject, we may cursorily inquire, whether the passion, so prevalent in England, for speculating on the foibles and vices of the great, merits quite the exceeding repre-

hension with which it is so popular to visit it. We should remember that nothing is adapted more keenly to interest a community of free and inquisitive habits, than an established distinction of ranks. To secure the acquiescence of an independent people in such an institution, its advantages must be preeminent and unquestionable. It is natural for them to inquire whether the virtues connected with high birth have indeed kept pace with its privileges, and corresponded with its motives and opportunities for the attainment of moral excellence. Rank implies, in its very nature, a superiority of pretension; and pretension, by an established law, provokes a watchful jealousy. It is also in the nature of rank sometimes to court observation, to challenge admiration, and sometimes to draw the curiosity of the vulgar towards its more retired mysteries. When thus the popular gaze is so strongly attracted, can it be expected that the good qualities alone of the high-born will be singled out for its scrutiny? Human nature must be altered first. Nor is this eye of keen scrutiny, fixed on the morals of the elevated, and seconded, as it too often is, by the tongue of scandal ready to circulate their aberrations, entirely without its benefits. It acts as a check upon those who are so greatly tempted on the one hand, and so narrowly observed on the other. It tends to abate somewhat of the extravagant reverence which is paid to rank. It serves to dissipate the delusion, and to console men for the inequality, in which splendor of birth involves the society where it prevails. By these observations, we only intend, partly to account for, and partly to palliate the rage, of which we so much hear, for speculating on the scandals of foreign high life, but which we do not pretend to justify in all its excesses.

Still, it may be asked, in reference to the more immediate track of our inquiry,—Shall names, which are altogether private, be obtruded into a painful notoriety? Shall the sanctuary of domestic hospitality be invaded, and conversations disclosed to the world, which those who unsuspectingly partook in them, never imagined would be repeated? Bold as it may seem, we venture to say that there appears to us in this language not a little of factitious apprehension, and perhaps a spice of no doubt unconscious cant. We revere, as profoundly as any one, the sacred shades of home. But we beg to distinguish them from the privacy of a convent. Nor can we forget that the true charm and happiness of home, are often rather

increased than violated by opening its doors. What free-masonry, what mystery, is involved in a dinner? A social party is no conclave of conspirators. Opinions there expressed, are always, to a certain degree, liable to be laid before the public, unless the peculiar nature of the case enjoins a discreet secrecy. Manners, forms, customs, incidents, witnessed there, may be legitimate and innocent subjects of description. Forbid it that we should advocate the race of Anne Royals. But an enlightened, candid, prudent, and gentlemanly traveller, who has enjoyed peculiar opportunities for observing the interior of foreign society, is surely justified in publishing his journal for the benefit of that very numerous class, who are compelled to remain at home. The lavish introduction of obscure names, indeed, may be objectionable in point of taste. But there can be little good cause of complaint, if initials, and occasionally, with due discretion, entire names are employed, to give to the record, a life, a point, and an air and voucher of authenticity, which it could not otherwise possess.

Perhaps it may be thought that the force of these observations will be weakened by applying to them the following personal test. Would you, it may be asked, give a very cordial welcome to a stranger, if you suspected that you should in consequence be 'served up cold,' some time after, in a volume of his travels? We reply, that such a circumstance is not calculated to chill the hospitality of one, who is conscious of moving in a respectable sphere, and associates with persons of ordinary good sense. We are all in some degree at the mercy of every stranger who enters our doors. The mere fact that a visiter will speak of us and ours to his friends, ought not to abate our hospitality. We know not why we should swear him to silence on our threshold. If we have reason to believe that he will speak of us with impertinence or malignity, then indeed we shall be on our guard.—So with the foreign traveller. An honorable citizen would say to him, You came among us favorably recommended, and are therefore welcome. You propose hereafter to publish an account of your adventures. Whatever you may observe beneath our roof, characteristic of the general state of society and manners, you are at liberty to record. Mere personal peculiarities you will of course avoid. Reveal, if you please, whether the favorite topics of conversation be literature or news, and how long the ladies remained at the dessert; but suppress, in mercy,

the mistakes which the servants may commit, and any consequent irritations you may observe on the countenances of their master and mistress.

Having thus attempted to settle our critical canons, though at much greater length than if authority so high had not encountered us at the threshold, we proceed to apply them to the article in review. While the scope of our preceding observations would afford a protection to the major part of Mr Wheaton's volume, yet the utmost extent of our liberal maxims must leave some portions of it open to exception. He has communicated to us a certain quantity and species of information, for which we readily profess our gratitude. We approve and sympathize with his thoroughly professional tone of observation. Perhaps we have had enough general descriptions of England and English society. The late Dr Holley used to say, that Americans knew more of that country than Englishmen themselves;—referring, of course, to persons of both nations moving in the same class. To render our knowledge still more analytical and complete, we needed reports of the state of things there, drawn up, so to speak, from particular points of vision. We needed the accounts of men, whose tastes or professions led them into separate veins of speculation. Mr Wheaton is an instance strong enough of what we mean. He goes out as a religious man and a minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church. He attempts not to disguise or resist the predilections and affinities naturally implied in these characters. It is not England as a whole, which seems to attract his eye, but England as a land of preachers, the seat of a church establishment, the nurse of religion, literature, and morals. Hence, although we may look for the exhibition of some prejudices, yet we expect in the observations of such a traveller, that accuracy, warmth, and life of coloring, which can be inspired only by a vivid personal interest.

It is but justice to our author to declare, that what prejudices he seems to have, are unmingled with a supercilious, intolerant spirit. Episcopacy in New England wears probably a more amiable aspect than elsewhere. The recipe for mitigating the odious features of any religious denomination, is simply this;—Be not the dominant party. There is deep wisdom in that heavenly maxim, *Blessed* are ye when men shall persecute you. Christianity owed much to persecution; and so in its turn has every one of its sects. Not that Episcopacy

has ever borne a very hard lot even in New England. But there has been just that measure of jealous, lowering, overbearing toleration grudgingly yielded to her, which has done her no little good, and moulded her into a very meek and amiable sect. Widely removed as are our doctrines from theirs, we are glad of this opportunity to render our testimony, in which we are confident that our readers will join, that a more respectable, more worthy, and, generally speaking, more liberal community than the Episcopalians of New England, nowhere exists. We should antecedently have said, that if the church of England at home, is to be tried in judgment by any of her colonial sons, the task could not probably be better executed than by one from Connecticut. He would visit her under the influence of her own genius, subdued and chastened by circumstances, by distance, and by time. He would so much belong to her, as to approach her with filial sympathy and affection; he would be so much independent of, nay, so much estranged from her, as to be struck by her peculiarities, willing enough to detect her imperfections, and courageous enough to reprove them.

Mr Wheaton's voyage to England was marked by no very interesting incidents. He is inclined to ascribe the dissipation of mind and the unfitness for a sober application to study, which are produced by a sea life, to the want of an immediate exciting motive. But the same want of immediate exciting motives often exists on land, without being attended by the same consequences. The effect in question we should ascribe partly to physical, and partly to other mental causes than the one assigned by our author. Even after recovering from seasickness, a considerable time is required for the brain to become accustomed to the roll of the sea, and the odious exhalations from the ship. A feverish lassitude is thus produced, and the power of attention is in a degree physically diseased. To this is undoubtedly to be added, the effect which always arises from a violent and total change of one's usual associations. Not only at sea, but under any form of travelling, or even when settled down for a few weeks or months on a visit among one's friends, the effort requisite to achieve any continued intellectual labor, is much greater than where the well-known furniture, library, prospects, and current of surrounding life, combine to tell the mind, what they have long told it, that there is its home. Who can forget the broken vows and

unread volumes of the long college vacation? Although the student has then several weeks at his entire command, yet he seldom accomplishes so much as he does voluntarily, during an equal period in term time, apart from his prescribed exercises. Here he is already in the traces; and his will, which is subjected by others, is more easily subjected by himself. It is true, that circumstances of extraordinary excitement will sometimes overcome the distracting causes we have referred to. A revered clerical friend, not long since deceased, and of the ripest attainments,* informed us, that the most intense effort he ever accomplished was a critical study of the Epistle to the Romans, on his first visit to England, and in one of the noisiest streets of the metropolis. The excitement arising from his situation he considered to be so great as not to distract, but rather to concentrate his attention. His *motive* for study would have been equally great at sea, or elsewhere; but its effect would have proved different.

Our author throws himself into his favorite sphere of observation, with an ardor which is sustained throughout, and which sometimes appears amusing. Scarcely, for instance, has he arrived at Liverpool, when he sets off on his first Sunday morning, walking two miles and a half and back again, through a drizzling rain, to hear a preacher of the established church. This preacher is Mr Buddicomb, 'known in America by a volume or two of published sermons, distinguished by their eloquence, piety, and good sense. Although he used but little action, his enunciation was earnest and emphatic, and commanded a deep attention from an audience, which, notwithstanding the bad weather, was very numerous.' In the afternoon, our traveller went to another church, which he names, 'where all the impressions he had received in the morning were reversed. A dropsical, gouty old man, whose infirmities seemed to be the fruit of good living, galloped through the service with a most indecent haste, and in a hoarse and scarcely audible voice. He was followed by a decent young man, who preached a decent sermon on the completeness of the christian system, which could offend nobody. Indeed, there were few present to be either scandalized or benefited by his lucubrations.' Mr Wheaton's evening, again, was spent at the church of the Asylum for the Blind, 'where he heard a sensi-

* Rev. S. C. Thatcher, of Boston.

ble, but, as he thought, not a very appropriate discourse, from the rector. He had too much to say about infidels, and reason enlightened by revelation; and was too speculative for an audience composed of the blind, or indeed for any congregation whatever.'

This history of Mr Wheaton's adventures on his first sabbath abroad, is characteristic of his tour throughout, so far as relates to the sacred day. It is characteristic, we will also venture to add, of certain predilections, before alluded to, with which we think his mind was affected. In some passages of his book, he utters his explicit testimony in favor of those doctrines and that party connected with the Church of England, which are usually denominated *evangelical.* Now it may be fairly presumed, even by the most candid reader, that, without Mr Wheaton's intending to misrepresent anything which he saw and heard, his impressions and descriptions would be colored by the prevailing atmosphere of his mind. We are not stoutly disposed to deny, that the evangelical, in comparison with the other party in the Church of England, contains the best preachers, the most crowded congregations, and the most decided share of piety. But we cannot resist the conviction, nor refrain from warning our readers of the possibility, —for which we shall soon show strong reasons,—that our author's representations of the state of things in these respects, are slightly warped by his own personal biases. Mr Buddicomb, if we remember rightly, is a preacher of the evangelical stamp. Let us just suppose that the decent sermon by the decent young man on the completeness of the christian system (a noble subject!) which could offend nobody, had been delivered with an 'earnest and emphatic enunciation' by Mr Buddicomb. Would it not have been apt to change its character, and instead of being sneered at, as a decent, inoffensive sermon, would it not have been 'distinguished for its eloquence, piety, and good sense?' So, too, with regard to the evening preacher, our traveller appears actuated by a somewhat captious spirit. 'Too much to say about reason enlightened by revelation!' What a slur on the most important of subjects! We hardly know how to take such an expression from the pen of a christian minister. Had Tindal or Bolingbroke uttered it, we might have comprehended the force of *his* objection. But as it now stands, we cannot account for it, except on the supposition, that the critic, having from some quarter discover-

ed the doctrinal complexion of the preacher, was led, by an imperceptible prejudice, to find a little fault with him at all hazards. As for the treatment of infidels in the same discourse, it might have been entirely appropriate for a congregation of the blind, who necessarily pass much of their time, we suppose, in conversation and idleness, and among whom a few speculative minds, or even one alone, might have been known to scatter poison, which could not be more effectually resisted than by an attack from the pulpit.

We may possibly be laying too much stress on these distinctions, but they will at least serve to show under what different aspects the same subjects will be viewed by different minds.

Fairly notifying to both our readers and Mr Wheaton, that it is not our intention to follow him throughout with this scrupulous analysis, and candidly repeating the acknowledgment, that his evangelical leanings are very remote from an odious exclusiveness, we will only remark upon one other point in the passage before us. We regretted to see the physical description, almost amounting to a lampoon, which is carried home and fastened to a particular individual, by the mention of the church where he officiates. If it was necessary to illustrate the evils of an establishment, or to accomplish any other purpose, by such an exhibition, the allusion might easily have been made more general. We trust that nothing will have been found in the exordium of our article, to shelter this delinquency of the traveller from due reprehension. But he does not often thus offend.

As to the following *sketchy* caricature of Liverpool, we conceive it to have been thrown off in a moment of ill-humor, and that our author's candor would have considerably modified it, had he first visited that city in a more genial season, and been permitted an extensive acquaintance with its society and institutions.

'Having devoted what time we could spare to a survey of notable things, we packed up our trunks, and prepared to take leave of this city of docks, fat men and fat women, coal-smoke, dirty streets, cast iron, mammon and mud.'—p. 30.

In passing from Liverpool to Birmingham, we meet with an occurrence which shows the ruling bent of the traveller's mind. Blessings on the enthusiasm, which can forego a dinner, on a long day's journey, in search of the sacred picturesque!

'A little after noon, we reached the ancient city of Stafford, very compactly built, but not very extensive. The extreme narrowness of the streets, and the jutting houses of timber and plaster, proclaim at once the antiquity of the place. While our coach-companions were snatching their hasty meal, we sallied forth to look at the churches, whose venerable appearance at a distance had attracted our notice. To find them was no easy matter, amidst such a labyrinth of crooked lanes. At length, we made our way to one, rather by accident than design; but another, whose "antique towers" had arrested our attention, defied all our attempts to approach it, or even to find where it stood, so completely was it hidden by the irregular piles of old buildings in its neighbourhood. A blast from the bugle put an end to our researches; and we hastened back just in time to resume our seats.'—pp. 31, 32.

In Birmingham, he was so fortunate as to be present at the Musical Festival. The following passage may be acceptable to our readers, for other reasons than the good talent at description displayed in it.

'Who has not heard of Madame Catalani? Her reputation for being the best of all the tuneful choir in the world, may warrant a more particular notice of her. If her singing delighted me, I was disgusted with her affectation. At a pause in the performance, she was led forward, and took her seat; and immediately commenced bowing and smiling to the genteel company which sat in the opposite gallery. Then she threw herself into a variety of postures, adjusting her dress, smiling, languishing, clasping her hands, throwing up her eyes, and *attitudenizing* in the most affected manner, till the organ began the prelude to the solo,—"I know that my Redeemer liveth;" when she arose and commenced that strain, so full of pathos and trembling hope. But its effect was nearly lost on me; I could not drive her fantastic airs out of my head sufficiently to enter into the spirit of the piece. The vast power, the richness, the compass and flexibility of her voice, however, were evident. She sang with sufficient simplicity, until she came to the penultimate syllable, to which she appended such a string of graces and embellishments, as to cause every one involuntarily to suspend breathing till she had got through. In her person she is tall and full formed; with nothing Italian in her features, except her eyes, which are full, soft, and dark: her dress was rather gaudy, and decorated with a profusion of jewels.'—pp. 34, 35.

No scene or adventure in the book has more interested us than the glimpse which the author caught of Dr Parr. It

seems like an incident which one would introduce into an imaginary tour through England, rather than an occurrence of real life. We should be glad of such an experience to relate to our children's children, and hardly know whether the sight of York Cathedral were more worthy of a visit across the Atlantic.

'At Hatton, a little hamlet on the road, we drew up before a small, plain house, to take in a young Oxonian. A fat old gentleman, in a bob wig and clerical dress, with a long pipe in his mouth, came out to take leave of his former pupil. "Farewell, Charles; God bless you, my dear fellow;—take care of yourself; farewell, farewell,"—said the old man shaking his young friend heartily by the hand. This was Doct. Parr, the famous Greek scholar, whose name is familiar to the literati all over Europe. The young student gave us some anecdotes of the doctor, whom he spoke of with enthusiasm. He is Vicar of Hatton; and his little church, capable of holding twenty families, is buried under a clump of elms, at a small distance from the road. His authority among his parishioners is unbounded; and he employs it to the benevolent purpose of healing their differences, and advising them in all their little concerns. Instead of preaching his own sermons, he takes a volume of Barrow or Tillotson into the pulpit,—gives some account of the author,—reads a discourse.—explains as he goes along, and translates the hard words into more intelligible English. His salary is only £80 per annum; and small as it is, he has no wish for preferment.'—p. 36.

The following note of the author on this passage, appears to deserve one or two criticisms.

'Dr Parr is since dead. His being overlooked, in the dispensation of church patronage, was owing to his Unitarianism, and general laxity of religious principle; of which he made little secret. For some time before his death, it was his custom to mutilate the liturgy—still retaining his living in the national church, to whose articles and formularies he had repeatedly subscribed his assent.—p. 36, *note.*

Here is a spice of uncharitableness, coupled with a spice of inaccuracy. We have to complain of our traveller for placing Dr Parr's Unitarianism in such close juxtaposition with his alleged laxity of religious principle, as to make one appear but the natural effect or concomitant of the other. We protest against any connexion between them. We know not why simple and intelligible views of the Deity should lead to a loose-

ness of religious principle. And when from theory we come to fact, we believe it will be found, that Unitarians, as a body, have been as firm, as strict, as distinct, as conscientious, as ready for sacrifices, and as unsuspicious, in the profession, maintenance, and defence, of their peculiar religious views, as any equal average body of Trinitarians.

But further, we wonder Mr Wheaton should have forgotten that Dr Parr's political principles and connexions were quite as efficient a cause as his Unitarianism, of his being overlooked in the dispensation of church patronage. Is the orthodoxy of every dignitary in the English church unquestionable? Did our traveller himself hear no whispers in this regard, relative to the present York chapter? Indeed, to any one acquainted with the state of things in that establishment since Dr Parr commenced his career, the idea of his Unitarianism, and let us add, too, of the laxity of his religious principles, being the sole obstacle to his promotion, might be rather incredible.

If, instead of charging that great and good man with a laxity of religious principle, our author had ascribed to him a liberality of sentiment, which scorned all sectarian partiality, all mean and selfish disguise, he would have expressed the truth of the case. And because the Doctor 'made little secret' of *this*, we take the liberty to insist, that his 'religious principle,' in the right sense of the phrase, was only so much the more strict. Had he really been lax, had he been willing to tamper with the most awful truths and objects in existence, he would neither have taken the trouble, nor braved the odium, 'of mutilating the liturgy,' but would quietly have read it through, like a stanch churchman, without discriminating between what his reason approved and what it abhorred. As for the poor sarcasm that he still retained his living in the national church to whose articles and formularies he had repeatedly subscribed his assent, we would express our astonishment, that a writer like Mr Wheaton, who must know the sense in which the articles of the church have long been subscribed to by a great portion of the wisest and best of her sons, should see fit to aim a blow at the head of Dr Parr, which must recoil on the whole establishment itself. The objection so uncandidly hinted in this note against the Doctor, has no force whatever, unless it be granted, that every word of the articles is faithfully and literally believed by every honest churchman who subscribes to them. And would even Mr Wheaton maintain

this? If he would, he runs into a new dilemma, and finds himself connected with a church, which presents the most cruel temptations, the most galling and slavish chains to those of her members who dare but to doubt, or even impartially examine the doctrines they have subscribed. Dr Parr, like an honest man, only realized and carried out into the light of day, the scruples which agitate the tender but coward consciences of thousands of his brethren. By our author's confession, he had only to be silent, and he might have attained preferment. But he nobly spoke out and wrote; he piously 'mutilated,' if that must be the word, and so far as such conduct could exert an influence, removed the lawn from his grasp. We shall be slow to believe the charge of laxity in religious principle against such a man, particularly when subjoined, as it is, to so beautiful and affecting an account of the manner in which he discharged his parochial duties.

Let us now follow our traveller into the study of an English prelate.

'Having occasion to wait on the Bishop of London,* I took the road, one fine morning, to Fulham, the country residence of the Bishop. I found him at home, and, after sending up my card, was shown into the library. While he was perusing my letters, I had an opportunity of studying his features and appearance. His age is apparently near sixty—his complexion sallow and unhealthy, like that of a man of studious habits; the expression of his countenance benevolent, rather than marked with lines of strong thought; and his person thin and emaciated. He had on the usual episcopal dress, consisting of a bob wig, a cassoc, and straight-breasted coat, buttoned up to the neck. On his table lay a pile of letters, which he seemed to be perusing and answering; but he pushed them aside, and immediately entered into conversation, putting a variety of questions relative to the church in the United States, and the state of literature amongst us. On the subject of Unitarianism, he was particularly inquisitive. Speaking of our literary men, he observed, "You have some able writers in your country.—I read the North American Review, and I think some of the articles admirably written, and with a juster judgment on the merits of the books reviewed, than is shown by our reviewers. But the mystery of reviewing here wants explaining. The writer, for instance, must not condemn a book, which stands on the shelves of his *publisher*.—Then

'* Hawley, now Archbishop of Canterbury.'

again, he considers to what religious or political *party* the author belongs, and the work is approved or condemned accordingly. The Edinburgh Review has often been highly inconsistent; sometimes depreciating, and then commending the same work, according to the immediate purpose to be answered. It is decidedly hostile to Christianity; but has now sunk almost out of notice in this country." After remaining near an hour, I rose to take leave; but he still detained me, standing and conversing, which led me to hope that my visit had not been unpardonably prolonged. His library is a small apartment, very plainly but neatly fitted up, and looking out on the Thames, which glides peacefully along a few yards from the windows. The impression I received from the interview was, that his lordship's talents are of a highly respectable stamp—his knowledge general, and his disposition amiable and benevolent. He talks much, but not fluently, nor always with a happy choice of expressions—appearing sometimes to be at a loss for proper words, and often stopping to change the form of a sentence. These defects disappear, however, before the kindness and affability of his manners.'—pp. 43, 44.

We are happy to observe, that, of late years, the Edinburgh Review has been far from 'decidedly hostile to Christianity,' and that, since the above recorded conversation (1824), when the reputation of that work for ability had a good deal declined, it has again approached a standard, but little, if at all, inferior to that it formerly sustained. The Bishop's criticism on these points, must receive several grains of allowance, coming, as it does, from a retired student and a high churchman.

'Having letters to the venerable Bishop of Durham, I called one day at his house in Cavendish Square, and sent in my card; and was soon after shown into his study. I found him busily engaged in writing letters, which he laid aside on my entrance. It was not difficult to recognize at once, in his noble features, the resemblance I had seen and admired in his engraved portrait; and although he is now, as he said, in his ninetieth year, his stature is erect, his look commanding, and his mental faculties apparently in full vigor. He said he was still compelled to devote a great deal of time to business, notwithstanding his extreme age; but hoped he should be found faithful at last. Speaking of the United States, he adverted to the war of the revolution; and said that his brother, Lord Barrington, then one of the Secretaries, wished that hostilities might be confined to the sea; it would exasperate less, would spare the effusion of blood, and the war might terminate without the separation of the colonies.

But finally he observed, a separation was inevitable. He inquired, whether the hostile feeling (he corrected the expression: he would not call it hostile, but *unfriendly*) towards England, had subsided since the last war: I said, I thought it had; that setting those aside, whose heads were heated with party politics, the general feeling of Americans towards the country of their ancestors was warm and friendly. He rejoiced to hear that this was the case—it could not well be otherwise, considering that, but a few years ago, we were one people. It was a subject of regret, that a degree of alienation was still kept up by the scribblers in newspapers and reviews, who had more influence in both countries than they deserved. Referring to Harvard University, he said he thought it was once correct in its theological views: an intimate and excellent friend of his, the son of a former governor of Massachusetts Province was educated there—but he was now no more. I gave him a short history of the change of religion in that university; which led to other inquiries, whether the Professors were men of ability—whether they were of the clerical order—amongst what denomination of Christians Unitarianism prevailed—by whom their clergy were ordained, &c. It was no subject of surprise, that those Unitarians who maintain the absolute non-existence of a clerical order, should quit the pulpit for other more congenial pursuits, when it suited their convenience. The Bishop spoke in high terms of the sermons of the late Bishop Dehon, which he had read through. They did honor to the church in America.'—pp. 67, 68.

We profess to be entirely in the dark as to one topic of this conversation. Who, or where these Unitarians are, that *maintain the absolute non-existence of a clerical order*, we are quite ignorant. We recollect, indeed, that the extravagant pretensions of Episcopalians on this subject, were as completely and unanswerably exposed in a certain series of letters, published some time since in Baltimore, as any rational Christian could desire. It is equally certain that American Unitarians, to a man, not only recognise the existence of a clerical order, but that they attach to it the greatest importance, regarding it as an indispensable instrument for the extension and maintenance of true Christianity. And though we have discarded the superstitious and unscriptural notions of earlier times, respecting the impress and transmission of the priestly character, yet among no denomination of Christians is a faithful performance of the sacred functions held in higher esteem, and among none are fewer exchanges, in proportion to their numbers, made

from the clerical for other professions in life. Still, we all consider that the man alone must magnify his office, and we will not permit the mere office to magnify the man. Nor do we know, why a minister of religion, who believes he can serve God and his race a great deal more effectually in any other calling, should still be chained to a profession, to which he finds his tastes, character, and circumstances but ill adapted. The door being thus left open, those who remain within the pale, enjoy at least the advantage of working under no sense of constraint, and feel that they are presenting their lives a free-will offering to the Lord.

Mr Wheaton quotes with apparent approbation a portion of a discourse, which he heard from the eccentric Rowland Hill:

'"The Socinian's prayer"—for he had a little of everything in his discourse—he said, was,—"Lord, I thank thee that thou hast given me a fine reason, and a superior understanding, and a great many other clever talents; and for these things, O Lord, I thank thee."'—p. 134.

These little touches of slander and exaggeration are no doubt very gratifying to those who have learned to look upon Socinians as a stigmatized party. But who ever heard of a Socinian thanking God that he had a *fine* reason, and a *superior* understanding, and *clever* talents? That Socinians should be grateful for the gift of reason, is but a proof of their piety. That they should be assiduous in using it, implies only their fidelity. That they should employ it, as we believe they earnestly do, in ascertaining the claims and the genuine import of revelation, shows only that they are willing to consecrate it to the highest of all purposes, the attainment of a pure and enlightened faith. Since our author has thought it worth while to circulate this loose sneer against a misunderstood and injured denomination of Christians, we have thought it worth while to subject it to a brief test of truth and fact.

The author's opinion as to the general character of preaching in the metropolis of England must interest our readers:

'On the following Sunday, I repaired in the morning to St. Botolph's, Bishop's-gate street, of which Archdeacon Blomfield* is rector. He is reckoned one of the best preachers in London, as well as one of the first *Grecians* in the country. There was

* 'Afterwards Bishop of Chester, and now Bishop of London.'

a large and attentive congregation in the church, and a numerous company of communicants surrounded the chancel. I was fortunate enough to hear the Archdeacon; but observed nothing in his discourse worthy of particular commendation. It wanted *method*; and, like many of the sermons I have heard in and about London, was deficient in strong and manly thought. There is a barrenness of invention in almost all of them—a poverty of matter which may be traced, in part, to a radically deficient theological education. The preachers have *literature* in abundance, which they lay up at the universities; they rarely offend against the laws of correct writing; but they have not *theology* enough. The sermon I heard was pious and practical; and towards the conclusion, impressive. The subject was, " the path of the just, a shining light." '—p. 153.

In the fulness of our liberality, we were about to devise some palliations of this disparaging picture, and to suggest that, as the London divines do not prepare their discourses merely for theologians, who come from a great distance, and who are naturally anxious to find their favorite views embraced and inculcated by others, it was tolerable praise, that their ministrations were 'pious, practical, and impressive.' But we recollected some remarks of the author in another part of the book, which shall be given as a substitute for our own.

'I have been long convinced, however, that the talents of a preacher are not to be correctly estimated by a single discourse. The best must necessarily preach a great many indifferent sermons; and men of eminent abilities are the most unequal in their pulpit productions. All subjects, too, are not equally promising: the invention of the clearest and most active spirits will sometimes flag; and then the work of composition proceeds heavily.'—p. 217.

And may not the small quantity of theology in the sermons of the London divines be at least a questionable defect? So difficult it is to keep from thorny speculation and unprofitable controversy, so tempting the lure and so easy the task to interweave into every discourse a favorite system, which shall indirectly flatter the opinions of hearers, that we feel disposed to entertain great candor at least, if not great respect for those clergymen, who chiefly confine themselves to the rather unattractive path of simply practical instruction. Occasionally, however, a doctrinal sermon, full, frank, and explicit, should strengthen with the requisite bone, the flesh

and blood of such a body of preaching. And we have reason to believe, that the Blomfields, the Andrewses, the Hodgsons, the Laws, and other dignitaries of the English church, fulfil their duty in this respect, although they happened not to meet Mr Wheaton's views of the *beau ideal*, in the sermons which he accidentally heard. We are afraid, too, that they might reasonably complain of some want of consistency in our author's animadversions. When one of them,* on the morning of Good Friday, labored to set forth the important and interesting *doctrinal* position, that the fulfilment of prophecies respecting our Saviour constituted a proof of his Messiahship, Mr Wheaton sees no propriety or merit in the discourse, because the point under discussion was one, 'which probably none of his hearers doubted,' though the church was filled in every part, with a miscellaneous London audience, attracted in extremely unpleasant weather by the popularity of the preacher. If there were no doubters on that point, in such an audience, we are glad to hear of it; but we are more afraid of some lurking prejudice in the reporter. In like manner, on the very next Sunday, when he hears Dr Hodgson, in a 'methodical, perspicuous, and conclusive discourse,' maintain that 'the incredulity of Thomas was unreasonable,' he insinuates that a discourse on such a subject, though preached on Easter-Day, was a mere waste effort, because 'his hearers already believed in the resurrection.' The church was on that occasion, also, crowded to excess by multitudes, the stability of whose faith our author so confidently regards as beyond all question. Why, also, may we ask, is it objected to Dr Blomfield, that his discourse wanted method, when the incoherent rhapsodies of the evangelical Rowland Hill only call forth the candid inquiries, whether 'sermons in general are not too stately for the audience, and whether preachers are not too much afraid of having their literary taste criticised, when to convince and persuade ought to be their only anxiety?'

The key to these little inconsistencies may be found in the following paragraph, on which we propose to make a few remarks:—

'I am persuaded that a higher tone of piety prevails, than would be naturally expected from the general style of pulpit instruction which it has been my lot to witness. That the latter

* Dr Andrews, Dean of Canterbury.

has undergone, however, a great change for the better within the last fifty years—that it has become more purely evangelical—that the doctrines of man's depravity by nature, of the necessity of a spiritual regeneration, of justification by faith alone, through the merits of Christ, have been, and still are, more frequently and distinctly held up to view—that there has been a general movement in the national establishment towards a return to the standard of her own articles, and of the Reformation—are facts which admit of no dispute. This change in the spiritual views of a large and influential portion of the clerical body has, to a considerable extent, produced a corresponding one among the people. The piety of the dissenters, I have been frequently assured, is in a great measure transferred to the national church; while many of their own chapels, once blessed with an orthodox ministry, have passed with their endowments into the hands of those who preach another gospel. The case of the dissenters at the present day affords a striking example, how difficult it is for a religious community to hold fast the profession of their faith, without the standard of a Liturgy, to which the doctrines of the pulpit may constantly be referred.'—pp. 159, 160.

It seems that, like most honest religionists, our author is inclined to ascribe an omnipotent influence to the favorite peculiarities which distinguish his own from other sects. He is perplexed by a fact, the confession of which is more than once extorted from him, that there should be so high an apparent tone of piety, so much decorum, so much seriousness, so thronged an attendance, in congregations which are debarred from 'evangelical' preaching! The kind of pulpit instruction, which alone he thinks *ought* to produce such effects, is that founded on the Calvinistic doctrines of the depravity of man's nature, the necessity of spiritual regeneration, and of justification by faith. Now we beg to assure him, that, wherever the ministers of the gospel, in the spirit of affectionate fidelity, urge upon their hearers the duty of repentance, on the simple and intelligible principles of rational Christianity, congregations will, on the whole, be as large and attentive—men will grow as pious and good, as they ever will under the inculcation of those extravagant positions, which bewilder their imaginations, and cause their natural reason and conscience to revolt. Nor will there be found, in the bosom of such communities, a considerable number of sober, worthy, intelligent, and religious individuals, who resolutely stand aloof from the doctrinal system urged upon them, and occasionally betray for it emotions of

contempt and aversion. Nor will still greater numbers be repelled without the porch, plunged into sullen infidelity or irreligious desperation, and never to be attracted back to the sanctuary, except, perhaps, amidst the torm and panic of a half-century revival.

When claims so lofty are made by good and sensible men, in favor of the doctrines above enumerated as constituting the substance of truly evangelical instruction, it is really worth while for those who value the principles of Liberal Christianity, to stand forth, and be equally explicit in stating the grounds of their preference, and in comparing the relative merits of the opposite systems in question. On the present occasion, we can do little more than furnish a few hints, although the subject is fully susceptible of an extended disquisition. In the first place, then, instead of the depravity of man's nature, scripture and experience seem, in our view, to concur in teaching no more than its *depraveableness*, and the consequent result which actually exists;—viz. a great, but not total depravity among men. This condition of human nature was sufficient to warrant the interposition of Heaven by a new revelation. It would render necessary the healing and preservative power of Christian institutions; and it seems to us the only consistent ground of humility, repentance, and vigilance on the part of those to whom the gospel is proposed,—the only consistent ground of faithful and persevering exertions on the part of preachers, in warning, reproving, exhorting to repentance, instructing, spending and being spent, in short, for the moral and spiritual benefit of their hearers.

The second doctrine, for which such vital importance is challenged, is, the necessity of spiritual regeneration. Now, looking this phrase full in the face, and translating it into plain terms, without any flinching or softening reservations, it signifies, that, whatever be the existing character of an individual, however innocent his life, pure his intentions, and positive his virtues,—Washington, for instance, or Howard—unless a supernatural change before death shall have taken place within him, he can expect nothing but everlasting damnation in the world to come. The Liberal Christian pauses before venturing to announce these terrible and extreme terms of salvation. He solemnly compares with the whole tenor of the New Testament, the circumstances under which Jesus declared to Nicodemus the necessity of a new birth. He perceives in the

change required at that interview by the Saviour, the laying aside of mistaken conceptions respecting the temporal power and splendor of the approaching kingdom of God, or reign of the Messiah, and the substituting in their room more spiritual and humbling views of it as a moral and religious dispensation.* He, therefore, cannot employ this very bold figure of speech in a new, and violent, and, as he believes, often a most dangerous sense, which he thinks never entered the Saviour's mind. Say not, that if this sense be no longer the burden of preaching, preaching will lose its power; for there still remain man's tremendous responsibility, and the awful sanctions of the gospel, not to speak of other moral instruments, by which the christian teacher may happily induce both himself and his fellow men to forsake the evil of their ways, and turn to the living God.

So, in the third place, we profess to see in the Calvinistic doctrine of justification by faith, a phrase borrowed from the ancient controversies of St Paul with the Judaizing Christians of his time, and applied to a modern combination of ideas and feelings entirely remote from that apostle's meaning. Circumcision, and other observances of the Mosaic law, being pressed upon the new converts as necessary to their justification, or complete righteousness, the apostle vindicates the liberty of Christians from the imposition of such shackles, and represents the christian faith, with its necessary consequences of moral and religious obedience, as sufficient for their justification. The true spirit and essence of this doctrine are maintained by Liberal preachers, when they teach their hearers, as they constantly do, not to depend on the efficacy of mere rites and ceremonies, or even the outside semblance of a righteous life, but to consider that morality only to be of any value, which springs from motives conformable to Christianity, and from a heart sincere in the sight of God. Loud appeals are often made to the Reformation, as if a more Orthodox view of this doctrine were a chief instrument in accomplishing that great event. But it should be remembered that the mighty force of Luther's celebrated artillery was aimed against the vaunted merits of the saints, the efficacy of the mass, supererogatory works, &c. These were, indeed, battered down by

* Read particularly the whole conversation of Jesus on that occasion, in which he seems mainly anxious to convey the idea that there must be a *suffering*, not a conquering Messiah. John iii.

the dogma of justification by faith alone through the merits of Christ; but they would have been equally levelled by it, as authority from scripture, whether Luther had privately interpreted the expression itself after Augustin, or according to the more rational and critical sense. St Paul, in some of his expressions, seems to disparage the efficacy of moral obedience.* But the train of his argument renders it evident, that, in these cases, he refers to acts of moral obedience, simply as prescribed parts of the Mosaic *ritual* system.† Their *inherent* value and excellence, so far from denying, he repeatedly and strongly maintains. ‡ He transfers their whole obligation to the christian system. § He even maintains, that, in all descriptions of men, whether Jews or Gentiles, they are peculiarly acceptable before God. ||

Now in spite of the foregoing facts and distinctions, those Christians, who claim the exclusive title of evangelical, insist upon our receiving the doctrine of justification by faith alone, in the obvious, modern, independent sense of the words, as if Paul had originally uttered them but yesterday on the exchange, to an audience totally ignorant of the circumstances attending the transition of the Jewish religion to the Christian. We, therefore, whether we be right or wrong in our own views of this difficult and complicated question, object, in the outset, to such a demand, even as matter of pure biblical criticism. On further examining the proposition itself, thus proposed to us, our objections surely do not diminish, but rather multiply all around. For, first, it involves an inherent and fatal self-contradiction. The faith, through which justification is said alone to come, is an act of obedience; it is therefore a work, a deed, equally as much as to honor one's father and mother, which, of course, must be classed among dead works.—2. Whoever embraces the doctrine in question, is either involved in a perpetual struggle between the obvious phraseology of his creed and a satisfying interpretation of it, or, with more consistency and boldness, he flies for relief to Antinomianism. Well does Mr Wheaton know how widely both of these melancholy alternatives have spread among some of the most respectable portions of his mother church.—3. As if to tie up the subject still more

* Rom. iii. 20. † Rom. iii. 1, 30. ‡ Rom. ii. 6, 8, 9, 15.
§ Rom. vi. & xii. || Rom. ii. 9, 10, 11.

completely in a knot of metaphysical difficulties, it is not faith, after all, which produces justification, but it is the imputed merits of Christ. None can acknowledge the exceeding perfections of Christ, or the saving tendencies of his religion, more cordially than we. But the idea that a man cannot be personally righteous, unless the righteousness of Christ be transferred or imputed to him, or placed to his account, so utterly confounds all sense of individual responsibility, and is so contradictory to the general tenor of scripture,* that we need not here enlarge upon it as a defective topic of christian instruction;—a task the less necessary, as we believe this doctrine has been for some time abandoned, in our own country, by the most prominent writers and preachers among the Orthodox.

Such, at length, are the principles, which Mr Wheaton and many other friends of Christianity think essential, not only to the prosperity of the Church of England, but of religion in general. That these principles are extremely popular among certain classes of people,—that, by the inculcation of them, languishing congregations have been revived, enlarged, and kept together for a time, is beyond dispute, but not beyond a rational explanation. Such facts are partly accounted for by the author of the volume before us, when engaged in a somewhat different train of speculation.

'It is certain,' he says, 'that the preachers who are most followed by high and low, are as much distinguished by bold conceptions, strong language, and an animated elocution, as by any other quality; and if a portion of the members of the establishment are still wedded to the old, lecturing, moralizing style of pulpit instruction, it is, I will venture to say, a prejudice, arising perhaps from the extravagances which have prevailed among some of the dissenters. Human nature in England, and in America too, is the same that it is all the world over. It loves *to be strongly moved*,† whatever the subject may be; and when left to its own unbiassed decisions, will always prefer that style of pulpit address, which blends a good degree of earnestness, and feeling, and imagination, with the argumentative and didactic.'—p. 209.

Another cause of the extensive reception of our author's cardinal doctrines, is, that they are constantly and confidently

* Job i. 1. Acts x. 2. † Italicised by the author.

stated by their advocates to be an essential part of Christianity, and thus contract all the reverence which is due to a religion, which, for the sublimity of its *evident* truths, the excellence and necessity of its *plain* requisitions, the impressive character of its author, and the proofs of its divine origin, is calculated, more than any other object of contemplation, to attract and move the human mind. When, too, we find in these so highly praised articles of belief, a large infusion of mysticism, a something, which our reason and natural conscience in vain try to comprehend,—in short, a kind of consecrated enigma, we shall perceive why they are so acceptable and popular with persons of a particular taste. But what, as we think, in the greatest degree recommends them to so many of the truly excellent of the earth, but, at the same time, as we shall show in a moment, most certainly nullifies the doctrines themselves, is, their appeal to the humility of men. Our ears are stunned with praises of the humbling doctrines of the cross. The pride of human reason alone is said to reject them.* What then must have the merit of receiving them? One of the loveliest qualities of the mind—even a *moral virtue!* That there is humility enough in the world to receive the doctrine of total depravity, proves that the world is not totally depraved. Spiritual regeneration cannot certainly be supposed to regenerate the very quality by the only means of which it operates. Justification by faith *alone* must be preceded by a *moral* quality, without which that faith itself could not exist.

For all these reasons, we should antecedently pronounce the doctrines in question to be a mistaken and visionary appendage to Christianity. Should they ever be productive of good, we should pronounce that good to be incidental, and very capricious in its exhibitions. It would be the strength belonging to a fever;—it would never be the gentle and persuasive influence shadowed forth by the mustard-seed and leaven of the gospel parables. The healthy state of human nature is not the soil for such opinions as principles of practice. They must terminate, sooner or later, in the opposite extremes of fanaticism and indifference; and no social organization can be permanently char-

* How seldom is it remembered that speculative reason, or a perception and adoption of the connexion between premises and their consequences, is the humblest state of the mind! No slave follows the leading of his master more obsequiously. Can the same be said of the imagination, or of the mystic sense?

acterised by them. Experience and history at once illustrate and justify these conclusions. What but a catalogue of struggles and failures is the history of dogmas savoring of Calvinism? We speak not now of the positive and grievous evils they have produced in private relations. Let that invidious topic pass. But in what congregation have a majority of hearers had any sort of clear comprehension or interest about them? What national establishment has been able to endure them? Where, we had almost said, is the community, in which they have secured, from generation to generation, the reverence and support of the most learned, wise, and good? Ask Geneva, Germany, Scotland, English Presbyterianism, the Church of England, our own neighbourhood, and the process which is at this moment going on in all the churches of the land. The peculiarities of the system, when not disclaimed, are every day explained away, and the securest triumph which its advocates obtain, is when they show, as they are sometimes eager, and sometimes driven to do, that their inmost ideas, after all, approximate or correspond to the intelligible and enduring principles of Liberal Christianity.

Least of all should Mr Wheaton find matter of congratulation in the revival and prevalence of these opinions in his parent communion. When they before had the predominance there, they filled that church and nation with fanatics and infidels, and occasioned the most tremendous ecclesiastical explosion on record. As surely as they are again propagated there, with zeal and success, so surely will they do the same thing again. We dissent from the opinion expressed by our author, that the increase of religious feeling in England has been owing to these half emancipated dogmas of the Reformation. Flies on a revolving wheel raise not all the dust. Some more general cause; some extensive reaction from the coldness and deadness of the last century, has simultaneously visited both the Orthodox and Liberal of all denominations. We should ascribe it to a higher tone of education, and an elevation in the general mind, giving the soul a new consciousness of its worth, and a stronger leaning towards the heavenly themes of Christianity. We are confident, that if, instead of listening to interested and prejudiced witnesses, Mr Wheaton had taken the trouble to visit in person some of the Dissenting chapels, where 'another gospel' from Calvin's is preached, he would have found evidences of a better spirit than he supposed to exist among them. With regard to the

blessings of a liturgy, with a reference to which the passage before us concludes, must we again meet and refute the old presumptuous triumph? Is it worth while for any religious community to hold fast the profession of their faith, longer than it is fixed in their minds? Does a liturgy secure uniformity? The fact is, that, with or without a liturgy, mankind will separate into high and low church, evangelicals and nationals, literals and liberals; and the true question regarding the best interests of religion and the greatest happiness of men, is, simply, whether they shall so divide from each other, with the entangling, ensnaring, and provoking shackles of a creed upon them, or, in the enjoyment of that large and conciliatory freedom, bestowed originally by the Creator, and afterwards confirmed and sanctioned by the Saviour.*

By a singular coincidence, the author was furnished on one day with the materials for the following pair of portraits. The originals form a strong contrast, and have, though in different ways, and among different classes, produced no inconsiderable impression on our side of the Atlantic.

'As the time for morning service approached, I strayed away in the direction of Paddington; till, passing along an obscure street, I suddenly came in front of Bentinck Chapel, which was open. Prayers were read by the Rev. Basil Woodd, minister of the Chapel, assisted by the Rev. Mr Wilks, the Editor of the Christian Observer, who officiates here as an assistant. A short and rather stout man, in the prime of life, and with a countenance singularly engaging and benevolent, then ascended the pulpit, and commenced a discourse on "holding fast the form of sound words," in aid of a collection for the Prayer Book and Homily Society. It was delivered wholly extempore; but he had not proceeded far, before it was evident that he was a preacher of no common powers. I inquired his name from the person next to me; and was told that it was Leigh Richmond. As I was not aware of his being in London, it was a subject of agreeable surprise, that I had been thus accidentally directed to a

*On the liturgy of his church Mr Wheaton elsewhere thus remarks:—'How difficult it is to read the Liturgy of the church *well!* To impart life and spirit to it, without flippancy—to observe the proper inflections without affectation—to give it variety without being declamatory, and pathos, without becoming monotonous!' The same observation has often occurred to us; but we have been accustomed to rank it among the other objections, to which that composition, as a medium of popular worship, is exposed.

church, where I had an opportunity of hearing a man who has eminently benefited and delighted the Christian world by his writings. The language of the speaker, like that of his written style, flows on like the current of a gentle river, watering and fertilizing the region through which it flows. It is rarely elevated or impassioned, and never mean. If it is too equable and diffuse for the highest flights of eloquence, it is in an eminent degree persuasive, and commands a deep and breathless attention. On the conclusion of the service, Mr Wilks invited me into the vestry room, and introduced me to the preacher, and the minister of the chapel. I only regretted the shortness of the interview, which however left a pleasing impression on my mind of the gentleness and affability of his disposition. He seemed to be a little exhausted with the effort of preaching; and when he rose to cross the vestry room, I remarked that, like Israel, he "halted upon his thigh." The chapel was filled to overflowing by an audience, composed principally of mechanics and laborers, who gave a very solemn attention to the exercises of the morning.

'In the afternoon, I went to St Luke's Chapel, Waterloo Place, where I learned the Rev. Sidney Smith was to preach before the Society for the Promotion of Prison Discipline. Mr S. has been formerly known as one of the literary contributors to the Edinburgh Review; and is supposed still to write for it occasionally.

'His text, from the 102d Psalm, was dismissed as soon as read; and the discourse which followed was much in the style of an article in the Edinburgh or Quarterly, on prison Discipline. With all its looseness and negligence, it was often pithy and pointed; and commanded a good share of attention. This was in part to be attributed to a sonorous voice and a graceful and impressive action, as well as to the vivid and forcible thoughts which were occasionally produced. The chapel was well filled with the rich and gay, whose carriages were drawn up in long array in the street; for Waterloo Chapel is one of the places of worship at the court end of the town, to which it is *fashionable* to resort on Sundays. The building is a neat piece of Tuscan architecture, and elegantly furnished within. It has been erected about four years.'—pp. 241, 242.

Mr Wheaton has a keen eye for the inspection and description of busy life; but we have often observed him to throw at length some pensive, tender, and religious shade over his liveliest pictures. We subjoin an instance.

'Thursday, 20.—The long expected drawing-room has been actually held, and the bustle produced by this important event may not perhaps be unworthy of a description. Returning about one, from a walk to the eastern part of the town, I found Bond Street completely occupied by a line of carriages, extending as far as the eye could reach. The day happened to be remarkably fine, and the display of equipages was such as could not fail to gratify the most ardent admirers of style. The procession began at Cavendish Square, and extended along Henrietta, Vine, New Bond, Grafton, and Albemarle streets, into St James' street, and thence down to the palace—an unbroken length of at least a mile. The scene was amusing enough at the cross streets, where tributary streams of carriages were vainly struggling to force their way into the main current, which was setting on towards the abode of royalty. The coachmen in the principal line, aware that if an entrance were once effected, the whole string of equipages in that street would follow, to their own no small delay, kept as close to each other as possible, very much to the discomfiture of the laced footmen who stood behind, and the derangement of springs, panels, and ornamental work, by the pole of the succeeding carriage. Dire was the crashing, and lamentable the havoc among these, as often as the whole body made a *shove* towards St James', which happened whenever a fresh load of court dresses was discharged at the gate of the palace. Then, whips resounded, and coursers sprang, and the whole procession advanced just the length of a carriage and its horses, but with an impetus which caused a terrible smashing among the glittering vehicles. The concussion appeared to be the greatest at the junction of Grafton with New Bond street, where the narrowness of the passage was still further straitened by some unlucky coal waggons, which found it easier to get into the squeeze than to get out. Files of Life-guardsmen were stationed along St James' street, and about the palace, to preserve order, and clear the streets of the populace, who were collected by thousands to enjoy the spectacle. After elbowing my way out of the crowd at the palace, where the throng of spectators was immense, I commenced a peregrination along the streets occupied by the procession; and as the glasses were generally down, I enjoyed an excellent opportunity of observing at my leisure the personages, great and small, who were hastening, or rather, sojourning, to pay their duty to England's Majesty. Here were gentlemen of the army, all radiant in scarlet and embroidery, and glittering with stars and badges of distinction—gentlemen of the law, in new gowns and full-bottomed wigs—bishops and deans, in full ecclesiastical costume—rich

citizens and gentry; and strangers, whose narrow purses obliged them to avail themselves of the humbler accommodations of a hackney coach, and whose splendor was therefore far from being overpowering. Should any of the fair honor my humble journal with a perusal, they will no doubt desire to be informed how the ladies looked; and I feel bound in honor to gratify their curiosity. Be it known, therefore, that with some half-a-dozen exceptions, the display of beauty was by no means such, as to indicate a remarkable superfluity of this commodity in fair England. Two or three, I thought, *were* eminently beautiful; but in a variety of instances, the blending of the rose and the lily was too pure and dazzling, to win the unsuspecting confidence of the beholder. The prevailing dress was white satin, revealing quite as much of the person as was proper to be exposed; and their hair was adorned simply with a plume of white feathers. Truth obliges me to record, that I saw many of them devouring biscuits and other contents of the confectioners' shops—a very plebeian occupation for such personages, and on such an occasion. ♦ But allowance must be made for the infirmities of nature, cooped up for hours without the power of locomotion. The carriages began to set down at one, and continued to roll on till five or six.—But it requires the pen of Master Laneham worthily to describe the particulars of this day's show. By eight, nothing remained of the pageantry save here and there a straggling coach moving homewards at a round trot. The military had dispersed—the music was silent—the crowd had disappeared—the gate of the palace was closed; and the sentinels were set for the night. Thus, does the fashion of this world pass away.'—pp. 243–5.

Unless there may have been a great deal of mechanical drilling and some deceptive management behind the curtain, the following account of an examination of the Charter-House Boys, well deserves the attention of those who are interested in the improvement of American education.

'It was a noble spectacle to see between five and six hundred of them assembled in one apartment, to exhibit proofs of the progress they had made in their various studies. The exercises were conducted by the Archbishop of Canterbury's chaplain and another clergyman, in the presence of a number of spectators. The eldest classes were examined in Sophocles, which they rendered into correct English with perfect fluency. The readiness with which they explained the sense of that difficult author, showed a proficiency in the language quite unknown in the schools, and even the colleges of America. In reading portions of the

New Testament in the original, they were not only required to attend to the nicest shades of meaning; but to cite parallel passages, illustrative of those on which they were examined, and to give explanations, geographical, grammatical, doctrinal, and historical—all of which was done with admirable readiness and precision. Their recitations from Virgil exhibited, in a striking manner, the perfection of their training in the Latin tongue. One began, *without book*, reciting and construing from half a dozen to a dozen lines. He had no sooner completed the sentence than the examiner called upon another boy in the class, who immediately commenced reciting in the same way; and so on, till each one had been examined in his turn. Notwithstanding they were suddenly called upon, and apparently without any order, there was no mistake, nor even the least hesitation, during the whole trial. The Bell system has been introduced here, it is said with the happiest effect. The ages of the boys seemed to be from eight to fifteen.'—pp. 237, 238.

On being introduced to Professor Buckland of Oxford, and gratified by hearing one of his lectures, our author expresses the highest opinion of the lecturer, but rather a poor one of the science of geology. 'It may,' he says, 'be pronounced a harmless pursuit, so long as the geologist is content to receive the Mosaic account of the creation, in preference to the uncertain register of that event, which he fancies he can read in the formation and position of the various strata.' Now it will not do to dismiss this matter so. It is true, there is much that is at present 'uncertain' about the science of geology, and many things a theorist in it 'fancies' with regard to its various phenomena. But that there are some conclusions, which irresistibly press upon every reflecting mind, from geological facts already known, cannot be denied. One of these conclusions is, the very great number of years, beyond all former calculation or imaginings, which must have elapsed since that series of changes commenced, whose records distinctly appear upon and beneath the present surface of the earth. Now, shall these appearances be made to bend to the received chronology of the bible, according to fallible theologians and ecclesiastical historians; or shall some new and fair interpretation be adopted, which shall cause the voices of nature and of holy writ to harmonize? For ourselves, unshackled by ecclesiastical formularies and institutions, we hesitate not a moment to decide. Our senses, our patient and humble observation of God's unquestionable doings around us, shall be, instead of Origen and Je-

rome, our interpreters of what Moses intended by the word *created*, and shall inform us whether his expression, *In the beginning*, referred to an assignable instant six thousand years ago, or to some indefinite period before the existing order of things. Thus, there is no necessity for exciting a glance of mutual jealousy between revelation and geology, or for paralysing the infant efforts of a sublime science by the threatened odium and thunders of the church, or by the extenuating sneer, that it may, conditionally, be a mere 'harmless pursuit.'

Searching for an extract, which might combine a specimen of the author's happiest manner with some subject of very general interest, we found none better suited to the purpose than this:

'Friday, June 4.—After dinner, I took the Bath road, intending to gain an eminence which appeared to overlook the city; and to continue my walk to Cumnor Hall. The first mile and a half of the road lay over the plain, and crossed a number of streams tributary to the Isis. About two and a half miles from the town, I reached the top of a hill which I had marked from the dome of Radcliff Library; and was repaid by a prospect, rich, extensive, and beautiful. The whole horizon to the northwestward, with the exception of a portion hidden by a small eminence, lay spread out before me. Very distant but gentle elevations, half lost in vapour, bounded the prospect; while a vast circular plain, glittering here and there with the rays of a bright sun reflected from the rivers, and villages, and hamlets, and spires, and hedges endlessly ramified—lay spread out at my feet, as on a map. In the midst of this beautiful panorama, Oxford, with all its dun palaces, towers and pinnacles, lay basking in the levelled rays of the sun; and from the position where I stood seemed to be blended into one mass, having the dark green, and occasional chalky spots, of Shotover hill, for its back ground. After regaling my sight awhile with the lovely landscape, and enjoying the cool breeze which swept over the hill, I pursued my walk; and about a mile beyond, turned off the main road down a lane, which wound along between lofty hedges, and soon brought me to Cumnor—the scene of Leicester's loves, and of the mysterious crime into which he was plunged by his ambition. The narrow walk, which for some distance had led over level ground, descends a little as it approaches Cumnor—a hamlet, composed of a few small, straggling, thatched cottages, inhabited by poor tenants to Lord Abington, the proprietor of the village. The vicarage stands on the left, just at the brow of a small descent; and a little farther on, and more remote from the road, are the ruins of Cumnor Hall, close

by the village church.—Having inquired out the sexton, the oracle usually consulted on such occasions, I entered his humble dwelling. "Are you the sexton, Sir?" "Why yes, Sir; I am *clerk* of the parish here"—placing a slight emphasis on the name which designated his vocation. His good woman was sipping her doctors' stuff by the fire, and was growing rather tediously eloquent on the subject of her ailments, when the return of my guide in his Sunday's coat, and the keys of the church, interrupted her catalogue of complaints. As we went towards the church, I inquired if the place had been much visited? "Why yes; for a spell, after a novel I heard talk of was printed a while ago, a wonderful sight of young folks used to ride out here and look about, particularly in the *vocation* at Oxford. But it didn't last long." On farther inquiry, I saw reason to congratulate myself on having a guide so well acquainted with the traditions and localities of the place, and gathered from him the following particulars. His ancestors had been tenants in the village for many generations; and he himself had spent the early part of his life in Cumnor Hall, which was pulled down about fifteen years since. The foundations are still remaining, and mark out the exact shape and dimensions of the Hall. It was a quadrangle, seventy or eighty feet square, entered by a gateway on the north side. The stair-case, in the adjoining corridor of which the tragedy is supposed to have been acted, was in the angle at the right of the entrance; and in the southwestern angle was, as my cicerone informed me, a richly carved room, which always went by the name of "Lady Dudley's Chamber," and which had the reputation of being haunted. None of the family would go into it after dark; but, said my honest informant, "I lived in the house a good many years, man and boy; and must say I never *seed* nor heard anything strange about it. The house looked like one of the colleges at Oxford, and had a wondrous sight of carved work in it, and painted glass in the windows, and was fit for a gentleman to live in; but it was thought to be haunted, and folks imagined they heard strange noises there; and latterly, nobody but farmers and such like lived in it." As for Tony Fire-the-fagot, he was a real personage, whose memory is still execrated among the villagers, for his parsimony and acts of oppression, of which my guide recounted a few. The most conspicuous monument in the church is one in the chancel to the memory of this same Anthony Foster, with a brass plate bearing his effigies engraved upon it, along with those of his wife and three children. He is represented as a knight cased in armour, in a kneeling attitude, with his hands uplifted in prayer, his helmet being laid aside. A long and tedious eulogy is engraved beneath, setting forth in

Latin the rare virtues of his character and his exemplary piety. The instrument begins with the words ANTONIUS FOSTER; while that of his wife commences with ANNA ROMOLDA WILLIAMS. So much for this worthy gentleman, whom the author of Kenilworth has immortalized in his tale. The stained glass of the Hall has all been destroyed, with the exception of a small piece, which is inserted in a window of the church. It represents a female kneeling by the side of a chair, in the act of devotion.

'From the wall of the church-yard, the ground gradually slopes towards the west, and commands a most extensive view in that direction as well as to the south, over a gently undulating country. A little distance below the ruins, the surface again becomes level, and is adorned with hedges and ancient elms; but soon slopes off in a long and gradual descent, till it is lost in the immense plain which stretches to the farthest verge of the horizon. Here, then, was the beautiful Countess immured in splendid captivity, happily ignorant of the treacherous game her ambitious lord was playing, the stake of which was a participation of the throne with his imperial mistress. Here, too, if the surmises of historians can be relied on, she perished, at least with the connivance of the illustrious Leicester, her wedded husband. Sitting on the wall of the church-yard, as the bright sun was sinking into the west, and all around was tranquil, save the sky-larks which were pouring out their wild warblings; as I looked down on the ruins of Cumnor Hall, I could not help thinking over the circumstances of the tragedy, of which this spot had been the scene, and the story of which has been so affectingly narrated by the historical novelist. On a farther examination of the ruins, I found a deep arched vault beneath the corridor, which led to the fatal stair-case, now partly filled with rubbish. It was now nearly sunset, and I sat out on my return. On reaching the summit of the hill I have before described, I once more paused to enjoy the beautiful prospect it commands; and resuming my walk, arrived in the evening at my lodgings.'—pp. 262–5.

Let us contemplate a picture of the genuine and thoroughgoing disciples of verbal Orthodoxy.

'Passing one evening by the Huntington chapel, [in Bath] curiosity induced me to enter. A young man from London was exhorting the congregation, which scarcely amounted to thirty. It was gratifying to see that the Antinomian S. S. had so few followers in Bath. When the speaker had concluded his observations, he proposed, that "some of the brethren present should relate what God had done for their souls. Come, brother Fisher; can't you tell us something of your religious experience?"

Brother Fisher commenced a narrative, but in so low a tone that I was unable to hear him. A young man near me, being next called upon, got up; and after some apologies for opening his mouth in the presence of those, whose age and acquaintance with the Lord's dealings were so much greater than his own, gave a common-place relation of his experience, in which there was a great deal of cant, and very little which could edify. He concluded by desiring brother Miller, "one of the fathers in Christ, to offer something for the instruction of babes in christian experience, as he professed himself to be." Brother M. spoke with more ability than his predecessors; and amongst much which was objectionable, he had some strong thoughts, and made some striking, and not inappropriate allusions to scriptural incidents; but the tendency of each speaker to do away the moral obligations of the gospel was most observable. Their observations were all decidedly of an Antinomian cast, and were calculated to strengthen each other in that pernicious delusion. The burthen of their exhortations was,—"Am I in Christ? If so, then I am safe," but a religious frame of mind, and holiness of life, were excluded as evidences of being in Christ, or even as necessary christian attainments. The preacher spoke of "the distress of some dear servants of God, because they were not holier or better. Why," said he, "you have nothing to do with growing better—it will not help forward your salvation in the least. Paul said, '*as* ye have received the Lord Jesus, *so* walk in him;' that is, as ye have received him as a suitable and all-sufficient Saviour, who is to do everything for you; continue to consider him in this light only; and *let holiness alone.* Rely on him—that's all."—Brother Miller said of *working*, "we have nothing to do with that, no more than this pew"—giving it at the same time an emphatic slap with his spacious palm. Here then was divinity with a vengeance. The disciple has only to persuade himself that he has *faith*, and he is at liberty to "work all manner of uncleanness with greediness." Yet there were better things said in the course of the meeting; and I have no doubt, but that the lives of many of these Huntington Antinomians are more exemplary, than their speculative faith is calculated to make them.—I left the London exhorter commenting on Brother Miller's "experience," in a disquisition which seemed to have neither beginning, middle, nor end.'—pp. 292–4.

It is amusing to compare this sympathising tenderness towards the extravagances of Antinomians, with some severe remarks on a London preacher, whose discourse against total depravity, the author manifestly caricatures, and calls it 'miserable stuff.'

But we love most our author's pencil out of doors. The mere study of Scott could never have inspired so delicious a sketch as the following:

'July 10th. I am now sitting on Prospect Point, the southwestern extremity of Lansdowne, and the most elevated ground within many miles of Bath. It is one of those glorious mornings which sometimes arise in such perfect beauty, as almost to make us forget that the repose of the elements can ever be disturbed. Low down in a valley to the southeast, and about four miles distant, the city appears, partially concealed by the projecting point of a hill, and arrayed in a transparent mantle of thin, blue smoke. Far beyond, and in the same direction, the Marlborough and Wiltshire Downs, and Salisbury Plain, stretch along the horizon, with a slightly irregular outline, till they terminate in an abrupt declivity at Stour Head; on the brow of which, Alfred's tower is distinctly visible, twentyfive miles distant, and in a direction due south. Here commence the Mendip Hills, less elevated than the former; and these, with other highlands, complete the boundary as far westward as the British Channel.—In the valley at my feet, to the southwest and west, the beautiful Avon winds along in graceful sinuosities, through a velvet margin of meadows, across which the shadows flit before a strong breeze from the ocean. Hamlets, towers, and village churches—the stately mansions of the rich, and the lowly cottages of the poor—clumps of trees, green hedges and lawns, are sprinkled all over the landscape, as if rained down from the clouds, and lie spread out beneath as on a map. Over all these, the sun sheds at times a glorious flood of light—the harvest, just beginning to look golden, waves gracefully before the wind—the larks are twittering over my head—a thrush is warbling his wild notes in yonder brake—sheep in countless myriads are grazing on the downs around me, the tinkling music of their bells relieving the solitude; and "the soft music of the village bells," stealing up the valley on the breeze, "falls at intervals upon the ear, in cadence sweet." A scene so rich, so peaceful, so inspiring as this, is not often to be met with even in this beautiful island, and seems to breathe new life and healthfulness into the soul.'—pp. 299, 300.

Did Mr Wheaton's note of admiration at the close of the following sentence mean to imply something ominous in the fact recorded? We are in the Abbey Church at Bath. 'Statues of the three persons in the Trinity once occupied a beautiful niche in the centre of the battlements, and appeared to be receiving the homage of the group of the angels below; but of these, only the middle one is remaining!'

Walking with a friend one morning in the vicinity of Bath, he came to an elegant mansion nearly finished. 'The owner,' he observes, 'had the bad taste to pull down a beautiful picturesque structure, farther down the valley, to make room for the erection of a formal three story building.' Bad taste is very much a thing of association. We rather sympathise with the owner of the three story building. We have heard bitter complaints of the coldness and leakiness of picturesque mansions with their many angled roofs, and of the inhospitality of stowing away a friend in some small and crooked apartment. The wisdom of modern times, in consulting utility, the greatest good of the greatest number, appeals to the most permanent ideas of beauty.

The religious world will be gratified by the following favorable report respecting the sabbath in London, although a few may be perplexed to reconcile it with a fact mentioned elsewhere by Mr Wheaton,* that there is scarcely more than one Calvinistic preacher of the establishment in that metropolis.

'I am still struck with the silence and good order of the streets of the metropolis on Sunday. It indicates a healthful feeling among the mass of the people in regard to sacred things; for the decorum is such as could not be enforced merely by a police. It is true there is a good deal of promenading in Hyde Park on Sunday afternoon; but the same decorum is observable there, which is visible in the throngs that are seen moving to or from the house of God. It argues well of the moral state of the population at large, when those who are disposed to violate the sanctity of the Lord's day, are obliged, by public opinion, to conceal their irregularities from observation. Judging by what meets the eye, the day of rest is not better observed in the cities of New-England than in the city of London. The people here are evidently a church-going people; and there is a propriety and decency in their behaviour in the sanctuary, which cannot fail to make a favorable impression, and which, so far as my observation has extended, is universal. It is in vain to say, that this may be all formality—that this decent exterior may be maintained, without supposing any very deep or universal spirit of piety. It may be true in individual cases; but cannot be true of any community in the mass. Nothing but a general and heart-felt sense of religion can long support a reverent attention to the externals of public worship, such as evidently exists in this vast metropolis, and everywhere meets the observation of a stranger.'—pp. 320, 321.

* See p. 41.

Our author passes into France, and his book immediately changes its character. He now gives us only descriptions of what has often been described before, intermixed with some personal adventures of no extraordinary kind. Either the language of the country, or a want of proper facilities, debarred him from that familiar intercourse with general and private society, which enabled him in England so often to gratify our curiosity.

Returning to the latter country, and pursuing his way into Scotland, he stops to pass a night and day with the Rev. G. S. Faber, of prophetic notoriety, but whether 'advantageously known among American divines,' or not, perhaps our author and we have two opinions. 'During the evening, Mr F. received a note from Lord L——, announcing the intention of himself and lady to attend church the next day; but on Sunday morning, the arrival of another message indicated a change of intention, in consequence of the indisposition of Lady L——. It was easy to see that so much parade and formality, in discharging a duty alike incumbent on the high and the low, were by no means agreeable to the honest, manly feelings of the Rector.' The blessings of patronage and an establishment! No President of the United States would venture to send so insolent a communication to the humblest minister in the country—and if he did, we have no hesitation in saying, that an immediate and dignified reproof would prevent a repetition of the offence.

Of the clergy of the Kirk of Scotland, Mr Wheaton observes, that those with whom he became acquainted in Edinburgh, were all men of agreeable and polished manners. 'Indeed,' he continues, 'it is understood that the theology of the Kirk has insensibly undergone a change within the last half century; a milder and more benevolent tone of doctrine having taken the place of the stern metaphysics of Geneva—the strong meat in which the members of the Kirk once delighted. Admitting such a change to have taken place, it could scarcely be without its effect on the manners of the clergy.'

We can only account for remarks like these, by supposing that our author had grown more liberal in the course of his travels. What sterner metaphysics ever scowled in Geneva, or what stronger meat was ever digested by the ancient Cameronians, than our author's views of the depravity of man's nature, the necessity of a new birth, and justification by faith alone? If these

doctrines were essential to the revival of primitive piety and pure manners in England, we know not how it is that, in Scotland, we see good arising from more mild and benevolent opinions. Will it be said, that other doctrines, such as election and perseverance, are referred to as particularly stern and strong, while total depravity and so forth, are the milder, the more benevolent, and the more conducive to polished manners? Give us new light and new powers to see how these things are!

But we fear we have augured too favorably from the last quoted passage. A different spirit appears over the leaf.

'I went to Saint Paul's, in the hope of hearing the celebrated Mr Alison. In this I was disappointed. His pulpit was occupied by the Rev. Mr S——, of Upper Canada, who seemed to have prepared a discourse for the occasion, in Mr Alison's own style. His text—"Art thou my very son Esau? And he said, I am"—might have given occasion, one would suppose, to introduce some useful reflections on the mischiefs of parental partiality, and the turpitude of falsehood. No such thing. The sermon was a tissue of sentimentalism and affectation, abounding in pretty conceits, but wholly without point. Mr Alison was present—a good-looking, portly personage, with a head venerably grey. Although in connexion with the Scottish Episcopal Church, he is considered by his clerical brethren as falling far short of the doctrinal standards of the church in which he holds a place. His sermons, like Dr Blair's, have had their day, and no longer retain a place on the shelves of Christian Theology.'—p. 438.

Mr Alison's sermons are not, indeed, models of theological disquisitions; but, on the other hand, they are certainly far from being, as is here intimated, tissues of sentimentalism and affectation. And who, that is free from the disease of bigotry, will concur in the condemnation pronounced on the chaste, the thoughtful, the judicious Blair? We loathe these sweeping little sentences against eminent writers, which cost whole paragraphs of fact and criticism to rebut. We are aware, that, in this inquiring and excitement-loving age, that once popular author has fallen somewhat into the back-ground, and that it is fashionable, in more than one circle of religionists, to speak of his alleged poverty and vacancy. Still he has too many substantial excellences, ever to lose a place on the shelves of christian theology, and will not soon be forgotten by the grateful votaries of a modest faith. A book may still remain a classic,

although it has ceased to be the rage. In a crisis, marked by the dangerous extremes of enthusiasm and indifference, it was the enviable merit of Blair to keep the pure flame of the altar from internally wasting away, or yielding to the violence of too strong a blast. He brought religion into the parlour, and into the recesses of taste and refinement, when it might otherwise have been monopolized by the clamorous tabernacle, or have slept in the old tomes of elaborate divinity. He invested the spirit of piety and practical Christianity in attractive forms, and set the worthy example of composing sermons, distinguished by the blended qualities of an easy, graceful, popular style, a perspicuous and scientific method, a quick but chastened imagination, and an abundance of apt scriptural allusion and quotation, undisfigured by a particle of mysticism or cant. The example has since been followed with great good effect, and has even been improved upon, we allow, by the infusion of more spirituality and fire. But if the volumes of Blair have had their day, it was not an idle or unprofitable day. Their unrivalled popularity, not built, like that of some of their successors, on a glaring and eccentric style, but on permanent principles of truth and nature, was also, in a religious point of view, an encouraging sign of the times. They were among other instruments, which at once called forth, and demonstrated a tone of piety in the higher classes. Nor can they ever be perused without imparting large and correct apprehensions of life and duty throughout their wider extended relations, and fanning in susceptible minds the enthusiasm of christian virtue. *Such* a day they will enjoy, through many changes of doctrine and taste, so long as the English language and the human heart remain the same.

On quitting England, the author renders a summary testimony of the impressions he has received from his visit. He had before done the same on taking leave of London; and we choose to extract his reflections written on the last mentioned occasion, rather than on the other, in consequence of their presenting nearly the same ideas, in a more condensed compass.

'It is not without some feelings of regret that I anticipate leaving a place, where I have spent so many months in frequent and agreeable intercourse with a social circle, of which I shall always cherish a pleasing recollection. During my sojourn in the metropolis, I have seen a great deal that is estimable, and some things less deserving of commendation. I have learned

to believe that excellence is not peculiar to any one country; and that civil and religious institutions, which would be ill suited to the state of society on the western side of the Atlantic, are far from being attended here with all the inconveniences, which theoretical politicians are fond of attributing to them. If England is old, it cannot be denied that her old age is green, healthy, and vigorous; her piety is as fresh and strong as ever, and even more so. From the extensive opportunities I have enjoyed of forming an opinion of the state of religion in her establishment, I am satisfied that, generally speaking, the principles of the reformed religion are taught in faithfulness and purity, and with a commanding influence on society; and that the number of *evangelical* preachers, in the best sense of the word, is yearly increasing. Of the warm, open, friendly hospitality of the English people, I have had too many proofs, to feel any reluctance in bearing a favorable testimony on this point; and can say with truth, that, one single instance excepted, I never met with an expression of any feelings but those of kindness and amity, towards the people of the United States. I am convinced that nothing is more fallacious, than to measure everything abroad by our own standards at home. The great mass of people in America are as thoroughly disqualified, by the prejudices of their education and their early associations, to form a correct judgment of the political and religious institutions of Great Britain, and their adaptation to the state of society here, as the bulk of the English people are to judge aright of our republican institutions, and their suitableness to *our* state of society. I shall give no credit hereafter to the reports of travellers, who affect to see nothing but corruption and licentiousness among the high and low; tyranny and misrule in the government; fat benefices and contented idleness among the clergy, and wretchedness among the peasantry. That abuses of this description do exist, there can be no question—what country is without them? But that they stand out among the prominent features of English manners and English society, no candid and well-informed man will deliberately assert.'—pp. 398, 399.

Mr Wheaton may feel suprised to see so formal an article bestowed by us on his unpretending claims. But as the greater portion of his book resembles a Sunday evening's gossip, so, like that, it has betrayed us unawares into some serious and earnest discussion. It is not lately that so fair an opportunity has presented itself, for a direct exposition of the religious principles which we value, and which we are willing should be as often and fully as possible before the public. Perhaps our

habits and functions as christian examiners and ready advocates of Unitarianism, have interested us so much in the theological parts of this work, that we have failed in doing complete justice to the rest. Before concluding, therefore, we would be careful to say, that we remember no traveller, who, with the leading exception on which we have already dwelt, exhibits greater fairness of mind than Mr Wheaton, or more clearness and purity of style, or neater criticisms on the fine arts, particularly architecture, or a more judicious choice of topics, or such liveliness of description, setting the reader down at once amidst the scenes portrayed—or such natural and heartfelt expressions of piety, mingled often with touches of a delicate pathos. Whoever has occasion to fill a day or two with good light reading, may not be better entertained than by our author's record of the conversation and anecdotes at the table of Chief Justice Park; his interview with Cunningham, of Velvet Cushion fame; his visits to Cambridge and Oxford, and particularly his accounts of several of the Professors and Lectures, not forgetting the 'Union Society;' his interview with Campbell, the South African missionary; his attendance at the meetings of various religious societies, with descriptions of the speakers and speeches; the sojourn at Aldenham Abbey; the peep at the breakfast (or luncheon?) of all England's judges; the conversation at Mr Wilberforce's; * the criticisms on several orators in both Houses of Parliament, especially the debate in the House of Lords on the Unitarian Marriage Bill, which, we rejoice to acknowledge, is here reported with a laudable impartiality; the Royal Society; Mackintosh; Davy; visit to Bath; the covetable day at Miss Hannah More's Barley Wood; Cemetery of *Père La Chaise*; York Cathedral; Edinburgh; the Highlands, with the Lady of the Lake in hand; the voyage home, surpassed by few other voyages, in hair-breadth escapes and moving accidents; not to speak of many less considerable scenes and adventures. All this is shaded, as we can perceive, by no faults of composition worth mentioning, unless we may except the constant changes rung on the pertinacious demands of waiters, and the exorbitant charges of landlords. The reader is sometimes balanced between pity for

* The broad compliment to the beauty of the lady, transgresses, we fear, the limits of our canons; but we leave the author to settle this point elsewhere.

the distresses, and a smile at the *naïveté* manifested on this subject by the traveller. Nor can we comprehend his apparent soreness about it, except on the supposition which makes it honorable to him, and which we believe to be well-founded, that he was travelling for the benefit and at the expense of an infant literary institution at home. However that may be, we take the liberty of advising him to expunge from his next edition all or most of his complaints on this point, and to be satisfied with his excellent reflections relating to it at the conclusion of the twentysixth chapter.

We shall not quarrel with several minor opinions and prejudices, on which we are at variance with the author, such as that justice is more respected for being administered in a gown, bands and wig, than in an ordinary dress;—that the Christian Observer is the most popular and useful religious publication in the world, and the almost actionable assertion, that Mr Brougham is totally unprincipled, which we no more believe than we do the kindred doctrine of total depravity, and which Mr Wheaton would probably never have believed himself, had not his intercourse lain chiefly among the offended subjects of Mr Brougham's parliamentary visitations. Such notions as the above, we suppose, are but idols of the cave in which the author's mental habits have been trained, and if false, can be corrected only by more extended views of men and things.

In his travels from Paris to London, Mr Wheaton fell in with a gentleman, whom, in a style of courtesy not universal among Episcopalians, he denominates an English Unitarian *clergyman;* and again, his 'clerical companion.' This language, connected with the mutual interest they seemed to take in the objects of curiosity along their route, would imply, that their intercourse with each other was maintained on quite friendly terms. Doubtless they beguiled the tedium of some of their long stages by discussions, involving the very points on which we have in this article been frankly expressing our sentiments. And though we may have defended the tenets of Liberal Christianity much less successfully than our brother of the parent-country, yet we will not yield to him in the cordiality and good humor, with which we bid adieu to our pleasant fellow traveller, notwithstanding the sharp controversies that have stirred us on the way.

ART. IV.—*An Account of the Rise and Progress of the Unitarian Doctrine, in the Societies at Rochdale, Newchurch in Rossendale, and other Places, formerly in Connexion with the late Rev. Joseph Cooke. In Ten Letters to a Friend.* By JOHN ASHWORTH. Second Edition. Newchurch, 1829. 8vo. pp. 80.

WE rarely meet with a publication so interesting as this. It contains the history of the process by which a numerous body of Methodists in the North of England passed from the faith and discipline of John Wesley to the simple doctrines of Unitarian belief. It is a memorable and instructive example of simple, uneducated men, being led by the study of the English bible alone, without any help from abroad, and without knowing that there was such a thing as Unitarianism in the world, to the adoption of those views which we hold as the actual truth of Christ. It shows the power of truth to make its way into minds which honorably open themselves to it, in spite of the hindrances of an imperfect text and faulty translation. It affords singular encouragement to the friends of free inquiry and liberal doctrine. And we do not know that our pages could be better occupied, than in spreading the information respecting this humble body of brethren, and asking for them the sympathy of the christian community on this side the water.

It is the design of the book before us, as stated in the first letter, to give 'a detailed account of the rise and progress of this inquiry after truth, with the manner and order in which the several doctrines of reputed orthodoxy came to be questioned by them, the arguments and trains of thought which induced them successively to reject them.' In this detail it will be impossible for us to follow the author. Those who would enter on so curious a study, must consult the publication itself. We can only give an outline.

The history begins with the preaching of the Rev. Joseph Cooke, a highly gifted minister in the Methodist connexion. No small part of its interest lies in his life and character. He became a travelling preacher at the age of nineteen or twenty, and was soon one of the most popular in the body. 'Perhaps,' says the writer, 'there never was a preacher in this country so universally admired and beloved as he was whilst in the Meth-

odist connexion. His abilities for preaching and ministerial usefulness, were not of the common kind; and he had almost always the pleasure and honor of addressing uncommonly large congregations.'

Mr Cooke's estrangement from this denomination was the first step in this remarkable history, and requires, therefore, to be distinctly related. He had observed, in the course of his travels, that the manner in which the doctrines of justification by faith, and the witness of the Spirit were taught, led to injurious consequences. He found some, 'who talked as though they thought religion consisted principally in raptures and impressions, and who made their own imaginations and feelings rather than the word of God, the criterion of religious truths; while others, because they could not attain to these raptures, were driven to dejection and despondency.' Being desirous to remedy these evils, he preached a sermon on each of the abovementioned doctrines, in which he attempted so to state them as to avoid the consequences he disapproved, but, as far as appears, without intending to contradict the teaching of Wesley on these points. These explanations, however, gave dissatisfaction, and caused his expulsion from the connexion in August, 1806. He gives some account of this affair, in the following passage.

'As several of the preachers (for reasons best known to themselves) heartily deprecated any debate in the Conference upon their system of doctrines, a committee was appointed, to converse with me on the subject. I met the committee in the evening; and there I learnt, that one point in which I was supposed to have erred, was, as to the *time*, and *evidence* of a man's justification, or, *when* a man may be said to be justified. I was supposed to have taught, that in whatever moment a sinner returns to God, according to the requisitions of the gospel, God accepts that sinner, or his wrath no longer abides upon him; or in other words, that the sinner is justified: and that, whether he has any comfortable persuasion of it in his own mind or not.—I acknowledged the truth of this supposition, and declared my present belief of what I had so taught. This was reported to the Conference the next morning, when I confirmed the truth of the report, and declared my readiness to prove what I had taught from the writings of Messrs Wesley and Fletcher. It was then moved, that if I thought myself able to do that, I ought to be heard. But this motion was over-ruled by the President observing, "I might be able perhaps to quote a few insu-

lated passages." This prevented any appeal or discussion from taking place. And nothing now remained, but to pass sentence upon me. It was however moved, that my sentence should be deferred another day, that I (not the Conference) might farther consider the subject. To this I replied, that if the Conference were resolved to condemn my sermons, I had no reason to think that another day, or week, would make any change in my opinions, and therefore desired that the matter might be brought to a conclusion. I was then desired to withdraw, while the Conference deliberated upon the subject. And on being recalled, I was informed, that "I could not be considered a member of that body, while I retained my present sentiments." '—pp. 8, 9.

This event, of course, produced no small excitement amongst those who knew and loved the expelled minister. In Rossendale, the first impressions were wholly adverse to his cause. Almost all the Methodists were dissatisfied with the doctrine which he advanced. But they could assign no reason for their dissatisfaction, as we learn from our author who was one of them, except the very common one, by which incipient inquiry is so often stifled, and the door shut in the face of truth;—'that it was new to them, and what they had not been accustomed to hear from their preachers, and therefore must be wrong.' One of them, however, undertook to converse on the subject with Mr Cooke, and was thence induced to resolve, 'that he would find out, if possible, which of the two, the Methodists or Mr C., was right.'

'For this purpose he got Mr Wesley's Sermons, the Minutes of the Conference, and the writings of Mr Fletcher. These he examined with attention, and soon found that they were inconsistent with themselves, and both agreed, and disagreed, with what Mr Cooke had taught, and for which he was expelled. This he showed to a few friends, who were all eager to know the truth respecting these things. They, therefore, joined their efforts together, in examining these writings again, on the subject in dispute. In one place they found Mr Wesley asking, "Is justifying faith a sense of pardon?" And answering, "It is denied." This they conceived agreed with Mr Cooke. In another place, "Is justifying faith a divine assurance, that Christ loved me and gave himself for me?" The answer to this is, "We believe it is." This was opposed to what Mr Cooke taught. But then it was also opposed to what Mr Wesley had said. Still perplexed

to find out on which side truth lay, but still searching for it, they were unexpectedly relieved by Mr Wesley himself, who says, "The assertion that justifying faith is a sense of pardon, is contrary to reason: it is flatly absurd. For how can a sense of our having received pardon, be the condition of our receiving it?" This inquiry carrying with it its own evidence, convinced them that Mr Cooke was right on this point at least, and that the Conference had expelled him for not teaching a doctrine which Mr Wesley deemed "flatly absurd."'—p. 11.

One of these inquirers, the author of this book, was, at that time, a local preacher among them. On publishing the result of their investigations, he and they were subjected to so much opposition and obloquy, that they withdrew from the body to which they belonged, and formed an independent society in Newchurch. Their number was small, their circumstances mean, most of them were parents of large families, and all of them, to a man, had to get their bread by hard labor; and at this particular time, not only were provisions dear, but work was difficult to be procured. They had the courage, however, to go on and build a chapel. After this was opened, their numbers increased; 'and being no longer bound by systems and creeds of men's making, they began to taste and relish the pleasures of that liberty, wherewith Christ has made us free.'

In the mean time, Mr Cooke had been settled with another congregation of seceders at Rochdale.

'The Conference being apprehensive that he might make a division there, sent after him three preachers, who had labored in Rochdale, and who were thought to be the favorites of the people there, to prevent if possible any division being made. One of these preachers, however, I conceive must have been sufficiently mortified, who, prolonging his Sermon, with the view (as his hearers thought) of preventing their hearing Mr Cooke, saw the greater part of his congregation leave him, to finish his long Sermon to the few that were left. Mr Cooke was received by his friends in Rochdale with the greatest cordiality. A large number of them left the Methodist connexion, many of them being in respectable circumstances. A subscription was immediately raised, and a large commodious chapel built, to which the name *Providence*, was given; and while this was doing he had the pleasure of addressing uncommonly large and crowded congregations. Hundreds flocking to see and hear this man, of whom re-

port said that he preached such strange things that the Methodists would have him no longer among them, and that since they had turned him out he had laid aside the Bible, and put common sense in its place. Among these there were some who had seldom attended any place of worship, and who had been champions in vice, who were now reclaimed, and are at this day pious and intelligent Unitarians.'—p. 10.

Thus, there were formed two congregations of those who adopted Mr Cooke's views of justification and the witness of the Spirit. Their departure from the regular doctrine of Methodism was but small; 'yet even this small difference was called a damnable doctrine, which would assuredly lead all who embraced it to hell.' There was as yet no perceptible approach toward Unitarianism, nor any very considerable removal from Orthodoxy. Perhaps, if these earnest inquirers had conjectured to what their free honesty would lead them; if they had had by them, some of the solemn Mentors of our time to watch over, forewarn, and alarm them; they might have closed their eyes on further light, and, like thousands of others, remained stationary all their days. But, happily, they thought only of seeking the truth; and they felt the duty and responsibility of seeking it without being deterred by dread of the result. They were thus led on, step by step, cautiously, gradually, and slowly; and only after many years of patient and toilsome investigation, did they arrive at those rich and ripe results, in which they now, with so much simplicity and strength of expression, rejoice.

These societies, having broken free from all trammels of human institutions and articles, became, as it were, associations for religious inquiry after truth. Their minds continued to be exercised on the subject of the witness of the Spirit, one of the points which had led to the schism, and they naturally connected with it the question of divine influence. Upon searching into this, they found, that, while they had always denied the Calvinistic opinion on this head, their own views had been altogether vague; 'they had been accustomed to make use of the phrase, but had formed no clear and distinct conception of its meaning. It now appeared to them, that as the *witness* of the Spirit consists in what the spirit declares, testifies, and affirms, concerning anything, so the *influence* of the Spirit (that influence which is necessary to convert a sinner from the error of his way) on the mind of a rational creature, can consistently imply no more, nor reasonably imply

less, than teaching man what he ought to do, and making known to him those inducements which are calculated to lead him to practise what he has been taught.'

In this connexion they were immediately led, in the next place, to assign a different meaning to their former favorite expressions, when they spoke of faith and repentance as the gifts of God. The arbitrary ideas which they had affixed to this language, they now perceived, as they thought, to lead to consequences scarcely less dreadful than the doctrine of reprobation; and they learned to discern that it is 'the privilege, the opportunity, the power or ability,' which is the gift of God, while the consequent act is the man's own voluntary deed. It is the power to believe and repent, which is given, not the act of faith and repentance.

Their attention was next turned to the doctrine of sanctification, as connected with Wesley's teaching on the subject of perfection. Here, too, they found themselves obliged to abandon the ground they had formerly held; and in doing this, they unavoidably entangled themselves in the deep questions respecting the origin and nature of sin. Here they were long delayed, fighting manfully for their old dogma of original sin, and long resolved not to relinquish it, although they felt that the conclusions at which they had just arrived respecting sanctification, 'struck directly at its root.' But they had considered it one of 'the fundamentals of Christianity;' and 'would not have relinquished it, had it not been on account of the insuperable difficulties and irreconcilable contradictions in which it involved them.' Of the process of thought and inquiry by which they were led to abandon it, we have not room for even a sketch. It occupies seventeen pages of the letters before us.

If they gave up this doctrine with reluctance, they seem to have clung with still more tenacious obstinacy to the popular doctrine of the atonement, to the examination of which they were next led.

'Till within two or three years of this time, we had been connected with a body of Christians, whose manner of teaching the doctrine of the Atonement differs very little from that in which the followers of John Calvin teach it; except that they possess the liberal-heartedness of saying, that Jesus Christ suffered in the room and stead of *all*, while the followers of Calvin say that he did this only for *a part*. Amongst these Christians, we had been accustomed to hear language like the following; namely,

"that Jesus Christ suffered in the room and stead of all sinners—that he suffered the punishment due to sinners—that by thus suffering he fulfilled the law for sinners, and made a satisfaction to injured justice for them—that he alone has paid the debt we to the Father owed—that he has reconciled God to the world." And you may now see language in print, equivalent to what I have often heard less elegantly expressed in the pulpit, that Jesus Christ "comprised, in his own personal life and death, those sufferings which it would otherwise have taken the millions of the human race an eternity to endure." Though we had now some doubts respecting the truth of the popular doctrine of atonement, yet we were very desirous of finding the above expressions, by which it is generally described, in the scriptures. For this purpose, we searched both the Old and New Testaments. But it is impossible to give you an idea of the painful disappointment we experienced, when, after the most careful perusal, we could find *no such* language there. And here my feelings induce me to say, that I cannot help thinking it a most unreasonable thing, that we should be looked upon by our christian neighbours, as though we had been guilty of some capital crime against religion, merely because we have not been able to discover in the scriptures what is not there to be found. Most dreadfully were we afraid of getting wrong, or of being called heretics; and we did all in our power, as honest men, to prevent it. But what am I saying? Why, my real meaning is, we did all in our power, as honest men, to prevent ourselves from getting at truth. We were dreadfully afraid of this, because we knew that we should be looked upon by our christian neighbours, as though we had been guilty of some capital offence against religion, and that they would call us heretics. There is an old adage amongst us, which says, that "custom makes things more easy;" and it is a very true one. We have now been so long accustomed to odious names, that the dread of them is worn off from our minds; nor shall we wonder if, in a few years, they become as fashionable, and then as respectable, as that of Orthodoxy.'—pp. 36, 37.

The reasons, adds our author, which at first induced them to doubt the truth of this doctrine, arose from the difficulties that lay in the way of proving it. These difficulties they found it impossible to remove, and were therefore obliged to surrender the doctrine.

Thus had they proceeded for three years in searching the scriptures and investigating christian truth. And the result of their slow and cautious and laborious movement, had been a change of opinion respecting the evidences of the christian

character, the origin of faith and repentance, divine influences, original sin, and the atonement. Step by step, they had advanced thus far, and as yet had neither questioned nor suspected the doctrine of the trinity. That great and fundamental dogma remained as yet a sacred and unquestioned verity in their minds. But their investigation into the popular notions respecting the atonement, leading them, as it did, to inquire into the connexion between the Father and the Son, to define their offices and mutual relations, and adjust their several claims, unavoidably opened their eyes to the difficulties by which the common opinion is encumbered, and suggested queries and doubts. Just at this point of their progress, Mr Cooke died, and they felt severely the want of his clear and sagacious mind in aiding their further inquiries. 'They regretted that they had not talked with him particularly about it;' but in accordance with his counsel and example they went on, appealing to the Bible, and comparing scripture with scripture, until they were satisfied that that holy book knows nothing of a trinity in unity, but declares in the most decided terms the strict oneness of the Divine Being. Here the work of their doctrinal reform seems to have been completed; and for about twenty years they have rested in it, rejoicing in the light to which they had been led, and dwelling together in peace and edification; sharing, of course, in the universal obloquy and unsparing denunciation with which the other sects combine to visit this unfortunate heresy, but consoled by the testimony of their consciences, and happy in the enjoyment of a heavenly hope.

Such is the history of not a small body of believers, men in the humble walks of life, and without the advantages of education, who, with no book but the English translation of the Bible, studied their way, step by step, to the Unitarian faith; and not only so, but held that faith firmly at a time when they supposed themselves to be its only recipients in the world, and knew not that there existed such a body as that of the Unitarians. To our view, there is in this simple fact an affecting and delightful testimony to the scriptural truth of the system. These sincere and single-hearted seekers found it, in spite of the hindrances of education and habit, in spite of the darkness thrown upon the sacred volume by a corrupted text and an imperfect version, in spite of the outcries and opposition of denunciatory sects, and the lamentations and enmity of former friends. Everything against them but God and truth, they sought, and

found. Their story is a memorable and glorious encouragement to the simple minded and true hearted everywhere. Their success makes us ashamed of our hesitancy and weakness of faith, in the trials and oppositions to which the good cause is exposed. We blush for ourselves, that we can ever for a moment doubt or despond. We blush for our brethren, that there is amongst them no more enterprise, trust, and devotion. We look at these devoted, persevering men, scattered in the humbler and darker regions of life; we see what they ventured to do, and how signally God rewarded them; and when we turn back to ourselves, we are constrained to cry out, in words that have been used elsewhere—'Shame on our sloth! Shame on our unbelief!'

We should do wrong to close this part of our subject in any other language than that which Mr Ashton himself uses, in concluding his last letter. Nothing can be more to the purpose, or better said.

'Thus, Sir, I have endeavoured to give you an account of the rise and progress of our inquiry after truth; with the manner and order in which the doctrines of reputed Orthodoxy came to be questioned by us, and the arguments and trains of thought which induced us successively to reject them. In doing this, we have been repeatedly accused of throwing away the Bible, and of having gotten a new Bible. But the real fact is, it was from the Bible, but particularly from the common version of the New Testament, that we learned what we now believe. Such was our ignorance of men and books, that taught what we now believe, that at the time we were relinquishing the doctrines of reputed Orthodoxy, we supposed ourselves to be the only people in the world who believed in this way; and, like Ishmael in this respect, to have our hand against every man, and every man's hand against us. The painful sensations which we felt on this account are indescribable, and at times made us wish that we could see as our christian neighbours did. But the plain simple scriptural truths which we had embraced were powerful; and we durst not, even to avoid persecution, ignominy, and pain, deny what appeared to us to be God's truth, and violate our consciences; and whatever men may think or say of us, we could appeal to God the searcher of hearts, that in these things we had been acting to the best of our judgment; and it was no small consolation to us that we had the testimony of a good conscience. Besides, in these days of persecution and distress, we met often one with another, and made known our requests to God by prayer

and supplication with thanksgiving; and the peace of God passing understanding kept our hearts and minds through Christ Jesus.

'But very soon after this, we heard of many churches where the same doctrines were taught which we had embraced; but like us, they were everywhere spoken against. With some of the members of these churches we soon became acquainted. At this time, in consequence of our ministers being invited to preach a few times at Elland, they had the happiness of becoming personally acquainted with you, by whom our condition was made known to the Unitarian public; who have given us a convincing and an affectionate proof of their regard towards us, by charitably contributing to the liquidation of more than three-fourths of the debt upon our chapel; and to them and to you do we feel unfeignedly thankful for the favors already bestowed upon us.'—pp. 68, 69.

We have already said, that no small part of the interest of this pamphlet is derived from the personal history of Mr Cooke. He led the way in reform, and during his brief ministry was indefatigable in his labors to extend a cause which he illustrated by a bright example in life and in death.

'In the autumn of 1809, Mr Cooke was seized with that affliction which in March, 1811, terminated his useful life. It is probable, that his illness was partly, if not wholly, occasioned by excessive labor and fatigue. While his health permitted, he preached two or three times every Sunday; and generally three or four times between Sunday and Sunday. Every fourth Sunday he came to our chapel, at Newchurch: the Monday and Tuesday following, he preached at Padiham and Burnley; which places are from fifteen to eighteen miles distant from Rochdale; beside occasionally visiting other places; for instance, Todmorden, where, in 1815, a party left the Methodists, having embraced the doctrines for which Mr Cooke was expelled; and Haslingden, where some have since become Unitarians. He had to encounter a host of opposition; particularly from the body with which he had formerly been united. This, together with thinking, preaching, writing, and travelling, overpowered his slender constitution; a consumption, attended with spitting of blood, obliged him to give up (except occasionally) the public duties of the ministry; and about eighteen months after, that life, which had been spent in doing good, was closed. Mr Cooke died March 14th, 1811. Mr Cooke left behind him, to deplore his loss, a wife and five young children, and more than a thousand people,

who looked up to him as their pastor; of whom it might most truly be said, "See, how they loved him!"'—pp. 49, 50.

An appendix contains an account of his patience, cheerfulness, and edifying deportment during his last illness, and an extract from the discourse delivered at his funeral. We take a passage from the latter, which, considering the source from which it comes, our readers will think to be striking.

'But Mr Cooke was a man that did not seek for ease. He thought for and preached to the same people five or six times in the week at the least, and his last sermon was always thought by his audience to be better, and to edify more, than that which preceded it. He had the care of erecting a house and a large place of worship—the labor of walking two or three miles into the country, three or four nights in a week—the fatigue of travelling to the distance of twenty miles from home once a month, and preaching at several places in the way—the care of all the societies—the pain of anything that was disorderly among them, besides the mighty opposition he met with from the body from which he had been expelled; so that he had not only to relinquish a plenteous and sure provision, and comparative ease, in order to maintain a good conscience; but in consequence thereof he had to encounter hardship, grief, and pain. When we read of St Paul counting all things loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus his Lord, and in opposition to all the learning, power, and malice of Jews and Gentiles, preaching the Gospel from Jerusalem round about to Illyricum, regardless of pleasure or pain, ease or hardship, praise or censure, we see a brave and great man. When we read of two thousand men choosing to be expelled from a church where they were with their families well provided for, suffering all the hardship of persecution and the most extreme and pinching poverty, rather than violate their consciences by assenting to an act of uniformity; we see two thousand great men, such as England never saw at once, either before or since that time. And when I see a man with a wife and four small children, for whom he had the most tender affection as a husband and father, expelled from a body which he dearly loved, and where he and his family were well provided for, abandoned to uncertainty, enduring hardship, encountering a flood of opposition, and preferring to relinquish and encounter all this, rather than give up truth and violate his conscience, I see a great man; which fully justifies me in saying, "Know ye not that a prince and a great man is fallen this day in Israel."

'Thus we have seen that the man whose loss we deplore, was great because he was good; because he used his abilities in

plucking sinners as brands from the burning, and because he preferred truth and a good conscience to every other consideration. And the exertions he made in spreading and vindicating truth, with the pain that he met with in so doing, no doubt laid the foundation of that complaint which terminated his life. Many who had very much decried what he had taught, supposed (because no doubt they wished it) that sickness and the prospect of death would shake that firmness which he had manifested while in health towards the doctrines for which he was expelled. But death, terrible as it may appear to some, was so far from moving him, that having heard the sermons read which contained those doctrines, he most heartily approved of them; and the more he examined the nature of the motives which induced him to publish them, the more he was convinced of their purity, and he possessed the greatest satisfaction of mind at the result thereof. In this happy belief he breathed his soul into the hands of that God he had thus conscientiously served.'—pp. 72, 73.

There are two things further, which we have noted in reading this pamphlet, so strikingly similar to what has been sometimes witnessed amongst ourselves, that we must be permitted briefly to state them. The first relates to the manner in which his opponents were pleased to speak of Mr Cooke's opinions.

'Two or three years before he died, it was said of him, that he had laid aside the Bible, and put common sense in its place; merely because he explained the Bible agreeably to the common sense of mankind; and to prove that he was wrong, he was called a Socinian. Since his death, we have often been told, that he was no Socinian; and that he was far from believing what we teach on the Atonement, Original Sin, and the Trinity.'—p. 51.

The other relates to an arrangement for exchanging pulpits. The two congregations at Rochdale and Newchurch, had grown up together at the same time, under similar circumstances, and a very intimate union naturally existed between them. Mr Cooke regularly exchanged with the minister at Newchurch every fourth Sunday; and on supplying the vacancy after his death, in doing which both societies had a voice, it was made an express condition of Mr Bowman's settlement, that the exchange should be continued; and 'Mr Bowman expressed his hearty desire that there should be an exchange.' All seemed to promise harmony and satisfaction. But by and by 'his strain of preaching began to alter;' dissatisfaction arose in consequence; people were 'astonished that the man

should act so directly contrary to his professions;' and the result at length was the dissolution of the former happy connexion between the two societies, and the division of the Rochdale congregation into two parts. We could almost believe, in reading this, that we were reading the account of some reputable transactions nearer home. The sequel, also, may find its counterpart in our own land. One of the trustees, it seems, had objected to the exchange, and no doubt encouraged and urged Mr Bowman to the measures which produced alienation and schism. Such busybodies there sometimes are in a society, who will have everything their own way. But observe the result.

'But what perhaps will surprise you as much as it surprised us, was, that the same trustee who opposed the exchange, and who professed so heartily to approve of Mr Bowman and what he taught, immediately turned his artillery against poor Mr Bowman; and calling in once more the assistance of his allies, in less than three months after his first victory, drove poor Mr Bowman back again to Ipswich.'—p. 55.

ART. V.—*The Life of Mohammed; Founder of the Religion of Islam, and of the Empire of the Saracens.* By the Rev. GEORGE BUSH, A. M. New-York: J. & J. Harper, 1830. 18mo. pp. 261.

ENGLISH literature has been remarkably deficient, until lately, in popular and well written accounts of Islamism and its founder. Dr Prideaux is a learned and honest writer on these subjects, but heavy, and full of prejudice. Sale's Koran, with the notes and preliminary discourse, contains much valuable information, collected and expressed with candor and a truly philosophical spirit; but it is a work for scholars, and not for general reading. The same remark is also applicable to the translation of Reland, and in some degree to that of Savary. Gibbon's learned and eloquent chapters on the character, policy, and brilliant fortunes of Mohammed and the early Ca-

liphs, have been much read and admired. Many are offended, however, and justly, at the sly insinuations against Christianity, in which they abound; and besides, as Mr Hallam observes, Gibbon, in this part of his work, has not sufficiently apprised the reader of the crumbling foundation, on which not a little of his splendid narrative depends. Dr White's Bampton Lecture Sermons, though the child of many fathers, and exhibiting, in its whole history, the most remarkable instance on record of literary fraud and mystification, is, after all, as it seems to us, a peculiarly unsatisfactory work, and in no respect worthy of the reputation of either of the three distinguished scholars concerned in its composition. The History of Mohammedanism, by Charles Mills, the first edition of which appeared in 1817, is decidedly the most valuable of that writer's publications, and still continues to be one of the best popular works in the language on the character and pretensions of the Arabian reformer, and on the morals, religion, and laws of the Moslem nations.

The recent wars and other changes in the East, have drawn the attention of Christians to these subjects, and awakened a degree of curiosity respecting them, which has not been felt since the Moors were driven out of Spain. As a consequence of this, and to gratify the tastes thus excited, a multitude of books of travels, and other works, have appeared in England in rapid succession during the last few years, many of which have not been republished, and some of them are hardly known, in this country. We may mention particularly Mr Forster's Mohammedanism Unveiled, whose object it is, in two octavo volumes, to prove from reason and scripture, that Mohammed was a special agent of the Almighty, a kind of spurious Messiah to the posterity of the spurious Ishmael, as Jesus Christ was a legitimate Messiah to the posterity of the legitimate Isaac; and that the origin, propagation, and permanence of Islamism are no more resolvable into natural causes, than the origin, propagation, and permanence of Christianity.

'From Abraham,' says he, 'by his sons, Isaac and Ishmael, went forth a twofold progeny, and a twofold promise. In each progeny the promise of Jehovah has, in point of fact, had a double accomplishment. A temporal and a spiritual Isaac, the legitimate heir, through Judaism and Christianity, has given laws and religion to a great portion of the inhabited world. Ishmael, the illegitimate seed, through the primitive Arabians, and the

variously incorporated Moslems, has given laws and religion to a still larger portion of mankind. Isaac new modelled the faith and morals of men; first, through his literal descendants, the Jews, and secondly, through his spiritual descendants, the Christians. Ishmael effected a corresponding revolution in the world; first, through his literal descendants, the Arabs, secondly, through his spiritual descendants, the Turks and Tartars. In the case of Isaac, the change was wrought by the advent of Jesus Christ; a person, uniting in himself, by divine appointment, the offices of prophet and apostle, of priest, lawgiver, and king; and whose character and claims are equally unprecedented. In that of Ishmael the change was effected by the appearance of Mohammed; a person professing to unite in himself the same offices as by divine appointment, and presenting in this union the only known parallel to Jesus Christ, and his typical forerunners, in the annals of the world.'*

Another work of a very different character has just appeared; 'An Apology for the Life and Character of the celebrated Prophet of Arabia, called Mohammed, or the Illustrious: By Godfrey Higgins, Esq.' This gentleman, instead of acknowledging two Messiahs, like Mr Forster, will not allow that we have had one. He admits that Jesus Christ was almost equal to Mohammed, that Christianity is not much inferior to Islamism, and that Unitarian Christians are about as good as Unitarian Mussulmans. To defend his illustrious prophet against the charge of imposture for representing himself as sent of God, he maintains that he may innocently have assumed this character, thinking himself called by Providence, in so corrupt and degraded a state of society, to bring about a reformation. One would suppose that he looks back with unaffected sorrow on the issue of the most eventful battle ever fought on this earth;—when the forces of Christendom, under Charles Martel, met in the heart of France, and rolled back and scattered the Saracen host, which had already swept over some of the fairest portions of Europe, and, but for that signal overthrow, were almost sure, in a little time, to plant the standard of the prophet on the walls of every city in the western world. 'A philosopher,' he says, 'may, perhaps, be tempted to heave a sigh of regret for the beautiful, plain, intelligible and unadorned simplicity of the Mohammedan profession of faith, Believe in one God, and Mohammed, the apostle of God.' Mr Higgins,

* Mohammedanism Unveiled, Vol. I. pp. 71, 72.

we hardly need add, affects, like many others, Gibbon's infidelity, without his genius and learning to adorn it, or his ingenuity and sense of decency to disguise it.

The work, the title of which stands at the head of this article, is chiefly remarkable as being the first on the subject from an American pen. It lays claim to no higher character than that of a compilation from approved authorities, most of them English and modern, and is deficient throughout in the indications of a sound philosophy, and just principles of criticism. The narrative, however, is conducted with considerable skill, and in a pleasing style, and for the most part, in a good spirit; and for these and other reasons, it is likely to be generally circulated and read in this country. The author says, in his preface ;—

'In one respect he may venture to assure the reader he will find the plan of the ensuing pages an improvement upon preceding Memoirs; and that is, in the careful collation of the chapters of the Koran with the events of the narrative. He will probably find the history illustrated to an unexpected extent from this source—a circumstance, which, while it serves greatly to *authenticate* the facts related, imparts a zest also to the tenor of the narrative scarcely to be expected from the nature of the theme.'—*Preface*, p. 6.

Our limits will oblige us to confine our selections and remarks to some views of Mohammed's personal character, and pretended revelations, which are still involved in doubt and obscurity.

The question is often stated, whether, in the judgment of sober and impartial history, he is to be condemned as guilty of fanaticism, or imposture, or both.

'On the one hand,' says Mr Bush, 'it is supposed by some, that Mohammed was constitutionally addicted to religious contemplation—that his native temperament was strongly tinged with enthusiasm—and that he might originally have been free from any sinister motive in giving scope to the innate propensities of his character. As the result of his retired speculations he might, moreover, it is said, have been sincerely persuaded in his own mind of the grand article of his faith, the unity of God, which in his opinion was violated by all the rest of the world; and, therefore, might have deemed it a meritorious work to endeavour to liberate his countrymen and his race from the bondage of error. Impelled by this motive in the outset, and being

aided by a warm imagination, he might at length have come, it is affirmed, as enthusiasts have often done, to the firm conviction, that he was destined by Providence to be the instrument of a great and glorious reformation; and the circumstance of his being accustomed to solitary retirement would naturally cause this persuasion to take a deeper root in his mind. In this manner, it is supposed, his career might have commenced; but finding himself to have succeeded beyond his expectations, and the force of temptation growing with the increase of his popularity and power, his self-love at last overpowered his honesty, ambition took the place of devotion, his designs expanded with his success, and he who had entered upon a pious enterprise as a well-meaning reformer, degenerated in the end into a wilful impostor, a gross debauchee, and an unprincipled despot.

'On the other hand, it is maintained, and we think with more of an air of probability, that his conduct from the very first bears the marks of a deep-laid and systematic design; that although he might not have anticipated all the results which crowned the undertaking, yet in every step of his progress he acted with a shrewdness and circumspection very little savoring of the dreams of enthusiasm; that the pretended visits of an angel, and his publishing, from time to time, the chapters of the Koran, as a divine revelation, are wholly inconsistent with the idea of his being merely a deluded fanatic; and that, at any rate, the discovery of his inability to work a miracle, the grand voucher of a divine messenger, must have been sufficient to dispel the fond illusion from his mind.'—pp. 46, 47.

Now we believe that the very fact here relied on as proving Mohammed an impostor,—his not pretending to be able to work miracles, proves the contrary. He could not, of course, work real miracles; but what was there, if we reject the supposition of sincerity, to prevent him from attempting to counterfeit miracles? He appears in every step of his progress, as a reformer and the founder of a new religion, to have been the dupe of his own delusions, to the extent, at least, of believing that he was really a prophet. 'Men,' says Shaftesbury, 'are wonderfully happy in a faculty of deceiving themselves, whenever they set heartily about it; and a very small foundation of any passion will serve us, not only to act it well, but even to work ourselves into it beyond our own reach.' It betrays a singular ignorance of human nature not to know that a sincere fanaticism is compatible with consummate artifice and address in the acomplishment of its leading designs. Even the dissoluteness

of Mohammed toward the close of life, admitting it to have been as great as is pretended, proves nothing; for what is more natural or common, than that one who feels himself exalted above ordinary humanity, should also feel himself exempted from its ordinary restraints and obligations? Power corrupted Mohammed, it is true, as it did Cromwell, and as it has done a thousand other fanatics; but it is a mistake to suppose that in doing this, it always, or often, has the effect to sink the fanatic in the impostor. He is a fanatic still. There is no point in morals which so much needs a distinct inculcation as this,—that a religious fanatic may continue sincere in his high pretensions, and yet, with a conscience that has become the dupe of his self-delusions, scruple not to commit the foulest crimes. Ambition and sensuality, in particular, can hardly expect to address themselves with so much success to the wily and cautious impostor, as to the sincere fanatic, who, with a temperament naturally sanguine, and already excited by other causes, has given up the reins of his passions to a diseased and perverted imagination.

The following account is given in the work before us of Mohammed's fundamental doctrines.

'He announced to them that he was commissioned by the Almighty to be his prophet on the earth; to assert the unity of the Divine Being; to denounce the worship of images; to recall the people to the true and only religion; to bear the tidings of paradise to the believing; and to threaten the deaf and unbelieving with the terrible vengeance of the Lord. His main doctrine, and that which constitutes the distinguishing character of the Koran, is, that there is but one God; that he only is to be worshipped; and that all idolatry is a foul abomination, to be utterly abolished. The 112th ch. of the Koran, entitled "The declaration of God's Unity," is held in the most profound veneration by the Mohammedans, and declared, by a tradition of the prophet, to be equal in value to a third part of the whole Koran. It is said to have been revealed in answer to the Koreish, who inquired of the apostle concerning the distinguishing attributes of the God whom he invited them to worship. It consists of a single sentence. "In the name of the most merciful God. Say, God is one God; the eternal God; he begetteth not, neither is he begotten: and there is not any one like unto him." In the incessant repetition of this doctrine in the pages of the Koran, the author is aiming not only at the grosser errors of polytheism

and idolatry, then common among the Eastern nations, but is levelling a blow also at the fundamental tenet of Christianity, that Jesus Christ is the son of God, "the only begotten of the Father."'—pp. 57, 58.

'"Verily, Christ Jesus, the son of Mary, is the apostle of God, and his word, which he conveyed into Mary, and a spirit proceeding from him. Believe, therefore, in God and his apostles, and say not there are three Gods; forbear this; it will be better for you. God is but one God. Far be it from him that he should have a son! Unto him belongeth whatsoever is in heaven and on earth; and he is sufficient unto himself." "They are certainly infidels who say, Verily, God is Christ the son of Mary. Whoever shall give a companion unto God, God shall exclude him from paradise, and his habitation shall be hell-fire. They are certainly infidels who say God is the third of three: for there is no God besides one God. Christ, the son of Mary, is no more than an apostle; and his mother was a woman of veracity: they both ate food." "There is no God but he: the curse be on those whom they associate with him in his worship."

'With this fundamental article of the Moslem creed, Mohammed connected that of his being, since Moses and Jesus, the only true prophet of God. "We gave unto the children of Israel the book of the law, and wisdom, and prophecy; and we fed them with good things, and preferred them above all nations: and we gave them plain ordinances concerning the business of religion. Afterward we appointed thee, O Mohammed, to promulgate a law concerning the business of religion: wherefore follow the same, and follow not the desires of those who are ignorant." The object of his mission, he affirmed, was not so much to deliver to the world an entirely new scheme of religion, as to restore and replant the only true and ancient faith professed by the patriarchs and prophets, from Adam down to Christ. "Thus have we revealed unto thee an Arabic Koran, that thou mayest warn the metropolis of Mecca, and the Arabs who dwell round about it. He hath ordained you the religion which he commanded Noah, and which we have revealed unto thee, O Mohammed, and which we commanded Abraham, and Moses, and Jesus; saying, observe this religion, and be not divided therein. Wherefore, invite them to receive the sure faith, and be urgent with them as thou hast been commanded." This revival and re-establishment of the ancient faith, he taught, was to be effected by purging it of the idolatrous notions of the Arabs, and of the corruptions of the Jews and Christians. For while he admits the fact that the books of the Old and New Testaments were originally written by inspiration, he at the same time

maintains, that they have been since so shamefully corrupted by their respective disciples, that the present copies of both are utterly unworthy of credit; and therefore he seldom quotes them in the Koran according to the received text.'—pp. 59–61.

We must not infer from these passages, as some have done, that Mohammed borrowed his religious notions, in the first instance, from the Jews or Christians. They are derived, for the most part, as Michaelis observes,* from a sect of Arabian philosophers—Naturalists we should term them—who believed but in one only God, and a future life of retribution. The Arabs called them Hanifin, that is, the Profane, because they disowned the gods of the country; just as among heathens the Christians were often called atheists, for the same reason. It is an error, therefore, in Mede, Jortin, and other respectable authorities, to represent Mohammedanism as being, in its origin, a christian heresy, or the fruit of one. The prophet, in the beginning, does not appear to have looked beyond reclaiming his idolatrous countrymen to the doctrines of natural religion. It was an after-thought which led him to engraft his system on preceding revelations, and represent himself as the last in a long succession of inspired lawgivers. His ambition arose with his power; his views of reform extended with those of conquest and empire; and he found, moreover, in the corruptions of the christian church, as he proceeded, almost as much to offend his better conceptions of the unity and spirituality of God, as in the superstitions of the pagans. The worship of relics and images was almost universal; the throne of the Almighty, in the words of Gibbon, was darkened by a cloud of martyrs, and saints, and angels; the virgin Mary was a goddess, and the trinity, as it was then taught, a gross and palpable tritheism.

In this state of things, it has been thought, and not without reason, that Mohammed owed all his merit, and much of his success, as a religious reformer, to the clear and decided testimony which he bore to the divine unity. Many among the Catholics must have been sensible, that, in the corruptions just named, the church was fast relapsing into a semblance of paganism. Such an impression was likely to be felt in the East more generally than anywhere else, because there monotheism, under different forms, had been deeply rooted in the best

* Laws of Moses, Vol. III. p. 129.

minds from the remotest antiquity. On this subject we will give the thoughts of an able but somewhat fanciful writer in the Monthly Review.

'The hereditary monotheism of the Hebrews followed them everywhere; and if they occasionally neglected the minor ceremonial of the law, they adhered obstinately to circumcision and to an iconoclastic hatred of images; they tolerated polygamy in the higher classes of society, and became so numerous in several provinces of the Persian empire, especially in Syria, that in many places, the monotheists were strong enough to shake off their allegiance to the idolatrous Babylonian sovereign, and to found independent states. Aretas, king of Damascus, and Abgar, king of Edessa, were separatists of this description; and Josephus notices a kind of league, which included many others. These petty princes adhered to the Hilldian party of the Jewish priesthood, and were glad to see the influence of the temple exerted to banish troublesome ceremonial observances; in common with the Hilldian Jews they acknowledged Jesus Christ as a prophet, but as nothing more, and so at a later period, but in the same spirit, did Zenobia, queen of Palmyra, who appointed Paul of Samosata, for her bishop.

'When the church of Rome made its great innovations in Christianity, by introducing the worship of images, the oriental Jew-Christians became indignant, and desirous of standing aloof from such idolatrous profanation. Mohammed saw this, and took up the oriental Christianity, exactly where he found it, with strict monotheism for its theology, with circumcision for its initiatory rite, with polygamy for a tolerated practice, with a high veneration for the Jewish scriptures, and with the opinion that Jesus Christ was a human sage, and a prophet of the truth.—Thus Mohammed met the traditional creed of all those nations which were descended from the subjects of the vast Parthian or Hebrew empire, and he was secure of the secret alliance of the monotheists everywhere while he permitted to his followers the plunder only of the idolaters and Latinized Christians. The custody of the sacred well, which was an hereditary right of the family of Mohammed, might aid him in dictating religious professions to the Arabians, but these his first followers had little of the spirit of piety, and, like the Pindaries of our own time, were a predatory cavalry, accustomed

to subsist by overrunning the seats of industry, and equally contented with any interior ally that could supply a pretext for irruption, and purchase the irremovable booty. If these Arabian freebooters were the original proclaimers of the religion of Mohammed, still there was little of conversion and little of faith among the Arabs; the popular, the settled, the enduring basis of his sect, is to be sought in the Jew-Christians or Hebrews, properly so called.' *

Though we do not concur in all these speculations, we think there is good evidence for believing that Mohammed appealed to Unitarian Christians, who confirmed some of his representations of our Saviour's doctrine, and were won over to his measures, in part at least, by their abhorrence of the unscriptural and idolatrous worship, which had found its way into the church. The following is given in Hale's New Analysis of Chronology,† as part of a correspondence between the prophet and the king of Abyssinia, a Christian.

'"In the name of God, gracious and merciful:

'"Mohammed, Apostle of God, to Naiashi Ashama, Emperor of Abyssinia, Health.

'"Glory be to God, the only God, holy, pacific, faithful, and the Protector.

'"I testify, that Jesus, the son of Mary, is the spirit of God, and his oracle; which God caused to descend into Mary, the blessed and immaculate Virgin, and she conceived. He created Jesus of his spirit, and animated him by his breath, as he animated Adam.

'"I call thee, on my part, to the worship of the only God; of God who has no equal, and who commands the powers of heaven and earth. Trust in my mission, follow me, be in the number of my disciples. I am the Apostle of God.

'"I have sent into thy states my cousin Jafar, with some mussulmans. Take them under thy protection, and prevent their wants. Lay aside the pride of a throne. I invite thee and thy legions to embrace the worship of the Supreme Being. My ministry is discharged. I have exhorted thee. Heaven grant that my councils may be salutary. Peace be with him who marches by the torch of the true faith."

'The king of Abyssinia having received this letter, applied it to his eyes, descended from the throne, seated himself upon the

* Monthly Review, Vol. XCI. p. 201. † Vol. III. pp. 320, 321.

ground, pronounced the profession of mussulman faith, and answered in this manner:

'"In the name of God, gracious and merciful.

'"To Mohammed, Apostle of God, Elnaiashi Ahama, Health.

'"Peace be with thee, Apostle of God! May he cover thee with his mercy, may he load thee with his blessings! There is no God, but he who led me to Islamism. O Prophet, I have read the letter which thou hast sent me. What thou sayest of Jesus is the true belief. He himself added no more. I thereto call to witness the Sovereign of heaven and earth."'

Mr Bush, after quoting a passage from the Koran, in which God is represented as saying, '*We* have cursed them,' observes in a note;—

'The reader will notice that notwithstanding Mohammed's strenuous assertion of God's absolute unity, and his execrations of those who ascribe to him "associates," yet when he introduces him speaking in the Koran it is usually in the plural number.'—p. 61.

Whether this was intended as a concession, or not, we are unable to say; but we choose to regard it in that light. It exposes in the happiest manner, as Rammohun Roy and others have said, the futility of attempts to deduce an argument for the trinity from the circumstance, that God is sometimes represented in the Old Testament as speaking in the same way. If this mode of expression had not been regarded merely as the regal style, and familiar as such particularly to the Orientals, and therefore perfectly consistent with the strict unity of the Supreme Being, we may be sure that it would never have been employed by Mohammed, or the compilers of the Koran. If these men had had the remotest suspicion that in after times a race of critics would arise, so ignorant of the philosophy of language as to adduce expressions of this nature in support of the trinity—a doctrine the peculiar object of Moslem aversion—we may be sure that they would either have avoided such expressions altogether, or explicitly protested against such a perversion of their true meaning.

A fact is also mentioned in this connexion by Mr Forster, and frequently insisted on for another purpose, which should lessen our surprise at the introduction of Trinitarianism into the christian church.

'The Trinitarian doctrine,' says he, '(however confusedly expressed and imperfectly understood) very curiously reappears in the shape of a Mohammedan heresy, in the philosophical school of the Hâyetians, or followers of the Molazalite doctor Ahmed Ebn Hâyet. The circumstance is highly intereresting and important, as an index to the tendency of Mohammedanism toward Catholic Christianity; thus manifested in the early reaching forth of Mohammedan speculation to grasp the fundamental mystery of Catholic truth.' *

If there are Trinitarian Mussulmans, we certainly cannot wonder that there should be Trinitarian Christians; for though the Bible is as truly and entirely Unitarian as the Koran, it will not be pretended that it is more so. The truth is, however, that the doctrine of the trinity, whether among Mussulmans or Christians, had the same origin. It did not originate in the Koran, or the Bible; but in pagan superstitions, in a strange propensity in mankind to multiply the objects of their worship, united, in the case of the philosophers, with Gnostic or Platonic notions of the Divinity. These causes were sufficient so far to blind the Moslem doctors, as to make them think that the deity of Jesus Christ was taught or recognised in a book manifestly and expressly written to refute the doctrine. Can we wonder, therefore, that, in the same or a similar state of society, the same or similar causes had the effect to blind and mislead Christians in the same way? As we know that the causes just named were sufficient to introduce the error of the trinity, or something like it, into Islamism, contrary to the obvious and express teaching of the Koran, we find no difficulty in accounting in the same way for the introduction of the same error into Christianity, contrary to the obvious and express teaching of the Bible.

The following is the account which Mr Bush gives of the origin of the Koran itself.

'The original or archetype of the Koran, Mohammed taught, was laid up from everlasting in the archives of heaven, being written on what he termed the *preserved table*, near to the throne of God, from which the series of chapters communicated by Gabriel were a transcript. This pretended gradual mode of revelation was certainly a master-stroke of policy in the impostor. "The unbelievers say, unless the Koran be sent down to him entire at once, we will not believe. But in this manner have we revealed it, that we might confirm thy heart thereby, and we

* Mohammedanism Unveiled, Vol. I. p. 386.

have dictated it gradually by distinct parcels." Had the whole volume been published at once, so that a rigid examination could have been instituted into its contents as a whole, and the different parts brought into comparison with each other, glaring inconsistencies would have been easily detected, and objections urged which he would probably have found it impossible to answer. But by pretending to receive his oracles in separate portions, at different times, according as his own exigences or those of his followers required, he had a ready way of silencing all cavils, and extricating himself with credit from every difficulty, as nothing forbade the message or mandate of to-day being modified or abrogated by that of to-morrow. In this manner, twenty-three years elapsed before the whole chain of revelations was completed, though the prophet informed his disciples that he had the consolation of seeing the entire Koran, bound in silk and adorned with gold and gems of Paradise, once a year, till, in the last year of his life, he was favored with the vision twice. A part of these spurious oracles were published at Mecca before his flight, the remainder at Medina after it. The particular mode of publication is said to have been this: When a new chapter had been communicated to the prophet, and was about to be promulgated for the benefit of the world, he first dictated it to his secretary, and then delivered the written paper to his followers, to be read and repeated till it had become firmly imprinted upon their memories, when the paper was again returned to the prophet, who carefully deposited it in a chest, called by him "the chest of his apostleship." The hint of this sacred coffer was doubtless taken from the Ark of the Covenant, the holy chest of the Jewish tabernacle, in which the authentic copy of the law was laid up and preserved. This chest Mohammed left at his death in the care of one of his wives; and from its contents the volume of the Koran was afterwards compiled. The first collection and arrangement of these prophetic relics, more precious than the scattered leaves of all the Sybils, was made by Abubeker, but the whole was afterward revised and new-modeled by Othman, who left the entire volume of the Koran in the order in which we now have it.'—pp. 62–64.

The writer appears to regard our present Koran as being substantially the same, even in its order, arrangement and dates, with that given by Mohammed himself, and is therefore continually referring to it as a valuable contemporary authority. In this opinion he is not sustained by the best writers on the subject, who agree more generally in the account given by Mr Mills.

'Whenever enthusiasm suggested, or passion and policy required it, a portion of the divine commands was proclaimed by the preacher to his auditory of fanatics, and registered by them in their memories, or inscribed on the more durable materials of the leaves of the palm-tree, and the skins of animals. A copy of these fragments was entrusted to the charge of one of his most favored wives; and although Abubeker, the first Caliph, methodized them into a volume, yet in the course of a few years, so many errors had crept into the sacred text, that Othman, the third Caliph, called in the different manuscripts, and assured the faithful, he would rectify them from the original. But so manifold were the various readings of these copies, that, as the least difficult task, the successor of the prophet destroyed the volumes themselves, and published a new Koran, which is the same that we now read.' *

Mosheim has still another theory.

'The book which the Mohammedans call the Koran, or Alcoran, is composed of several papers and discourses of Mohammed, which were discovered and collected after his death, and is by no means that same *law*, whose excellence Mohammed vaunted so highly. That some parts of the true Koran may be copied in the modern one, is indeed very possible; but that the Koran or Law given by Mohammed to the Arabians, is entirely distinct from the modern Alcoran, is manifest from this, that in the latter, Mohammed appeals to and extols the former, and therefore they must be two different compositions. May it not be conjectured, that the true Koran was an Arabic poem, which Mohammed recited to his followers without giving it to them in writing, ordering them only to commit it to their memory? Such were the laws of the Druids in Gaul, and such also those of the Indians, which the Bramins receive by oral tradition, and get by heart.' ‡

We shall close this article with a passage from Hallam's Middle Ages, better calculated than anything we have seen to enlighten the public mind, and correct popular misconceptions, respecting the spirit of Islamism, and the causes of its spread.

'A full explanation of the causes which contributed to the progress of Mohammedism is not perhaps at present attainable by those most conversant with this department of literature.

* Mills' History of Mohammedanism, pp. 277, 278.
‡ Mosheim's Eccles. Hist. Vol. II. pp. 154, 155, note.

But we may point out several of leading importance: in the first place, those just and elevated notions of the divine nature, and of moral duties, the gold ore that pervades the dross of the Koran, which were calculated to strike a serious and reflecting people, already perhaps disinclined, by intermixture with their Jewish and Christian fellow citizens, to the superstitions of ancient idolatry; next, the artful incorporation of tenets, usages, and traditions from the various religions that existed in Arabia; and thirdly, the extensive application of the precepts in the Koran, a book confessedly written with much elegance and purity, to all legal transactions, and all the business of life. It may be expected that I should add to these, what is commonly considered as a distinguishing mark of Mohammedanism, its indulgence to voluptuousness. But this appears to be greatly exaggerated. Although the character of its founder may have been tainted by sensuality as well as ferociousness, I do not think that he relied upon inducements of the former kind for the diffusion of his system. We are not to judge of this by rules of Christian purity, or of European practice. If polygamy was a prevailing usage in Arabia, as is not questioned, its permission gave no additional license to the proselytes of Mohammed, who will be found rather to have narrowed the unbounded liberty of Oriental manners in this respect; while his decided condemnation of adultery, and of incestuous connexions, so frequent among barbarous nations, does not argue a very lax and accommodating morality. A devout Mussulman exhibits much more of the Stoical, than the Epicurean character. Nor can any one read the Koran without being sensible that it breathes an austere and scrupulous spirit. And in fact the founder of a new religion or sect is little likely to obtain premanent success by indulging the vices and luxuries of mankind. I should rather be disposed to reckon the severity of Mohammed's discipline among the causes of its influence. Precepts of ritual observance, being always definite and unequivocal, are less likely to be neglected, after their obligation has been acknowledged, than those of moral virtue. Thus the long fasting, the pilgrimages, the regular prayers and ablutions, the constant almsgiving, the abstinence from stimulating liquors, enjoined by the Koran, created a visible standard of practice among its followers, and preserved a continual recollection of their law.

'But the prevalence of Islam, in the life-time of its prophet, and during the first ages of its existence, was chiefly owing to the spirit of martial energy that he infused into it. The religion of Mohammed is as essentially a military system, as the institution of chivalry in the west of Europe. The people of Arabia, a race

of strong passions and sanguinary temper, inured to habits of pillage and murder, found in the law of their native prophet, not a license, but a command to desolate the world, and the promise of all that their glowing imaginations could anticipate of Paradise annexed to all in which they most delighted upon earth. It is difficult for us, in the calmness of our closets, to conceive that feverish intensity of excitement to which man may be wrought, when the animal and intellectual energies of his nature converge to a point, and the buoyancy of strength and courage reciprocates the influence of moral sentiment or religious hope. The effect of this union I have formerly remarked in the Crusades; a phenomenon perfectly analogous to the early history of the Saracens. In each, one hardly knows whether most to admire the prodigious exertions of heroism, or to revolt from the ferocious bigotry that attended them. But the Crusades were a temporary effort, not thoroughly congenial to the spirit of Christendom, which, even in the darkest and most superstitious ages, was not susceptible of the solitary and over-ruling fanaticism of the Moslems. They needed no excitement from pontiffs and preachers to achieve the work to which they were called; the precept was in their law, the principle was in their hearts, the assurance of success was in their swords. O prophet, exclaimed Ali, when Mohammed, in the first years of his mission, sought among the scanty and hesitating assembly of his friends, a vizir and lieutenant in command, I am the man; whoever rises against thee, I will dash out his teeth, tear out his eyes, break his legs, rip up his belly. O prophet, I will be thy vizir over them. These words of Mohammed's early and illustrious disciple are, as it were, a text, upon which the commentary expands into the whole Saracenic history. 'They contain the vital essence of his religion, implicit faith and ferocious energy.'*

One word as to the proper orthography of the prophet's name. In the Byzantine historians it is sometimes written Maometis, from which, we suppose, was derived the old way of spelling it in English, Mahomet. This is now almost universally rejected by oriental scholars. Mills prefers Muhammed; Rammohun Roy, Mohummed; Sale, Mohammed. Mr Bush very judiciously adopts the mode last mentioned, as supported by the best authorities; and we hope his example in this respect will be followed by writers generally, if for no other reason, for uniformity's sake.

* Hallam's Middle Ages, vol. II. pp. 402–6.

ART. VI.—*Observations upon the Peloponnesus and Greek Islands, made in* 1829. By RUFUS ANDERSON, one of the Secretaries of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Boston: CROCKER & BREWSTER. 1830. 12mo. pp. 334.

THE objects which the Prudential Committee of the Board of Foreign Missions had in view, in sending Mr Anderson as a special agent to the Mediterranean, are stated to have been the two following. 'First, the missionaries to Syria, being driven from their station by the political disturbances which agitated the Turkish empire, were in the island of Malta, and the Committee were anxious to confer with them in relation to future operations in the east. Second, the Committee were desirous to know, more satisfactorily than they had the means of knowing, precisely what kind of efforts in behalf of liberated Greece were incumbent on the Board.'

The results of the agency are partly exhibited in this volume. It consists of two main divisions; the first of which is a narrative of the tour, including observations on the localities and scenery, soil and agriculture, manners and customs of Greece, and the effects of the late war upon the country; and the second is an account of its territory, population and government, state of education, and church, concluding with opinions on the proper measures to be pursued by Protestants for the benefit of the oriental churches. To those who wish for information on these subjects, without intending to go deeply into them, we can recommend this book, from a cursory perusal of it, as furnishing what they want, in an entertaining manner, a concise form, a fair and moderate spirit, and with great apparent accuracy.

Mr Anderson sailed from Boston for Malta, on the 28th of November, 1828. In a little more than twenty days he saw the opposite mountains of Europe and Africa, and on the first day of the year 1829 arrived at Malta. Here he remained till the 25th of February, and then embarked for Corfu, with the Rev. Eli Smith, a missionary of the Board, as his companion. They reached Corfu on the 3d of March, and then pursued their tour through most of the Ionian Islands, the Peloponnesus, the Western Sporades, and the Northern Cyclades. Though their object in this tour was not to measure

ruins and determine the sites of ancient cities and battle-grounds, but to institute moral and religious investigations, which they considered, and which we consider, of far greater importance, yet they show that they are not insensible to classical influences, and the details of their journey are frequently enlivened by sketches of scenery, brief accounts of the remains of antiquity, and interesting anecdotes.

As our intention is only to offer a short notice of this work, we shall proceed at once to make a few extracts from it, taken almost at random.

The travelling equipment of Mr Anderson and his friend, while on the peninsula, is thus described.

'The time from the 13th to the 25th of May we spent at Ægina, making inquiries of which the principal results will be given when I speak of the state and prospects of education in Greece. At the end of that time, having received letters to men most likely to favor our object in different parts of the Peloponnesus, and also a circular from Mr Tricoupis, Foreign Secretary of the Greek government, commending us to the provincial authorities, we entered upon our principal tour in the peninsula. Knowing the country to be almost literally destitute of houses, we had procured a cotton tent at Ægina sufficiently large to accommodate ourselves and baggage. Our interpreter had liberty to sleep in it, but he often chose to spend the night with the muleteers under the open heavens, which at this season are beautifully clear. We carried utensils for cooking, and certain articles of food, as coffee, tea, sugar, rice and ham. In addition to our interpreter, we took a man to look after our baggage, who was willing to attend us and provide his own food for four dollars a month. The animals we rode were usually mules, accoutred with a rope halter for a bridle, a pack-saddle of rude frame-work, and cord for stirrups. Throwing our capotes across the saddle and whatever else we had to render the seat tolerable, we moved on in a moderate walk, and in Indian file, with a muleteer on foot before to lead the way, and others behind to urge on the caravan. Mr Smith or myself rode first, as we found the one or the other had the freest animal, and our interpreter kept near us to perform the duties of his office. The servant saw that the baggage was neither stolen, nor lost; and it is due to his carefulness or to the honesty of the Greeks, to say, that not an article was missing at the end of the journey. When we wished to encamp, we inquired for water, grass, and a sheep-fold. Having found these, or at least the two former, our tent was pitched, our strong wooden chests were so laid as to serve for tables, and our beds spread on the ground.

Pilaf was made of the rice, and the occasional addition of an egg rendered this dish quite a luxury.* Our bread was often old and dry, and was never very white, though commonly made of wheat, and palatable. Once or twice it was made simply of barley, and then it was coarse, black and heavy. In all the Arcadian region we were generally able to obtain the milk of ewes, or goats, but we saw no cows. The shepherds frequently supplied us with a preparation they call *yogourte*. It is the *leben* mentioned by our missionaries in Syria, and is milk coagulated in a particular manner,† and soon rendered agreeable by use. Meat we could seldom get. Our diet was necessarily simple, but we fared better than we had reason to expect, and never went long hungry. Perhaps I ought to add, that we travelled in respectable style, such as gave us admission to any society we wished to enter.'—pp. 67, 68.

At Demetsana, in the province of Arcadia, the travellers had a conversation with the head-master of a school there, which has been celebrated throughout the Morea for two generations past. This conversation speaks so honorably of the liberality and judgment of both parties, that we take pleasure in quoting a portion of it. If religious conversations here at home, between those of different communions, could always be carried on after the same model, we should be glad.

'The young man wished to know the opinions of our countrymen in reference to the *procession of the Holy Ghost*, which the Greeks believe to have been from the Father only, and not from the Father and the Son. It is a point of doctrine which they magnify into great importance. We told him that it had never been a subject of controversy in our country, and that we attribute less consequence to it than the members of the Greek church do. Without pressing his inquiries on this head, he asked what creed we received. It was replied, that we assent to what is called the Apostles' creed, and to some others, but that we regard nothing as binding on our religious belief except the Bible—no acts of councils, no articles of the church, no creeds: the Bible was our only authoritative rule of faith and worship: what that contained, we felt bound to receive; what was contrary to that, we felt bound to reject.

* 'Pilaf is rice boiled with a little meat, or butter.'

† 'The monks at the convent of Megaspelæon said the *yagourte* was prepared in the following manner; viz. 1. Warm a little milk. 2. Put in a small quantity of flour and lemon juice. 3. Boil the composition. 4. Boil such a quantity of milk as is thought proper. 5. Put into it a small quantity of the previous compound, and let this new one stand twelve hours.'

'In the end, he declared himself much pleased with our explanations, as he evidently was. Some of them placed us in a more favorable light than he had expected. He said nothing to either of us about apostolical succession—made no inquiries touching the validity of our ordination—nor did he appear to feel any difficulties on that point. In fact, we never heard the subject introduced by a Greek; and my own inquiries and those of my missionary brethren in the Mediterranean led me to think, that the members of the oriental churches have not yet had their attention much awakened to it. Should it unhappily become matter of inquiry and controversy, the missions of *all* our western churches will suffer—I know not but in equal degrees.

'And here I may be allowed to say, that the cardinal point of Protestantism—that *the Scriptures are the* SUFFICIENT *and* ONLY *rule of faith and practice*—never appeared to me of such vital importance, as when among the degenerate churches of the East. And I believe he will be likely to do most good as a missionary to them, with whom this is most habitually and thoroughly, both in the letter and spirit, a practical principle. He should appeal to the word of God often and habitually, as the only infallible oracle we have access to on earth, and to other standards *only* as they tend to excite a reverence for that; for "the word of God," and nothing else, will be found "quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword."

'In the evening we went to take leave of our venerable friend, the œconomos. He and his family received us with their usual kindness, and we spent an hour in agreeable conversation. Mr King was two days in this family, and they mentioned him with expressions of high regard. The old man appeared to rejoice in the opening prospects of his country, and to desire that every part of it might be blessed with the lights of science. At parting, he invoked the blessing of God upon us, and also "that of the Virgin, if we pleased."'—pp. 108, 109.

It seems that Mr Anderson found all the common people of Greece, what the Cretians long since were declared to have been, 'always liars.' A lamentable disregard to truth was the chief fault which he discovered in them. Those whom he had occasion to employ, whatever might have been the diversities of character among them in other respects, invariably agreed in the practice of this vice.

The following is a very pleasing illustration of those passages of scripture in which Christ likens himself to a 'good shepherd.'

'Being wakeful at night, I occasionally heard noises from the hills, which our attendants said proceeded from wolves. The

watchful shepherds shouted, and the sheep probably escaped. I was forcibly reminded of the "Good Shepherd." Were the flock near our tent to be forsaken by the shepherd for a single night, it would be scattered and devoured. Just as certainly would it be so with the flock of Christ in this world.

'One of the great delights in travelling through a pastoral country, is to see and to feel the force of the beautiful imagery in the scriptures borrowed from pastoral life. All day long the shepherd attends his flock, leading them into "green pastures," near fountains of water, and he chooses a convenient place for them to "rest at noon." At night, he drives them near his tent, and if there is danger, encloses them in folds, and at the first alarm he is roused for their protection. They know him, they know his voice, they do not flee from him, they follow him. The tender lambs he often keeps at home while their dams are feeding on the mountains, lest they be wearied, or lost, or fall down the fatal steep. When travelling he tenderly watches over them, and carries such as are exhausted in his arms, or stops the flock till they are rested. Such a shepherd is the Lord Jesus Christ to his spiritual flock. Nay, far more: for he says, "I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand."'*—pp. 117, 118.

An idea of the ravages committed during the struggle between the Greeks and Turks, and also of the extent to which they have been repaired, may be gained from the succeeding extract.

'In our progress through the Peloponnesus, it was affecting to behold the extent of the *devastations occasioned by the late war.* In the province of Elis, we saw no place that had not been destroyed. In the province of Achaia, we saw only one or two,

* 'John x. 28. "Having had my attention directed last night to the words, *The sheep hear His voice, and He calleth His own sheep by name*, &c. I asked my man if it was usual in Greece to give names to the sheep. He informed me that it was, and that the sheep obeyed the shepherd when he called them by their names. This morning I had an opportunity of verifying the truth of this remark. Passing by a flock of sheep, I asked the shepherd the same question which I had put to my servant, and he gave me the same answer. I then bade him to call one of his sheep. He did so, and it instantly left its pasturage and its companions, and ran up to the hand of the shepherd with signs of pleasure, and with a prompt obedience which I had never before observed in any other animal. It is also true of the sheep in this country, that *a stranger they will not follow, but will flee from him; for they know not the voice of strangers.* The shepherd told me, that many of his sheep are still WILD; that they had not yet learned their names; but that, by teaching, they would all learn them. The others which knew their names he called TAME."—*Mr Hartley's Journal, Lond. Miss. Reg. for 1830, p. 223.*'

and those in the interior. We witnessed no exemptions from general ruin among the towns and villages of Argolis, except the walled city of Nauplion and a few towns in the southern districts. In Arcadia, the Egyptians ravaged every plain, nearly every valley and mountain, and almost every town, village and hamlet, that came in our way. Fire and sword appear also to have been carried entirely through the two provinces of Messenia; for we saw no place and heard of none that had not been laid waste, except the fortresses of Mothone and Corone: and in Upper Messenia nearly half a million of olive-trees were said to have been destroyed. In Laconia, the only place we visited that did not exhibit the direful effects of war, was the town of Marathonesi in Mane. Nearly the whole of Mane, however, appears to have escaped the rage of the enemy.

'From this rapid survey it would seem, that the flames were carried, either by Turk, Arab, or Greek, over almost the whole extent of the peninsula. Such was the fact; and the few towns and villages which survive the general ruin, are, without any prominent exceptions, either walled, or situated in remote parts of mountainous peninsulas and promontories, or in obscure recesses, or on almost inaccessible steeps.

'Little had been done towards rebuilding the towns, and a long period must elapse before the fruit-trees can be replaced. Indeed a year had not elapsed when we made our tour, since the evacuation of the country by its terrible scourge, the Egyptian army. Yet had great progress been made in the cultivation of the soil. I have aimed to give some idea of this in the preceding pages. To this species of industry the people now had strong inducements, both in the necessities of their families and the unwonted security of their possessions. The government had also extended aid to the impoverished cultivators of the soil. About the time of our entrance into Greece, the President wrote to the provincial rulers of insular, peninsular, and continental Greece, saying that he designed to appropriate 1,000,000 of francs, or about 200,000 dollars, from the French subsidy, towards providing seed, oxen, and implements of husbandry, in the way of a loan to such as had been reduced to penury by the war, and directing them to make the necessary inquiries.* Yet many must have found great difficulty in procur-

* 'At the same time the President gave encouragement that, should the treasury receive the assistance he hoped for, he would appropriate another sum to aid the inhabitants of the cities in rebuilding their houses.—Soon after he published an order, that regular plans should be observed in rebuilding the different cities.'

ing seed and the necessary aid of cattle and tools; and considering these embarrassments, and the general poverty of the people, and the smallness of their number, the progress of agriculture was to us matter of great surprise. On the western and northern maritime plains, from Navarino round to Bostitsa, we saw, indeed, but little cultivation; the plains of Corinth, Cleonæ and Nemea, of Tegea, Mantinea, Lala and Stenyclerus, and the valley of the Pamisus, were to a great extent used only for pasturage; and there were numerous other arable tracts in every part of the country, that remained yet to be subjected to the plough. Still there are few points of observation, from which the eye would not rest upon cultivated patches, and often the number of them would be great.'—pp. 138, 139.

Mr Anderson was called upon to perform an interesting ceremony, for a brother missionary, in St Nicholas, the capital of the island of Tenos.

'Here we again met with our friend Mr King, and, before our departure, I had the happiness of giving him a home in the Levant, by uniting him in marriage to a lady of congenial mind—of Grecian descent, but a native of Smyrna, where her family still resides under the protection of France. It was gratifying to observe, that there was nothing in this marriage which seemed to alarm the prejudices of the people, although Tenos is one of the most bigoted islands in the Archipelago. In the course of two or three days, nearly all the people of standing in the place, both male and female, called to express their good wishes. A Greek priest, too, a worthy man, but himself unmarried, sent a pair of doves the next day, and soon followed them with his blessing, in which he appeared to be cordial.'—p. 157.

We learn from a note on the 249th page of the volume, that 'Mr and Mrs King have collected an interesting female school in St Nicholas.' Schools for children of both sexes are greatly needed in Greece, and the government is favorably inclined to their establishment. To wrangle with the Greeks about the corruptions of their church, would, at the present time, or perhaps at any time, be the height of folly; but to instruct their poor and ignorant children in the elements of knowledge, and the pure principles of virtue and piety, is real wisdom and charity. If they can be enlightened, there is little doubt that they will discover the corruptions of their church themselves. Whatever contributes to enlighten them is a positive benefit to them. Whoever contributes to enlighten them, in any degree, is their benefactor. We believe that these opinions have not

been entertained by all the missionaries who have been among them; but from the book before us, we gather that they are substantially those of Mr Anderson and his immediate coadjutors.

Leaving the narrative of the tour, we come to the second principal division of the work; and we shall borrow one extract from the chapter in it which is devoted to the state and prospects of education. After speaking of the schools existing in the Peloponnesus and the islands, the writer gives the following description of a *Theological Institution*, which forms a part of the Ionian university, established at Corfu. The university itself owes all its importance to the munificence of the late Lord Guilford.

'A THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY within the pale of the Greek church, instituted by Greeks, and with the declared design of "raising the Greek clergy of the Ionian Islands from their present declension to that rank which shall qualify them happily to influence, by their instructions and example, the morals and manners of the people,"—is an interesting object of contemplation. I shall therefore explain the nature of the institution, so far as I am enabled to do so by authentic documents.

'The government provides for the support of thirtynine beneficiaries, to be received from the different islands in certain fixed proportions. If more are admitted, they must be supported from their own resources, or by private beneficence. The requisites for admission as beneficiaries of government, are these:—the student must be a native Ionian—must have completed the age of seventeen years—must have gone through the studies of the secondary schools—must be certified by the bishop of his island to possess a good moral character—must have no physical defect, or organic disease—must have had the small pox in the natural manner, or by inoculation, or have been vaccinated—and must belong to a respectable family. On admission, he is required to declare on oath, that, being informed of all the regulations emanating from government for the seminary, he becomes a member of the institution in order to acquire that knowledge which is necessary to the proper performance of the duties of a christian minister; and that he will obey all the laws of the seminary, will submit to his superiors, and live in fraternal amity with his fellow-students.

'The dress of the beneficiaries, and all the articles of their wardrobes and furniture, are prescribed with exact particularity. They must "wear a long black gown, and over this a black cloak of bombazette still longer, with broad sleeves, and the borders

lined with a cloth of purple color; and must gird the body above the inner gown with a sash of crimson-colored silk." The head must be covered with a black cap, and the hair be allowed to grow long, and hang about the shoulders, in the common manner of the Greek clergy. Numerous rules are also given for the conduct of the students, and some cautions are administered, which indicate a sad state of morals among the people. An exclusion from society is enjoined, that has an air of monastic rigidity, but probably it is no greater than prudence requires.

'The student ordinarily remains five years in the seminary. At the end of that time, if his age be suitable, and he has obtained the different degrees, he may receive orders as a deacon, or presbyter. If a student renounce his clerical profession, and retire from the seminary without sufficient reasons, he is required to refund the expenses incurred by the government on his account, and may be debarred from all public employments; and the remaining students are forbidden to have intercourse with him.

'The statutes define the studies of the seminary to be theology, and whatever goes to illustrate theology, together with the ecclesiastical services and ceremonies. From other sources we learned, that the summary of christian divinity, by Platon, late metropolitan of Moscow, translated into modern Greek by Coray, with some additions by the university professor of divinity, is at present used as a text-book; and we have the authority of Professor Bambas for saying, that Platon's work gives a faithful representation of the doctrines sanctioned by the highest uninspired authorities of the Greek church. The theological students may attend the various lectures of the university; and if they have a taste for music, they are instructed in that which is practised in their churches. In their vacations, they are required to be taught the theory of agriculture.

'Twice a month, on the Sabbath, the professor of sacred hermeneutics and the principal of the seminary, who is also professor of ethical theology, are expected alternately to preach a sermon before the students, adapted to the gospel of the day; and they are to discuss, and to enforce upon the attention of their pupils, all those religious virtues, which are so indispensable to the station for which the beneficiaries are intended, and all those virtues which are designed to bless man in his numerous social relations. The students, also, are to be exercised in preaching, at the discretion of their professors; morning and evening they must attend prayers in the public hall, with the principal and tutors; and frequent confession is enjoined upon them. When they have completed their studies, the general committee of education,—

say the statutes,—" being assured of their talents and morality, shall give them the preference in the nomination proposed to government of teachers and assistants of secondary and primary schools. All those, however, who may be distinguished in the exercise of pulpit eloquence, shall be appointed as preachers in the different islands; and according to the conduct of the students, the reputation they shall have acquired, and the information and evidence in possession of government, they shall be preferred in the filling of vacancies, which occur in ecclesiastical dignities."—The number of students in the Theological Seminary, in the early part of 1829, was about twenty.'—pp. 254–7.

Our limits forbid our making any extracts from the interesting chapter on the Greek Church, which closes the book. With one passage in this chapter we were somewhat forcibly struck. Mr Anderson has been stating the well known fact, that the religion of the Greeks consists very much in external observances, and that the common people are apt to hold in light estimation the christian character of Americans, when they are told that they eat meat in their fasts, and do not make the sign of the cross, nor confess to the priests, nor invoke the saints. He then adds, 'Yet must it not be understood, that the Greeks believe there is no salvation out of the pale of their church. They estimate the dignity and privileges of membership in their church very highly, but they set up no such arrogant claim as this.'

Do they not? So far we honor them. But if they did, would they be wholly unsupported by the example of Protestants, American Protestants, and at this very day and hour? Are there none among us who set up this 'arrogant claim?' Are there none who undertake to deny salvation to multitudes of their neighbours, whose faith, to say the least of it, is as honest, and whose works are as good as their own? Let them go abroad, among a strange people, bigoted like themselves, and then they may learn how it feels to be denied salvation. Poor humanity! Thus it is that rough experience must teach it, slowly and painfully. Thus it is that the blind must often be made to see, and the deaf to hear.

Whether this volume does, or does not afford a complete exposition of the views of the missionaries with regard to Greece, we are not qualified to say. We have no right to suspect that it does not. With Mr Anderson's opinions, as therein expressed, we are ready to agree, almost word by word.

We believe that it is a good work to establish schools, and to distribute school-books and the sacred scriptures among the Greeks. We believe that money spent for these and similar purposes, is much better laid out than in getting up childish processions, or fancy balls, or subscription dinners, professedly in honor of a revolution or a victory, but really for the amusement and gratification of the vulgar and the vain.

NOTE.—I cannot close a five years' connexion with this work, which, for that period, has been the object of my thoughts and cares to which all other objects have been secondary, without recording on the last page for which I shall be in any way responsible, an expression of the gratitude I feel towards those who have cooperated with me in its management. My obligations, at different periods, have been to each so signal, that to make distinctions or exceptions would be invidious. I therefore beg them, all, to accept this public testimony of my thanks.

FRANCIS JENKS.

Boston, Dec. 31, 1831.

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